Manstein's castling in January 1944

[Juan G. C.]

In late December 1943 and early January 1944, at the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, Field Marshal von Manstein, Commander of Army Group South, wanted to abandon the Dnieper bend and the Crimea in his right flank to pull back and shorten the front and with the liberated units mount a strong counteroffensive in his left flank. Doing so, he hoped to repeat his successful castling maneuver of March 1943. But Hitler forbade any withdrawal. What would have happened if Manstein had been allowed to do what he wanted?

[History Learner]

In late December 1943 and early January 1944, at the start of the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive, Field Marshal von Manstein, Commander of Army Group South, wanted to abandon the Dnieper bend and the Crimea in his right flank to pull back and shorten the front and with the liberated units mount a strong counteroffensive in his left flank. Doing so, he hoped to repeat his successful castling maneuver of March 1943. But Hitler forbade any withdrawal. What would have happened if Manstein had been allowed to do what he wanted?

Soviets were pretty overstretched and exhausted by this time, while the units in Crimea and the like were comparatively in much better shape. The German pullback though would likely telegraph something is afoot, and the muddy conditions were pretty terrible for both sides logistically.

[Juan G. C.]

Soviets were pretty overstretched and exhausted by this time, while the units in Crimea and the like were comparatively in much better shape. The German pullback though would likely telegraph something is afoot, and the muddy conditions were pretty terrible for both sides logistically.

Then what would have been the result? Could the germans have stopped the Soviet offensive?

[History Learner]

Soviets were pretty overstretched and exhausted by this time, while the units in Crimea and the like were comparatively in much better shape. The German pullback though would likely telegraph something is afoot, and the muddy conditions were pretty terrible for both sides logistically.

Then what would have been the result? Could the germans have stopped the Soviet offensive?

Given the success of the Germans and Romanians in repulsing the first Soviet offensive in April of 1944, I wouldn't be surprised if the Germans pull off a victory to be honest. Might be sufficient to derail Soviet operational tempo in 1944, although I doubt the Germans could re-gain the strategic initiative the same way Manstein was able to achieve with Third Kharkov.

[Cult Icon]

What were the forces that were to be freed up?

The "backhand blow" involved the 4th Panzer Army, 1st Panzer Army attacking in unison..

There were numerous armored counterattacks up north, the largest in Nov-Dec 1943 with the 48th Panzer Korps's results greatly limited by restricted terrain conditions (forested regions).

[Juan G. C.]

What were the forces that were to be freed up?

The "backhand blow" involved the 4th Panzer Army, 1st Panzer Army attacking in unison..

There were numerous armored counterattacks up north, the largest in Nov-Dec 1943 with the 48th Panzer Korps's results greatly limited by restricted terrain conditions (forested regions).

Withdrawing from the Crimea would have freed the 17th Army, which on April 1944 had five german and six romanian divisions, around 200,000 soldiers, 3,600 artillery weapons and 200 thanks, according to the german Wikipedia. I do not know if it had more or less on January 1944. Withdrawing from the Dnieper bend would have shortened the front by 900 kilometres, I do not know how many divisions would that have freed.

It seems that Manstein intended to use 4th Panzer Army (which was already in his left wing) and 1st Panzer Army for the counterattack, he had ordered the later to pull back from the front and move to the north between the 4th Panzer Army and 8th Army in preparation.

[Cult Icon]

estimate how many infantry can be freed?

[Juan G. C.]

estimate how many infantry can be freed?

I confess that I do not know how to do the estimate.

[Cult Icon]

The infantry strengths of Army Group South were very low at this period with only the fresh divisions (eg. 16.Pz) being strong. Unlike in March 1943 the Soviets were not at their culmination point and were launching continuous offensive with strong forces.

The assault units earmarked for Zhitomir-Berdichev- the christmas eve offensive- would have to be drawn into the defense against an Axis counteroffensive. So the attack would have to occur prior to Dec 24 .

The chronic problem in AGS was their inability to encircle sizable soviet units and inflict serious defeats on them. Their Pz units like the 48.PzK (the strongest formation of AGS) could penetrate into the depths but they did not have the infantry to consolidate. So the Soviet forces just pulled out of the potential pockets. Same thing for the massed Panzer counterattacks of Waltraut and Winterreise, and Vatutin. What they could do however, was inflict heavy tank losses and temporarily disable Soviet armored units, which were then quickly refilled and back to strength much faster than the German ones.

So any counteroffensive by AGS would by nature need to have a lot of fresh infantry units available to seal off the pockets. The condition of AGS's infantry units was that they were heavily reliant on their armor, artillery, and support weapons to keep their thin infantry line in place. The actual ability of their divisions (outside of fresh units) to make big attacks was limited.

[Juan G. C.]

The infantry strengths of Army Group South were very low at this period with only the fresh divisions (eg. 16.Pz) being strong. Unlike in March 1943 the Soviets were not at their culmination point and were launching continuous offensive with strong forces.

The assault units earmarked for Zhitomir-Berdichev- the christmas eve offensive- would have to be drawn into the defense against an Axis counteroffensive. So the attack would have to occur prior to Dec 24 .

I was thinking in the withdrawal being allowed around December 27, once launched the Soviet Zhitomir–Berdichev Offensive.

The chronic problem in AGS was their inability to encircle sizable soviet units and inflict serious defeats on them. Their Pz units like the 48.PzK (the strongest formation of AGS) could penetrate into the depths but they did not have the infantry to consolidate. So the Soviet forces just pulled out of the potential pockets. Same thing for the massed Panzer counterattacks of Waltraut and Winterreise, and Vatutin. What they could do however, was inflict heavy tank losses and temporarily disable Soviet armored units, which were then quickly refilled and back to strength much faster than the German ones.

So any counteroffensive by AGS would by nature need to have a lot of fresh infantry units available to seal off the pockets. The condition of AGS's infantry units was that they were heavily reliant on their armor, artillery, and support weapons to keep their thin infantry line in place. The actual ability of their divisions (outside of fresh units) to make big attacks was limited.

I have checked it and at least the five german divisions which would have been freed by abandoning the Crimea were infantry divisions (50th, 73rd, 98th, 111th and 336th). As I am ignorant about these matters I do not know if they are enough or too few. I suppose that abandoning the Dnieper bend would have freed some more, but I do not know how many.

[Juan G. C.]

Could then the counteroffensive have succeeded? According to Frieser's The Eastern Front 1943-1944, Manstein "wanted to move the point of concentration from the right to the left wing of his army group in order to remedy the situation by means of offensive defence, that is, counter-blows in the open flanks of the Soviet attacking forces." Could the front have been stabilized on a line from, say, Nikolayev on the mouth of the Bug up to the outskirts of Kiev?

[Cult Icon]

For tactical/operational understanding I recommend this out of print series plus the unit histories/memoirs of involved units. Too bad the price is very bad now. The mapbooks are essential. Unfortunately the super threads on the Ukraine 43-44 are now lost due the closing of ACG forums. Those threads were filled with german /soviet documents, maps, and statistical data that the books don't have. Hell's Gate by Nash and Korsun by Zetterling are also very helpful and easily available.

https://www.amazon.com/Zhitomir-Berdich ... 731&sr=8-2

[Juan G. C.]

How many infantry divisions would have been necessary for the counteroffensive to succeed?

[Cult Icon]

How many infantry divisions would have been necessary for the counteroffensive to succeed?

This is hard to say as what was going on was that the majority of the divisions were not capable of serious attacks due to weak infantry strengths. There were even remnants of divisions merged together and reorganized into several Korps-Abteilung to increase front line strength.

I believe that a counteroffensive would AT LEAST have to be as strong as the "backhand blow". The entire southern wing would have to be activated for the attack. The crisis with the German forces at this time was their weak reinforcement rate in terms of personnel. The Western armies were being developed and the Eastern were being starved by a Fuhrer Order, making things crisis prone as the Axis position deteriorated. IIRC in Sept or Oct Manstein's divisions averaged the equivalent of one infantry battalion each. Then it slowly regained a bit by the end of 43' prior to the Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive.

Overall I have doubts if any reversal of the scale of the Backhand blow was possible as at the basic level it was very difficult for the Army Group South to reverse the attrition of their forces. In 1942 there was a major counterattack up North by the 11th Army IIRC which encircled the 2nd Shock Army. This involved four corps- a very big counterattack by Axis standards. There were many major counterattacks by two panzer korps in 43-45, their potential effects were limited. Not enough mass.

[Juan G. C.]

This is hard to say as what was going on was that the majority of the divisions were not capable of serious attacks due to weak infantry strengths. There were even remnants of divisions merged together and reorganized into several Korps-Abteilung to increase front line strength.

I believe that a counteroffensive would AT LEAST have to be as strong as the "backhand blow". The entire southern wing would have to be activated for the attack. The crisis with the German forces at this time was their weak reinforcement rate in terms of personnel. The Western armies were being developed and the Eastern were being starved by a Fuhrer Order, making things crisis prone as the Axis position deteriorated. IIRC in Sept or Oct Manstein's divisions averaged the equivalent of one infantry battalion each. Then it slowly regained a bit by the end of 43' prior to the Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive.

Overall I have doubts if any reversal of the scale of the Backhand blow was possible as at the basic level it was very difficult for the Army Group South to reverse the attrition of their forces. In 1942 there was a major counterattack up North by the 11th Army IIRC which encircled the 2nd Shock Army. This involved four corps- a very big counterattack by Axis standards. There were many major counterattacks by two panzer korps in 43-45, their potential effects were limited. Not enough mass.

Thank you very much. How could the entire southern wing be activated for the attack? I mean, part of it would have to hold the new front, wouldn't it?

I think the counteroffensive could have counted on the whole 1st and 4th Panzer armies (at least 21 infantry divisions and 7 Panzer divisions) and some units from the 6th, 8th and 17th armies (at least 5 infantry divisions).

I think that Manstein did not believe either that a success like that of the Third Battle of Kharkov was posible. I think his objectives were 1st to stop the Soviet Offensive and 2nd to regain some territory in order to stabilize the front on a more or less straight line from the mouth of the River Bug up to, say, Ovruch or Malyn. Was that doable?