My point only applies up to the fall of France; after that there was no use for a massive land army until/unless engaging Germany with larger allied armies was possible. Otherwise the British Army's prospects outside of peripheral theaters were the same as the KM's: show it could die with honor.KDF33 wrote: The British focused on growing the size of the Army before the fall of France:
Before France fell, Britain had a good chance of making the difference between holding and losing in France with a larger army. Could anyone well-versed in WW1 doubt that the French Army couldn't stop Germany except with major allied assistance? In 1914 the small BEF had arguably made the difference; in 1939 it should have been obvious (it was to Lloyd George) that Germany would not have a second front and therefore a larger initial BEF was necessary.
So if Britain wanted an anti-Hitler coalition excluding Stalin - for all practical purposes this was Chamberlain's wont - then it had to step up and provide a substitute for Russia or France would be beaten. Germany was, after all, about twice as large in population and economy as France in 1939. It was simply inexcusable for Britain to have contributed only 10 divisions to that fight.
It was excusable if one accepts that Britain needed to focus on air/sea forces to keep its boot on the necks of 500 million black/brown people worldwide, especially when others (i.e. Japan) wanted to replace the British boot with their own. But I don't accept that excuse, especially as weighed against the necessity of stopping Hitler.
And appropriately so after France fell.KDF33 wrote:I'd say it looks like being kicked off the continent led to a change of focus.
Crystal clear that we shouldn't. I was wrong in my recollection about 1941 locomotive production.KDF33 wrote:I don't know that we should.
A caveat to this picture: German loco production did expand massively after and in response to the transport crisis of winter '41-'42, during which 70-80% of German locos sent East to support the Ostheer were stranded there when damaged by the cold and/or lack of water stations. For the problem, see Most Valuable Asset of the Reich by Mierzejewski:KDF33 wrote:Growth appears stable for most of the war, with focus in 1940-2 on raising railway car output, then in 1943 on locomotives.
For the response to the crisis, here's GSWW v.6:. Because the DRB locomotives had been designed with the milder
German winters in mind, their water pipes, pumps, and control mechanisms
were mounted on the outside of their boilers, exposing them to the extreme
cold of the eastern winter. Soviet locomotives had these devices placed under
the boiler jackets or at other locations where they remained warm. The Reichsbahn was aware of these problems and instituted programs to rectify them. But there were not enough heated locomotive sheds available in the east to thaw
frozen engines or make the necessary modifications on them. This confronted
the DRB with the difficult task of returning the damaged locomotives to Germany for repair while sending more engines to the east to replace them. The result was a net decline in the number of locomotives available in the Reich itself,
causing operating problems in Germany. The immobilization of engines in the
east led to the loss of freight cars as well. p.102-3
...so German loco production had a peak between autumn '42 and mid-'43 that is somewhat obscured by annual statistics. As Germany lost territory its rail transport needs declined, thus the emergency priority for locos was later abandoned and loco production lost urgency.an ambitious production programme, ranking
for the first time as an armaments project, was embarked upon: this envisaged
a technically simplified uniform locomotive type, adapted to war requirements
in the east. During the current year  manufacture was to run at 200 railway
engines per month, to increase to 400–500 per month in 1943. But since this
new programme would, at best, become effective in the autumn... p.880
Anyway that's why I recalled '42 loco production far exceeding '41; I forgot that the '42 ramp to loco production didn't bear fruit until autumn.
...but I also don't see my mistake changing the basic picture of Britain outproducing Germany in total real war production in 1941, as adding "trains" to "guns and small arms" doesn't obviate Britain's advantage in all the other categories I listed. Furthermore, even were trains to push Germany over the top marginally in total 1941 war production, it's hard to judge it sufficient to explain away Germany's edge in total economic size even after the military personnel differential.
But we should be talking proportions instead of absolute numbers. There's no reason to think that Germany needed a larger proportion sustaining the civilian economy at similar levels of mobilization.*KDF33 wrote:I also don't think the "NAM" category is representative of military production potential, given that Germany's larger population would have required, for a similar level of mobilization, a larger number of people working to sustain its civilian economy than Britain's.
*except that the NAM sector had to support a larger number of ag workers. Then again German farmers were poor peasants (and criminally-deprived Zwangsarbeiter) who didn't consume much.
In fact, there's some relief to the civilian economic burden by mobilizing more men: soldiers don't spend as much at grocery stores, furniture shops, and cinemas: their provisions, housing, and amusements are generally placed on the military accounts. The predominance of soldier pay and of soldier provisioning in German early-war military expenditures probably conceals a further aspect of under-mobilization, in that the German civilian economy was mostly relieved of feeding/housing/amusing millions more men when these burdens were transferred to the military.
Your German population stats appear to be for prewar Germany rather than Greater Germany+Protectorate. The geographical delimitation of the Reich is a statistical issue that a lot of the historiography ignores but shouldn't. For example, here's a graph from GSWW v.5/1 showing the intensity of Wehrmacht drafts based on underlying employment, where darker colors proportionately represent more drafts:KDF33 wrote:If you use non-agricultural workers neither serving in the armed forces nor producing for them in the metalworking industries, you get the following respective shares of total population for June 1941:
The lighter colors aside newly-acquired lands outside prewar Germany represent, per GSWW and economic common sense, intensified efforts to exploit the coal/ore deposits of Lorraine and Silesia (Districts V, VIII, and XII particularly relevant). The Wehrmacht drafted fewer men from these more economically important regions than in less industrially-important regions.
In other words, Germany was shifting its employment to the periphery of, and beyond, the Altreich in a rational response to its territorial gains and newly-acquired raw materials. So the importance of Greater Germany vs. Altreich should loom larger than is commonly given credit by even generally good analyses like the USSBS's. Greater Germany's workforce was substantially larger than USSBS's stats for prewar Germany (as documented in my cite last post).