Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

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stg 44
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#46

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 18:05

Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 17:05
stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 02:43
That's a problem given that Richard provided a source that by the 17th 52nd division was replacing scratch units of rear area personnel on the front lines around Triprath given the lack of infantry to hold the line. So even if 43rd was on the line at that time, which we're not sure they were, they could well get overrun quickly and 43rd units behind the lines are hit before they have a chance to form up, since the distances to the vital areas were so short.
From 'Tank Tracks' by Peter Beale

"The 9th [Royal Tank Regiment] moved slowly through Belgium and Holland and reached the Dutch mining town of Brunssum on 3rd December. After a few days there the battalion moved forward into Germany, passing through the town of Geilenkirchen to take up positions in the villages of Hockheide, Bauchem, Rischden, Niedenheide and Gilrath in support of 43 Div.
On 10 December the CO attended an O group at 214 Brigade at which 43rd Division Operation 'Shears' was outlined, whereby the enemy divisions west of the River Roer between Roermond and Geilenkirchen were to be destroyed. 34 Tank Brigade with 43rd Division were to do the break-out and 52nd Division with 8 Armoured Brigade and Guards Armoured Division the mopping-up. 9 RTR tanks in support of 214 Brigade were to complete the first phase of the break-out.
Following heavy and continual rain the ground provided poor tank going and frequent reports showed no improvement. Nevertheless, thousands of air photos and maps were issued and every plan was complete when the news came that the operation was cancelled.
The battalion remained in position with its role unchanged.
On 16 December news was received of the German counter-offensive against the American First Army front, attacking with the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies"

So 43rd Division, with probably two brigades 'up', was in the line on the 16th, they had a lot of tank support, the locations and layout of the enemy in front of them were well known and the 'going' off road was poor for vehicles.
That quote doesn't actually show that the 43rd had its brigades 'up' on the 16th. All it says is that 'the battalion' (9th RTR was a glorified battalion?) remained in position and its role unchanged. If anything 52nd division's detached brigade was on line to replace the 43rd division as they were swapped out on the 17th and the detached brigade, the 157th light brigade, was probably the first one on the line since it was already present with the departing division on the 15th of December. So from the 15th-16th the 43rd filtered off the line and started being replaced by the 52nd division as it filtered in in parts. That means on the 16th things were near peak vulnerability to an attack as the 43rd division was mostly off the line by then and replaced at that point only by 1 light brigade of a division that wouldn't arrive until the morning of the 17th. Though the 9th RTR was just west of Geilskirchen as part of 34th Armoured Brigade with the GAD east of them.

Also in terms of the weather on the 16th it was apparently frozen ground by then with the mud a problem until the 3rd week of December. Due to the lower ground pressure of German tanks they had little problem traversing even snowy ground that British tanks had issue with (same with the US Shermans):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M4_Sherman#Mobility
Comparative testing with the second generation wide-tracked German tanks (Panther and Tiger) conducted by the Germans at their Kummersdorf testing facility, as well as by the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, proved otherwise; partly from their use of the characteristic Schachtellaufwerk interleaved and overlapped roadwheels (as used on pre-war origin German halftrack vehicles), especially over muddy or other unfavorable terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson M. Hawkins of the 2nd Armored Division wrote the following comparing the U.S. M4 Sherman and German Panther in a report to Allied headquarters:

It has been claimed that our tank is the more maneuverable. In recent tests we put a captured German Mark V [Panther] against all models of our own. The German tank was the faster, both across country and on the highway and could make sharper turns. It was also the better hill climber.[112]

This was backed up in an interview with Technical Sergeant Willard D. May of the 2nd Armored Division who commented: "I have taken instructions on the Mark V [Panther] and have found, first, it is easily as maneuverable as the Sherman; second the flotation exceeds that of the Sherman."[112]

Staff Sergeant and tank platoon sergeant Charles A. Carden completes the comparison in his report:

The Mark V [Panther] and VI [Tiger] in my opinion have more maneuverability and certainly more flotation. I have seen in many cases where the Mark V and VI tanks could maneuver nicely over ground where the M4 would bog down. On one occasion I saw at least 10 Royal Tigers [Tiger II] make a counterattack against us over ground that for us was nearly impassable.[112]

U.S. crews found that on soft ground, such as mud or snow, the narrow tracks gave poor (i.e., high) ground pressure compared to the Panther and Tiger. The U.S. Army issued extended end connectors ("duckbills") to add width to the standard tracks as a stopgap solution. Duckbills began to reach front-line tank battalions in fall 1944, but were original factory equipment for the heavy M4A3E2 Jumbo to compensate for the extra weight of armor. The M4A3(76)W HVSS Shermans and other late models with wider-tracked suspensions corrected these problems, but formed only a small proportion of the tanks in service even in 1945.
Problem for the Comet as well:
https://www.baiv.nl/comett335227/#:~:te ... 0kg%2Fcm2).
Ground Pressure: 13.85 lbs/inch2 (0,974 kg/cm2).
http://www.panther1944.de/index.php/en/ ... hnik/kette
Ground pressure::
0,88 kp/cm² Ausf. D and A

0,89 kp/cm² Ausf. G and F
And even Churchill tank to some degree:
http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... ntry-tank-
Ground pressure 13.1
For the conversion:
https://www.inchcalculator.com/convert/ ... 703.068836.
13 psi 9,140 kgf/m²
13.1 then is a bit more. Not that much more than the Panther, but every bit is significant in those ground conditions.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#47

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 18:20

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:00
Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 17:05
From 'Tank Tracks' by Peter Beale
Good catch and bad on me, I forgot to look at the tank brigades and only focused on the armoured brigades. 31 Tank Brigade was another 4,224 and 150+ tanks. 6th Guards Tank Brigade another 3,611 and 150+ tanks, and 34 Tank Brigade another 3,086 and 150+ tanks were under command XII Corps at this time, although 31 TB was nominally attached to 79 Armoured Division.
31st AB was not present in the area on the 16th.

Neither was 6th Guards Armoured:
https://sites.google.com/site/6thguards ... thebrigade
Between October and January the Brigade fought in Holland particularly in Tilburg, Overloon, Venraij and Meijel.


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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#48

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Nov 2020, 18:40

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:05
So from the 15th-16th the 43rd filtered off the line and started being replaced by the 52nd division as it filtered in in parts. That means on the 16th things were near peak vulnerability to an attack as the 43rd division was mostly off the line by then and replaced at that point only by 1 light brigade of a division that wouldn't arrive until the morning of the 17th.
There is no evidence of 43rd Division 'filtering' from the line on the 15th and 16th. From http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/w ... _tripsrath and already quoted by you "On the 16th December Worcesters were ordered to send a recce party to Aalbeek, no one ever knew quite why. The party was recalled almost before it arrived there and was dispatched on the following day (17th December) to Tilburg. Private Thomas Scully (now moved to �D� Company with Captain Percy Huxter) remembers being a member of this Recce Party to Tilburg where he arranged billets in the local house of Hobbemastraat and Jozef Isra�lsstraat, for 16, 17 and 18 Platoon of �D� Company. He learnt to use the following Dutch phrase �Wilt U geven biljets voor soldaten, hoeveel� translated meant �Will you provide billets for soldiers, how many�.

It was not generally known until long afterwards that the object of this move was to allow the Worcestershire Battalion a period of special training prior to committing it as part of the force to make the assault on the Siegfried Line on 9th January 1945. The Recce Party procured billets in Tilburg and the Battalion moved off from Brunssum to occupy them at 09.00 hours on the 18th December."

That 30 Corps then 12 Corps sector was very strong on the 16th December 1944, two armoured divisions, two infantry divisions, two AGRAs, one armoured brigade, one tank brigade.
So roughly 900 tanks, 400-500 artillery pieces and 400-500 anti-tank guns on a what, 25km front?

Within a few days of course 12 Corps strength would be roughly halved.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#49

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 18:43

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:05
That quote doesn't actually show that the 43rd had its brigades 'up' on the 16th.
So now, after having been there since November 1944, the 43 Division suddenly disappears into the sunset on 16 December. This is getting ludicrous.
All it says is that 'the battalion' (9th RTR was a glorified battalion?) remained in position and its role unchanged.
You have no clue what you're babbling about. It was the 9th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment.
If anything 52nd division's detached brigade was on line to replace the 43rd division as they were swapped out on the 17th and the detached brigade, the 157th light brigade, was probably the first one on the line since it was already present with the departing division on the 15th of December.
What is the "157th light brigade"? 157 Infantry Brigade of 52 (Lowland) Infantry Division, was attached to 43 (Wessex) Division on 11 December 1944 to begin the relief in place. It returned to command of 52 Division on 16 December 1944. It consisted of the 5th Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry, the 6th Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, The Glasgow Highlanders.
So from the 15th-16th the 43rd filtered off the line and started being replaced by the 52nd division as it filtered in in parts.
Dear Lord, give me strength. FM 3-90, "A relief in place is a tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit." Known in the British Army as a RPOL, a Rearward Passage of Lines. See Army Doctrinal Publication Land Operations, Para. 8-73. I would try to dig out the contemporary reference in the FSR, but at this point it is becoming clear that it would be better to simply place you on ignore, since you appear impervious to both references and good sense.
Also in terms of the weather on the 16th it was apparently frozen ground by then with the mud a problem until the 3rd week of December.
Oh dear God. The temperature average on 16 December 1944 at Aachen was 46 degrees. At Mönchengladbach it was 44. The minimums were 39 and 38 respectively.

(snip irrelevancies about tanks based on an ignorant assumption about the weather in the region on 16 December 1944)
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#50

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 18:49

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:20
31st AB was not present in the area on the 16th.

Neither was 6th Guards Armoured:
It was under command XII Corps, as was 9th RTR. Tanks move. They have tracks and engines.

Sentence removed Andy H
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#51

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 19:17

Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:40
There is no evidence of 43rd Division 'filtering' from the line on the 15th and 16th.
The 12th AG situation maps from the 12th-17th show them moving off the line.
Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:40
From http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/w ... _tripsrath and already quoted by you "On the 16th December Worcesters were ordered to send a recce party to Aalbeek, no one ever knew quite why. The party was recalled almost before it arrived there and was dispatched on the following day (17th December) to Tilburg. Private Thomas Scully (now moved to �D� Company with Captain Percy Huxter) remembers being a member of this Recce Party to Tilburg where he arranged billets in the local house of Hobbemastraat and Jozef Isra�lsstraat, for 16, 17 and 18 Platoon of �D� Company. He learnt to use the following Dutch phrase �Wilt U geven biljets voor soldaten, hoeveel� translated meant �Will you provide billets for soldiers, how many�.

It was not generally known until long afterwards that the object of this move was to allow the Worcestershire Battalion a period of special training prior to committing it as part of the force to make the assault on the Siegfried Line on 9th January 1945. The Recce Party procured billets in Tilburg and the Battalion moved off from Brunssum to occupy them at 09.00 hours on the 18th December."
That is about the Worcestershire regiment, which was off the line as of December 16th:
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/T ... d_Time.php
On the 6th December 1944 the Worcesters were relieved by 4th Wiltshires and, preceded by the usual recce party (the Second-in-Command, all Company seconds-in-commands, and representatives of all specialist platoons) crept back down the village streets. Unfortunately a 17-pounder anti-tank gun took the wrong turning at the church leaving Birgden and drove towards Schierwaldenrath, which was still in enemy hands. It ran into a minefield, blew itself and its crew sky-high causing an almighty explosion. The Worcesters eventually arrived once more at Brunssum at 23.30 hours and debussed at the air-raid shelters of the coalmine.

On the following morning (7th December) the 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. Vickers, inspected the troops' quarters and ordered that civilian billets be found forthwith. This was achieved with little trouble or delay, the men once more enjoyed the warm welcome of the Dutch folk.

During this period of inactivity Field-Marshal Montgomery ordered 30 Corps to make plans to clear the enemy from the a three-cornered area bounded by Roermond in the north, Sittard in the south and the River Roer to the east. This area later became know as the Sittard-Roermond Triangle. This operation was given the codename 'Shear'. This operation would then allow for the destruction of the enemy west of the Rhine.
So they were in reserve and planning, not on the line. Brunssum is southeast of Sittard, which itself was behind the front lines.
Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:40
That 30 Corps then 12 Corps sector was very strong on the 16th December 1944, two armoured divisions, two infantry divisions, two AGRAs, one armoured brigade, one tank brigade.
So roughly 900 tanks, 400-500 artillery pieces and 400-500 anti-tank guns on a what, 25km front?

Within a few days of course 12 Corps strength would be roughly halved.
XXX corps was in the process of moving into the Canadian sector around Nijmegen for Op. Vertiable. The HQ was in Stein on the Meuse with 52nd division and XII corps during its phased move. Nominally the 12 corps section was strong, but the 43d division was largely off the line, same with 52nd division and both infantry divisions were in the process of administrative reorganization and movement behind the lines to exchange positions.
The primary formations holding a more than 15 miles long front were two armored divisions, at least one of which was overstretched holding 7 miles of front by itself. Yes the 9th AGRA was behind the lines supporting them, but it was the only corps level artillery group east of the Meuse that has been identified so far and was blinded by the weather since it did not have high ground to observe from nor could it fly artillery spotting aircraft. It had to rely on telephone lines hopefully not cut in artillery duels.

5th AGRA was west of the Meuse with 53rd division and largely unable to participate in events other than harass the flank along the Meuse which would probably be held by 2/3rds of the 173rd VG division and not particularly relevant to the offensive.

8th Armoured Brigade was off the line too by this point, replaced by the 34th Armoured around Geilskirchen, but other than that armoured brigade there is no evidence that any others were on line at that point or able to rapidly intervene on the 16th.

So all the nominal numbers you listed are inaccurate to say the least and don't account for the mess of movements of units behind the lines from the 15th-17th that happened historically that would leave units unable to rapidly respond to a surprise armored offensive, nor the front line on the morning of the 16th particularly well prepared to stop them long enough for reserves to figure out what is going on, move to the front, and deploy in enough time and space in peace to do so effectively. Besides infantry divisions aren't necessarily well set up to counterattack armored breakthroughs. Since the majority of British armor east of the Meuse would already be on line on the 16th they wouldn't have much left on the 16th to launch counterattacks with against penetrations. Plus per the info we've seen presented here so far there wasn't a lot of preparation for defensive action on a corps scale and with cross communications set up with neighboring American corps. Historically the American 84th division were was by the 183rd VG division launching a night infiltration attack that took until about noon on the 16th to clear up with the full commitment of its artillery and thus far we haven't seen any info that the British were set up to rapidly request help from the American 7AD either if GAD got in trouble, since it's reserve would be the 43rd division.

Let's say for the sake of argument though that the GAD is deployed around Geilskirchen and linked up with the 84th division on the right flank, 1 light brigade from the 52nd division and 1 regular inf brigade from the 43rd are holding the line between Sittard and Geilskirchen with the 34rd Tank Brigade in support. No AGRA's in the area to support them and it's unclear whether they could call on any US corps level artillery to help. They'd be facing 3 German armored/panzer grenadier divisions of II SS Panzer Corps, mostly rebuilt, who would have enough space to deploy all 3 of their divisions from Gangelt to the Wurm river. 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions and 3rd Panzergrenadier division, plus corps artillery and likely the 183rd VG division tying down the US 84th division on the flank east of the Wurm river.

Meanwhile to their west the 7AD is on line by itself with 9th AGRA in support and 2/3rds of the 52nd division at Stein about 10km behind them. Facing them would be XII SS (Panzer in this scenario) corps, which in this scenario likely has it's own corps artillery, 173rd VG division, 2nd SS Panzer, 9th Panzer, and 15th PzGren division. They are flanked by the 53rd division with the 5th AGRA across the Meuse to the Northwest, but holding an extended line by itself and at best able to pin part of the 173rd to the river. They too have enough room to deploy all 3 mobile divisions on line from the Meuse through Sittard to the flank of II SS Panzer corps at Gangelt. Effectively they'd have 3 mechanized divisions against 7AD and either the 1 light brigade of the 52nd attached to the 43rd division or one of the 43rd's infantry brigades that was online.

The British were quite good by this point in the war, but they have their human limits and strategic surprise would be a big problem to overcome when outnumbered.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#52

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 19:23

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:49
stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:20
31st AB was not present in the area on the 16th.

Neither was 6th Guards Armoured:
It was under command XII Corps, as was 9th RTR. Tanks move. They have tracks and engines.
So where exactly was the 31st AB on December 16th? I can find no reference to them east of the Meuse by this date.

9RTR was with 34th AB west of Geilskirchen.

Sentence and quote removed Andy H

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#53

Post by Andy H » 19 Nov 2020, 19:37

Hi

Some interesting detail coming forth and makes for interesting reading.

However, please argue the 'facts' and not the person.
Those reading this can make up there own minds, without remarks and retorts of a personal nature adding to the brew.

Regards

Andy H

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#54

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 21:31

Andy H wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 19:37
Some interesting detail coming forth and makes for interesting reading.

However, please argue the 'facts' and not the person.
Those reading this can make up there own minds, without remarks and retorts of a personal nature adding to the brew.
Sorry Andy, but mulish, ignorant obstinacy drives me crazy. Such as the continued denial that the 43 (Wessex) Division, in the line west of Geilenkirchen from the end of CLIPPER until 17 December when it was relieved by 52 (Lowland) Division, was incapable of conducting a defense of its area, or was somehow, for some unexplained reason "out of the line".

Or the silly business about 34 Tank Brigade - it was not 34 Armoured Brigade until 2 February 1945. The 9th RTR War Diary clearly indicates, among other things:

"As the month [November] drew to an end, it became clear that the Regiment would definitely not be the guests of Roosendaal for Xmas. On 26 November all courses were cancelled and by the 29th the Squadrons were lined up in the Wildert area ready for the transporters which were to take the Regiment to XXX Corps area, established on the left flank of the 9th U.S. Army.

By 1 December half the journey to XXX Corps had been completed and once again the Battalion were in Belgium, receiving the traditional Flemish hospitality.

The wheel column spent one night at Opglabeek about fifteen miles north-west of Maastricht. It was believed that a couple of days would be spent there awaiting the arrival of the tanks which were travelling on transporters via Brussels, but orders were received that the journey would continue the following night. This was to ease the traffic problems over the American bridge that was now carrying all traffic west due to the other bridges further north being destroyed by the rising river.

The tank column remained at Waterscheide and finally followed 24 hours later, also travelling by night over minor roads which in no way corresponded with those shown on the map. Though no tanks were lost, there were a number of stragglers who had thrown tracks on the bad, narrow roads.

By midday 8 December, however, the Regiment had concentrated in Brunssum under 34 Tank Brigade, which now formed the nucleus of XXX Corps reserve, which was to be prepared to take up defensive positions on the right flank to hold bank any enemy penetrations down the Wurm Valley – the Corps front being held by 43 Division on the right with 8 Armoured Brigade under command and the Guards Armoured Division on the left.

The first few days passed without any excitement, though each day new billeting arrangements were made due to the constant changing of Regimental areas. This discomfort was, however, in part compensated for by being able to indulge in the luxury of hot baths and shower made available at a nearby pit-head.

This was also a favourable opportunity to put the finishing touches to the formation of the “Qui s’y Frotte” Association, which had been formed to provide help and give assistance to next-of-kin of members of the regiment who are killed in action, and the first copies of the Regimental newsletter were circulated.

147 RAC relieved a regiment of the 8 Armoured Brigade [under command XII Corps] after a couple of days and on the eighth the Battalion moved forward into Germany to take their place, while 156 Brigade [52 Division] came under command 43 Division and relieved 129 Brigade.

The German villages had been badly damaged and one remembered the Normandy villages of the past. The mud was thick, which necessitated a universal issue of gumboots and as the change-over took place the tanks nosed their way into damaged houses and prepared positions. Reconstruction of living was necessary – cellars and houses were made habitable and in the forward areas the most common sign of life was a thin trail of smoke rising from a rusty pipe that protruded from a cellar.

At the same time that the Regiment took over from 147 RAC, 156 Brigade, which had come under command 43 Division, relieved 129 Brigade. A Squadron moved two troops into Hockheide 873667 in support of 6 Cameronians, and held two troops in reserve at Bauchem 8564. B Squadron also had two troops forward in Rischden 8666 in support of 4/5 RSF with the remainder of the Squadron at Neiderheide 8665. C Squadron remained in reserve in the Headquarters area which had been established in Gillrath 828662.

The front remained quiet though there was a certain amount of activity in preparation for future operations.

During this lull further experiments were carried out with REME concerning the device to be fitted to Churchills for clearing paths through Schu minefields in order to assist the infantry in attack against prepared positions. On 9 December a demonstration was given attended by the Division Commander and was considered successful. Though various experiments had been carried out the device finally approved consisted of a steel bar at the end of which were welded steel plates drilled so that they could be attached to the edge of the hollycone drawbar. On the bar were threaded two sets of manganese track plates separated by a distance piece.

Each set of plates had the spuds facing forward and consisted of a total of seven plates, the sixth being specially adapted by welding to its spud three carrier universal track plates. The wheel guides of the carrier track plates acted as combs on the ground and as the plates were welded so that on the side of the tank track itself there was an overlap of four inches it was possible to clear two lanes approximately 5 feet in width with an uncleared gap in the centre of approximately 1 foot.

On December 10th, the CO attended an “O” Group at 214 Brigade, 43 Division. Operation “Shears” was outlined whereby the enemy divisions disposed west of the River Roer between Roermond K 7990 and Gilenkerchen K 8664 were to be destroyed. 34 Tank Brigade with 43 Division were to do the break-out and 52 Division with 8 Armoured Brigade and Guards Armoured Division the mopping up. 9 R Tanks in support 214 Brigade were to complete the first phase of the break-out.

Following heavy and continual rain the ground provided poor tank going and frequent reports showed no improvements. Nevertheless, thousands of air photos and maps were issued and every plan was complete when the news came that the operation was cancelled.

The Regiment remained in its position with its role unchanged. On December 16th news was received of the German counter-offensive against the American First Army front, attacking with the 6th and 5th Panzer Armies."
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#55

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 22:00

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 19:23
So where exactly was the 31st AB on December 16th? I can find no reference to them east of the Meuse by this date.
Don't really care. 31 Tank Brigade - it was not 31 Armoured Brigade until 2 February 1945 - was a specialist unit equipped with flamethrowing tanks as of 16 December, with 141st RAC and 1st FF Yeo, which were assembled in reserve, preparing for SHEARS.
9RTR was with 34th AB west of Geilskirchen.
Yes, 9th RTR was with 214 Brigade, 43 Division, 147th RAC was with 156 Brigade, 52 Division. 107th RAC was with 43 Division as well, apparently remaining in 43 Division reserve at Brunssom.

GEILENKIRCHEN. Could you at least make an effort to spell it correctly?
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#56

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 22:33

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:00
stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 19:23
So where exactly was the 31st AB on December 16th? I can find no reference to them east of the Meuse by this date.
Don't really care. 31 Tank Brigade - it was not 31 Armoured Brigade until 2 February 1945 - was a specialist unit equipped with flamethrowing tanks as of 16 December, with 141st RAC and 1st FF Yeo, which were assembled in reserve, preparing for SHEARS.
Shears was cancelled on the 12th of December, so they couldn't be assembled in reserve and be preparing for it; they'd be more likely moving north to get ready for Veritable, the operation decided on instead and which 43rd and later Guards Armoured would be moving for as well.

So you really should care if you're going to be making the positive claim it was available for action near Sittard on the 16th.
Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:00
9RTR was with 34th AB west of Geilskirchen.
Yes, 9th RTR was with 214 Brigade, 43 Division, 147th RAC was with 156 Brigade, 52 Division. 107th RAC was with 43 Division as well, apparently remaining in 43 Division reserve at Brunssom.
Source?

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#57

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 22:40

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:33
Shears was cancelled on the 12th of December, so they couldn't be assembled in reserve and be preparing for it; they'd be more likely moving north to get ready for Veritable, the operation decided on instead and which 43rd and later Guards Armoured would be moving for as well.
What part of "did not move" are you having difficulty understanding?
So you really should care if you're going to be making the positive claim it was available for action near Sittard on the 16th.
Since I said no such thing, I'm not sure why I should care.
Source?
Just what I said. 9th RTR War Diary.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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stg 44
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#58

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 22:54

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:43
stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:05
That quote doesn't actually show that the 43rd had its brigades 'up' on the 16th.
So now, after having been there since November 1944, the 43 Division suddenly disappears into the sunset on 16 December. This is getting ludicrous.
You're getting downright silly with your strawmanning since you lack and actual argument against what I said. The 43rd moved into reserve to prepare to move over the Meuse on the 17th and for the 52nd division to take over the area on the 17th. Shockingly that would mean it removed most of its infantry front the line to prepare for the move at and most had a single brigade on line on the 16th, with the other being the 157th light brigade of the 52nd division.
Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:43
If anything 52nd division's detached brigade was on line to replace the 43rd division as they were swapped out on the 17th and the detached brigade, the 157th light brigade, was probably the first one on the line since it was already present with the departing division on the 15th of December.
What is the "157th light brigade"? 157 Infantry Brigade of 52 (Lowland) Infantry Division, was attached to 43 (Wessex) Division on 11 December 1944 to begin the relief in place. It returned to command of 52 Division on 16 December 1944. It consisted of the 5th Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry, the 6th Battalion, The Highland Light Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, The Glasgow Highlanders.
http://highlandlightinfantry.org.uk/world-war-two/

A brigade organized to be light infantry rather than a standard infantry brigade, as it was trained in both mountain warfare and as an air-landing brigade.

Since the 52nd division only showed up in the area where the 157th was on the 17th, they are shown on the 12th AG map as detached until the 17th.
Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:43
So from the 15th-16th the 43rd filtered off the line and started being replaced by the 52nd division as it filtered in in parts.
Dear Lord, give me strength. FM 3-90, "A relief in place is a tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit." Known in the British Army as a RPOL, a Rearward Passage of Lines. See Army Doctrinal Publication Land Operations, Para. 8-73. I would try to dig out the contemporary reference in the FSR, but at this point it is becoming clear that it would be better to simply place you on ignore, since you appear impervious to both references and good sense.
You're quoting US manuals for starters. Also why do you think your reply is in any way relevant to what actually happened in this specific situation? Manuals aren't perfectly adhered to by everyone in all situations. Plus as we know from earlier quotes part of the line was being held by cooks and rear area support personnel that the 52nd only relieved on the 17th, per your own provided source. That doesn't really indicate that the 43rd division left the majority of its infantry on line.
https://www.lawlerbrown.com/page-18.html
The German's Ardennes Offensive began on the 16 December and on the 17th the Battalion moved to Gillrath just three miles north of Geilenkirchen and now within the frontiers of the Reich (the first battalion of The Royal Scots on German soil). The 52nd Lowland Division was now positioned to the south of the Heinsberg salient which had to be held to prevent an 'Ardennes type' of assault which could threaten the British Second Army. The Battalion had been hurriedly moved forward to take over this sector of the line manned by a make-shift battalion of troops formed from drivers, cooks and administrative personnel.
Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 18:43
Also in terms of the weather on the 16th it was apparently frozen ground by then with the mud a problem until the 3rd week of December.
Oh dear God. The temperature average on 16 December 1944 at Aachen was 46 degrees. At Mönchengladbach it was 44. The minimums were 39 and 38 respectively.
Source? Also Aachen is a fair bit south of the areas we are talking about plus you also have to factor in time of day and temperatures at say 4:30am vs. noon.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#59

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 22:56

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:40
stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:33
Shears was cancelled on the 12th of December, so they couldn't be assembled in reserve and be preparing for it; they'd be more likely moving north to get ready for Veritable, the operation decided on instead and which 43rd and later Guards Armoured would be moving for as well.
What part of "did not move" are you having difficulty understanding?
What part of 'source your claims' did you have difficulty understanding?

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:40
So you really should care if you're going to be making the positive claim it was available for action near Sittard on the 16th.
Since I said no such thing, I'm not sure why I should care.
You claimed it was in reserve behind the front line preparing for Shears. So you should care that you're making yourself look increasingly foolish.

Richard Anderson wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:40
Source?
Just what I said. 9th RTR War Diary.
Did you have a stroke? The 9th RTR was with the 34th tank brigade, not the 31st.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#60

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 23:10

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 22:54
You're getting downright silly with your strawmanning since you lack and actual argument against what I said. The 43rd moved into reserve to prepare to move over the Meuse on the 17th and for the 52nd division to take over the area on the 17th. Shockingly that would mean it removed most of its infantry front the line to prepare for the move at and most had a single brigade on line on the 16th, with the other being the 157th light brigade of the 52nd division.
You still have no clue what a RIP/TOA or a RPOL is, do you?
A brigade organized to be light infantry rather than a standard infantry brigade, as it was trained in both mountain warfare and as an air-landing brigade.
OH dear God! The Brigade was not "light". The designations of various battalions as "light" are holdover designations from when they were organized as "light" infantry in the Napoleonic wars.
Since the 52nd division only showed up in the area where the 157th was on the 17th, they are shown on the 12th AG map as detached until the 17th.
Babbling again. It was trained and organized first as a mountain division and then as an airportable division, but never deployed as such.
You're quoting US manuals for starters.
No I did not.

(snip further denial of reality)
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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