Why the Waffen-SS

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

You post, "It is your personal opinion not supported by any source or authority that the setting up of the 3 abovementioned divisions was intentionally done at a super slow pace." Untrue, and you will not be able to bring up a single quote where I say this.

I have talked to you before about dishonestly attributing to me things I haven't posted. Remember this:

"You post, "You still keep repeating 3 div were inactive for half a year....." No, I did not post that. You quoted me correctly immediately above and yet chose to misrepresent me immediately below in your own words. This is a recurrent feature of you posts.

You post, "It is not realistic to see the 3 senior waffen ss divisions involved in what you think was the decisive campaign." Exactly the same applies. I did not post that either. You first quoted me accurately above and then proceeded immediately afterwards to misrepresent what I wrote in your own words.

Why do you do this repeatedly? It is easily checkable and just undermines your credibility.

It also undermines whatever case you are trying to make, however meritorious.

If you can't make an honest case, what are you doing here?

On the up side, it relieves me of the obligation to defend things I never posted!"

Cheers,

Sid.

[Aida1]

' Kriegstagebuch der Deutschen Wehrmacht 1942 Teilband 2 Percy Schramm Bernard & Graefe Verlag pp 1298-1299

Führerbefehl 13 September 1942 concerning the relief of battle weary divisions from the east

....
4. in total 15 inf divisions and 6 personell units for fast units have to be transferred to the west and to be refitted there, from these before the end of 1942 at least 8 infantry divisions, which have suffered the most and the 6 personell units for fast units.
The personell units for fast units gave to be gained by combining the material of 2 battle weary units in one unit and transporting the personell of the other unit to the west.....
5. Beginning january 1943 8 fast units have to transferred to the east- suitable for the tropics- to the Caucasus front. At the same moment the rest of the battle weary infantry divisions have to be transferred from the east to te west and refitted there.
6. Subsequently to the fast units according to point 6, it is to be planned to then transfer to the east in a very fast timetable, 15 full strength infantry divisions'(10 from 13. and 14.Welle and the 5 divisions relieved from the east in 1942)for an offensive deployment.
7.During the transport to the east ordered above, the strength of the units of OB West has to be maintained.
Therefore it is to be guaranteed through all suitable measures- timely previous allocating of the necessary material and personell for the to be refitted east divisions- that through the transporting away of 8 fast divisions and 15 infantry divisons , no weakening of the combat strength in the west occurs….'

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,

You post, "It is your personal opinion not supported by any source or authority that the setting up of the 3 abovementioned divisions was intentionally done at a super slow pace." Untrue, and you will not be able to bring up a single quote where I say this.

I have talked to you before about dishonestly attributing to me things I haven't posted. Remember this:

"You post, "You still keep repeating 3 div were inactive for half a year....." No, I did not post that. You quoted me correctly immediately above and yet chose to misrepresent me immediately below in your own words. This is a recurrent feature of you posts.

You post, "It is not realistic to see the 3 senior waffen ss divisions involved in what you think was the decisive campaign." Exactly the same applies. I did not post that either. You first quoted me accurately above and then proceeded immediately afterwards to misrepresent what I wrote in your own words.

Why do you do this repeatedly? It is easily checkable and just undermines your credibility.

It also undermines whatever case you are trying to make, however meritorious.

If you can't make an honest case, what are you doing here?

On the up side, it relieves me of the obligation to defend things I never posted!"

Cheers,

Sid.

I have the perfect right to interpret what you state . And where credibility is concerned i am not worried because you only express a very personal opinion not supported by any source while i keep to what historically happened and i can source that.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

Indeed, you do have a perfect right to interpret what I write.

What you do not have right to do is wilfully and repeatedly misrepresent what I write.

It is simply dishonest on your part and shows a lack of personal integrity.

If you had any sort of mastery of sources you might address the points I make directly, instead of addressing points I never raised. You are conducting an awful lot of displacement activity to evade the point.

Your fundamental problem is that after a year you still cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

On top of this, you now also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time? Again, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

There were only six Reich-raised Waffen-SS motorized/panzer divisions and they all seem to have spent a disproportional share of their existence over mid-1942 to mid-1944 away from any active battlefront compared with their Army equivalents. Why?

This fact (and it is a fact) does not conform with the Waffen-SS's popular image as Hitler's "fire brigade" (a phrase you have used yourself above).

It all gives the impression that the hard-pressed Army was the shield behind which the Waffen-SS was expanded.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,

Indeed, you do have a perfect right to interpret what I write.

What you do not have right to do is wilfully and repeatedly misrepresent what I write.

It is simply dishonest on your part and shows a lack of personal integrity.

If you had any sort of mastery of sources you might address the points I make directly, instead of addressing points I never raised. You are conducting an awful lot of displacement activity to evade the point.

Your fundamental problem is that after a year you still cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

On top of this, you now also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time?

Cheers,

Sid.

Again simply ignoring historical facts which were explained to you at length using multiple sources which you choose to ignore.
There was no special treatment in sending DR and LAH to France when an imment threat was perceived. They were the obvious choice. And the mobile units in France were only meant to return to the eastern front in january 1943 in exchange for battle weary east divisions. No special treatment there either.
It has been told to you before that 9,10 and 12 ss were specifically meant for OB West. Not some theory of mine but simple historical fact.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

If you had any sort of mastery of sources you might address the points I make directly, instead of addressing points I never raised. You are conducting an awful lot of displacement activity to evade the point.

Your fundamental problem is that after a year you still cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

On top of this, you now also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time? Again, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

There were only six Reich-raised Waffen-SS motorized/panzer divisions and they all seem to have spent a disproportional share of their existence over mid-1942 to mid-1944 away from any active battlefront compared with their Army equivalents. Why?

This fact (and it is a fact) does not conform with the Waffen-SS's popular image as Hitler's "fire brigade" (a phrase you have used yourself above).

The apparent "special treatment" of the Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions is exposed by comparing them to what happened with their direct Army equivalents, who did not get such extended breaks away from operational fronts. Indeed, half the Army's panzer divisions got no break from the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1945 and none of the ten Army motorised divisions got a break away from the Eastern Front throughout their existences.

It all gives the impression that the hard-pressed Army was the shield behind which the Waffen-SS was expanded.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,

If you had any sort of mastery of sources you might address the points I make directly, instead of addressing points I never raised. You are conducting an awful lot of displacement activity to evade the point.

Your fundamental problem is that after a year you still cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

On top of this, you now also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time? Again, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

There were only six Reich-raised Waffen-SS motorized/panzer divisions and they all seem to have spent a disproportional share of their existence over mid-1942 to mid-1944 away from any active battlefront compared with their Army equivalents. Why?

This fact (and it is a fact) does not conform with the Waffen-SS's popular image as Hitler's "fire brigade" (a phrase you have used yourself above).

The apparent "special treatment" of the Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions is exposed by comparing them to what happened with their direct Army equivalents, who did not get such extended breaks away from operational fronts. Indeed, half the Army's panzer divisions got no break from the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1945 and none of the ten Army motorised divisions got a break away from the Eastern Front throughout their existences.

It all gives the impression that the hard-pressed Army was the shield behind which the Waffen-SS was expanded.

Cheers,

Sid.

Repeating unhistorical nonsense does not make it more true. No historian has ever come up with this strange stuff. :roll:
I think you will have to leave to Hitler the privilege of determining where he was cvonvinced there was gong to be a fire and in the summer of 1942 he was convinced one was imminent in France. The strange thing is you would want Hitler to send understrength battleweary east divisions to France and not use the much stronger 'firebigade' ,part of which was even in Germany. :roll:
So you only exhibit bias.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

Still avoiding actually addressing my questions, this time on the grounds that "no historian has ever come up with this strange stuff"! Perhaps you should read more widely, or perhaps they really have missed something.

Either way, this does not excuse you from addressing it, because this is factually based and you are not disputing any of the facts.

Your fundamental problem is that you cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

On top of this, you also have the problem of explaining why the three other Reich-raised Waffen-SS panzer divisions saw no action for up to 15 months after their first formation, while their army equivalents were back in action in half the time? Again, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?

There were only six Reich-raised Waffen-SS motorized/panzer divisions and they all seem to have spent a disproportional share of their existence over mid-1942 to mid-1944 away from any active battlefront compared with their Army equivalents. Why?

The apparent "special treatment" of the Reich-raised, Waffen-SS divisions is exposed by comparing them to what happened with their direct Army equivalents, who did not get such extended breaks away from operational fronts. Indeed, half the Army's panzer divisions got no break from the Eastern Front from 1941 to 1945 and none of the ten Army motorised divisions got a break away from the Eastern Front throughout their existences.

These facts, (and they are facts) do not conform with the Waffen-SS's popular image as Hitler's "fire brigade" (a phrase you have used yourself above).

Indeed, it all gives the impression that the hard-pressed Army was the shield behind which the Waffen-SS was expanded.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Aida1]

An example of an army pz division that got a long rest was the 1 pz which was sent to France in 1943 without its equipment, was refitted, enjoyed a bit of sun in Greece and was back in action on the eastern front by november 1943. Could theoretically have been refitted on the eastern front but OB West needed mobile reserves so it got lucky.http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... /1PD-R.htm

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Aida1,

Yes, half the Army's panzer divisions stayed on the Eastern Front throughout 1941-45, but 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th and 21st Panzer Divisions spent some time in France over 1942-44. On top of that, not one of the Army's ten motorised infantry divisions was sent to France. So about one in three German Army mechanized divisions spent some time recuperating in France.

By contrast, all six Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions spent extended periods in France, two of them more than once, one of which also had time out behind the lines in Italy as well.

As a crude measure, in the 24 months between June 1942 and June 1944 1st W-SS Division spent about 14 months on an active battlefront, 2nd W-SS Division 13 months and 3rd W-SS Division 20 months.

In the 18 months between their creation in January/February 1941 and June 1944 9th W-SS Division spent about two months on an active battle front and 10th W-SS Division spent 3 months on one. (This is significant when compared with the speed with which the Army managed to get 14th, 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions rebuilt. These had spent 9 months, 11 months and 10 months on an active battlefront by June 1944).

In the 12 months between its creation in June 1943 and June 1944 12th W-SS Division saw no action. The nearest Army equivalent appears to be the Feldherrnhalle Division, which was also reportedly created in June 1943 and on an active battlefront from October 1943. It had therefore seen some 9 months of operations by June 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Aida1]

Kriegstagebuchs des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht Teilband 1 Percy Schramm Bernard & Graefe p 690
' 19 august 1942
West This morning at 0600 english troops have landed at Dieppe. The landings intentions of the enemy were not apparent from the enemy air activity yesterday. The landing was carried out in a width of 30 km, at Dieppe there are english tanks on land, the heights there are firmly in our hands. The SS Adolf Hitler and the 10 pz have been put at the disposal of the local commander General Kuntzen,commanding general of LXXXI corps. The Führer considers to send the Grossdeutschland to the west after all , drops this thought as OB West reports that the english will be dealt by evening'

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,



In the 12 months between its creation in June 1943 and June 1944 12th W-SS Division saw no action. The nearest Army equivalent appears to be the Feldherrnhalle Division, which was also reportedly created in June 1943 and on an active battlefront from October 1943. It had therefore seen some 9 months of operations by June 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

Strange remark as 12 ss was reserve of OB West and therefore not meant to see any action before the allied landed. :roll:

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,


In the 18 months between their creation in January/February 1941 and June 1944 9th W-SS Division spent about two months on an active battle front and 10th W-SS Division spent 3 months on one. (This is significant when compared with the speed with which the Army managed to get 14th, 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions rebuilt. These had spent 9 months, 11 months and 10 months on an active battlefront by June 1944).


Cheers,

Sid.

Strange remark as these 2 divisions were actually not meant to see any action before the allied landed. :roll:

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,

Yes, half the Army's panzer divisions stayed on the Eastern Front throughout 1941-45, but 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th and 21st Panzer Divisions spent some time in France over 1942-44. On top of that, not one of the Army's ten motorised infantry divisions was sent to France. So about one in three German Army mechanized divisions spent some time recuperating in France.



Cheers,

Sid.

There was a rotation system of giving as mobile reserves for OB West refitting/setting up divisions which would at some point rotate to the eastern front when the next rotation between western and eastern front occurred. They would just arrive with personell leaving their vehicles in the east. Same thing for some inf div. Most divisions would simply refit behind the front. The sending of DR and LAH in july 1942 was a reinforcement of the existing divisions in France because of an imminent threat. They would rotate back to the eastern front with most of the other mobile div in France when the next rotation would happen in january 1943.

No division was sent to France to have a nice holiday.

[Aida1]

Hi Aida1,


Your fundamental problem is that you cannot justify the necessity of all three senior Reich-raised Waffen-SS divisions being simultaneously off operations in the backwater of France for up to six months in the second half of 1942, while all their direct Army equivalents were on the Eastern Front throughout 1942. Their roles were entirely interchangeable. For all your Waffen-SS divisional histories, you still cannot answer the basic question, Why this special treatment for the Waffen-SS?


Cheers,

Sid.

No special treatment there. When Hitler decided that OB West needed more mobile divisions because of an imminent threat, he sent DR and LAH who were the obvious choice and he also considered sending Grossdeutschland. He again considered sending Grossdeutschland at the time of Dieppe. So Hitler intentionally chose his elite divisions and you cannot deny that he would consider these divisions elite. These divisions were in his eyes certainly superior to any battleweary understrength mobile division belonging to AGN and AGC who would be the only alternative so you make no sense at all. :roll: