80% Of German Equipment & Manpower Was On The Eastern Front

[Yuri]

As can be seen from the report of the 147th Flakabteilung (see page 7, highlighted in blue rectangle), the 2nd battery burned the localities Kololowskij, Lobatsch (in the sketch, the error instead of Lobatsch is written Wobatsch), Sentschin (in the sketch, the error Ssenschin). Unfortunately, it is not specified how many shells were used up by 88 mm guns 3500 or 6000.

[Yuri]

The General situation (on 22.8.43) in the area of Amwrossijevka at the time of occupation of the combat position of the 2nd battery of the 147th Abteilung (not mobile according to the Zamansky's method).

Sketch from the explanation of the commander of the 2nd battery (sketch made 26.8.43) about the reasons for the loss of half of the battery in Amwrossijevka.

[Yuri]

The personnel of 2./FlakAbt.147 (v) gave written explanations to the investigator. From these explanations (battery Chef Oberleutnant Bundscherer, Wachmeister Große, Unter-offiziere Notzen and other) it follows that in the battle for Amwrossijewka, this battery operated under the control of light Abteilung 775 (commander Hauptmann Böhmke). There is no information about the fate of batteries of lei.FlakAbt.775 in the explanations. However, the study of the following document of the 15.FlakDiv.(mot.) allows us to assume with highly likely probability the results of the battle for Amwrossijewka for the guns and personnel of the Hauptmann Böhmke's Abteilung.

Gem.FlakAbt.147(v): “on the March in Zaporozhye”
Lei.FlakAbt.775 (v): “The equipment (material part) is smashed to pieces, the personnel is broken (scattered), in the process of collecting”

I believe that this and other documents listed above allow us to point out the main drawback of the Zamansky method, which It uses to study the German Luftwaffe Flak: Zamansky either doesn't know, doesn't understand, or ignores that the difference between anti-aircraft artillery of the German Luftwaffe "in the East" and in the "expanded territory of the Reich" such as the difference between Heaven and Earth.
The numbers in Zamansky's work are useful (for me at least), but the conclusions based only on these numbers are false.

[krimsonglass51]

Of note to the general contention endorsed by Putin - that the West didn't want a big land war, was happy to have the Russians do it instead - is the virtual halt of increases in spending on Army Ground Forces in 1Q/2Q 1943:



By that time it was clear the SU would survive and could do most of the bleeding/killing. 1943 would be the deadliest battlefield year for the SU.

So is there an alternate explanation for that halt in spending, or did the American brass actually ease up on spending because they knew the Soviets would survive?

As I wrote earlier, just as it was in the Pacific where the Americans decided the war there, it was the Soviets that decided the war in Europe. The Western Allies shortened the length of the conflict, which in turn reduced the death toll especially for the Soviets.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Of note to the general contention endorsed by Putin - that the West didn't want a big land war, was happy to have the Russians do it instead - is the virtual halt of increases in spending on Army Ground Forces in 1Q/2Q 1943:



By that time it was clear the SU would survive and could do most of the bleeding/killing. 1943 would be the deadliest battlefield year for the SU.

So is there an alternate explanation for that halt in spending, or did the American brass actually ease up on spending because they knew the Soviets would survive?

As I wrote earlier, just as it was in the Pacific where the Americans decided the war there, it was the Soviets that decided the war in Europe. The Western Allies shortened the length of the conflict, which in turn reduced the death toll especially for the Soviets.

There was no real "Plan B" - the Soviets had to survive or Germany couldn't have been beat - at least not by conventional means. I've discussed/documented that the W.Allies so believed here: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=252647

Prior to Stalingrad there was extreme worry within the US Army that failure to land in France ASAP would cause Soviet collapse. My point in the quoted reply goes more to the urgency of fielding forces for large-scale land warfare.

The W.Allies were essential to Soviet victory, IMO, they didn't merely accelerate it. They diverted around half of German production and a significant share of manpower. Give to Ostheer all the forces fighting or lost in the Med during 1943, plus those guarding Western Europe, and Germany can at least stalemate the SU during '43. It can probably hold the Donets basin etc., which has important implications for Soviet industrial and manpower strength (by '43 SU was relying on conscripts from liberated territory to fill its ranks). Plus the thousands of flak barrels and millions of shells aimed at the CBO instead of RKKA. Add in Lend Lease...

Russia couldn't have beat Germany alone but we in the West were happy for her to bleed mostly alone.

[Art]

So is there an alternate explanation for that halt in spending, or did the American brass actually ease up on spending because they knew the Soviets would survive?

As a US publication says:

The progress of the war on the Russian front and the prospective air bombardment over the European continent still left uncertain, at the end of 1942, the Army's ultimate size as well as the number of combat divisions necessary to win the war. It was also still difficult to predict with exactitude the casualty rates to be expected or the reserve strength that would be needed.

Postponement of the plan to launch a major cross-Channel operation in 1943 made the need of mobilizing a large U.S. ground army less immediate. Instead, greater emphasis was placed on first developing U.S. air power. Given this and anticipated limitations in shipping, it appeared at the end of 1942 that the projected deployment of a huge air force overseas by the end of 1944 would definitely restrict the number of divisions that could be sent overseas by that time. It was clearly undesirable to withdraw men from industry and agriculture too long before they could actually be employed in military operations. Allowing a year to train a division, the mobilization of much more than a hundred divisions by the end of 1943 appeared to be premature. In late 1942, moreover, materiel procurement plans for the armed services for 1943, particularly for the Army ground program, were revised downward by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a War Production Board recommendation. All these limiting factors pointed to the need for scaling down previous long-range calculations, as well as for effecting economies in manpower within the Army. [6]

[6] For a discussion of the late 1942 factors influencing Army troop
basis calculations see Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and
Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington 1947), pp. 214-17.

https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_15.htm

The reference ("The Organization of Ground Combat Troops:) says that the army procurement program was downsized in October 1942 but without mush discussion about the reason.

[Yuri]

The palm of the mobility championship, if there were such a thing, should be given to the 15th Anti-Aircraft Division (mot.). In August 1942, this anti-aircraft division operated in the Caucasus together with the 1st Tank Army. 12 August 1942, an order was received to proceed to Stalingrad to work together with the 4th Tank Army (48th Tank Corps and 4th Army Corps). In three days, the division, consisting of two anti-aircraft regiments (five FlakAbteilungs in total), marched 700 kilometers from the Caucasus to Stalingrad and from August 15 to October 18 operated in the Stalingrad area. The amount of mileage for the period of operations in the area of Stalingrad (that is, from mid-August to mid-October 1942) is not specified. However, we know that the 9th FlakDivision (which operated together with Paulus ' 6th Army) had a mileage of approximately 1,000 km per gun in October. Therefore, we can reasonably assume that the 15th anti-aircraft Division will have a similar mileage, that is, 1000 kilometers per gun. Thus, for two months from mid-August to mid-October, a mileage of guns of the 15th FlakDivision will be 700 +1000 + 1000 +700 = 3 400 kilometers in 64 days or almost 53 kilometers in a day.

But that's not all. On November 19, the Red Army launches Operation Uranus and the 15th Anti-aircraft Division is again ordered to move to Stalingrad, where it takes part in Operation Winter Storm

[krimsonglass51]

Yuri, I'll have to admit that raw data and talk about logistics flies over my head. Based on your research, you're arguing that the majority of the Luftwaffe's anti-aircraft crews were on the Eastern Front from 1941-1943 right? If so, was there any point that the Western Allied bombing campaigns diverted a significant amount of that away?

[Yuri]

Yuri, I'll have to admit that raw data and talk about logistics flies over my head. Based on your research, you're arguing that the majority of the Luftwaffe's anti-aircraft crews were on the Eastern Front from 1941-1943 right? If so, was there any point that the Western Allied bombing campaigns diverted a significant amount of that away?

I sight your question (#39 25 Sep 2020, 23:56) and wanted to answer a little later, however, given you are asking the question again, i decided to answer now briefly and then in more detail.

In 1943, all those people from Flak personnel of the German Luftwaffe who could be operating "in the East" were in this "East". We have shown above that in the Luftwaffe Flak divisions located in "the expanded territory of the Reich", only 25% of the personnel were from the Luftwaffe, and 75% were non-Luftwaffe personnel. However, these 25% belonging to the Luftwaffe personnel could not be sent to the "East": these are people from the category of v-Flak-Personnel. v-Flak-Personnel are either veterans of the 1st (Imperialist) World War (that is, people who are not suitable for action in the field army due to old age) or people who are not suitable for service in the field army for health reasons: chronic diseases, with an mutilation /without a hand, without an eye, etc./, or wounded on healing. Division commanders of the Luftwaffe tried to detain some healthy personnel in their divisions, but the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Goering, issued this very-very strict (terrible) order, The so-called "Spieß order".

If I understand correctly - "Spieß" is the slang nickname of a Feldwebel (sergeant major). I think it would be more correct if Goering's order is translated by native German speakers. I will only briefly say that Goering demands that if he says that it is necessary to allocate the best people, then it means that it is necessary to allocate the" Best " - young, healthy and without a criminal record. If his - Goering's- order is not carried out, then he -Goering- give away of the division commanders on trial. As follows from the testimony of prisoners of war, have been replaced: with "East" for "expanded territory of Reich" loss old and sick, and with the "expanded territory of Reich" to "the East" arrived young and healthy people.

To counter strategic bombers (that is, against aircraft bombarding the "expanded territory of the Reich"), resources were used that could not be used "in the East". As paradoxical as it may seem, but from "the East " strategic bombers did not distract any a crumb of Flak-forces of the German Luftwaffe.
However, this does not mean that strategic bombing did not help the Red Army in its struggle against the European invaders. This assistance was more substantial than simply diverting the anti-aircraft forces of the German Luftwaffe.

[Jan-Hendrik]

'Spieß' is the Kompaniefeldwebel, the highest NCO within a unit.

Jan-Hendrik

[Yuri]

In the Zamansky's work the losses of anti-aircraft guns for 1944 were left without research.
Meanwhile, 1944 is a special year for the anti-aircraft artillery of the German Luftwaffe:
- the number of strategic air raids increases;
- the production of 88 mm Flak reaches a maximum - 6772 guns.
And at the same time, the losses of strategic bombers decreased. Why?
The answer is simple. Because “Ten of the Stalin strikes” wiped out the anti-aircraft forces of the German Luftwaffe in powder.
In one 1944 year, the number (4560) of destroyed 88 mm Flak guns exceeded the total number (4548) destroyed in the previous four and a half years of the war (from 01.091939 to 31.12.1943).
It is important that in the first eight months of 1944, the number of lost 88 mm anti-aircraft guns exceeded their output.
a) January-Feb:
- Leningrad: 2nd and 6th Anti-Aircraft Divisions.
b) January-March
- Zhytomir-Rovno-Kamenets-Podolsk: 10th Anti-Aircraft Division;
- Korsun-Uman-Botoshany: 17th Anti-Aircraft Division
c) February-April
– Nikopol-Odessa: 15th Anti-Aircraft Division;
d) May
- Crimea: 9th Anti-Aircraft Division;
e) June-July
- "Bagration" (Belarus-Lithuania): 12th, 18th and 23th Anti-Aircraft Divisions;
f) August
– Moldova-Romania: new 15th, 5th and remnants 9th Anti-Aircraft Divisions;
g) September-October
-Yugoslavia: 19th and 20th (former Africans) Anti-Aircraft Divisions;
- Arctic (Northern Finland and Norway).
Nine from above-mentioned anti-aircraft divisions are motorized divisions and, as can be seen from the reports, the losses of vehicles and other equipment are enormous.

[Jan-Hendrik]

Nine from above-mentioned anti-aircraft divisions are motorized divisions and, as can be seen from the reports, the losses of vehicles and other equipment are enormous.

Do you have any loss reports for 1944 for those Divisions?

Jan-Hendrik

[krimsonglass51]

To counter strategic bombers (that is, against aircraft bombarding the "expanded territory of the Reich"), resources were used that could not be used "in the East". As paradoxical as it may seem, but from "the East " strategic bombers did not distract any a crumb of Flak-forces of the German Luftwaffe.
However, this does not mean that strategic bombing did not help the Red Army in its struggle against the European invaders. This assistance was more substantial than simply diverting the anti-aircraft forces of the German Luftwaffe.

So how did Allied strategic bombing help the Soviets?
According to David Glantz:

In addition to its ground combat contribution, the Allies conducted a major strategic bombing campaign against Germany (which the Soviets could not mount) and in 1944 drew against themselves the bulk of German operational and tactical airpower. The strategic bombing campaign did significant damage to German industrial targets, struck hard at the well-being and morale of the German civil population, and sucked into its vortex and destroyed a large part of the German fighter force, which had earlier been used effectively in a ground role in the East. Although airpower did not prove to be a war winning weapon, and German industrial mobilization and weapons production peaked in late 1944, the air campaign seriously hindered the German war effort. Equally disastrous for the Germans were the losses of tactical fighters in that campaign and in combat in France in 1944. So devastating were these losses that after mid-1944 the German air force was no longer a factor on the Eastern Front.

Does that seem about right?

[TheMarcksPlan]

To counter strategic bombers (that is, against aircraft bombarding the "expanded territory of the Reich"), resources were used that could not be used "in the East". As paradoxical as it may seem, but from "the East " strategic bombers did not distract any a crumb of Flak-forces of the German Luftwaffe.
However, this does not mean that strategic bombing did not help the Red Army in its struggle against the European invaders. This assistance was more substantial than simply diverting the anti-aircraft forces of the German Luftwaffe.

So how did Allied strategic bombing help the Soviets?
According to David Glantz:

In addition to its ground combat contribution, the Allies conducted a major strategic bombing campaign against Germany (which the Soviets could not mount) and in 1944 drew against themselves the bulk of German operational and tactical airpower. The strategic bombing campaign did significant damage to German industrial targets, struck hard at the well-being and morale of the German civil population, and sucked into its vortex and destroyed a large part of the German fighter force, which had earlier been used effectively in a ground role in the East. Although airpower did not prove to be a war winning weapon, and German industrial mobilization and weapons production peaked in late 1944, the air campaign seriously hindered the German war effort. Equally disastrous for the Germans were the losses of tactical fighters in that campaign and in combat in France in 1944. So devastating were these losses that after mid-1944 the German air force was no longer a factor on the Eastern Front.

Does that seem about right?

For a good argument on the effect of W.Allied strat bombing, see How the War was Won by O'Brien. He overstates his case and makes some significant analytical errors, nonetheless it's a good book full of good data and analysis.

Glantz's analysis here is superficial. It wasn't so much the air forces sucked westward, rather the labor and other economic resources devoted to air and sea warfare that otherwise would have been to put into producing more land weapons.

[Sean Oliver]

Any Russian complaints about a lack of W.Allied effort against Hitler is laughable anyway, because of Stalin's shameless appeasement and assistance given to Hitler, which backfired with near fatal consequences for Russia. Stalin's intention was that once Hitler got into a major war with the West, Soviet economic aid would keep Nazi Germany in the war for as long as necessary to destroy 'capitalism', and the Red Army would waltz into Europe and claim it all for Moscow. Trouble was, Hitler was an even more unscrupulous liar than Stalin. Ever notice how 80 years of Russian historiography still describes Barbarossa as a 'betrayal', as if the two regimes were natural allies against the West?