WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

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KDF33
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by KDF33 » 17 Mar 2021 05:57

daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:10
No, simply that the Axis (Powers, including the three minor powers mentioned above) were essential to even hold the line in the east in 1942 (when the USSR is supposed to collapse), given the German losses and the brilliant offensive strategy of constantly widening the (north-south) front at the same time the theater was a constantly lengthening (east-west).
I don't know that the minor Axis allies were essential to holding the line in 1942. Certainly during the first Soviet winter counter-offensive, it was overwhelmingly German forces that held the line.

Their contribution grew in the spring / early summer, and they made up ~12.5% of the total Axis strength at the beginning of the summer offensive (~0.4 / 3.2 million). The Axis line really became dependent on them only in the second half of the summer, when, as you rightly point out, the Germans ludicrously overextended themselves, an unforced mistake that was hardly inevitable but for Hitler's idiosyncratic "strategy".
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:10
The reality the Germans had mounted simultaneous offensives in three (sub) theaters in the east in 1941 and were reduced to (maybe) 1.5 equivalents in 1942 sort of suggests the trend. The reality they were down to less than 1 in 1943 illustrates it quite clearly.
This is an oft-repeated talking point. It posits that declining German fortunes in the East were a function of an irrepressible "trend" in the balance-of-force, favoring the Soviets as time passed. IMO, this is an ex post facto explanation. It doesn't account for the high degree of contingency of outcomes in the mid-1941 to mid-1943 period.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 17 Mar 2021 06:17

KDF33 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 05:57
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:10
No, simply that the Axis (Powers, including the three minor powers mentioned above) were essential to even hold the line in the east in 1942 (when the USSR is supposed to collapse), given the German losses and the brilliant offensive strategy of constantly widening the (north-south) front at the same time the theater was a constantly lengthening (east-west).
I don't know that the minor Axis allies were essential to holding the line in 1942. Certainly during the first Soviet winter counter-offensive, it was overwhelmingly German forces that held the line.

Their contribution grew in the spring / early summer, and they made up ~12.5% of the total Axis strength at the beginning of the summer offensive (~0.4 / 3.2 million). The Axis line really became dependent on them only in the second half of the summer, when, as you rightly point out, the Germans ludicrously overextended themselves, an unforced mistake that was hardly inevitable but for Hitler's idiosyncratic "strategy".
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:10
The reality the Germans had mounted simultaneous offensives in three (sub) theaters in the east in 1941 and were reduced to (maybe) 1.5 equivalents in 1942 sort of suggests the trend. The reality they were down to less than 1 in 1943 illustrates it quite clearly.
This is an oft-repeated talking point. It posits that declining German fortunes in the East were a function of an irrepressible "trend" in the balance-of-force, favoring the Soviets as time passed. IMO, this is an ex post facto explanation. It doesn't account for the high degree of contingency of outcomes in the mid-1941 to mid-1943 period.
Well yeah, but Nazi Germany absent Hitler isn't really Nazi Germany, is it?

It's an equally repeated talking point, but if Germany "had" rational leadership in this period, they wouldn't have gone to war.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by KDF33 » 17 Mar 2021 07:09

daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 06:17
Well yeah, but Nazi Germany absent Hitler isn't really Nazi Germany, is it?
Agreed. My point is simply that the outcome of the Soviet-German war during the decisive year of 1942 had less to do with insurmountable Soviet advantages, and more to do with German mistakes.

I would, however, also argue that the relatively strong German position in mid-1942 had more to do with Soviet mistakes in 1941 - early 1942 than with irrepressible German strength at the beginning of Barbarossa.

IMO, the pendulum of initiative swung back and forth in the East from mid-1941 to mid-1943 largely on account of the respective sides' egregious strategic blindness and operational mistakes. Both Hitler and Stalin were impulsive military leaders that mostly reacted to the impressions of the moment while failing to grasp the fundamentals of the war. Contrary to received wisdom, I would argue that Stalin never got the wiser. His war was just easier than Hitler's: to win, he just had to survive long enough for the Anglo-Americans to start making an impact.
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 06:17
It's an equally repeated talking point, but if Germany "had" rational leadership in this period, they wouldn't have gone to war.
I agree. Admittedly, its not clear to me that many major powers had rational leadership in that period. With that being said, obviously Hitler's kind was the most destabilizing and destructive.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Mar 2021 08:10

KDF33 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 07:09
its not clear to me that many major powers had rational leadership in that period. With that being said, obviously Hitler's kind was the most destabilizing and destructive.
There's rational and there's rational.

Most people use "rational" to mean something more like "reasonable" on moral and characterological grounds - Hitler definitely meets that definition "irrational".

A narrower definition of "rational" denotes purely instrumental rationality: the ability correctly to analyze means and ends. On this definition it's often rational for a criminal to murder a child who witnessed a burglary, even though this kind of behavior is irrational and insane by common meaning - even among many criminals.

On the narrower definition of rationality, there's a good argument that Hitler was - up to Barbarossa - the most rational of world leaders. At multiple points in his rise he matched a realistic appraisal of his means and his desired ends - something that IMO contemporary leaders completely failed to do. Had he been always instrumentally irrational - e.g. always beholden to a myth of German invincibility - he would not have taken the cold-bloodedly rational and pragmatic step of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Note that many diehard Nazis deplored the Pact; the Reich Chancellery was littered with Nazi pins thrown there by disillusioned acolytes. Rather, an instrumentally irrational belief in German invincibility would have persuaded Hitler to tilt against the world as he supposedly did later (more on that below).

Another example of Hitler's instrumental rationality is his assiduous avoidance of provoking war with the USA in 1941 when many in his military - Raeder particularly - all but called Hitler a coward for abiding American provocations in the Atlantic and on economic matters. Hitler nonetheless held his fire - he'd beat Russia first, then fight the Americans.

By contrast, contemporary world leaders in 1939 had reasonable moral views (i.e. Hitler is bad) but were instrumentally irrational regarding their means. Chamberlain and Daladier (to a lesser extent), for example, drew a line on Poland that they couldn't back up and foreseeably so. Stalin likewise made a calculation that, on his own terms, should have doomed him and his country completely ("Hitler will surely beat our brains in!" he exclaimed when France fell) and largely doomed it in every sense but losing the war.

On the grandest of strategic questions - what will decide the coming wars - Hitler properly evaluated strategic airpower as indecisive while the Anglo-Americans placed completely irrational (instrumentally) faith in strategic bombing. Motivated reasoning surely underlay this evaluation, as the Anglo-Americans didn't want to fight - and since WW1 never have fought - large-scale total wars on the ground.

The first great exception to Hitler's instrumental rationality - and the one that is the fulcrum of world history - was his underestimation of the SU. As with the Anglo-American misjudgment of strategic bombing, this error has an alibi: Hitler was flush with Victory Fever and, always the stupid racist, he took the Slavs too lightly. Racist stupidity wasn't unique to Hitler though - see Allied evaluations of the Japanese - and everyone is vulnerable to Victory Fever.

The post-'41 Hitler - the one whose Wunderwaffen fantasies and other Final Victory delusions are Exhibit #1 for his irrationality - is largely a fiction. He never believed any of it; he knew was a dead man no later than '42. But here again he's basically rational: his choice was to fight on or kill himself earlier. For somebody who cares zero for other lives, the rational choice is burn it all down with you.

Basically Hitler was a pretty mediocre person generally but possessed some well-above-average analytical skills. We probably all know multiple people smarter than Hitler and, unfortunately, a few as inwardly desolate. A sad fact, however, is that politics doesn't select for intellectual seriousness and Hitler's opponents were, by and large, lightweights. The pettiness and mediocrity of this person - his detestable taste in art, the offensive stupidity of Nazi political aesthetics with its "wow isn't fire cool!" aesthetics - shouldn't blind us to the fact that the few correct moves he made - and which the Allies flubbed - turned what should have been a quick suppression of German revanchism into history's greatest nightmare.

The personally reasonable but instrumentally irrational liberals of 1939 were the ones incapable of making analytically correct decisions that matched ends and means.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Mar 2021 09:10

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Mar 2021 10:35
The post-SU stalemate would require a buildup of American/Anglo armies to guard against Sealion and to stop Axis advances across the whole Eurasian landmass. Raising these armies would significantly reduce Allied war production.
A bit more on this from "The 90 Division Gamble" by Maurice Matloff in Command Decisions.
Why, if Germany could maintain a military establishment of 9,835,000 or 10.9 percent of its population and Britain could support 3,885,000 or 8.2, did American manpower officials insist in late 1942 that 10,500,000 or only 7.8 percent would be the maximum force that the country could sustain without incurring serious dislocation to the American economy? [5] The problem as well as the answer stemmed basically from the fact that the Allies had from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its industry. From the very beginning, American manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry.

The Army had therefore to compete for manpower not only with the needs of the other services but also with the prior claims of industry. Cutting too deeply into the industrial manpower of the country in order to furnish men for the Army and Navy might interfere seriously with arming U.S. troops and those of the Allies for the successful conduct of the war. Furthermore, the United States was fighting a global conflict. To service its lines of communications extending around the world required large numbers of men, and great numbers of troops were constantly in transit to and from the theaters.
The War Manpower Commission, informing the armed services that approximately 1,500,000 men could be furnished to them in 1944, stated that this figure would be close to the limit of those that could be withdrawn from the manpower pool without jeopardizing war production, transportation, and essential civilian services.
Efforts to formulate troop bases for 1944 and beyond that were being made at the same time pointed to the need for drastic reductions of earlier estimates. [8] The planners were working from the old assumption of the late 1941 and early 1942 period that the USSR might be defeated by the Germans, thus forcing on the Allies a far greater and more costly ground effort
So in ATL 1942, US planners believe the only way to beat Germany - if she could beat at all - is to raise a larger army. The A-bomb is just an obscure notion at that time; it certainly doesn't determine the projected troop basis. Therefore, if the U.S. stays in the war post-SU, it fights with significantly less production behind it.

Note that the larger forces under discussion - the Victory Program of 1941's 215 divisions - were judged in 1942 completely inadequate to defeat Germany absent the SU, as anyone should realize and as discussed further here. So even the production reductions mooted in 1942 - i.e. VP41 program - wouldn't have approached what American planners would have considered necessary to defeat Germany, were such defeat considered feasible at all (it wasn't).

Most apropos of this thread, there is no feasible timeline in which the US raises the army it considered necessary for any hope of defeating Germany, while also maintaining production at levels necessary to the CBO. I've so far analyzed the ATL post-SU air war as if US production is identical to OTL but that's flatly impossible unless the US has found some politically viable formula for selling endless war without the hope of victory.

If the US wants to sell the public on the notion that it will invade Europe and defeat Germany, it must abandon the CBO to raise an army remotely capable of making that promise credible. If it does not abandon the CBO, it must have a public receptive to endless siege warfare against Germany and delayed - perhaps indefinitely - victory over Japan.

These decisions have long time-horizons. Even if ATL US planners started including the A-bomb in their projections in 1944, it would take years to efficiently return millions of additional soldiers to factories provided with the tooling necessary for something like OTL production levels.

In short, continuation of the CBO - a doomed effort against stronger ATL German defenses - is irreconcilable with a credible push for final victory over Germany. Abandonment of the CBO, OTOH, is politically infeasible and its ground-campaign corollary is militarily doomed. The unanimous contemporary judgment that Germany could not be defeated if SU fell is correct as a matter of military history and determinative as a matter of counterfactual analysis.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Politician01 » 17 Mar 2021 12:47

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
16 Mar 2021 20:14
You are obviously stuck in your mindset
So are you Tom, so are you....
historygeek2021 wrote:
16 Mar 2021 22:10
How exactly is this for sure?
Mounting casualties and no visible path to victory. OTL in terms of casualties WW2 was a cake walk for the Wallies because the Soviets absorbed most damage. In this ATL the Wallies stick to bombing - basically admitting that they are to scared to invade and have no idea how to win - or they invade Sicily/Italy as per OTL - for 5x the casualties and half the OTL advance speed.
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:15
Um, yeah ... mmmkay.
Really thats all dave? How about you react to my previous post, where I debunked all your nagging? Still waiting on those "multiple strategic options" you claimed the Wallies have now that the pesky USSR is gone that apparently made these "options" impossible OTL.

As allways the main problem of threads like these are:

1. Anglo Chauvinism: We defeated Germany and to say that Anglos would have been probably incapable of doing so without the USSR is heresy.

2. Lack of knowledge - or deliberate denial on how much manpower and how much effort/resources the Germans had to invest against the USSR, and how this disrupted German production/strategy/development of new weapons ect and how much easier it made the war for the Wallies.

3. The inability to consider the geopolitical changes that would have arisen after a succesfull Barbarossa/Blau and its impact on Anglo populations/policy. Contrary to the myths that are allways constructed after succesfull wars, US population was not very enthusiastic about the war with Germany, the main focus was on punishing the Japanese.

Look I am not even claiming that it is impossible for the Wallies to beat Germany on their own - without the USSR it just becomes a LOT harder and evidence suggests that negotiations are a far more likely path. But if they would be ready, able and willing to sacrifice several million of their troops in a massive air AND ground warfare campaign in the 43-46 period, they might win against the Germans in 300 out of 1000 timelines.

If they have absolutely no regard for their air crews and are ready to nuke Central Europe into oblivion, willing to sacrifice millions of Britons to German Biological/Chemical counterstrikes- they might win in 950 out of 1000 timelines.

They however do not have the power of hindsight. All they know in the spring of 1943 is that Germany just defeated the USSR and that it can transfer hundreds of thousands of troops West, demobilize hundreds of thousands into its factories, and thousands of specialists for weapon development. They can send thousands of additional tanks, guns, aircraft and motor vehicles West, German fuel and resource situation becomes a little better immediately.

The few people that work on the nuke do not know when it will be ready, they also do not know if it will work. Meanwhile Allied losses in the air sykrocket, Allied losses on the ground skyrocket (if they invade in the Med) the war in Europe seems unwinnable. Bascially high casualties, for very little gain. There are elections in the US in 1944, Roosevelt dies in April 45 anyways, negative public opinion due to stalemate and high casualties, then here is the question of Japan ect ect

So realistically it would seem that with all these obstacles, by the summer of 1945 the war in Europe would have morphed into a cold-war state in perhaps 800 out of 1000 timelines and would not have resumed after the defeat of Japan. You might think differently - but then please support evidence that can be discussed and not handwave slogans like: US STRONK! Manpower and resources unlimited! The public loves war and will never surrenda! Casualties dont matter! Everyone knows that da nukes are ready by 1945! Wehraboo! No Germany cant do this lol and even if it does it doesnt matter lol!

I believe with this, everything that can be said, has been said.

Cheers

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by historygeek2021 » 17 Mar 2021 19:19

The Allies would never make peace with Adolf Hitler. Hitler broke every treaty he ever signed. He habitually attacked countries he was at peace with. Waging war was the raison d'être of his regime. Making peace with Hitler would only give him time to consolidate his gains, strengthen his military, and launch a surprise attack on Britain and the United States.

Hitler's offensive style of warfare would inflame Allied public opinion against him. He would continue U-boat attacks, bombing civilians, invading other neutral countries and developing terror weapons (V-1, V-2) that would only increase public outrage in western countries who would demand his removal from power.

When in history has an anti-war movement succeeded in bringing an end to a war? Vietnam continued for years after mass protests. Public opinion is overwhelmingly against American intervention in the Middle East, but our troops have been there for years. In most anti-war movements, the enemy country poses minimal threat, but Germany posed an existential threat and was actively seeking to destroy western countries. It would be the easiest thing in the world for western governments to keep their people afraid of Hitler and to demand that his regime be crushed.

Business interests would also demand that the war continue. War contractors stood to make incredible profits from the continuation of the war. Allied victory would extend American economic hegemony over most of the planet, creating a world of opportunity for American businesses. Germany was competing with the United States in Latin American markets before the war. America would not allow a continent sized Greater Germany to compete with it in global markets.

Wars can last for decades. America was winning the technology race, as others have shown in this thread. American fighters, bombers and missiles would advance beyond Germany's technological abilities. Hitler would have an area to defend stretching from Norway to Morocco to Persia to the Urals. His forces would be spread thin, and the Allies could chip away at his empire little by little. Eventually it is the German people and their conquered subjects, surrounded and blockaded on all sides, isolated from the rest of the world and subsisting on ever stricter rations who would grow tired of the war and demand its end, just as they did in the First World War.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Mar 2021 19:59

[/quote]

A bit more on this from "The 90 Division Gamble" by Maurice Matloff in Command Decisions.
Why, if Germany could maintain a military establishment of 9,835,000 or 10.9 percent of its population and Britain could support 3,885,000 or 8.2, did American manpower officials insist in late 1942 that 10,500,000 or only 7.8 percent would be the maximum force that the country could sustain without incurring serious dislocation to the American economy? [5] The problem as well as the answer stemmed basically from the fact that the Allies had from the beginning accepted the proposition that the single greatest tangible asset the United States brought to the coalition in World War II was the productive capacity of its industry. From the very beginning, American manpower calculations were closely correlated with the needs of war industry.

The Army had therefore to compete for manpower not only with the needs of the other services but also with the prior claims of industry. Cutting too deeply into the industrial manpower of the country in order to furnish men for the Army and Navy might interfere seriously with arming U.S. troops and those of the Allies for the successful conduct of the war. Furthermore, the United States was fighting a global conflict. To service its lines of communications extending around the world required large numbers of men, and great numbers of troops were constantly in transit to and from the theaters.
The War Manpower Commission, informing the armed services that approximately 1,500,000 men could be furnished to them in 1944, stated that this figure would be close to the limit of those that could be withdrawn from the manpower pool without jeopardizing war production, transportation, and essential civilian services.
Efforts to formulate troop bases for 1944 and beyond that were being made at the same time pointed to the need for drastic reductions of earlier estimates. [8] The planners were working from the old assumption of the late 1941 and early 1942 period that the USSR might be defeated by the Germans, thus forcing on the Allies a far greater and more costly ground effort
What I would expand this with is the US use of African & Latina American labor and men for the military. Defacto or by conscious design those two labor pools were under used into 1944. In the shorter span, through 1943 it looks relatively small,a 5% increase? Projecting forward into 1945 & 46 is more difficult. Any upward trends are distorted by the changes and reductions in production goals that started in 1944. Next is incomplete or unbuilt production sectors in 1944-45. ie: the war funded reconstruction of the US railways did not taper off until 1947. It was approximately 75% complete in late 1944 & regions like New England still had inadequate transport capacity due to near 15+ years of underinvestment. All Ive seen are some projections into 1946-47 made in 1942-43, for potential material output and military manpower.

Finally there is the usual question of if just counting ground combat forces is a accurate measurement for estimating the overall situation & outcomes. Theres a reason the US & Britain invested heavily in air power and doubled down on that investment as the war progressed. Were the leaders correct in that, or should they have sent the airmen and factory workers to the infantry?

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 17 Mar 2021 20:02

Politician01 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 12:47
Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑16 Mar 2021 20:14
You are obviously stuck in your mindset

So are you Tom, so are you....
Politician01 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 12:47
Look I am not even claiming that it is impossible for the Wallies to beat Germany on their own - without the USSR it just becomes a LOT harder
I agree entirely. :D

OK?

Regards

Tom

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Politician01 » 17 Mar 2021 20:22

historygeek2021 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 19:19
Wars can last for decades.
Britain is running out of manpower by 1943, faces Indian independence in 1947 - perhaps even faster in this ATL - and the disintegration of its Empire and British economy is overheated to such an extent that it was cannibalizing itself by 1944. The Americans by 1945 face similar problems even if they are less pressing. But the war can last for decades and Oceania will prevail..........sigh.........

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by historygeek2021 » 17 Mar 2021 20:30

Politician01 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 20:22
historygeek2021 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 19:19
Wars can last for decades.
Britain is running out of manpower by 1943, faces Indian independence in 1947 - perhaps even faster in this ATL - and the disintegration of its Empire and British economy is overheated to such an extent that it was cannibalizing itself by 1944. The Americans by 1945 face similar problems even if they are less pressing. But the war can last for decades and Oceania will prevail..........sigh.........
Britain fought successfully through 1945.

Indian independence movements will be ruthlessly crushed during wartime. There's a reason it happened after the war and not during the war.

America didn't face any "similar problems" in the OTL. What about this ATL makes America face "similar problems"?

I love how everything is always roses for the Axis in these ATLs - hundreds of thousands fewer casualties, massively increased output in every sector, unbridled support from their conquered subjects - while the Allies are falling to pieces, suffering unsustainable casualties, and their populations are in open revolt. It's amazing the Allies won at all if this is how the world really works.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by History Learner » 17 Mar 2021 20:48

daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 04:02
History Learner wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:52
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:15
Politician01 wrote:
16 Mar 2021 13:21
It also completely ignores US public opinion. People do not want war - its the Politicians that want it. With Roosevelt on the loosing side, he might well loose the 1944 election to a Republican who promises to make peace with Germany and to concentrate on Japan. Regardless, he is dead in April 45 anyway, giving Truman the opportunity to conduct realpolitics.
Um, yeah ... mmmkay.

How many Americans who were of age in 1941 have you ever spoken with?
Worth noting that, IOTL, support for a peace deal shot up to 40% at several points and this was with the OTL situation:
And yet, the Republicans were in the minority in both houses throughout the war.
Given the OTL situation, yes. Here, however, OP has specified a completely alternate situation where the Axis are doing much, much better relative to what happened historically. To really drive the point home, look at the 1942 Midterms. If the national vote shifted overall just 1% further Republican, the following Congressional races would flip:

California 11
California 23
Illinois 2
Illinois 7
Indiana 11
Kentucky 7
Massachusetts 3
Minnesota 9
New York 16
Oklahoma 2
Pennsylvania 2
Pennsylvania 3
Pennsylvania 25
Utah 1
West Virginia 2
Wyoming At Large

That's 16 seats in total, and given their OTL win of 209 seats, more than sufficient to take control of the House. In the Senate, Montana and Colorado would both be flipped; enough to prevent cloture on filibusters. In effect, FDR becomes a lame duck President and can be forced into a Pacific First strategy at the least by the Republicans. By the time Japan is vanquished, there will absolutely be no stomach to take the millions of casualties necessary to defeat a Germany in control of everything from, say, Brittany to the Urals.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by History Learner » 17 Mar 2021 20:54

historygeek2021 wrote:
17 Mar 2021 04:23
History Learner wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:52
daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021 03:15
Politician01 wrote:
16 Mar 2021 13:21
It also completely ignores US public opinion. People do not want war - its the Politicians that want it. With Roosevelt on the loosing side, he might well loose the 1944 election to a Republican who promises to make peace with Germany and to concentrate on Japan. Regardless, he is dead in April 45 anyway, giving Truman the opportunity to conduct realpolitics.
Um, yeah ... mmmkay.

How many Americans who were of age in 1941 have you ever spoken with?
Worth noting that, IOTL, support for a peace deal shot up to 40% at several points and this was with the OTL situation:

Image

See American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele,The Journal of American History , Dec., 1978, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Dec., 1978), pp. 704-723:
The coming of war to America changed but did not destroy the peace issue. Many of those who had stubbornly resisted involvement now hoped to terminate it as quickly as possible, and apparently only a lack of organization significantly differentiated sentiment for a negotiated peace from the isolationism of 1941. Moreover, as the President quickly learned, the leadership for an effective negotiated peace movement seemed likely to emerge from the die-hard remnants of the America First Committee, particularly in the person of the isolationist national hero, Charles A. Lindbergh.​

America First officially disbanded in February, and many of its officials announced their support for the war effort. Nevertheless, the activities of some members, including Lindbergh, remained the subject of government interest and concern. In mid-February Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover informed the President that former members of the Committee had "gone underground" and were "biding their time," awaiting the opportunity to emerge again as a "political force." Hoover cited as evidence a mid-December meeting at which the renowned flyer had allegedly held forth on the yellow and Bolshevik menaces, on the foolishness of the current war in Europe, and on what might be done to reverse American policy. ​

According to Hoover's informant, Lindbergh declared that "when the American people, by reason of the lists of the missing and the statements of war losses, realize that they have been betrayed by the British and the Administration," the Committee should be ready to "advocate a negotiated peace." Hoover also noted that he had obtained information from other sources to the effect that the America Firsters had a "secret mailing list of 8,476,000"; that lately a "great many individuals among foreign speaking groups have been circularized"; and that the leaders of the underground organization planned to hold a "series of house parties . .. to keep alive contacts."34​
Further:
Nevertheless, the President could not rest easy, for the fate of the extremists notwithstanding, he had reason to ponder the possibility that his more respectable political enemies might use the peace issue to unsettle and embarrass the administration. In April OFF warned that in the fall congressional campaigns "subversion will probably be intermingled with politics" as both administration opponents and Nazi propagandists seek to "promote defeatism or play upon the war weariness of the people." Fleshing out this prediction was a report informing the President that three leading isolationist Republicans, Congressman Joe Martin, former Congressman Bruce Barton, and publisher Roy Howard, had "just held a secret meeting in far off Tucson," leading to speculation that they were planning an "isolationist attack" against administration war policies. A more explicit warning came to Roosevelt from a friend, New Dealer Gardiner Jackson, who told him in the fall of 1942 that the business interests behind the presidential candidacy of Thomas E. Dewey were working hard for a negotiated peace and had taken a recent conciliatory speech by Hitler as the "opening gun of the drive to call the war off. . . ." The problem raised by these reports (if true) was, as OFF warned, that even if the agitation of the peace issue could not force the administration into negotiations, it could do "much damage" by strengthening "the hand of those in Congress whose main goal is the harassment and obstruction of the President."37
So three congressman and a few followers of Charles Lindbergh were having secret house parties. Wow, I never knew America came so close forgiving and forgetting the whole Pearl Harbor thing ... :roll:
I would highly encourage you to re-read the post instead of providing meme answers that suggest you did not so in the first place. Beyond the fact the citation specifically notes a secret mailing list of 8 million American First members had been retained, polling conducted by Gallup found that 40% of Americans supported a peace deal with Germany and the Roosevelt Administration considered this a grave political and strategic threat.

American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele:
By mid-February the shallowness of public commitment to the war had become a subject of national public discussion. To those who enthusiastically supported the administration's view of the war-and this included most of the nation's publicists and opinion leaders-America seemed indifferent.7 The consensus was that after the initial shock of Pearl Harbor had worn off, the public had lapsed into complacency. Public officials, reporters, and other "informed observers" described Americans as "smug," "slothful," and "asleep." According to Time, while people did what they were called upon to do, "they showed little excitement about the war."8 Poor morale generated the most intense public discussion early in 1942, but the problem remained a matter of official concern throughout the year.​

For example, in September OWI reported that "few citizens are fully supporting the war effort. Most are content with the same comfortable ruts." The report said that not many Americans were convinced the military situation was critical or doubted eventual victory. Moreover, although most expected the war to last several years, few thought the struggle would entail great sacrifices. This and other analyses of morale noted a popular disposition to concentrate on the advantages accruing to various sectors of the populace and to conclude that others were exploiting the war for selfish advantage.​
Even against the hated Japanese, by 1945 war exhaustion had likewise set in and the JCS was getting very concerned about it. To quote from Michael D. Pearlman's "Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization and the Atomic Bomb":
"Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5"​
A Germany in control of Europe to the A-A Line or the Urals is one that has the capacity to inflict millions of casualties upon the Anglo-Americans, with its strategic position affording it the ability to last until the late 1940s at the least even if the willpower is there on the part of the Allies to endure that much sacrifice. In such a scenario, I find it highly likely that public support for the war will give out long before Germany is crushed underfoot. Whether or not Churchill or FDR hate Hitler is irrelevant in the face of public opinion, given the former two are, after all, in charge of Democracies. Said public opinion was also not universally behind the war in the way we view today, but was in fact much more fickle and this directly shaped Allied operational planning as a result.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 17 Mar 2021 21:05

politician01 wrote:I believe with this, everything that can be said, has been said.

Cheers
Good post, cheers. Let me say just a little more though...
politician01 wrote:they might win against the Germans in 300 out of 1000 timelines.

If they have absolutely no regard for their air crews and are ready to nuke Central Europe into oblivion, willing to sacrifice millions of Britons to German Biological/Chemical counterstrikes- they might win in 950 out of 1000 timelines.
I broadly agree that there is a feasible path for Anglosphere victory if we remove all political and cultural constraints. In an unconstrained war of attrition, Germany might run out of soldiers first. Sure there's Japanese, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, and probably Spaniards to count as well but their combat efficiency is significantly lower and their national staying power too (besides Japan). If The Empire and its offshoots are willing to take 5 million dead, they might eventually win.

With the A-bomb in the mix, Anglosphere odds are significantly better in the "ruthless America" ATL.

One significant problem, however, is the Type XXI submarine. Nobody had any answer to this weapon even in 1948.

In our ATL, Germany and Hitler are turning their attention to Britain already in late '41, as the SU is clearly going down (Moscow fallen, etc.). It's a distinct possibility that the additional resources for the Uboats - including leadership attention - results in Type XXI being conceived a year or so earlier and that - with more and better workers on the project and less bomb damage to its production chain - it's fully operational by 1944. In that ATL, Germany is likely building at least 2x the 30/month it was capable of building OTL (absent bombing).

Plus, Germany would have shipyards in occupied SU, southern France, and Italy to use (OTL Raeder mooted shifting U-boat production to Leningrad but obviously didn't have the opportunity).

So it's conceivable that Germany is building 80 T21's per month or ~1,000/year by the end of 1944.

That makes any American effort outside the Western Hemisphere impossible (unless maybe the Spruce Goose actually works?). Indeed, a thousand T21's in the Atlantic would endanger Allied surface fleets.

In that condition, Sealion '44/'45 is a distinct possibility.
politician01 wrote:you might think differently - but then please support evidence that can be discussed and not handwave slogans like: US STRONK!
Nice try. You can never educate someone who doesn't want to learn:
historygeek2021 wrote:The Allies would never make peace with Adolf Hitler...
...several hundred words lacking a single citation or compelling logic. Nothing but patriotic slogans.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Mar 2021 21:09

History Learner wrote:
17 Mar 2021 20:54


A Germany in control of Europe to the A-A Line or the Urals is one that has the capacity to inflict millions of casualties upon the Anglo-Americans,
Only in the mind of someone who thinks the Allies 'cheated' and did not have a 'fair fight' with the Germans. In the alternate alternate reality (I.E actual reality) The Allies made sure their armies were fit for the tasks they were given and they must have done something right as the Germany Army was (in reality) defeated everywhere it tried to make a stand

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