No, but the ROK Army was - essentially - professionalized along US lines in 1952-53, at a point when the war - although still very "hot" was stabilized; having the ocean on each flank was a huge advantage for the UN/allied forces, of course, and forced the Chinese and what was left of the NKPA to fight (relatively) conventionally, force-on-force. The Korean War was never an insurgency, obviously, in the sense the Vietnam conflict(s) were, at least at time.
The ROK Army was also literally doubled in size (from 10 light infantry division equivalents to 20) in 1952-53, which was possible because of the inherent stability of the front and the reality the Americans were willing to fund the expansion and sustain it, because it helped achieve the US strategic goals of the moment.
Here's a pretty reasonable short summary:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv103xd ... b_contents
The problem for the ARVN was the "Vietnamization" effort came at a point in that conflict where the front was not stable and the landward flank, at least, was not "closed." Likewise, it's worth noting the US has been willing to maintain combat forces in the ROK from 1953 to the present day; there was no will among US decision-makers to do the same in the RVN, even if the situation had stabilized.
And the US tried extensive operations in Cambodia, and support to the Cambodian and Laotian governments; it was never enough to shut down the landward borders.