FDR's Tragic Refusal to Deal with the German Resistance and Abandon "Unconditional Surrender"

[Knouterer]

The obvious problem was that anything other than unconditional surrender would mean that many if not most Nazi crimes would go unpunished, possibly even unrecorded. Which would be unacceptable to public opinion in many Allied countries, especially those that had suffered under German occupation. And rightly so.

Another problem would be that whatever FDR did or said, from 1943 on the Russians were not going to be satisfied with anything short of total crushing victory.

The German (military) resistance - such as it was - seems to have had only vague unrealistic ideas about what they could offer and what the Allies would accept.

For example, if the Allies had demanded that all SS and Wehrmacht officers suspected of war crimes be handed over to them, would that have been acceptable to the plotters? Or would they deem that "dishonourable"?

[mikegriffith1]

The 20 July Plot demonstrated clearly the German resistance was a paper tiger.

I think it demonstrated just the opposite. And think how much stronger the resistance would have been if FDR had not insisted on unconditional surrender. Many German officers and officials who hated Hitler and the Nazis felt compelled to support the regime after FDR announced his policy of unconditional surrender.

And there can be no question that FDR's appalling, senseless refusal to deal with the Bodoglio government for months enabled Hitler to send reinforcements to Italy and cost many thousands of American lives.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi MG1,

I would suggest that the German resistance was much weaker than you think. There were a few isolated cases of active resistance in Austria in 1945, none of which were successful. In the Alt Reich I am aware of none.

You post, "Many German officers and officials who hated Hitler and the Nazis felt compelled to support the regime after FDR announced his policy of unconditional surrender." Who were all these officers, who, incidentally, had already been supporting the Nazi regime with their professional expertise since 1933?

Few came out of the woodwork even for the July 1944 Bomb Plot, when Germany's situation was far worse than it had been when the Unconditional Surrender demand was adopted 18 months earlier. What is more, even then the military side of the German resistance, who were strongly nationalist, wanted to negotiate to retain some of Hitler's gains.

You post, "And there can be no question that FDR's appalling, senseless refusal to deal with the Bodoglio government for months enabled Hitler to send reinforcements to Italy and cost many thousands of American lives." Perhaps if the Badoglio Government had not said publicly that it was intending to continue the war at Germany's side, there would have been an earlier opening for this. However, whether it would have saved any American lives is debateable, as the Germans still had the capacity to contest the Italian Peninsula anyway.

Most importantly, why would anyone in a position of strength like the Allies, ever want to pursue a compromise peace with a regime like Nazi Germany?

Cheers,

Sid.

[wm]

Are you suggesting that Hitler's death = a successful coup?

It would be a good start but I suppose an energetic Nazi leader, e.g., Göring, Keitel could have stopped it quite easily.

[OpanaPointer]

Are you suggesting that Hitler's death = a successful coup?

It would be a good start but I suppose an energetic Nazi leader, e.g., Göring, Keitel could have stopped it quite easily.

I concur. The institution inertia would have to be overcome for a successful coup, and by the '40s that would have required massive popular support and strong military support. Neither were available. What-iffing is powered by magic.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The 20 July Plot demonstrated clearly the German resistance was a paper tiger.

I think it demonstrated just the opposite. And think how much stronger the resistance would have been if FDR had not insisted on unconditional surrender.

The Unconditional Surrender policy did not emerge until late January 1943. The war had been underway near four years then. I'm not seeing any evidence the resistance weakened when the policy was announced, if anything the resistance increased in the last 2-3 years after the policy was announced.

By latter 1943 most thinking Germans saw the war was lost, and the longer it dragged out the worse it might be for Germany, & Europe in general. The Italian capitulation was made after negotiations and some conditions were agreed to, so the Germans could see some hope. Given the unrealistic plans so many leaders in the opposition had its clear many were not taking the policy seriously.

[Futurist]

The 20 July Plot demonstrated clearly the German resistance was a paper tiger.

I think it demonstrated just the opposite. And think how much stronger the resistance would have been if FDR had not insisted on unconditional surrender.

The Unconditional Surrender policy did not emerge until late January 1943. The war had been underway near four years then. I'm not seeing any evidence the resistance weakened when the policy was announced, if anything the resistance increased in the last 2-3 years after the policy was announced.

By latter 1943 most thinking Germans saw the war was lost, and the longer it dragged out the worse it might be for Germany, & Europe in general. The Italian capitulation was made after negotiations and some conditions were agreed to, so the Germans could see some hope. Given the unrealistic plans so many leaders in the opposition had its clear many were not taking the policy seriously.

Good point in your last sentence here. Also, did unconditional surrender ever actually apply to Italy as a matter of United States and Allied policy--or only to Germany and Japan?

[OpanaPointer]

World War II
Main article: German Instrument of Surrender

The Japanese delegation, headed by Mamoru Shigemitsu, prepares to sign the instrument of surrender aboard the USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay, 2 September 1945

Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel signing the definitive act of unconditional surrender for the German military in Berlin.
The use of the term was revived during World War II at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 when American President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated it to the press as the objective of the war against the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan; in doing so. When Roosevelt made the announcement at Casablanca, he made reference to General Grant's use of the term during the American Civil War.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconditi ... lternative.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Some present the U. S. thing as a spontaneous or individual thing of Roosevelt. Not quite. He had been discussing the end game for the war, including surrender, with others. Marshal, Knox, & others were all tapped for their thoughts on this part of the 'end of war politics'. That dialogue had been going on for sometime. I cant say this was a consensus thing, but it was not some whim Roosevelt sprung on Churchill on a night in Morocco. Tho he may have enjoyed ambushing Churchill with it.

Theres all the question of what the term conditions meant. I had always assumed it meant the surrenderer should not bother asking for terms, the victor intends to dictate conditions.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Theres all the question of what the term conditions meant. I had always assumed it meant the surrenderer should not bother asking for terms, the victor intends to dictate conditions.

This is a good point. For instance, the Japanese were in no shape to lay conditions by Jul 45 , but the Americans accepted all the same the continuance of Hirohito on the throne, even though the Japanese had not the power to demand it. "Unconditional surrender" obviously meant a few different things, with the victors deciding.

[DrG]

A few notes, given that this topic is of extreme importance but can quickly derail into several sub-topics.

I see that the first post of this thread provided some wrong information about the Italian armistice. The "unconditional surrender" policy did not delay this armistice: the Badoglio government, in agreement with the King, took the decision to start negotiations with the Western Allies when Hitler refused to meet King Victor Emanuel III, who, in turn, wished to put the Führer in front of his responsibilities for the promises that he had made to Mussolini (but which the Duce hadn't been able to have turned into reality by his counterpart) about an armistice with USSR. This happened on 30 July 1943, after the phone call by the Italian attaché in Berlin, gen. Luigi Efisio (note: if an Italian is called Efisio or Gavino, there is a 99% chance that he is of Sardinian ancestry) Marras (note: it is a Sardinian surname, and thus must be pronounced as it is written, with the accent on the first "a" and with the full sound of the final "s", not in the French way as one might think), who reported, in strict Sardinian dialect (to avoid German eavesdropping), the extremely negative outcome of his meeting with Hitler earlier that day.
Anyway, already on 22 July 1943 Mussolini had informed the King of his decision to leave the alliance with Germany by 15 Sept. 1943 if Hitler hadn't signed an armistice with USSR before that date.

Moreover, Mussolini and the King were aware that the "unconditional surrender" policy was not to be applied to Italy since January 1943 (practically in real time with Casablanca), when Giacomo Acerbo was informed of this decision by American envoys met in Switzerland. Not surprisingly, Acerbo was appointed Minister of Finances and Treasury soon after (on 6 Feb. 1943), in order to give him a higher status in case he were needed as negotiatior with the Allies (this did not happen, anyway). As recalled by Cordell Hull in page 1571 of his memoirs: "[...] the surrender of Italy the following month, although ostensibly on an unconditional basis [my note: to be precise, the Short Armistice of 3 Sept. 1943 did not use the word "unconditional" and the Long Armistice, which used it, was later amended to delete this adjective and, anyway, it never came into force], was actually, as I have previously mentioned, a negotiated surrender, and the terms of the armistice were agreed to in discussions in Lisbon, Portugal, between representatives of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff and Marshal Badoglio."

Therefore, I think that the matter of the Italian armistice can be discarded from this thread.

I have also noticed that the Nazi crimes have been used as a justification for the "unconditional surrender" policy, but it should be recalled that USSR (i.e. the country most subject to Nazi policies) was not involved in its planning by Roosevelt and Churchill, albeit the US and UK government stated this policy mostly to appease Stalin, who feared a separate armistice between his Western Allies and the Axis. At the same time, Stalin did not bind himself to this policy until 1st May 1943, when USSR endorsed it officially.

This said, and I would like to avoid recalling this matter, there should be also the "hornets' nest" of secret negotiations that went on during most of the war between the powers involved in the conflict (and about which I have not the time to get involved in debates, I am sorry). A topic that in Italy has reached a deep level of study, but in other cultures looks almost like blasphemy, mostly because of the "Good vs. Evil" narrative which is used to describe WW2 to the broad public. Just on Saturday, for example, I finished reading a very long article about this topic, and thus ordered the book which is an expansion of it, by Eugenio Di Rienzo and Emilio Gin (two university professors, of a school different and somewhat in contrast with Renzo De Felice's one, who, anyway, was a pioneer about secret diplomacy in WW2). I think it is almost (too many stupid typos) a masterpiece, you can read its abstract in English and its Italian text (good luck) here: https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... h_the_USSR.

[OpanaPointer]

I cant say this was a consensus thing, but it was not some whim Roosevelt sprung on Churchill on a night in Morocco. Tho he may have enjoyed ambushing Churchill with it.

He didn't ambush Churchill, WSC knew he was going to announce it.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I cant say this was a consensus thing, but it was not some whim Roosevelt sprung on Churchill on a night in Morocco. Tho he may have enjoyed ambushing Churchill with it.

He didn't ambush Churchill, WSC knew he was going to announce it.

& I dd not say he didn't. Roosevelt had earlier proposed it to WSC & pressured him into including it as a announced policy form the SYMBOL conference. Like so much else Churchill wanted to keep options open and felt it should have remained on the table for joint discussion.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Until I recently read Thomas Fleming's book The New Dealers' War: FDR and the War Within World War II, I was not aware of the size and strength of the German resistance and of their attempts to get FDR to abandon his unconditional surrender stance. ...

It looks to me like Flemming passes lightly over the unrealistic ideas of the German resistance leaders. That somehow they could avoid a complete Allied occupation, could preserve a German army, negotiate border settlements, ect... many even thought a Allied/German alliance was possible vs the USSR, or that a western settlement was possible leaving Germany free to continue resistance against the Soviet armies. Yes it is possible to find leaders in the US, or even in Britain when digging deep enough, who would endorse something like that. There were a few who would have even approved continuing the final solution for the Jews and other undesirables. But, that was neither a majority of US leadership, nor a group on a realistic track.

There has been a common misunderstanding of Roosevelts core goal in WWII. That is it was to allow US political and economic power to dominate globally post war. Allowing a German, Italian, or Japanese state to negotiate a independence & political climate that ran counter to long term US interests was not in the cards.

[OpanaPointer]

I cant say this was a consensus thing, but it was not some whim Roosevelt sprung on Churchill on a night in Morocco. Tho he may have enjoyed ambushing Churchill with it.

He didn't ambush Churchill, WSC knew he was going to announce it.

& I dd not say he didn't. Roosevelt had earlier proposed it to WSC & pressured him into including it as a announced policy form the SYMBOL conference. Like so much else Churchill wanted to keep options open and felt it should have remained on the table for joint discussion.

I didn't say you didn't say he didn't. "Pressured" is a fun word.