Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#76

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Mar 2021, 17:36

Kind of a digression but when has that ever stopped us?
daveshoup2MD wrote:
12 Mar 2021, 08:38
...Looking back, the reality seems that even with US resources, the initial forces were far too slender to to get to Tunisia before the winter; a more realistic approach may well have been to take Morocco and Algeria, concentrate on the build-up over the winter, and move on Tunisia in the spring-summer; which is pretty close to what happened historically, as it was. That still requires a commitment to coalition warfare that it does not appear the Allies - meaning the British - had command staff capable of delivering upon in 1942.
Perhaps, certainly in how the campaign played out over six months. However in late November Nerhing judged the Axis situation in Tunisia as lost and recommended consolidation in Bizerte and then probable evacuation. Kesselring understood the situation in similar terms to Nehring, but being a gambler doubled down on fighting on the approaches to Tunis city. This was the week when the combined US/British BLADE Force was fighting over the towns of Medjeb al Bab and Teboura. The latter 25 km from downtown Tunis. On the 25th Nov Maj Barlows tank company overran the Axis airfield at Diedidea & destroying 25+ German aircraft, just ten km from the Tunis suburbs. Barlow commander, LtCol Waters of 1/1 Armored regiment briefly considered taking his entire tank force of 45 tanks to raid Tunis. The disorganized situation of BLADE Force & the unlikely ability to send fuel and ammo to Waters battalion in Tunis caused the idea to be dropped. But the act was on the table & the situation in flux.

Kesselring gambled and relieved Nehring in favor of Arnim, ordering Tunis defended. Andersen the same moment failed in confidence as well. Telling Eisenhower the advance of the 78th Div had stalled & of his pessimism about holding the critial Medjeb river valley. Ike left Andersen in place & defered to his judgement.

Its 'difficult' to say what the combined effect of Nehrings loss of confidence and enemy tanks on the streets of Tunis that night would have been. On the heels of the defeats at Medjeb al Bad, Teboura, & Diedidea to the 25th its a worthwhile question.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#77

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 07:55

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Mar 2021, 17:36
Kind of a digression but when has that ever stopped us?
daveshoup2MD wrote:
12 Mar 2021, 08:38
...Looking back, the reality seems that even with US resources, the initial forces were far too slender to to get to Tunisia before the winter; a more realistic approach may well have been to take Morocco and Algeria, concentrate on the build-up over the winter, and move on Tunisia in the spring-summer; which is pretty close to what happened historically, as it was. That still requires a commitment to coalition warfare that it does not appear the Allies - meaning the British - had command staff capable of delivering upon in 1942.
Perhaps, certainly in how the campaign played out over six months. However in late November Nerhing judged the Axis situation in Tunisia as lost and recommended consolidation in Bizerte and then probable evacuation. Kesselring understood the situation in similar terms to Nehring, but being a gambler doubled down on fighting on the approaches to Tunis city. This was the week when the combined US/British BLADE Force was fighting over the towns of Medjeb al Bab and Teboura. The latter 25 km from downtown Tunis. On the 25th Nov Maj Barlows tank company overran the Axis airfield at Diedidea & destroying 25+ German aircraft, just ten km from the Tunis suburbs. Barlow commander, LtCol Waters of 1/1 Armored regiment briefly considered taking his entire tank force of 45 tanks to raid Tunis. The disorganized situation of BLADE Force & the unlikely ability to send fuel and ammo to Waters battalion in Tunis caused the idea to be dropped. But the act was on the table & the situation in flux.

Kesselring gambled and relieved Nehring in favor of Arnim, ordering Tunis defended. Andersen the same moment failed in confidence as well. Telling Eisenhower the advance of the 78th Div had stalled & of his pessimism about holding the critial Medjeb river valley. Ike left Andersen in place & defered to his judgement.

Its 'difficult' to say what the combined effect of Nehrings loss of confidence and enemy tanks on the streets of Tunis that night would have been. On the heels of the defeats at Medjeb al Bad, Teboura, & Diedidea to the 25th its a worthwhile question.
True, but an understrength tank battalion fighting in a city where the Axis had quite capable infantry equally capable of digging in seems a bridge too far, in more ways then one.

The cautious alternative would have been an all-American expeditionary force, limited to Morocco and (western) Algeria; the audacious one would have been a reinforced US corps in Morocco and a reinforced British corps in eastern Algeria (Bone and Phillipeville, presumably) with a floating reserve worth the name ready to steam for Tunis if Esteva went for the main chance.

As it was, landing separate three task forces (Morocco, Oran, Algiers) and the hoped-for overland "dash" to Tunis seems willful disregard of the concept of concentration and time and distance, much less the maritime superiority the Allies held in the greater MTO in 1942.


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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#78

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Mar 2021, 09:18

Hi daveshoup2MD,

You may be right as far as the local situation is concerned, but I am not sure the quick end to the Tunisian Campaign was necessarily in the wider Allied long term interest.

I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?

I think the slow development of the Tunisian campaign, although not intended, may have turned out to be advantageous.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#79

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Mar 2021, 11:48

daveshoup2MD wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 07:55
The cautious alternative would have been an all-American expeditionary force, limited to Morocco and (western) Algeria; the audacious one would have been a reinforced US corps in Morocco and a reinforced British corps in eastern Algeria (Bone and Phillipeville, presumably) with a floating reserve worth the name ready to steam for Tunis if Esteva went for the main chance.
The audacious plan would have been derived from the idea of ignoring Morocco & shifting the three TF one space east, with the Eastern TF landing at Bone, the Center at Oran, & the Western at Algiers. The Brits were still repairing the damage from Op PEDESTAL & were reluctant to send a TF in range of strong Axis air support at Bone, Oran was less risky. The US leaders insisted on Morocco. Their intelligence analysis told them (falsely) the Spanish would seize the Moroccan ports and Allow Axis air forces to join them. Im unsure how seriously the Brits took this threat, but they went along with the Moroccan occupation.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#80

Post by Sheldrake » 13 Mar 2021, 12:12

Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
Hi daveshoup2MD,

You may be right as far as the local situation is concerned, but I am not sure the quick end to the Tunisian Campaign was necessarily in the wider Allied long term interest.

I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?

I think the slow development of the Tunisian campaign, although not intended, may have turned out to be advantageous.

Cheers,

Sid.
Agreed.
There were several things at play in Tunisia.

1. This was the first Allied Combined Arms operation and a substitute for the cancelled cross channel operations proposed by the US since Pearl Harbour. It had to be made to work as an allied operation. It did not matter what national commands occupied Algeria or Morocco, the balance of forces would have to face the Germans and Italians in Tunisia and get along well enough to win as an allied force.

2. It was the first US Army land operation of any scale against the European axis powers. Carl mentioned organisational culture and systems. The US Army had always been very small in peace time and then rapidly expanded to meet major commitments -e.g. the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2. There were very few commanders with any experience of high command and so a pattern that emerged of rapid promotion followed by dismissal when the commander failed to deliver. The indecisive McLellan was a great trainer but a poor battle leader. He was probably in post too long. Keep sacking the Mcdowells, Burnsides, Pope''s and Hooker and you will eventually find Grant, Meade, Sherman and Sheridan. Pershing was merciless in WW1.

The Germans and to a lesser extent the British had an opportunity to see how commanders performed at junior command in battle. A man who could not cope with the stress of combat would be found out at battalion or brigade level. Commanders appointed to army command had an opportunity to learn and demonstrate competence commanding a division and corps. A French general is alleged to have said that it cost 10,000 casualties to train a divisional commander inn WW1. Many of the British failures in command were through rushed promotions. Cunningham had commanded an AA Division before conducting the Keren battles at Corps level - but not adequate preparation for facing Rommel in a mobile battle. Ritchie was a staff officer parachuted into army command as Aukinleck's puppet. When he returned in 1944 as a Corps commander he did well. Slim's early operations did not go well in East Africa. The British had a fair churn of commanders, though Brooke was acutely aware of the limited pool of talent and confided in his diary that as CinC Home Forces he should sack half of his corps and division commanders but couldn't find anyone better, The US Army did not have even the luxury of a known pool of commanders. It may have been tough on Fredendall, Dawney and Lucas, who were unlucky in their appointments but US culture sees them first as losers.

Anderson was a fighting soldier, wounded on the 1st day of the Somme and had a much better command career than predicted by a mediocre staff college assessment made by Percy Hobart. He did well enough as a brigade commander in 1940 to be appointed to take over Montgomery's 3rd Division. He did well enough as a divisional and corps commander in Home Forces to be appointed to command 1st Army. But he was the fourth choice. The first choice -Alexander took over from Aukinleck and the second - Montgomery took over command of 8th Army and the third choice Schriber became ill. Hobart's assessment of Anderson as having limited capacity is borne out by events. He was out of his depth as the army commander of an allied force with lots of other people also new to battle.

Army command is a political role. An army of half a million men cannot be commanded purely by administrative diktat, training directives and tactical memorandum. Command is about leadership as well as management. The commander is the equivalent of a major of a city and projects an image through personal contacts with subordinates, and a public image through the media and staged meetings and parades. Montgomery, Patton and Rommel all knew this and used this to project their leadership. It did not matter if Rommel's staff dug a deep dug out: The newsreels had shown Rommel leading panzers from the front. In 1944 he was a tireless visitor to the Atlantic wall and a vocal critic of indolence. Patton was only a profane man as far as his public image. Montgomery's belief in himself and the British Army's doctrine rubbed off on his army. Fredendall and Anderson did not either know how to manage their image or know what they needed to do to provide leadership to their forces.

Op Torch might have turned out differently with Alex or Montgomery as 1st Army Commander. Alex had the dimplomatic skills to work well with Americans. Montgomery arguably the drive, tactical nous and an urge to train and improve. BUT The Americans found Montgomery hard to stomach even after he had credibility after El Alamein. It could have been the end of his career.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#81

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Mar 2021, 13:09

Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?
Years ago I set out study the benefits of the Mediterranean combat experience for the US Army. Im still searching. First I was struck by how few US units and senior leaders actually had been in battle in the MTO. By May 1944 there were just nine US ground combat with combat experience in the ETO & MTO, & only four of those had more than a few weeks of combat experience. A huge number of reports on combat experience were sent back to the US for AGF to apply to training. But the evidence of effect is thin. In France and Germany one fonds the fresh units from the US making the same mistakes and following the same tactical doctrines the US I & II Corps brought to Africa in 1942. Its notable how few Army officers of any rank were rotated back to the US to lend their experience to training. Fredendal is one of the few. There is evidence the reports concerning equipment were acted on. Thousands of changes in the designs of US built equipment were made 1943-1944 & a significant portion look like there were made in direct response to reports from the MTO & Pacific. So yes, Pattons 3rd Army went across France with better air filters on the motors, & better capacitors in the radios. What really surprises me is how few of the amphibious op experienced US officers were in the US 1st Army for Op NEPTUNE. Of the three probable army commanders Bradley was the least experienced, with only one combat operation, and thin involvement in planning previous ops. Patton had two behind him and a large scale exercise in the US. Clark also had command of a army size combat assault (two if op SHINGLE is counted), and was deeply involved in planning five or six, plus exercises as far back as 1940. Bradley's two corps commanders had some training for amphib ops in the PTO, but limited direct experience. Bradlys staff was also unexpectedly thin on officers with direct MTO experience, & direct experience in amphib assaults. The mistakes made on the Normandy beaches were often the same made in Op TORCH, or WATCHTOWER for that matter.

The USN & RN are a different matter. Admiral Hewitt & his peers clearly accumulated 'best practices' & built up some corporate knowledge. Repeat errors are less evident. The Army Air Forces clearly learned from all its combat experience. Hap Arnold tried hard to allow the combat lessons to filter back to the training in the US. The main point with the US Army is the surprisingly thin evidence of the combat experience from overseas having the assumed effect on preparation/training.
Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
... Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?
Cant really imagine it. The Italians judged Sardinia and Sicilly indefensible and hedged their bets there. The usually optimistic Kessllring looked at the loss of air power over Sicilly and judged it a delaying action at best. Concern over the ground force being cut off as in Tunisia influenced this. Beyond that the US formation under them most pressure from counter attacks in Sicilly was the 45th ID fresh from the US with zero combat experience. Combat experience does not count for a lot when you are putting your least experienced units at the front end.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#82

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 18:19

Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
Hi daveshoup2MD,

You may be right as far as the local situation is concerned, but I am not sure the quick end to the Tunisian Campaign was necessarily in the wider Allied long term interest.

I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?

I think the slow development of the Tunisian campaign, although not intended, may have turned out to be advantageous.

Cheers,

Sid.
Not following what you're suggesting - no Italian entry into the war in 1940? Because otherwise, there was going to be a North African campaign.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#83

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 18:30

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 11:48
daveshoup2MD wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 07:55
The cautious alternative would have been an all-American expeditionary force, limited to Morocco and (western) Algeria; the audacious one would have been a reinforced US corps in Morocco and a reinforced British corps in eastern Algeria (Bone and Phillipeville, presumably) with a floating reserve worth the name ready to steam for Tunis if Esteva went for the main chance.
The audacious plan would have been derived from the idea of ignoring Morocco & shifting the three TF one space east, with the Eastern TF landing at Bone, the Center at Oran, & the Western at Algiers. The Brits were still repairing the damage from Op PEDESTAL & were reluctant to send a TF in range of strong Axis air support at Bone, Oran was less risky. The US leaders insisted on Morocco. Their intelligence analysis told them (falsely) the Spanish would seize the Moroccan ports and Allow Axis air forces to join them. Im unsure how seriously the Brits took this threat, but they went along with the Moroccan occupation.
Well, given the state of the Allied experience of coalition warfare in Q4 1942, some of the decisions that were made (US assault troops in British assault shipping with a British covering force, landing as part of a joint Anglo-American composite division deep inside the Med, etc) I think the Americans were right to insist on Morocco. They'd seen the allies shown off "continental" beachheads in the greater ETO three times already in 1940-41, after all.

If the conops had been a US corps (ideally, Patton's amphibious corps headquarters, reinforced) in Morocco, and a British corps (Crocker? Allfrey?, also reinforced) in eastern Algeria, with a floating reserve and heavy escort for Tunisia ready and at sea, seems like the end result could well have been better than the reality.

The question of the French military reaction to an undeniably British expeditionary force in eastern Algeria is a reasonable one, of course; although if the targets are Philippeville or Bone, as opposed to Algeirs and/or Oran, the reaction might have been muted - and given Darlan's willingness to deal, presumably some sort of accommodation would have been accepted.

Of course, that raises the same challenges the historical deal did, but that was smoothed over quite quickly, after all.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#84

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Mar 2021, 18:39

Hi daves.....

I am suggesting what I posted, that it may have been "fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience."

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#85

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 18:43

Sheldrake wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 12:12
Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
Hi daveshoup2MD,

You may be right as far as the local situation is concerned, but I am not sure the quick end to the Tunisian Campaign was necessarily in the wider Allied long term interest.

I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?

I think the slow development of the Tunisian campaign, although not intended, may have turned out to be advantageous.

Cheers,

Sid.
Agreed.
There were several things at play in Tunisia.

1. This was the first Allied Combined Arms operation and a substitute for the cancelled cross channel operations proposed by the US since Pearl Harbour. It had to be made to work as an allied operation. It did not matter what national commands occupied Algeria or Morocco, the balance of forces would have to face the Germans and Italians in Tunisia and get along well enough to win as an allied force.

2. It was the first US Army land operation of any scale against the European axis powers. Carl mentioned organisational culture and systems. The US Army had always been very small in peace time and then rapidly expanded to meet major commitments -e.g. the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2. There were very few commanders with any experience of high command and so a pattern that emerged of rapid promotion followed by dismissal when the commander failed to deliver. The indecisive McLellan was a great trainer but a poor battle leader. He was probably in post too long. Keep sacking the Mcdowells, Burnsides, Pope''s and Hooker and you will eventually find Grant, Meade, Sherman and Sheridan. Pershing was merciless in WW1.

The Germans and to a lesser extent the British had an opportunity to see how commanders performed at junior command in battle. A man who could not cope with the stress of combat would be found out at battalion or brigade level. Commanders appointed to army command had an opportunity to learn and demonstrate competence commanding a division and corps. A French general is alleged to have said that it cost 10,000 casualties to train a divisional commander inn WW1. Many of the British failures in command were through rushed promotions. Cunningham had commanded an AA Division before conducting the Keren battles at Corps level - but not adequate preparation for facing Rommel in a mobile battle. Ritchie was a staff officer parachuted into army command as Aukinleck's puppet. When he returned in 1944 as a Corps commander he did well. Slim's early operations did not go well in East Africa. The British had a fair churn of commanders, though Brooke was acutely aware of the limited pool of talent and confided in his diary that as CinC Home Forces he should sack half of his corps and division commanders but couldn't find anyone better, The US Army did not have even the luxury of a known pool of commanders. It may have been tough on Fredendall, Dawney and Lucas, who were unlucky in their appointments but US culture sees them first as losers.

Anderson was a fighting soldier, wounded on the 1st day of the Somme and had a much better command career than predicted by a mediocre staff college assessment made by Percy Hobart. He did well enough as a brigade commander in 1940 to be appointed to take over Montgomery's 3rd Division. He did well enough as a divisional and corps commander in Home Forces to be appointed to command 1st Army. But he was the fourth choice. The first choice -Alexander took over from Aukinleck and the second - Montgomery took over command of 8th Army and the third choice Schriber became ill. Hobart's assessment of Anderson as having limited capacity is borne out by events. He was out of his depth as the army commander of an allied force with lots of other people also new to battle.

Army command is a political role. An army of half a million men cannot be commanded purely by administrative diktat, training directives and tactical memorandum. Command is about leadership as well as management. The commander is the equivalent of a major of a city and projects an image through personal contacts with subordinates, and a public image through the media and staged meetings and parades. Montgomery, Patton and Rommel all knew this and used this to project their leadership. It did not matter if Rommel's staff dug a deep dug out: The newsreels had shown Rommel leading panzers from the front. In 1944 he was a tireless visitor to the Atlantic wall and a vocal critic of indolence. Patton was only a profane man as far as his public image. Montgomery's belief in himself and the British Army's doctrine rubbed off on his army. Fredendall and Anderson did not either know how to manage their image or know what they needed to do to provide leadership to their forces.

Op Torch might have turned out differently with Alex or Montgomery as 1st Army Commander. Alex had the dimplomatic skills to work well with Americans. Montgomery arguably the drive, tactical nous and an urge to train and improve. BUT The Americans found Montgomery hard to stomach even after he had credibility after El Alamein. It could have been the end of his career.
Alexander and Montgomery had other responsibilities at the time, however; I've always wondered about James Gammel, who appears to have been well-regarded by all of his superiors (from Auchinleck to Montgomery to Wilson to Alexander), served as chief of staff to SACMED under Wilson and Alexander, and yet never got an operational command outside of the UK.

Kind of like Archibald Nye; as significant as both men's careers were, one wonders if they would have been better in operational commands than some of those who did receive them. Nye, as a mustang (or whatever the British equivalent is) might very well have been just the individual to work with the Americans, for example.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 13 Mar 2021, 19:05, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#86

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 19:00

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 13:09
Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?
Years ago I set out study the benefits of the Mediterranean combat experience for the US Army. Im still searching. First I was struck by how few US units and senior leaders actually had been in battle in the MTO. By May 1944 there were just nine US ground combat with combat experience in the ETO & MTO, & only four of those had more than a few weeks of combat experience. A huge number of reports on combat experience were sent back to the US for AGF to apply to training. But the evidence of effect is thin. In France and Germany one fonds the fresh units from the US making the same mistakes and following the same tactical doctrines the US I & II Corps brought to Africa in 1942. Its notable how few Army officers of any rank were rotated back to the US to lend their experience to training. Fredendal is one of the few. There is evidence the reports concerning equipment were acted on. Thousands of changes in the designs of US built equipment were made 1943-1944 & a significant portion look like there were made in direct response to reports from the MTO & Pacific. So yes, Pattons 3rd Army went across France with better air filters on the motors, & better capacitors in the radios. What really surprises me is how few of the amphibious op experienced US officers were in the US 1st Army for Op NEPTUNE. Of the three probable army commanders Bradley was the least experienced, with only one combat operation, and thin involvement in planning previous ops. Patton had two behind him and a large scale exercise in the US. Clark also had command of a army size combat assault (two if op SHINGLE is counted), and was deeply involved in planning five or six, plus exercises as far back as 1940. Bradley's two corps commanders had some training for amphib ops in the PTO, but limited direct experience. Bradlys staff was also unexpectedly thin on officers with direct MTO experience, & direct experience in amphib assaults. The mistakes made on the Normandy beaches were often the same made in Op TORCH, or WATCHTOWER for that matter.

The USN & RN are a different matter. Admiral Hewitt & his peers clearly accumulated 'best practices' & built up some corporate knowledge. Repeat errors are less evident. The Army Air Forces clearly learned from all its combat experience. Hap Arnold tried hard to allow the combat lessons to filter back to the training in the US. The main point with the US Army is the surprisingly thin evidence of the combat experience from overseas having the assumed effect on preparation/training.
Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 09:18
... Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?
Cant really imagine it. The Italians judged Sardinia and Sicilly indefensible and hedged their bets there. The usually optimistic Kessllring looked at the loss of air power over Sicilly and judged it a delaying action at best. Concern over the ground force being cut off as in Tunisia influenced this. Beyond that the US formation under them most pressure from counter attacks in Sicilly was the 45th ID fresh from the US with zero combat experience. Combat experience does not count for a lot when you are putting your least experienced units at the front end.
Good points; one other thing to keep in mind, in terms of assessing "combat experience" of the Allied forces committed to NEPTUE/OVERLORD; the Americans were arguably, equivalent to or better off than the British and and better off than the Canadians. The US re-deployed an armored division, two infantry divisions, and an airborne division from the MTO to the UK, all with recent (1942-43) combat experience, and all four had key roles in the assault and immediate follow-up; the British re-deployed an armored division, two infantry divisions, and an airborne division from the MTO to the UK (again, all with recent 1942-43 combat experience) , but only three were committed in the same time frame as the four US veteran divisions. The Canadian divisions with recent combat experience were in the Med (1st and 5th Armoured), unless one counts the 2nd Division's experience at Dieppe, and the 2nd didn't go ashore in France until July, 1944.

All in all, the Allied forces that fought in Normandy, France, and Belgium in 1944 did remarkably well against an enemy on the defensive. Normandy to VE Day was 11 months, after all; given the distances from Normandy (and Provence) to the Rhine and Ruhr, and from the Rhine and Ruhr to Berlin, it's always been unclear to me how much "faster" they are supposed to have won in 1944-45.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#87

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 19:03

Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 18:39
Hi daves.....

I am suggesting what I posted, that it may have been "fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience."

Cheers,

Sid.
I'm just asking when you think a likely point of departure would have occurred to prevent an Allied campaign in North Africa, and/or are you including Egypt/Libya in the definition of "North Africa Campaign," or see that term as referring to only to French North Africa.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#88

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Mar 2021, 19:22

Hi daves.....,

I would suggest German intervention was the key. Only so much could be learnt against the under equipped Italians. The British needed to extend themselves against the Germans to really sharpen themselves up for an invasion of continental Europe.

Cheers,

Sid.

Sid Guttridge
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Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#89

Post by Sid Guttridge » 13 Mar 2021, 19:33

Hi Guys,

I was just looking at the US forces used in the initial landings in the Mediterranean from July 1943. By a quick calculation:

In Sicily, the US landed three divisions with previous combat experience and one without.

In the invasion of Italy, at Anzio and in the south of France all the US divisions initially landed by sea had previous combat experience.

Cheers,

Sid.

daveshoup2MD
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#90

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Mar 2021, 21:04

Sid Guttridge wrote:
13 Mar 2021, 19:22
Hi daves.....,

I would suggest German intervention was the key. Only so much could be learnt against the under equipped Italians. The British needed to extend themselves against the Germans to really sharpen themselves up for an invasion of continental Europe.

Cheers,

Sid.
Okay, thanks. An MTO in 1940-43 without German intervention in Africa is interesting. Presumably, the British "pause" after the initial 1940-41 counteroffensive, for East Africa, the Levant-Iraq-Iran, and later Greece, still takes place... unless you think Greece turns out differently? The Germans have an extra 3-4 motorized divisions, after all.

Which, all else being equal, means the British are in (roughly) the shape they were in in terms of the 8th Army and DAF order of battle by the summer-autumn of 1941 as they were for CRUSADER, historically, but (perhaps) somewhat earlier and facing a much weaker Axis (Italian) force in eastern Libya; then start the offensive, do well, are driving for Tripolitania, and then the Pacific War begins?

At any rate, I expect the British can manage to take control of Libya at some point in 1941-42, so perhaps the Med is fully open in the spring-summer of 1942, as opposed to the autumn-winter? With the British in Tripolitania, the French in North Africa might (or might not) rally, of course.

Lots of potential points of divergence, of course.

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