Sid Guttridge wrote: ↑13 Mar 2021, 09:18
Hi daveshoup2MD,
You may be right as far as the local situation is concerned, but I am not sure the quick end to the Tunisian Campaign was necessarily in the wider Allied long term interest.
I always think it fortunate for the Western Allies that the North Africa Campaign happened at all, as it gave the British and American armies time to gain some successful combat experience. Without it, by the time it came to invade the European continent, the British experience would have been just a few disastrous weeks at Dunkirk and in Greece two or three years before and the Canadians one bad day at Dieppe in 1942, while the US Army would have had no combat experience at all. Can you imagine if the Axis had had just half the formations lost in Tunisia available in Sicily and a Kasserine Pass-type debacle had happened on the island's beaches to either the British or Americans?
I think the slow development of the Tunisian campaign, although not intended, may have turned out to be advantageous.
Cheers,
Sid.
Agreed.
There were several things at play in Tunisia.
1. This was the first Allied Combined Arms operation and a substitute for the cancelled cross channel operations proposed by the US since Pearl Harbour. It had to be made to work as an allied operation. It did not matter what national commands occupied Algeria or Morocco, the balance of forces would have to face the Germans and Italians in Tunisia and get along well enough to win as an allied force.
2. It was the first US Army land operation of any scale against the European axis powers. Carl mentioned organisational culture and systems. The US Army had always been very small in peace time and then rapidly expanded to meet major commitments -e.g. the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2. There were very few commanders with any experience of high command and so a pattern that emerged of rapid promotion followed by dismissal when the commander failed to deliver. The indecisive McLellan was a great trainer but a poor battle leader. He was probably in post too long. Keep sacking the Mcdowells, Burnsides, Pope''s and Hooker and you will eventually find Grant, Meade, Sherman and Sheridan. Pershing was merciless in WW1.
The Germans and to a lesser extent the British had an opportunity to see how commanders performed at junior command in battle. A man who could not cope with the stress of combat would be found out at battalion or brigade level. Commanders appointed to army command had an opportunity to learn and demonstrate competence commanding a division and corps. A French general is alleged to have said that it cost 10,000 casualties to train a divisional commander inn WW1. Many of the British failures in command were through rushed promotions. Cunningham had commanded an AA Division before conducting the Keren battles at Corps level - but not adequate preparation for facing Rommel in a mobile battle. Ritchie was a staff officer parachuted into army command as Aukinleck's puppet. When he returned in 1944 as a Corps commander he did well. Slim's early operations did not go well in East Africa. The British had a fair churn of commanders, though Brooke was acutely aware of the limited pool of talent and confided in his diary that as CinC Home Forces he should sack half of his corps and division commanders but couldn't find anyone better, The US Army did not have even the luxury of a known pool of commanders. It may have been tough on Fredendall, Dawney and Lucas, who were unlucky in their appointments but US culture sees them first as losers.
Anderson was a fighting soldier, wounded on the 1st day of the Somme and had a much better command career than predicted by a mediocre staff college assessment made by Percy Hobart. He did well enough as a brigade commander in 1940 to be appointed to take over Montgomery's 3rd Division. He did well enough as a divisional and corps commander in Home Forces to be appointed to command 1st Army. But he was the fourth choice. The first choice -Alexander took over from Aukinleck and the second - Montgomery took over command of 8th Army and the third choice Schriber became ill. Hobart's assessment of Anderson as having limited capacity is borne out by events. He was out of his depth as the army commander of an allied force with lots of other people also new to battle.
Army command is a political role. An army of half a million men cannot be commanded purely by administrative diktat, training directives and tactical memorandum. Command is about leadership as well as management. The commander is the equivalent of a major of a city and projects an image through personal contacts with subordinates, and a public image through the media and staged meetings and parades. Montgomery, Patton and Rommel all knew this and used this to project their leadership. It did not matter if Rommel's staff dug a deep dug out: The newsreels had shown Rommel leading panzers from the front. In 1944 he was a tireless visitor to the Atlantic wall and a vocal critic of indolence. Patton was only a profane man as far as his public image. Montgomery's belief in himself and the British Army's doctrine rubbed off on his army. Fredendall and Anderson did not either know how to manage their image or know what they needed to do to provide leadership to their forces.
Op Torch might have turned out differently with Alex or Montgomery as 1st Army Commander. Alex had the dimplomatic skills to work well with Americans. Montgomery arguably the drive, tactical nous and an urge to train and improve. BUT The Americans found Montgomery hard to stomach even after he had credibility after El Alamein. It could have been the end of his career.