Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

[KDF33]

In this regard, TMP's timeline is correct: the Germans had to eliminate the Soviet Union by the late summer of 1942.

Why?

[Peter89]

In this regard, TMP's timeline is correct: the Germans had to eliminate the Soviet Union by the late summer of 1942.

Why?

Because the potential benefits coming out of it will not change much if the Eastern front drags on.

[KDF33]

Because the potential benefits coming out of it will not change much if the Eastern front drags on.

Past a certain point, certainly.

I still see the Germans reaping major benefits if they remove the Soviets as a significant factor by 1943.

[ljadw]

In this regard, TMP's timeline is correct: the Germans had to eliminate the Soviet Union by the late summer of 1942.

You mean the late Summer of 1941 ,of course .

[ljadw]

The Soviets were incapable of absorbing such losses. Between 1.5.1942 and 1.8.1942, the strength of the Red Army fell from 11,218,122 to 10,401,553 men, a reduction of 816,569, or 7% of their total strength. The only reason why they more-or-less maintained their strength in-theater over the summer is because they allocated the entirety of their 10 reserve armies, as well as miscellaneous units drawn from other areas, including inactive Caucasus districts and the Fronts facing

I see a typo : it must be : the Soviets were CAPABLE of absorbing such losses ,because
May 1 1942 :Operational Forces :5677915,Stavka Reserve :218276,Inoperational Forces :5040440 Total :10936631

November 1 1941:Operational Forces :6605498,Stavka Reserve :202965, Inoperational Forces :3800620 Total :10609083
Between May and November the strength of the Operational Forces was going up by 920000 men.An increase of 16 % .
The Soviets had in May 9325 tanks, 31000 guns, 66000 mortars and 15000 aircraft
They had in November 13800 tanks,46000 guns, 109000 mortars and 19800 aircraft .
They were stronger in November than in May .
To pick up a period of 3 months to argue that the Red Army could not absorb its losses ,can be considered as looking for a period to'' prove '' that the Red Army can not absorb its losses .

[KDF33]

I see a typo : it must be : the Soviets were CAPABLE of absorbing such losses ,because
May 1 1942 :Operational Forces :5677915,Stavka Reserve :218276,Inoperational Forces :5040440 Total :10936631

November 1 1941:Operational Forces :6605498,Stavka Reserve :202965, Inoperational Forces :3800620 Total :10609083
Between May and November the strength of the Operational Forces was going up by 920000 men.An increase of 16 % .
The Soviets had in May 9325 tanks, 31000 guns, 66000 mortars and 15000 aircraft
They had in November 13800 tanks,46000 guns, 109000 mortars and 19800 aircraft .
They were stronger in November than in May .
To pick up a period of 3 months to argue that the Red Army could not absorb its losses ,can be considered as looking for a period to'' prove '' that the Red Army can not absorb its losses .

No. My point is that the Soviets couldn't absorb losses at the level of the May-July period, which they didn't.

They recovered in October - November, at a time when combat was at a low ebb on the Eastern Front.

By the way, the data you show for November still shows a decline in Soviet personnel of 327,548 men.

[Peter89]

Because the potential benefits coming out of it will not change much if the Eastern front drags on.

Past a certain point, certainly.

I still see the Germans reaping major benefits if they remove the Soviets as a significant factor by 1943.

By 1943 the Japanese lost the initiative, the US shipbuilding program started to pour out capitals, the Axis was confined into Europe and Germany bled white in the SU.

The intelligence and technological gap widened and the Battle of the Atlantic was won by the Wallies.

If the war with the SU drags on and further German resources are lost there, the chance that the Germans eliminate the British with the extra resources from the SU shrinks to 0.

To imply that the Germans would somehow defeat the Soviets and sustain moderate casualties is not realistic. It is much more likely that an early victory against the SU would mean higher German losses compared to the OTL.

Also, the major benefits of the SU is very much questionable. What the Germans lost in the invasion of the SU - both in actual losses and the loss of trade - was never compensated by any benefits they reaped from there. The cause of this was the Red Army, which didn't let the Germans to stroll into a continent-sized country.

To think that "coal, oil, grain, manganese, etc." was right there for taking, is wrong. First the Germans had to defeat the Soviets, rebuild the damaged infrastructure and integrate the new resources into their war machine. Then of course the new sites have to be protected and the supply lines secured. If the Red Army was strong, if there was partisan activity, if the new sites required serious protection and the infrastructure is badly damaged, the whole operation makes no sense.

[ljadw]

I see a typo : it must be : the Soviets were CAPABLE of absorbing such losses ,because
May 1 1942 :Operational Forces :5677915,Stavka Reserve :218276,Inoperational Forces :5040440 Total :10936631

November 1 1941:Operational Forces :6605498,Stavka Reserve :202965, Inoperational Forces :3800620 Total :10609083
Between May and November the strength of the Operational Forces was going up by 920000 men.An increase of 16 % .
The Soviets had in May 9325 tanks, 31000 guns, 66000 mortars and 15000 aircraft
They had in November 13800 tanks,46000 guns, 109000 mortars and 19800 aircraft .
They were stronger in November than in May .
To pick up a period of 3 months to argue that the Red Army could not absorb its losses ,can be considered as looking for a period to'' prove '' that the Red Army can not absorb its losses .

No. My point is that the Soviets couldn't absorb losses at the level of the May-July period, which they didn't.

They recovered in October - November, at a time when combat was at a low ebb on the Eastern Front.

By the way, the data you show for November still shows a decline in Soviet personnel of 327,548 men.

The decline of 327,548 was caused by a decline of the inoperational forces,while the operational forces were going up .

[ljadw]

And this decline was NOT caused by big losses, because the losses of the 2nd quarter of 1942 (May, June, July ) were the lowest since the beginning of the war .
From Krivosheev

1942
1st quarter 1,854,772
2nd quarter 1,549,545
3rd quarter 2,507,557
4th quarter 1,457,404
Other point Blau started at June 28,not in May.
As the big losses were not the cause of the decline, one must search for other reasons .
Reasons as : less men called up, more men (from the inoperational forces ) discharged to work in the industry/agriculture .

[per70]

There were ten, and I'd like to see some evidence that they were concentrated around Moscow. I remember seeing a map on this forum that showed they were deployed in an arc going from the Volkhov Front to Stalingrad. At the vert least, 3 of them were behind the South-Western and Southern Fronts, namely the 5th, 6th and 7th.

Walter Kerr provides the following map in his book "The Secret of Stalinrad"

reserve_armies.png

I'm also under the impression that the 9th and 10th Reserve Armies were newly formed, and therefore ideally needed more time before being deployed to the frontline.

[KDF33]

I'm also under the impression that the 9th and 10th Reserve Armies were newly formed, and therefore ideally needed more time before being deployed to the frontline.

Great map and much appreciated contribution, as usual.

You're also correct about 9th and 10th Reserve Armies: all but one of their divisions were raised in June, and they were committed to the front in August and September, compared to July for most of their brethren. IMO this can only be described as rushed - but then the Soviets were in a crisis situation.

The map also indicates that there were, roughly speaking, two equal groupings of reserve armies: one ringing Moscow from the north, east and south (1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th and 10th), and another covering the Don and the Volga (3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th), the latter having on average longer-trained formations.

Everything I've seen so far indicates that the idea that the RKKA was concentrated along the Moscow axis, although not quite a myth, is overstated in its extent as well as in the conclusions derived from it. In terms of reserves, it is plainly incorrect.

What is correct is that Soviet force density per km of front was higher between Rzhev and the Oka river, roughly corresponding to the area of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front, down to that of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front. There, force density was roughly twice that of the Southern sector attacked by Heeresgruppe Süd in Fall Blau.

[Max Payload]

Another minor point, 3rd Tank Army wasn’t formed until 22 August.

My mistake. The army was formed in May, it just wasn’t released from High Command reserve to the operational army (Western Front) until August.

[TheMarcksPlan]

In this regard, TMP's timeline is correct: the Germans had to eliminate the Soviet Union by the late summer of 1942.

Why?

Because the potential benefits coming out of it will not change much if the Eastern front drags on.

I haven't argued that the Germans need to eliminate the SU by the end of '42, only that German victory is much easier if they do so. Ostsieg in '42 allows, for example, the predictable fall of the MidEast and North Africa in '42/'43 and the war probably doesn't last into 1945 as a result.

In fact several of my ATL's have explicitly discussed the SU lasting into 1943. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=242003#p2202861

Once again I have to remind you of what the Americans actually thought of the strategic picture, had the SU fallen. From Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries, citing on page 127 a September 21, 1943 memo from the JSCC to the U.S. representatives to the Tehran Conference:

[the JSCC] concluded that a policy ‘‘aligned realistically with the
military capabilities and interests of the United States’’ had to include as ‘‘cardinal
factors’’ the following:

a. Frank recognition of the fact that the defeat of Germany is so dependent
upon the continued full cooperation of Russia

So even in Fall 1943 the U.S. military chiefs viewed themselves "dependent" on Russia for the defeat of Germany. They saw a view like Peter89's - that the W.Allies could prevail absent Russia - as not "realistically aligned with military capabilities and interests of the United States."

I've cited this work before; some on AHF remain impervious to evidence.

[Peter89]

In this regard, TMP's timeline is correct: the Germans had to eliminate the Soviet Union by the late summer of 1942.

Why?

Because the potential benefits coming out of it will not change much if the Eastern front drags on.

I haven't argued that the Germans need to eliminate the SU by the end of '42, only that German victory is much easier if they do so. Ostsieg in '42 allows, for example, the predictable fall of the MidEast and North Africa in '42/'43 and the war probably doesn't last into 1945 as a result.

In fact several of my ATL's have explicitly discussed the SU lasting into 1943. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=242003#p2202861

Once again I have to remind you of what the Americans actually thought of the strategic picture, had the SU fallen. From Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries, citing on page 127 a September 21, 1943 memo from the JSCC to the U.S. representatives to the Tehran Conference:

[the JSCC] concluded that a policy ‘‘aligned realistically with the
military capabilities and interests of the United States’’ had to include as ‘‘cardinal
factors’’ the following:

a. Frank recognition of the fact that the defeat of Germany is so dependent
upon the continued full cooperation of Russia

So even in Fall 1943 the U.S. military chiefs viewed themselves "dependent" on Russia for the defeat of Germany. They saw a view like Peter89's - that the W.Allies could prevail absent Russia - as not "realistically aligned with military capabilities and interests of the United States."

I've cited this work before; some on AHF remain impervious to evidence.

The Middle East and North Africa fell in 1941/1943 anyway.

A notion from a chief military advisor is not evidence of what you say. We know a bucketload of ranking military officiers, who had great but false visions; also, we know the role of overestimating certain dangers and possibilities and underestimating other dangers and possibilities. For example, have you read Raeder's Great Plan or other strategic visions of the SKL? They were detailed, but couldn't be carried out in full either.

Your source is proof for that the Soviets played a key role in defeating the Germans, not that the Wallies would give up immediately if the Soviets are defeated.

The political leaders of the Wallies understood the situation better than a number of their military commanders, and both Roosevelt and Churchill gave orders contradicting their military advisors. You cannot cherry-pick notions from advisors and leave the actual decision makers' policies out of the picture.

Churchill also fought on when the Brits not simply didn't have Soviet aid, but the Soviets actually helped Germany to shatter the British blockade. It's unlikely that they'd give up when their national existence and world dominance was in question.

I'm not impervious to evidence - on the contrary, really. I even gave detailed criticism of your ever-shifting agenda. However, I feel that you should address a few very basic problems first, before we can move on.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The political leaders of the Wallies understood the situation better than a number of their military commanders, and both Roosevelt and Churchill gave orders contradicting their military advisors.

Then it's a good thing for you that Roosevelt didn't express exactly the same thoughts as his military leaders on this subject...

...oh wait:

FDR:

"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war
depends on the Russians." Recorded in Morgenthau's diary on June 15, 1942.

FDR:

Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe. ‘‘Brief Joint Estimate of the Military Situation of the Associated Powers,’’ memo, Dec. 21, 1941, JB 325, serial 729, RG 225, NA

-------------------------------------------------------

I'm not impervious to evidence - on the contrary, really.

I eagerly await the revision of your views in light of the above evidence.


Such a revision would force a revision on me regarding past statements such as:

I've cited this work before; some on AHF remain impervious to evidence.