At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[ljadw]

There is no proof that a rapid,single thrust occupation of Moscow was possible . The Soviet forces before Moscow were still undefeated .Tanks do not occupy a city .
There is also no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the defeat of the Red Army . Much more likely is the opposite : the defeat of the Red Army would result in the fall of Moscow .
Besides, PzGr Guderian was much too weak to be able to occupy Moscow,it would need the help of the ID of von Kluge .See the figures given by Stahel .

[PanzerModeler]

December 11th 1941.

Invading the Soviet Union was probably not a good idea, but war between the two was most likely inevitable after all. Like the prior poster mentions, there's no proof that a rapid single thrust to take Moscow was possible, and the occupation of Moscow was not a guarantee that the Red Army would stop fighting. But I don't think it was really the last nail in the coffin and I don't think the winter of 1941 was the big defeat either.

1942 started off with Rzhev, Demyansk, Kharkov, Voronezh...I can't imagine the Russians felt very confident when every major battle they fought for the first half of 42 wound up with their own hand being fed into the meat grinder. Had there been some smarter plays made, maybe the winter of 1942 and Stalingrad wouldn't have been as disastrous. Yes, the tide turned, and it was increasingly downhill for the Axis from there, but I think by then many factors were at play.

If I had to pick one point in time to say "Oh hey look, Germany just lost the war!" it would be December 11th 1941.

Declaring war on the United States sealed their fate. In that moment they opened the floodgates of Lend-Lease, daylight bombing, the closing of the mid-Atlantic gap, American mass production, etc. That one moment brought the whole team of Allies together. The British had been at war against Germany, learning and developing, since 1939, and had an advantageous position for launching attacks on Germany itself from the west. The Soviet Union had the political will and ability to absorb human casualties on a scale that none of the other Allies had, and they had the manpower reserves to accept and replace those casualties. The United States had access to raw material and to the production capacity to produce almost anything that the Allies wanted, to make it stupid fast, and to make as many as you wanted without limits.

At that point, it was only a matter of time.

[ljadw]

I have to disagree on December 11 :
War with the US was much more likely than war with the USSR .The Germans expected such a war before 1943 ,LL was already going on before December 11 , and became important only in 1943 .
And, I doubt that an active US intervention was needed to defeat the Germans ( I know that this is a sacrilege in the US ).I doubt also that an active Soviet intervention was needed to defeat the Germans ( I know that this is a sacrilege in Russia ) .
Germany planned to defeat the USSR in a short and quick campaign,because it knew/it was convinced that this was the only way to defeat the Soviets . The logical conclusion would be that Germany lost the war in the East in the Summer of 1941, but NOT that Germany lost WWII in the Summer of 1941 ,because defeat of the USSR would not result in a German victory against the US and Britain .

[mezsat2]

There is no proof that a rapid,single thrust occupation of Moscow was possible . The Soviet forces before Moscow were still undefeated .Tanks do not occupy a city .
There is also no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the defeat of the Red Army . Much more likely is the opposite : the defeat of the Red Army would result in the fall of Moscow .
Besides, PzGr Guderian was much too weak to be able to occupy Moscow,it would need the help of the ID of von Kluge .See the figures given by Stahel .

There is no proof, obviously, but it was highly likely the Ostheer could certainly have occupied Moscow in September with a focused, single thrust in August/Sep. Remember, in the good going in summer, the German army still had a great deal of mobile formations (including cavalry). It wouldn't have been just tanks marching on Moscow.

Yes, there were large Soviet forces in the Ukraine, but again, they were weak in terms of equipment, communications, and most critically, air cover and mobility. It would be difficult for them to mount a large flanking counterattack on foot with no air support. In other words, they could have been dealt with in Spring 1942.

Hell, half these men were Ukrainian and hated Stalin, anyway. Hitler could have put them in Feldgrau and they'd have probably fought like savages for him.

[ljadw]

There is no proof that a rapid,single thrust occupation of Moscow was possible . The Soviet forces before Moscow were still undefeated .Tanks do not occupy a city .
There is also no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the defeat of the Red Army . Much more likely is the opposite : the defeat of the Red Army would result in the fall of Moscow .
Besides, PzGr Guderian was much too weak to be able to occupy Moscow,it would need the help of the ID of von Kluge .See the figures given by Stahel .

There is no proof, obviously, but it was highly likely the Ostheer could certainly have occupied Moscow in September with a focused, single thrust in August/Sep. Remember, in the good going in summer, the German army still had a great deal of mobile formations (including cavalry). It wouldn't have been just tanks marching on Moscow.

Yes, there were large Soviet forces in the Ukraine, but again, they were weak in terms of equipment, communications, and most critically, air cover and mobility. It would be difficult for them to mount a large flanking counterattack on foot with no air support. In other words, they could have been dealt with in Spring 1942.

Hell, half these men were Ukrainian and hated Stalin, anyway. Hitler could have put them in Feldgrau and they'd have probably fought like savages for him.

This is starting from the old traditional POV that everything was going well for the Germans and that they needed only one last push to conquer Moscow and that the fall of Moscow would result in the fall of the USSR, but that the Bohemian corporal refused this .
The truth is that at the start of August the whole concept of Barbarossa had failed : after 6 weeks of fighting the Soviets should, following the Barbarossa planners ,be on the run and the only thing the Ostheer would have to do was to clean up the whole thing .
Reality was totally different : Barbarossa had failed and the Soviets counterattacked from Leningrad to the Black Sea, while the Ostheer was totally exhausted and forced to the defensive .
Some examples (From Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East ) :
P 316 : Combat readiness of PzGr 2 on July 29 1941 : 29% .Its number of tanks was going down from 953 on June 22 to 286 on July 29 .
39 Corps had only 40 % left .
PzGr 3 : Combat readiness 42 % (P 282 ) .
There are no figures for the ID ( which is a big shortcoming of Stahel ) , but these divisions also were very weakened .
At the end of July, the Ostheer had lost some thousand tanks,7000 trucks, 5000 personal cars,200 anti tank guns and more than 200000 men,ammunition was almost exhausted:it would take weeks to resupply the Ostheer,and the supplies would not make good the losses .
And whatever may say and still repeat the Pz Lobby : an offensive would be impossible as long as the ID wouldnot have recovered, and if the offensive was successful ( which we can discard,as Typhoon failed ) ,it would take the Germans several weeks to advance to the East,as the mobile units could advance only at the speed of the infantry .
And, than, The Soviets would always have different choices :
to defend Moscow west of the city
to give up the city and build a new defense line east of Moscow
to make from Moscow a Stalingrad avant la lettre .
And as Moscow was bigger than Stalingrad,it would take the Germans months to conquer Moscow ( IF they could ) and, the Soviets would still continue the war .
The success of Typhoon a month earlier would depend totally on the Soviets : if they suddenly raised both arms,shouting death to Stalin, the war was won :but they did it not in October/November, thus why would they do it in September .

[mezsat2]

There is no proof that a rapid,single thrust occupation of Moscow was possible . The Soviet forces before Moscow were still undefeated .Tanks do not occupy a city .
There is also no proof that the fall of Moscow would result in the defeat of the Red Army . Much more likely is the opposite : the defeat of the Red Army would result in the fall of Moscow .
Besides, PzGr Guderian was much too weak to be able to occupy Moscow,it would need the help of the ID of von Kluge .See the figures given by Stahel .

There is no proof, obviously, but it was highly likely the Ostheer could certainly have occupied Moscow in September with a focused, single thrust in August/Sep. Remember, in the good going in summer, the German army still had a great deal of mobile formations (including cavalry). It wouldn't have been just tanks marching on Moscow.

Yes, there were large Soviet forces in the Ukraine, but again, they were weak in terms of equipment, communications, and most critically, air cover and mobility. It would be difficult for them to mount a large flanking counterattack on foot with no air support. In other words, they could have been dealt with in Spring 1942.

Hell, half these men were Ukrainian and hated Stalin, anyway. Hitler could have put them in Feldgrau and they'd have probably fought like savages for him.

This is starting from the old traditional POV that everything was going well for the Germans and that they needed only one last push to conquer Moscow and that the fall of Moscow would result in the fall of the USSR, but that the Bohemian corporal refused this .
The truth is that at the start of August the whole concept of Barbarossa had failed : after 6 weeks of fighting the Soviets should, following the Barbarossa planners ,be on the run and the only thing the Ostheer would have to do was to clean up the whole thing .
Reality was totally different : Barbarossa had failed and the Soviets counterattacked from Leningrad to the Black Sea, while the Ostheer was totally exhausted and forced to the defensive .
Some examples (From Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East ) :
P 316 : Combat readiness of PzGr 2 on July 29 1941 : 29% .Its number of tanks was going down from 953 on June 22 to 286 on July 29 .
39 Corps had only 40 % left .
PzGr 3 : Combat readiness 42 % (P 282 ) .
There are no figures for the ID ( which is a big shortcoming of Stahel ) , but these divisions also were very weakened .
At the end of July, the Ostheer had lost some thousand tanks,7000 trucks, 5000 personal cars,200 anti tank guns and more than 200000 men,ammunition was almost exhausted:it would take weeks to resupply the Ostheer,and the supplies would not make good the losses .
And whatever may say and still repeat the Pz Lobby : an offensive would be impossible as long as the ID wouldnot have recovered, and if the offensive was successful ( which we can discard,as Typhoon failed ) ,it would take the Germans several weeks to advance to the East,as the mobile units could advance only at the speed of the infantry .
And, than, The Soviets would always have different choices :
to defend Moscow west of the city
to give up the city and build a new defense line east of Moscow
to make from Moscow a Stalingrad avant la lettre .
And as Moscow was bigger than Stalingrad,it would take the Germans months to conquer Moscow ( IF they could ) and, the Soviets would still continue the war .
The success of Typhoon a month earlier would depend totally on the Soviets : if they suddenly raised both arms,shouting death to Stalin, the war was won :but they did it not in October/November, thus why would they do it in September .

One look at the Soviet transportation grid in June 41 shows clearly how an all-out strike and occupation of this hub would paralyze the entire existence of the USSR. Large scale evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east (which in view of the eastern front only, doomed the Wehrmacht) would be impossible. Anything like rapid troop deployment and communications with these formations would likewise be impossible.

Yes, Stalin could have retreated to Kuibyshev with the rest of the government and ultimately all the way to Vladivostok had he seen fit, but to organize and execute an organized defense under these chaotic conditions, one must admit, would be a daunting task.

[ljadw]

The evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east was not depending on the railway stations of Moscow,besides, a lot of it was already evacuated before Moscow could be occupied .
And, the importance of the evacuation was much exaggerated by postwar Western historians,as already before 1941 a big part of the heavy industry was located east of Moscow .
The fact remains that a conquest of Moscow would take a lot of time and absorb that many forces (at least 40 divisions ) that the advance to the east would be stopped .
If Moscow was not conquered, the Germans would still be faced with a strong Soviet force in their rearguard .
Last point: the relocation of the industry to the east started already BEFORE June 1941.
And about Moscow :only a third of the factories who were going to the east in 1941( = 498 ) were located in the Moscow region,and only of them can one say that they used the Moscow railways .There is no proof that the 550 factories who were leaving Ukraine for the east were making a detour via Moscow .
The evacuation was important, but not decisive : Second Baku and Magnitogorsk existed already before the war .

[mezsat2]

The evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east was not depending on the railway stations of Moscow,besides, a lot of it was already evacuated before Moscow could be occupied .
And, the importance of the evacuation was much exaggerated by postwar Western historians,as already before 1941 a big part of the heavy industry was located east of Moscow .
The fact remains that a conquest of Moscow would take a lot of time and absorb that many forces (at least 40 divisions ) that the advance to the east would be stopped .
If Moscow was not conquered, the Germans would still be faced with a strong Soviet force in their rearguard .
Last point: the relocation of the industry to the east started already BEFORE June 1941.
And about Moscow :only a third of the factories who were going to the east in 1941( = 498 ) were located in the Moscow region,and only of them can one say that they used the Moscow railways .There is no proof that the 550 factories who were leaving Ukraine for the east were making a detour via Moscow .
The evacuation was important, but not decisive : Second Baku and Magnitogorsk existed already before the war .

The penultimate calculation here is whether the occupation of the Soviet seat of government, transportation, and a great deal of its industry would or would not outweigh the defeat of a rump mass of troops in the Ukraine. A person can make arguments either way, but I suppose the fact that things worked out as they did would lend more credence to the former. I would estimate that had the Ostheer successfully occupied Moscow before winter, they would likely be more equipped to survive an encirclement courtesy of Zhukov than they could endure later at Stalingrad. There was more loot to be had in Moscow and Luftwaffe would have been in a far better position to land reinforcements and supplies at Moscow in 1941 as opposed to Stalingrad in 42.

[ljadw]

Germany could not win its war against Britain and the USA if it had to fight a long war in the east ;a long war meaning a war that would continue after December 31 1941.
That is one of the reasons that Barbarossa was planned as a short war ( the other reason being that it was impossible to defeat the USSR in a long war ) .
The conquest of Moscow in November 1941 would not result in the collapse of the Soviet state before the Winter, but only in the horror scenario of a war in the east in 1942 .
Only the collapse of the Soviet state before the Autumn of 1941,long before the Autumn,would result in the fall of Moscow (there is a difference between fall and conquest ).
About Stalingrad : the LW has been unjustly hold responsible after the war by the army apologists,slavishly followed by Western ''historians ': there is no proof that outside the Kessel sufficient supplies were waiting for the troops in Stalingrad ,but that the LW (Goering ) was incapable to transport them . It is as much possible that the aircraft of the LW were waiting on supplies that not arrived ,because of AND transport AND production problems .Besides, every one knew that it was impossible to supply an encircled force of 250000 men by air .There were already supply problems BEFORE the encirclement .
The same would happen in the Moscow scenario : the transports to AGC were interrupted during a big part of the Winter,because of the weather and the LW could transport only what was available immediately behind the front line of AGC .

[Ружичасти Слон]

One look at the Soviet transportation grid in June 41 shows clearly how an all-out strike and occupation of this hub would paralyze the entire existence of the USSR. Large scale evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east (which in view of the eastern front only, doomed the Wehrmacht) would be impossible. Anything like rapid troop deployment and communications with these formations would likewise be impossible.

Most strange. What you was write was not be correct.

Please can you for to show what map or diagram you was make look on.

On correct map on Soviet railways anybody can to see on one look Soviet union was not be paralyze when lose Moscow.

[mezsat2]

Not paralyzed. Severely restricted. The most important factor would not have been the transportation itself, yet again, but the command and control of transportation and communications. Certainly, this is a subjective evaluation and cannot be proven one way or the other. The primary argument I'm making is that Stalin and the Stavka would have found defense of their country most difficult were it to be forced out of Moscow.

Ultimately, they would most likely have prevailed, but at the cost of several more years of war. Had Hitler not needlessly involved the United States in the conflict by continuing it's attacks on England, they would not have prevailed under any circumstances.

[ljadw]

Ultimately, they would most likely have prevailed, but at the cost of several more years of war. Had Hitler not needlessly involved the United States in the conflict by continuing it's attacks on England, they would not have prevailed under any circumstances.

This is not correct
1 The war with Britain would inevitably result in a war with the US
2 Without the war with Britain (and thus with the US ) and France,Germany would be weaker against the USSR : if there was peace with an undefeated Britain and France in June 1941, these would be stronger,and would tie much more German forces,because neutral neighbors are potential enemies .

In June 1941 some 50 German divisions and a big part of the LW were tied outside the east because Britain continued the war and were thus not available for Barbarossa .
If,in the ATL,there was no war with Britain and France,much more German divisions and aircraft would be tied outside the east .
The paradox is that without war with Britain and France the situation for Germany would be worse :France had a potential of 100 divisions in September 1939 , in the OTL it was disarmed in June 1941, in the ATL it could have 100 divisions in June 1941 .
3 Germany could not win against the USSR,because even if it won,it would be much weaker opposite Britain and France ;that's why in 1914 the East was secondary as it was in 1941 .
War with Russia in 1914 had as meaning to make a war in the West possible.
War with the SU in 1941 had as meaning to force an end on the war in the West before the intervention of the USA.

[Ружичасти Слон]

So you was change mezsat opinion from

One look at the Soviet transportation grid in June 41 shows clearly how an all-out strike and occupation of this hub would paralyze the entire existence of the USSR. Large scale evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east (which in view of the eastern front only, doomed the Wehrmacht) would be impossible. Anything like rapid troop deployment and communications with these formations would likewise be impossible.

on new mezsat opinion

Not paralyzed. Severely restricted. The most important factor would not have been the transportation itself, yet again, but the command and control of transportation and communications. Certainly, this is a subjective evaluation and cannot be proven one way or the other. The primary argument I'm making is that Stalin and the Stavka would have found defense of their country most difficult were it to be forced out of Moscow.

Ok. I was understand opinion was only mezsat opinion and mezsat subjective evaluation. But what is connection to real historys ?

For to make subjective evaluation must to have some real history evidences and datas.

Can you to give some datas or evidences for to explain mezsat evaluation ?

[Beteigeuze]

After Moscow, the Germans could not win. After Stalingrad, they could not draw. After Kursk it was a matter of time before they lost. The only serious possibility for the Germans was Moscow. Because Moscow was important not from a political point of view but mainly from a military one. All the branches of the railway ended in Moscow. The Soviets could not move an army quickly if they lost Moscow.....

After failing to take Moscow in the first winter, the eastern front was over, in the words of Hitler himself to von Mannerheim.
At some point he would be deprived of Romanian oil, and it would be 1 week if he collapsed (as he says)

[ljadw]

What Hitler told Mannerheim was nonsense : the importance of the Romanian oil for Germany was very limited .Besides, Germany was already defeated BEFORE it lost the Romanian oil .