WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#46

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Nov 2020, 20:54

Lars wrote:If The USSR is out of the war in early 1943,

The other question which is highly speculative is what condition rump-USSR is in.
* Will Stalin remain in power, will the Communists?
* My answer is probably no to the second question, and most likely no to the first.
* At least there will be a second civil war within The USSR.
* The Communist regime will be without the gain of The Ukraine and Caucasus and left with little (but expanding) oil from the Ural area.
* Coal is also a problem without the Donbas and the Moscow area mines.
* Lend-lease will stop.
* However, if USSR/Russia manages to hold together against the odds then from 1944 the Germans will have re-stock the Eastern front with assets somewhat including some Luftwaffe assets.
These are all valid points but the strategic picture would be changed to a much greater degree than addressed in your points.

The biggest issues are the MidEast and Iberia. Hitler planned to invade the MidEast through/with Turkey, including from the Caucasus. (See Halder's diary for such planning even during the preparatory stages of Barbarossa). Hitler would also have been able to force Spain's accession to Axis or to invade, which would require no more than a quarter of the OTL Ostheer. An Axis Iberia makes Tunisian logistics untenable until/unless the Allies construct massive rail infrastructure from Morocco to Tunisia.

If, as I find likely, Turkey at least allows German passage to Syria/Iraq, the W.Allied strategic position in the MidEast is untenable. As I've documented elsewhere, British and American leadership did not believe they could do much in the MidEast had Russia fallen. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=105#p2294326 viewtopic.php?f=11&t=252647&p=2296993&h ... y#p2296993

Basically they lack the ground forces and shipping logistics to hold anything and lose Abadan and Suez sooner or later. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=90#p2293853

But would the W.Allies really have allowed the Germans to overrun Levant and Mesopotamia without fighting? Or do political considerations force sending good money after bad, redirecting at least part of 8th Army against the German MidEast drive? If they do so, can they finish things in Tunisia?
Lars wrote:* If The USSR is out of the war in early 1943, the Germans will immediately send most of the Luftwaffe to the crisis in Tunisia.
* The Germans and Italians will hold out longer, but a larger Tunisgrad is still in the cards, by say, late summer 1943.
45% of LW frontline strength - 1,671 planes - was in the east in February 1943. http://www.ww2.dk/Dan%20Zamansky%20-%20The%20Study.pdf

The Germans were able to establish air superiority in Tunisia that winter with ~850 aircraft.
By the
middle of the month, the Allies knew the Germans were moving the
technologically superior Fw 190 into Bizerte, and by mid-December at
least 850 German aircraft were operating out of the all-weather airfields
in Tunisia. The Axis air forces, although nearly equal in size, would
secure air superiority over the TORCH air forces in North Africa.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019701.pdf

So moving just half of the Ost-LW to Tunisia/Sicily doubles German theater strength. From Sicily, a strengthened LW would do much to secure Axis supply lines.

Now what of Malta? OTL the island accounted for ~half of Axis ships sunk in the Tunisia campaign. Can Malta operate effectively against a massively strengthened LW? Might the Axis execute the long-delayed landing against Malta in this ATL?

If Malta is shut down and the LW maintains air superiority for a few more months, Rommel's forces will be significantly stronger. The Axis can also move shipping resources from the Black Sea, which were not insignificant.

Within a few months of Germany's MidEast move, Suez is gone and with it the W.Allies supply lines from the East. What then? Does the RN still try to operate from Libyan ports? If so, how supplied? The Sicilian narrows are still shut down (indeed they'd be more dangerous to W.Allies than OTL because the mine resources deployed OTL in the Gulf of Finnland are now added to the Axis barrage in the Sicilian straits.)

-----------------------------------------------------

And let's wind back the clock to the months prior to the OP's "early '43" fall of the SU. Obviously things are going very poorly for Russia in '42 in this ATL, so might the Axis have diverted sufficient resources to take Malta in Summer/Fall '42? If they do, then the strategic picture is obviously changed significantly. Axis has more shipping than ATL (fewer losses from Malta). Probably Rommel gets an extra division or two prior to Russia's fall, as not everything will be needed on the Eastern Front against a collapsing RKKA.

Could that mean an even larger response to Torch in November/December, with the front line falling farther west in Algeria, thereby making supply interdiction more difficult? Seems likely to me.

-----------------------------------------------------

Elsewhere I've discussed an ATL based on the SU making peace in September '42, which makes some of the above questions easier to answer. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=45#p2292747

But even with an early '43 SU defeat, Tunisgrad is impossible given Axis Iberia and Mideast, plus more secure Axis LoC to Tunisia. The Allies would have to withdraw towards Morocco in the West and hope they can bring 8th Army with them - otherwise it's stranded between Axis forces in Tunisia and the Levant/Suez. Most likely pursuit of Rommel ends as soon as the shooting starts in MidEast and Iberia.

---------------------------------------------------------
Lars wrote:* Given that the invasion of Sicily was less than perfectly executed, I can see a likely scenario where the much larger rested and refitted German elite divisions coupled with a much stronger Luftwaffe throws the Allied invasion back into the sea.
Even if we imagine that the Allies somehow clear North Africa despite the Iberia/MidEast issues, it's highly unlikely they'd even attempt a Sicily invasion. OTL they had trouble against 2-3 German divisions; ATL Germany can easily move 10x that force. More likely would be an invasion of Sardinia/Corsica.

But again, it's likely that Gibraltar and Suez are in Axis hands by mid-'43 so there's no real prospect of doing anything in the Med.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#47

Post by Richard Anderson » 17 Nov 2020, 22:40

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 20:54
45% of LW frontline strength - 1,671 planes - was in the east in February 1943. http://www.ww2.dk/Dan%20Zamansky%20-%20The%20Study.pdf

The Germans were able to establish air superiority in Tunisia that winter with ~850 aircraft.
By the
middle of the month, the Allies knew the Germans were moving the
technologically superior Fw 190 into Bizerte, and by mid-December at
least 850 German aircraft were operating out of the all-weather airfields
in Tunisia. The Axis air forces, although nearly equal in size, would
secure air superiority over the TORCH air forces in North Africa.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019701.pdf
I am sorry and mean this in the nicest way, but the good Major is talking through his hat in a most embarrassing way.

The Germans did not "establish air superiority in Tunisia that winter", they contested air superiority in Tunisia that winter, obtained local air superiority over Tunis, which they then lost in March 1943. They were able to do so, because the Allied airfields and LOC was west of the Atlas mountains...and the Allied air command was busy dicking things up trying to win the war on their own, so were more interested in dropping bombs on the harbors in Tunisia than establishing air superiority.

Nor did they do it with "`850 aircraft". The entire Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean as of 1 January 1943 was ~800 aircraft, of which 150 were in Tripolitania supporting Rommel, 140 were in Tunis and its environs, 390 were in Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily, and 120 were in Greece and the Aegean.

The "technologically superior Fw 190" they moved to Bizerte was in November, not December 1943. It was II./JG 2, which completed conversion from Bf 109 to FW 190 at Beaumont-le-Roger on 20 October 1942 and moved to San Pietro by 20 November, when they made the hop to Bizerta. On the 1st of November they had 7 A-2, 32 A-3, and still 2 Bf 109G-1/R2. During the month they received 7 more A-2/A-3, transferred out the Bf 109, and lost 28 FW 190, 9 to enemy action, 17 to operational causes, and 2 to overhaul, starting December with just 18 aircraft. In December they received 30 aircraft and lost 27, 8 to enemy action, 18 to operational causes, and 1 to overhaul, leaving them with 21 aircraft on 1 January. During the five months 1 November 1943- 1 April 1943 they averaged 23.2 aircraft on hand and as of the 1st of April they had ZERO aircraft and began converting to the Bf 109G.

By 23 February 1943, the Luftwaffe had increased in strength from 150 aircraft to about 300, of which 180 were operational. The Italians contributed another 275 (as of 29 March), with probably about the same proportion operational. The Americans had about 865 aircraft and the British another 425.
So moving just half of the Ost-LW to Tunisia/Sicily doubles German theater strength. From Sicily, a strengthened LW would do much to secure Axis supply lines.
Bases and logistics. It hampered the early Allied air effort in Tunisia, because the Germans were able to make use of the complex of airfields around Bizerta and Tunis already established by the French. However, the Germans did not have the airfield construction and logistical infrastructure comparable to the Allied, which was able to build and supply more bases in the region faster than the Germans and Italians. On 1 November 1942, the Americans had only 186 aircraft in the Middle East, all in Egypt and its environs. By the end of February it had 1,855, not quite half in Algeria-Tunisia.

BTW, Mark J. Conversino's 1988 masters thesis Airpower in Transition: The Evolution of United States Tactical Air Doctrine, 1942-1943 and Thomas J. Mayock's Air Phase of the North African Invasion, November 1942, (USAAF Study No. 105, 1944) are much better examinations of the problems encountered in Tunisia.

[EDIT - again] Sorry, I should have referenced Mayock's study No. 114, The Twelfth Air Force in the North African Winter Campaign, 11 November 1942 to the Reorganization of 18 February 1943 (1946), which is the relevant one.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#48

Post by Politician01 » 18 Nov 2020, 14:03

As @Lars and @THeMarcksPlan have noted:

The Wallies are allready invested in the Med by early 1943. I dont think that a Soviet collapse/negotiated peace even in March 1943 would make much of a difference for the Tunisian campaign, since it would take a few weeks to relocate substantial forces and the Wallies are effectively in control of the Med by this point and can block Axis shipping. Perhaps Tunisia can be prolonged by a month until early June but certainly not much longer than that.

After that the Wallies are in quite a conundrum. The LW can easily reinforce their Med forces by 1000 additonal aircraft, and an extra 20 German divisions in Sicily/Sardinia/Souther Italy. The Wallies have to attack here, because all their forces are concentrated in the Med and they would hope to keep the innitiative and they would hope to execute a landing before the Germans have time to build up their defences. If they chicken out from invading in the Med - they sure as hell would not go forward with the Normandy invasion, basically ending the war in Europe.

This would force them to invest a lot more resources into this theatre in 1943/44. Their losses would rise accordingly. If they go forward with Husky, then Sicily will not take 5 weeks but perhaps 5 months - or perhaps the Axis manages to establish a permanent defensive line around Mount Etna prolonging the campaign well into 1944.

This means Italy is still in the war by early 1944. Without a Stalingrad catastrophe, victory over the USSR and a successful defense of Sicily, it is unlikely that Mussolini would have been removed from office. This saves the Germans a lot of occupation divisions in the Balkans which OTL had to replace the Italians, it also means that the Italians inflict at least some additional damage on the Wallies, without any cost for Germany.

And now comes the conundrum for the Wallies. The Americans which didnt really want to attack in the Med would be forced to invest additional divisions and aircraft into this theatre,weakening their Normandy invasion force and their bomber force. The same applies to the British. Churchills "soft underbelly" would be a farce. Seeing their slow progress in Sicily, their rising bomber losses over Western Europe and constant pressure to invest more forces into the Pacific against the Japanese, I cant see Roosevelt winning the 1944 election, or even if he does, preventing the shift of the main American war effort towards the Pacific, thus effectively ending the war in Europe.

Oh and lets not forget the Middle - East. Because if the Germans control the Caucasus the Wallies have to reinforce this theatre with a few hundred additional tanks and aircraft and a few additional divisions, just in case. These are again force that would be missing elswhere.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#49

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Nov 2020, 17:42

politician01 wrote:The Wallies are allready invested in the Med by early 1943. I dont think that a Soviet collapse/negotiated peace even in March 1943 would make much of a difference for the Tunisian campaign, since it would take a few weeks to relocate substantial forces and the Wallies are effectively in control of the Med by this point and can block Axis shipping.
Why are the Soviets defeated in March '43 though? If everything is going as OTL, then the SU suddenly collapses, I agree with you.

But for your ATL to make any sense the SU has to be going down by the time Torch happens. If that's true, then why is the German response the same as OTL?

As I said, I mostly agree with you and this is a minor nitpick. I suppose a sudden Soviet collapse in early '43 is possible due to internal revolt and/or civil war stemming from, e.g., more serious famine (a very real outcome if Germans take/hold Kuban etc. earlier).

If it the "sudden Soviet collapse" scenario, it's still boneheaded for the Allies to invade Sicily. Germany can close off the Mediterranean by taking Iberia/Suez; the forces necessary to invade Italy would be required to prevent either of those events happening. If they commit hard to Sicily/Italy they certainly can't save Iberia and probably not Suez either, so an entire army group is stranded from sea LoC. It's a longer route to disaster than I've laid out elsewhere but it's still the predictable outcome.

There simply were no options for the Allies other than hoping the CBO would radically weaken Germany. That was the entire basis of W.Allied strategy when such strategy considered fighting Germany absent the SU. As I've laid out elsewhere, however, most Americans/British thought there wasn't much chance of beating Germany, post-SU.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#50

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Nov 2020, 18:05

Richard Anderson wrote:the good Major is talking through his hat in a most embarrassing way.
Yeah you're right about the 850 airplanes. I only used that cite because I was reading the article after Peter89's repeated promotion of it. It's not a great article.

I've noticed that the AF publishes a lot of work by mid-grade personnel seeking a degree. Some of it is not very good.

In any event, there's no dispute about whether the LW established air superiority over northern Tunisia and the Sicilian straits for the first few months of the Tunisian campaign. More LW resources would mean more aerial dominance in that period and perhaps the period's extension. Whether Germany can hold out indefinitely in Tunisia or whether it's good money after bad depends on the broader strategic picture: do the Axis control Iberia? If so, Tunisgrad is much more difficult - IMO impossible in '43.
Richard Anderson wrote:Bases and logistics. It hampered the early Allied air effort in Tunisia, because the Germans were able to make use of the complex of airfields around Bizerta and Tunis already established by the French. However, the Germans did not have the airfield construction and logistical infrastructure comparable to the Allied
That's why I specifically said LW redeployments to Sicily, not Tunisia. The point is to maintain the LoC; the LW can do so from Sicily. Knocking out Malta alone removes half of OTL shipping losses. A few more divisions and more supplies would extends Armeegruppe Afrika's life by at least several months, by which time the Ostheer will have conquered Iberia or forced Franco's acquiescence, which makes Tunisgrad impossible. That's before considering the German move into the MidEast.
Richard Anderson wrote:The problem was, by 1942 the German training program was already well on its way to implosion.
Fair but that's OTL, not necessarily ATL.

While it's true that LW leadership denuded training programs to meet short-term emergency goals, the emergencies simply aren't present if Russia is defeated or, earlier in ATL, is plainly being defeated. The stripping of training programs began with a 1942 emphasis on getting as many bomber crews as possible for the Ostheer, well before Stalingrad.

Even with hindsight it's not a bad strategy. A somewhat rational person like Jeschonnek understood that Germany stood no chance if the SU remained in the war; gambling everything on knocking it out was justified.

But the important OTL:ATL point is that such strategic desperation isn't warranted ATL. As you point out, the LW doesn't have sufficient base infrastructure in Tunisia to send all its forces there; much of the LW can relax, relatively speaking. No draw downs of training programs.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#51

Post by Politician01 » 18 Nov 2020, 19:01

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:42
Why are the Soviets defeated in March '43 though? If everything is going as OTL, then the SU suddenly collapses, I agree with you.
I imagine a scenario like this: In 1941 the main Schwerpunkt of Barbarossa remains AGC drive towards Moscow, AGS is secondary and AGN tertiary. As a result Moscow is taken in October, Stalin flees east. The fall of Moscow still doesnt knock out the USSR out of the war, but it severely weakens it in terms of production and transportation (Moscow had around 10% of the entire production capacity of the USSR and was the main transportation hub of the European part of the USSR. The psychological blow would be severe as well. Typhoon is launched a month earlier as an attempt to recapture Moscow, but because of weaker forces and worse transportation it amounts to little, wasting precious Soviet resources.

In 1942 the Germans launch an ATL Blau, capturing the remainder of the Ukraine, Army group A and B descend upon Stalingrad which is taken within 3 weeks and conquer the entire Caucasus by November 1942. This is possible because once again the Red Army would amass most of its forces East of Moscow, trying to recapture it in a gigantic offensive in October 1942. This offensive would end like the Mars offensive OTL.

The loss of Stalingrad, the Caucasus and the failure to recapture Moscow, would have stretched Soviet morale and economy to the breaking point. In a rage Stalin once again purges his Generals, the Politburo conspires against Stalin removing him from office, Beria tries to take over, Khrushchev tries to take over. Chaos or civil war breaks out, the Red Army Officer Corps is a shadow of its former self. Whoever is left, negotiates with the Germans and gives them everything west of the Urals for a cease fire.

The Germans need a few months to occupy this wast territory, so while theoretically they could send some forces West by January 1943 when the Soviets disintegration process would have started, the real flow could not have kicked in before April 1943, by which time it would have been to late. As mentioned, by February 1943 the Wallies were pretty much in control of the Med sea lanes. Sure 500 extra aircraft in Sicily/Tunisia in February would help, as would an additonal 3 or 4 German divisions (if they could be shipped and supplied) however by early 1943 Wallied superiority was so big that Tunisia was a lost cause.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:42
If it the "sudden Soviet collapse" scenario, it's still boneheaded for the Allies to invade Sicily.
Well, if they dont want to lose the innitiative and dont want to admit that they are to scared of invasion and that the war in Europe is effectively over, they will have to. They allready have substantial forces in the Med by early 43 and invading the Balkans/southern France doenst make any sense. This would be their last chance to gain a foothold on the continent, before all those Eastern divisions would be transferred West.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#52

Post by T. A. Gardner » 18 Nov 2020, 19:06

Tunisia is a lost cause for the Axis. While the date of defeat might not be certain, the loss of N. Africa is. Why?

Once the US invades Vichy French territory, they can and will build up at a rate that exceeds what Germany and Italy can put in place. This is because Germany and Italy are limited by available shipping space, convoy escorts, and naval assets. An airlift cannot replace this, not in the short term, and certainly not in the long term.

If Germany takes Vichy territory, they don't have the means to adequately defend it. The US still invades and the situation overall remains the same. Germany loses N. Africa eventually.

The British pushing from Egypt still happens so the Axis is faced with a two-front war there.

Taking the Iberian peninsula does nothing to change any of this. The US can still invade Vichy territory from the Atlantic side and now the Iberian peninsula becomes a target for aerial bombardment.

As for the LW training program: As pointed out, the LW raided training programs for transport pilots for the Norwegian campaign, then again for the invasion of France, then for the invasion of Greece / Crete, etc. This was an on-going thing that robbed the entire LW training program of any continuity. Instead of creating a pool of trained replacement pilots, doing this resulted in a near perpetual shortage of well-trained replacements. The combination of losses from using students and instructors as aircrew and the loss of training time left the LW with fewer replacements in the pipeline.

So, if the Germans determine that there's some vital need to shove more troops into N. Africa and they don't have the shipping available immediately, they might well turn to the LW, rob the training centers of students and instructors to fly transport missions to N. Africa rather than ground say, bomber units and use those crews to fly the missions.
The problem here is that Germany simply doesn't have a large enough training program to produce sufficient pilots to man all the aircraft they have available. Until that changes they are going to be forced into a position of robbing Peter to pay Paul which they were doing right from the start of the war.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#53

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Nov 2020, 19:14

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:05
Yeah you're right about the 850 airplanes. I only used that cite because I was reading the article after Peter89's repeated promotion of it. It's not a great article.
Tsk, tsk!
I've noticed that the AF publishes a lot of work by mid-grade personnel seeking a degree. Some of it is not very good.
The quality of the output from Air University students has been steadily going downhill for years. The problem seems to be the original AF studies were written by NCOs. Now they have Majors (P) writing them. :lol:
In any event, there's no dispute about whether the LW established air superiority over northern Tunisia and the Sicilian straits for the first few months of the Tunisian campaign. More LW resources would mean more aerial dominance in that period and perhaps the period's extension. Whether Germany can hold out indefinitely in Tunisia or whether it's good money after bad depends on the broader strategic picture: do the Axis control Iberia? If so, Tunisgrad is much more difficult - IMO impossible in '43.
I hate to say it, but your ATL timeline seems to be infinitely mutable, with events added and subtracted as required to meet whatever hindsight you need to respond to.
That's why I specifically said LW redeployments to Sicily, not Tunisia. The point is to maintain the LoC; the LW can do so from Sicily. Knocking out Malta alone removes half of OTL shipping losses. A few more divisions and more supplies would extends Armeegruppe Afrika's life by at least several months, by which time the Ostheer will have conquered Iberia or forced Franco's acquiescence, which makes Tunisgrad impossible. That's before considering the German move into the MidEast.
When? Again with the infinitely mutable timeline.
Fair but that's OTL, not necessarily ATL.

While it's true that LW leadership denuded training programs to meet short-term emergency goals, the emergencies simply aren't present if Russia is defeated or, earlier in ATL, is plainly being defeated. The stripping of training programs began with a 1942 emphasis on getting as many bomber crews as possible for the Ostheer, well before Stalingrad.
Sorry, but no, the training program was shambolic by the beginning of the war and could not keep up with the initial pace of operations.
Even with hindsight it's not a bad strategy. A somewhat rational person like Jeschonnek understood that Germany stood no chance if the SU remained in the war; gambling everything on knocking it out was justified.
They did gamble everything and failed.
But the important OTL:ATL point is that such strategic desperation isn't warranted ATL. As you point out, the LW doesn't have sufficient base infrastructure in Tunisia to send all its forces there; much of the LW can relax, relatively speaking. No draw downs of training programs.
The Lehrgruppen went operational at the start of the war. Raiding the schools system instructor pool for qualified pilots began in March 1940. The Ergänzungsgruppen, formed in the fall of 1940 in order to give the operational units some means of providing replacements that weren't dead meat, were disbanded in January 1942 to provide more operational units. The regionally based Ergänzungs Gruppen formed in February were periodically shoved into operational roles as well, especially the E-Jagdgruppe West. The Luftwaffe continuously was feeding off itself to sustain operations. It was not something that just began in 1942.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#54

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 Nov 2020, 19:21

Richard Anderson wrote:They did gamble everything and failed.
Obviously. Do you have a winning strategy for Germany starting from OTL 1942? There's probably no way for Germany to have won by then but we "know" that from hindsight. If you're Jeschonnek in 42, however, you could do worse than to recognize that everything depended on knocking out the SU ASAP and throwing everything on that roll of the dice. Staying focused on long-term training goals in that scenario isn't the rational play if there's any chance to beat the SU (there probably wasn't by then but, again, hindsight).
Richard Anderson wrote:When? Again with the infinitely mutable timeline.
This isn't my timeline!!!!!

In any case, you don't need to be brain genius to realize that Germany will move against Iberia and/or Mideast if Russia falls in early '43. Heck, Hitler was considering such a move OTL even without SU falling. To ignore that factor is to ignore the broader strategic picture, regardless of whose ATL you're in.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#55

Post by Peter89 » 18 Nov 2020, 20:04

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:05
I only used that cite because I was reading the article after Peter89's repeated promotion of it. It's not a great article.
The deliberate misunderstanding is that I used that source to support my claim about the intelligence edge of the Wallies in the MTO. The lack of source criticism explains a lot though.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#56

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 06:06

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 19:21
Obviously.
:lol:
Do you have a winning strategy for Germany starting from OTL 1942?
No. I've said before and I'll say again, any winning strategy for Germany needs to start much earlier in the 1930s, requires prescience on the part of the German leadership (and a different set of leaders), and a different financial climate.
There's probably no way for Germany to have won by then but we "know" that from hindsight.
Obviously.
If you're Jeschonnek in 42, however, you could do worse than to recognize that everything depended on knocking out the SU ASAP and throwing everything on that roll of the dice. Staying focused on long-term training goals in that scenario isn't the rational play if there's any chance to be
at the SU (there probably wasn't by then but, again, hindsight).
The desire to build up a showing set of neato units, without a really robust training structure to support it, is what got them into trouble...there simply weren't any rational plays by that point.
This isn't my timeline!!!!!
Sorry, there are so many competing timelines trying in ensure the Iron Dream is realized that I tend to lose track.
In any case, you don't need to be brain genius to realize that Germany will move against Iberia and/or Mideast if Russia falls in early '43. Heck, Hitler was considering such a move OTL even without SU falling. To ignore that factor is to ignore the broader strategic picture, regardless of whose ATL you're in.
I like be brain genius thank you very much. And I doubt very much Germany would hie off into other mad schemes against Iberia and/or Mideast if the Soviet Union had fallen. Why would they risk it when their "rational play" would be to attempt to knock out the UK rather than create new enemies?
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#57

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 19 Nov 2020, 08:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 22:40
... On 1 November 1942, the Americans had only 186 aircraft in the Middle East, all in Egypt and its environs. By the end of February it had 1,855, not quite half in Algeria-Tunisia. ...
I used to have some notes that showed the Allied totals across the MTO for January, and again in April or May. I can't trust my memory but it seems at the latter date the Allied strength in the operating units, and replacement/reserves were about triple the number shown above. Which is about what John Ellis gave for the full operating strength of the German air forces in January 1943. IIRC total Allied operating strength in both the UK & MTO mid 1943 was a bit north of 10,000 aircraft. 11 or 12k?

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#58

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 17:45

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 08:34
I used to have some notes that showed the Allied totals across the MTO for January, and again in April or May. I can't trust my memory but it seems at the latter date the Allied strength in the operating units, and replacement/reserves were about triple the number shown above. Which is about what John Ellis gave for the full operating strength of the German air forces in January 1943. IIRC total Allied operating strength in both the UK & MTO mid 1943 was a bit north of 10,000 aircraft. 11 or 12k?
I doubt if adding the British would triple that figure and "replacement/reserves" were aircraft, which are not much good without crews. As of 23 February 1943, the Northwest African Air Forces on hand aircraft strength, including USAAF and RAF units was (USAAF/RAF):

Northwest African Strategic AF - 410/16
Northwest African Tactical AF - 178/184
Western Desert AF - 258/98
Northwest African Coastal AF - 19/127
Total - 865/425
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#59

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Nov 2020, 00:26

Richard Anderson wrote: And I doubt very much Germany would hie off into other mad schemes against Iberia and/or Mideast if the Soviet Union had fallen. Why would they risk it when their "rational play" would be to attempt to knock out the UK rather than create new enemies?
How exactly would they knock out the UK in 1943? E-boat landing parties?

The long-term goal would be to knock out UK but a college try would take a few years of build up. In the meantime, taking Iberia and the MidEast would have been the play. That might be sufficient to knock out the UK anyway, if Hitler still has appetite for peace. We know the U.S. was thinking in terms of a pivot to Pacific had SU fallen in '42, and a focus on narrow U.S. interests rather than on those of the United Nations. Not sure that's still the case if SU falls in early '43 but could well have been. W.Allied exhaustion re Europe would have been more likely had the W.Allies fought with numerical disadvantage in Iberia/MidEast and lost an army group or two.

A sudden Soviet collapse in early '43, however, is a bit late in the game for Germany to mount a true threat to England before the A-bombs start falling.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

#60

Post by Richard Anderson » 20 Nov 2020, 00:41

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Nov 2020, 00:26
How exactly would they knock out the UK in 1943? E-boat landing parties?
Probably not, but they did spend an awful lot of the time from fall 1940 through spring 1941 building landing boats, MFP and the like, to replace the motley horde of improvisations they had built for SEELÖWE, and then continued building them through 1943, so maybe they might contemplate using them? It was enough that it caused some circles in Britain to expect an invasion in spring 1941, rather than the madness of assailing a putative ally.
The long-term goal would be to knock out UK but a college try would take a few years of build up. In the meantime, taking Iberia and the MidEast would have been the play.
But Germany and Hitler were already dealing with Spain as an Ally and doing so quite happily. Why would they suddenly change? Knocking out the USSR might make Franco more amenable to a more direct alliance, but why would Hitler wwant to attack Spaain?
That might be sufficient to knock out the UK anyway, if Hitler still has appetite for peace. We know the U.S. was thinking in terms of a pivot to Pacific had SU fallen in '42,
I love how everyone always focuses on Ike's butthurt in spring-summer 1942. Yes, blackest day and all that, but he got over it rather quickly.
and a focus on narrow U.S. interests rather than on those of the United Nations. Not sure that's still the case if SU falls in early '43 but could well have been. W.Allied exhaustion re Europe would have been more likely had the W.Allies fought with numerical disadvantage in Iberia/MidEast and lost an army group or two.
Um, the Western Allies were at great pains not to invade or antagonize Franco, so why would they fight to exhaustion in Iberia? Again, why would Hitler invade Iberia?
A sudden Soviet collapse in early '43, however, is a bit late in the game for Germany to mount a true threat to England before the A-bombs start falling.
Now its a "sudden...collapse" in 1943. Why? Yet again the whole timeline seems murky.
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