Avalancheon wrote: ↑23 Dec 2020 13:19
This is a response to some comments that were made much earlier in this thread.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Sep 2020 02:53
Peter89 wrote:
1 German Infantry Division
Inactive: 80t/d
Average: 150t/d
Fighting: 1100t/d
1 German Panzer Division
Inactive: 30t/d
Average: 300t/d
Fighting: 700t/d
Let's take your average for now and do a simple calculation from them and from, initialy, your characterization* of Turkish railways:
Peter89s claims about the supply requirements of a German division seem to check out. According to this site:
http://www.mnstarfire.com/ww2/history/l ... ision.html
''A typical full strength infantry division would consist of roughly 17,000 men. Prior to 1944 a German infantry division would include over 5,000 horses and almost 950 motor vehicles. A division of this size would need 53 tons of hay and oats, 54 tons of food, 20 tons of petrol, one ton of lubricants, ten tons of ordinance and another 12 tons of miscellaneous supplies plus ammunition and baggage (approx 150 tons total per day).''
''A Panzer or Armored Division would be roughly 14,000 men. Usually there would be over 3,000 vehicles... The supply requirement for an average of motorized, mechanized and panzer divisions has been stated as approximately 300 tons per day.''
However, this figure
does not include ammunition consumption. For some idea of what their ammo needs are, we can look to the Eastern front. In August of 1941, Franz Halder noted that the Ostheer had expended 340 trainloads of ammunition during a 15 day period. This means they were consuming an average of 8220 tons ammunition per day on the Eastern front. Spread out across 150 divisions, that works out to about 55 tons per division, per day.
So when adding in ammunition requirements on top of their regular needs, the infantry divisions would each need 205 tons of supplys a day, and the panzer divisions would need 355 tons a day.
Thus, a force of 10 infantry and 10 panzer divisions would need 5600 tons of supplys a day.
TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Sep 2020 02:53
Peter89 wrote:As for the railways in Turkey, they were singles, expected to handle 10 trains per day, loaded with 450-800t - and the railways that connected Istambul with the rest of the network, was not even the best (able to handle 17t axle weight). This 4500-8000t/d capacity was simply not enough, and the deeper the forces go into Turkey, the less enough it will become.
Let's take your average for now and do a simple calculation from them and from, initialy, your characterization* of Turkish railways:
*As I hope is clearer from my map, I'll be using two railways: one from Marmara Sea and one from Aegean, likely starting from Izmir and running via Aydin to the Anatolian Plateau.
Two railways gives us 9-16,000 t/day. If Germany deploys 10 ID's and 10 panzer/mobile divs, that's 4,500 t/day required. Then let's double it 9,000 t/day for Grosstransportraum, army/corps-level assets, and LW. Where's the problem? We haven't even addressed truck column capacity from the ports/beaches yet.
Peter89s estimate on the capacity of a single track railway are unrealistically low. He says 10 train (pairs) per day, but in fact it was 12. More importantly, it was possible to greatly improve the capacity of a single track line, to the point where they could handle 72 train (pairs) per day. (Thats an increase of 6 times) This is explained in the article, The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945, by H.G.W. Davie.
''The capacity of a particular line was the number of trains that could run down its length
both up and down, usually given as 12 pairs of trains a day for single lines or 24 pairs of trains for double track lines for restored military railways. However, double-track lines run by the Reichsbahn in Germany might achieve 72 or 144 train pairs a day; the difference was due to the number of sidings that allowed trains to pass one another and the complexity of the signaling equipment.''
The article also explains that a typical German supply train would be 90 axles, with a weight of 850 tons and carrying 450 tons of cargo. Thus, 12 trains per day down a single track line will yield about 5400 tons of supplys at their destination. The Germans will undoubtedly upgrade the capacity of this line, although to what extent is debatable. They probably won't be able to increase it to 72 trains per day, but they could manage 36 trains per day. That would yield 16,200 tons of supply per day on one single track line.
IIIRC my numbers came from here:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html
RAILROAD SUPPLY TRAINS
(1) Standard supply trains. German logistical manuals outline the use of standard rations, ammunition, and fuel supply trains with a maximum net load of 450 metric tons (or approximately 500 short tons)
(2) Rations supply trains (Verpflegungszüge), with an average of 40 cars per train may be composed as follows:
(a) Iron rations: 300,000 full and 300,000 half iron rations, totalling 442 metric tons.
(b) Full rations with fodder: 180.000 human and 40,000 animal rations, amounting to 454 metric tons. These may be loaded into three parts, each containing 3 days' supplies for 20,000 men and 4,000 animals.
STANDARD TROOP TRAINS.
The Germans have found it desirable to use troop trains of a reasonably constant composition. The standard trains found in the Balkans, Italy, and Norway are composed of fewer cars than the base types in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands which are described below. All types are designed as far as possible to carry a self-contained unit such as a company or a battalion. Nonstandard trains also may be used for troop movements.
K-trains (Kraftfahrzüge or motor vehicle trains) average 51 cars per train and carry approximately 250 soldiers, 20 heavy vehicles (weighing up to 22 short tons per vehicle), and 20 light vehicles, plus other equipment. If lighter equipment is carried, the number of soldiers can be increased.
S-trains (Sonderzüge, or special trains) are made up for the movement of very heavy tanks and self-propelled guns. The number of men carried per train averages 125; the number of cars forming the train is between 30 and 35. An S-train usually carries from four to six Tiger tanks or from six to eight Panther tanks, interspersed with lighter equipment.
Sp-trains (Sonderpanzerzüge, or special tank trains) carry approximately 20 medium tanks together with personnel arid other equipment. The standard Sp-train is composed of about 33 cars.
I-trains (Infanteriezüge or infantry trains) of about 55 cars per train hold some 350 officers and men, 10 light vehicles, 10 heavy vehicles of a maximum weight of 22 short tons per vehicle, and 70 horses, together with other equipment. If a minimum of equipment is carried, up to 800 troops can be moved. It is possible that the I-trains seldom are used by the Germans at present.
Replacement troop trains with 50 to 60 cars per train can hold over 2,000 replacements. The Use of this type of train probably has been discontinued.
(c) Full human rations with no bread but only baking materials: 300,000 rations, totaling 450 metric tons.
(d) Flour train (Mehlzug): 833,000 rations, amounting to 450 metric tons.
(e) Oat train (Hafersug): 90,000 rations, totaling 450 metric tons.
(f) Animal trains (Viekzüge): 360 cattle weighing 180 metric tons, 1200 pigs weighing 120 metric tons, or 1800 sheep weighing 72 metric tons.
(3) Ammunition supply trains (Munitionszüge), with an average of 30 cars per train, are of three types:
(a) Unit-loaded trains, loaded according to the proportion of different types of ammunition needed by a particular division.
(b) Caliber unit trains, in which each car is loaded with approximately 15 metric tons (161/2 short tons) of ammunition of a specific caliber.
(c) Single caliber unit trains, in which all cars are loaded with ammunition of the same caliber.
(4) Fuel supply trains (Betriehstoffzüge) of two types are used:
(a) 20 gasoline tank cars, holding between 340 cubic meters (around 89,800 gallons) and 440 cubic meters (around 116,200 gallons) of fuel.
(b) 25 cars, holding gasoline in 200-liter (53-gallon) and 20-liter (5-gallon) cans and carrying 400 cubic meters (105,600 gallons) of gasoline, and five cars with oil, engine oil, gear oil, paraffin, and (in winter) anti-freeze barrels and cans.
(5) Horse supply trains (Pferdersatzzüge) consist of 55 cars, each holding eight riding or light draft horses per car or 440 horses per train; six heavy draft horses per car or 330 horses per train; or four very heavy horses per car or 220 horses per train.
(6) Signals and engineer construction materials trains (Baustoffzüge) average 40 cars, of which 39 are open cars, with a net tonnage of about 820 metric tons (900 short tons).
(7) Tank trains carrying up to 25 medium tanks or up to 8 heavy tanks have also been reported. The average number of cars per tank train is about 33, with widely varying net loads.
(8) Mixed equipment trains are very frequent and may contain from 25 to 60 cars with a total net tonnage of up to 850 metric tons.
Please check again on the ammunition consumption.
Also, the Bulgarian railway, the only way where you could transport stuff was good for 2/3 cargo only.
36 trains per day in this direction is an illusion. The Germans might rebuild the whole railway on the Balkans, making it double track and everything, but it's not gonna happen soon, and by this standard, they could have built a railway anywhere, anytime.
You see, "one train" can be translated into many, very different types of supply and troops, my numbers are representing a theoretical maximum, without the "Balkan load" limit.
Obviously, the economic exploitation of the Balkans cannot stop forever, and the Bulgarian domestic economy can't be stopped forever.
If you plan a short-term offensive, then you might build up and load forward supply depots, but to operate 5+5 divisions fighting heavily on the offense using this railway line is a daydreaming.
I quoted exactly S.H. Beaver that he estimated 12-20 trains per day for a single standard gauge track railway; I used 10 trains per day as a very optimistic number, because in order to achieve that, a lot of things must happen right, which they usually didn't.
I don't really understand you; you say that my numbers are "unrealistically low", because I used 10 trains per day and you used 12.
Did you check the numbers of the Bulgarian domestic economy? Their typical cargo and train types? Did you substracted it from the 12?
b. The line Passau-Ried-Leoben had a carrying capacity of eighteen trains.
c. The line Salzburg-Spittal-Klagenfurt could also carry eighteen trains daily, but only with half the normal load because of the steep gradients across the Alps.
The daily detraining capacity of the Bruck-Graz-Klagenfurt area was seventy-eight trains, or the equivalent of the combat elements of two infantry divisions. Consequently, all of the rear echelon elements of these divisions had to detrain in the Vienna area, capable of handling 144 trains a day, and in Salzburg, where forty-eight additional trains could be unloaded. The divisional service units then had to reach the assembly areas by marching overland. However, since road conditions were poor at this time of the year, snow-clearing detachments had to be provided to keep the Salzburg-Liezen-Bruck and Vienna-Bruck-Graz roads clear. The same roads also had to be used by those divisions that moved solely by motor transportation. Since rigid traffic control was enforced and traffic regulations were strictly adhered to, the execution of these movements did not entail any undue delay.
2. The area around Nagykanizsa was selected for the assembly of the one motorized infantry and two panzer divisions subordinated to XLVI Panzer Corps headquarters. Some of the tracked vehicles moved upon the Vienna-Sopron-Nagykanizsa railroad line, whose feeder capacity was twelve trains a day. Other elements detrained in the Budapest-Szekesfehervar area and continued on to Nagykanizsa by road. Some of the motorized columns moved directly from Vienna by road since the Hungarian highways were clear of snow.
The above-mentioned capacity figures of railroads and highways were eventually reached, but not before many difficulties had been overcome. The main problem was that no preparatory work had been started until the evening of 27 March. The system of classifying all major railroad lines according to their capacity, introduced at the beginning of the war, and the method applied in processing military rail movements both proved efficient during this emergency. The maximum performance schedule, which required the almost complete stoppage of all nonmilitary traffic, had to be resorted to only on the Austrian railroads. Aside from conserving personnel and materiel, the adherence to normal train schedules whenever possible permitted the Germans to camouflage the movements to the assembly areas right up to the time when the first contingents arrived at the detraining points.
THE GERMAN CAMPAIGNS IN THE BALKANS (SPRING 1941)
These numbers were used in emergency situations. The realistic number is way, way lower. 10 2/3 loaded military trains EVERY day on this line would be a logistical miracle.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."