The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

[historygeek2021]

According to David Glantz in Operation Barbarossa, Chapter 6, the Soviet high command (Stavka) and commander of the Southwestern Front, Kirponos, discussed the strategic threat to the Southwestern Front as early as August 18. Stalin made the decision to hold Kiev "at all costs" on August 19. The threat from Guderian's panzer group was apparent to the Stavka by August 30. Shaposhnikov and Vasilevsky urged Stalin to withdraw the Southwestern Front on September 7. Guderian and Kleist's panzer groups didn't close the encirclement until September 16.

So yes, it's entirely plausible that the Stavka could have made the decision for the Soviet Southwestern Front to withdraw in late August or early September before the pincers from Guderiand and Kleist trapped it.

[History Learner]

Making the decision, yes, that is easy but as pointed out evacuating quite literally hundreds of thousands of men with all their equipment is another matter entirely.

[historygeek2021]

The Soviets moved armies and equipment around all the time. The Southwestern Front had retreated to Kiev in early July - hundreds of thousands of men and equipment. Reinforcing armies were constantly shuffled up and down the front throughout 1941. Perhaps if they had waited until September 7 then some equipment would have been lost, but nothing close to the disaster of the OTL in which the entire front was encircled and captured.

[History Learner]

The Soviets moved armies and equipment around all the time. The Southwestern Front had retreated to Kiev in early July - hundreds of thousands of men and equipment. Reinforcing armies were constantly shuffled up and down the front throughout 1941. Perhaps if they had waited until September 7 then some equipment would have been lost, but nothing close to the disaster of the OTL in which the entire front was encircled and captured.

Yes, they did move forces....but that takes time to organize, collect the transportation assets to achieve such and then effect such a movement all the while, to paraphrase a military maxim, the enemy has something to say about it too. That both sides moved forces around all the time didn't prevent the numerous encirclements and destructions that occurred in the Eastern Front IOTL. Perhaps for the purposes of this thread it would also be useful for you to state emphatically when this retreat begins?

[historygeek2021]

There were multiple dates when the Soviet Union could have retreated. The Stavka discussed it on August 18, August 30 and again on September 7. The later they withdrew, the more men and material would have been lost, but if they had made the decision by September 7, then it still would have been nothing close to the OTL disaster.

[History Learner]

There were multiple dates when the Soviet Union could have retreated. The Stavka discussed it on August 18, August 30 and again on September 7. The later they withdrew, the more men and material would have been lost, but if they had made the decision by September 7, then it still would have been nothing close to the OTL disaster.

Okay, then for the purposes of this thread, can you please pick one so that we may all operate from a mutual understanding instead of trying to decipher whether one is arguing from the position of one withdraw date vs someone arguing from the other?

[KDF33]

An earlier retreat, however, is a war winner for the Germans.

That's a bold statement.

2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies can thus effect a Via'zyma-Briansk encirclement in August against Reserve and Briansk Fronts, subsequently taking Moscow in September.

I don't know about that. Soviet forces caught in the incomplete Smolensk encirclement were finished on August 5th. By that date, Heeresgruppe Mitte had advanced more than 400 km from its starting line. It would have required some R&R time before another general advance, and thus I can't see it renewing the offensive until late August.

Then there's the fact that Heeresgruppe Mitte's mobile forces had been significantly reinforced at the time of Taifun. Specifically, the Germans used a total of 9 Panzer divisions just for the Vyazma encirclement, and a further 5 for Bryansk. That's a total of 14 Panzer divisions, of which 2 (2. and 5.) were fresh formations that arrived in September from Germany. If the Germans attack in late August, even with the forces historically allocated for Kiev, they'll have just 8 Panzer divisions (12. having joined Heeresgruppe Nord to reduce Leningrad).

IMO, the outcome is far more likely to look like Smolensk in July than Vyazma in October. Which, in terms of POW yields, and combined with the survival of Southwestern Front, suggests that the Germans are facing a stronger Red Army in October than historically.

Without Moscow and the resulting collapse in the Soviet infrastructure network, Leningrad will be unable to hold and Army Group North will be able to take it, either directly or through reaching the Svir River to effect a link up with the Finns; either way, the city will fall that Winter.

I don't think it's a given that Moscow falls in this scenario. Even if it does, there was an alternative rail line passing through Kirov to supply the northern theater. It's also unclear that the Germans can hold Moscow in this scenario, given that the RKKA is likely to be stronger in the fall than historically.

1942 would thus be a mop up operation, with AGC and AGS conducting a pincer attack on the poorly supplied and low morale forces that survived 1941 in the Ukraine just to be destroyed in 1942. I'd imagine the A-A Line is achieved by the close of 1942, and then in 1943 the Germans occupy up to the Urals against sporadic resistance. The Anglo-Americans will cut an armistice deal, and still finish Japan off in 1945 or so; instead of a Soviet-American Cold War, we get a Nazi-American Cold War.

Per the above, I don't think this scenario is a given.

[History Learner]

That's a bold statement.

Not bold, just accurate.

I don't know about that. Soviet forces caught in the incomplete Smolensk encirclement were finished on August 5th. By that date, Heeresgruppe Mitte had advanced more than 400 km from its starting line. It would have required some R&R time before another general advance, and thus I can't see it renewing the offensive until late August.

2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies-the main striking power of AGC-were used continuously in combat throughout August supporting AGS and AGN while the infantry component spent all of August fending off Soviet counter-attacks. If they needed rest, they never got it and during said time not only achieved the Kiev encirclement, but then went on to achieve Via'zyma-Briansk. If you are also referring to the supply situation, the logistical network was ready for such by mid to late August; maybe sooner, I'd have to double check.

Then there's the fact that Heeresgruppe Mitte's mobile forces had been significantly reinforced at the time of Taifun. Specifically, the Germans used a total of 9 Panzer divisions just for the Vyazma encirclement, and a further 5 for Bryansk. That's a total of 14 Panzer divisions, of which 2 (2. and 5.) were fresh formations that arrived in September from Germany. If the Germans attack in late August, even with the forces historically allocated for Kiev, they'll have just 8 Panzer divisions (12. having joined Heeresgruppe Nord to reduce Leningrad).

IMO, the outcome is far more likely to look like Smolensk in July than Vyazma in October. Which, in terms of POW yields, and combined with the survival of Southwestern Front, suggests that the Germans are facing a stronger Red Army in October than historically.

We know Guderian was angling for the exact same operation axis of attack and we saw how well that worked out historically for them. As for force totals, again, we need to examine and compare the two sides, in which case, we find the Soviets are also weaker than they would be later on; September was actually the lowest month for force creation after the German invasion.

I don't think it's a given that Moscow falls in this scenario. Even if it does, there was an alternative rail line passing through Kirov to supply the northern theater. It's also unclear that the Germans can hold Moscow in this scenario, given that the RKKA is likely to be stronger in the fall than historically.

Given the Soviets would have nothing to stop the Germans with after this August V-B, I don't see why Moscow wouldn't fall. Specifically as it pertains to Leningrad though, said alternative route significantly extends out the time to send supplies as well as has a lower capacity limit. David Glantz certainly pulls no punches on the subject on his book concerning the Siege of Leningrad:

Per the above, I don't think this scenario is a given.

You are entitled to your opinion, so that's fine.

[Avalancheon]

As noted by others, the timeframe given by the OP isn't workable and basically means OTL, sans a few extra survivors; maybe the Germans don't take Rostov but they ended up loosing it again OTL that same winter so it's a wash there.

An earlier retreat, however, is a war winner for the Germans. With the Soviet pullback, AGS can take Kiev on its own and secure the Dnieper, especially the vital ore production sites and the like near it (including 60-80% of Soviet aluminum output). More importantly, however, it settles the Kiev or Moscow debate of July/August firmly in favor of Moscow, since AGS can now achieve its goals on its own and the chance for a major encirclement on that Axis is non existent.

In order to really change the outcome of the battle of Kiev, the Soviets would have needed to evacuate in late August. This would pre-empt the German attempt to encircle them. Panzer Group 2 had already begun its march south on August 25, but it didn't really get going until September 1 (when they got resupplied and reinforced). Its not clear what the Wehrmacht would have done if they saw the Red Army evacuating the salient.

The Germans would probably have driven forward in a vain attempt to prevent the Soviets from escaping, and closed in on nothing but thin air (and a few thousand unlucky Russians). They had already committed themselves to closing the Kiev pocket by mid August. Its seems unlikely that the Germans would stand idly by while the Soviets conduct a disorderly retreat: They would present a tempting target.

But as for your scenario. The idea is that a Red Army evacuation of Kiev in late August would enable the Wehrmacht to mount an early attack on Moscow. ​This might seem to be true superficially, but the reality is more complex. In early September 1941, Army Group Center was still in the process of building up a supply stockpile that would enable them to execute Operation Typhoon. The state of their railways was still in an shaky position, and only a few trains per day were reaching Smolensk. This delayed the start of the offensive on Moscow until late September.

2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies can thus effect a Via'zyma-Briansk encirclement in August against Reserve and Briansk Fronts, subsequently taking Moscow in September. Without Moscow and the resulting collapse in the Soviet infrastructure network, Leningrad will be unable to hold and Army Group North will be able to take it, either directly or through reaching the Svir River to effect a link up with the Finns; either way, the city will fall that Winter.

Even if we assume that the Germans can launch the Operation Typhoon at this early date (which is by no means a given), there are some things that must be kept in mind. Namely, Army Group Center will be attacking without Panzer Group 4. This means they will only have two Panzer Groups and three Infantry Armys. The Moscow attack will unfold along a somewhat narrower front than OTL, with somewhat less offensive strength. And after Panzer Group 2 seals off the Bryansk pocket, it is going to stall out in the exact same place it did in OTL: Right in front of Tula. They were brought to a halt by a mixture of the mud, bad roads, poor resupply, and strong enemy resistance.

So after the Wehrmacht liquidates the Vyazma-Bryansk pocket, they will be continuing the drive on Moscow with only one Panzer Group and two Infantry Armys. Thats going to pretty much limit them to a direct attack against the gates of the Capitol. And meanwhile, there is a real possibility that the Red Army will send all their reserves against Army Group Center, rather than against Army Group South (because they haven't been gutted by the battle of Kiev). The Soviets mobilised five Reserve Armys in September 1941, and if they are all deployed to Moscow instead of the Ukraine, that will lead to a tough battle indeed.

1942 would thus be a mop up operation, with AGC and AGS conducting a pincer attack on the poorly supplied and low morale forces that survived 1941 in the Ukraine just to be destroyed in 1942. I'd imagine the A-A Line is achieved by the close of 1942, and then in 1943 the Germans occupy up to the Urals against sporadic resistance. The Anglo-Americans will cut an armistice deal, and still finish Japan off in 1945 or so; instead of a Soviet-American Cold War, we get a Nazi-American Cold War.

In the context of the 1941 campaign in the East, skipping the battle of Kiev to launch an early attack on Moscow might be a poor tradeoff. The Soviets suffered some 650,000 irrecoverable losses at Kiev. If they avoid that catastrophe, then the Red Army is going to be considerably stronger than OTL. (Even after you factor in the losses at Vyazma-Bryansk) They might well be able to fight the Germans to a standstill in front of Moscow, even without the help of the mud and snow. And if the Soviets do lose the Capitol, they will still be able to mount very strong counter-attacks and wear down the Wehrmacht to a greater extent than OTL.

[historygeek2021]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

[Avalancheon]

With the Soviet pullback, AGS can take Kiev on its own and secure the Dnieper, especially the vital ore production sites and the like near it (including 60-80% of Soviet aluminum output).

Just a note. The Soviets had four aluminum plants at this time: One at Volkhov, one at Tikhvin, Zaporozhye, and Kamensk-Ural. The Volkhov and Tikhvin plants were fed with bauxite from the Tikhvin deposits. The Zaporozhye and Kamensk-Ural plants were fed with bauxite from the Kamensk-Ural deposits.

The Dnieper itself has no bauxite deposits. And the Germans didn't capture Zaporozhye until October 3. That gave the Soviets time to partially dismantle the aluminum smelter and ship part of it to the East.

[Avalancheon]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Again, that may seem to be true on its face, but the reality is not so simple. Yes, the Soviets will be able to withdraw five Armys from Kiev with few losses. That is a major boost for them in the Grand scheme of things. But Southwestern front will not be able to interfere with Army Group Center in any meaningful way. There are two reasons for this.

First, they have evacuated the Kiev salient, which means they are not able to strike at their flanks (not initially). They can only confront Army Group Center head on.

Second, they will be disorganised after their rapid retreat, and will not be in a position to immediately go over to the attack. They will need time to get themselves sorted out, and by then, they will be facing a renewed attack from Army Group South.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

Only 39th Panzer Corps (minus 1 division) was transferred away from Panzer Group 3. They were deployed to strengthen the drive on Leningrad. Meanwhile, Panzer Group 4 had sent 56th Panzer Corps on a pointless diversion to Demyansks.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

This is what David Glantz claimed in one of his books.

[historygeek2021]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Again, that may seem to be true on its face, but the reality is not so simple. Yes, the Soviets will be able to withdraw five Armys from Kiev with few losses. That is a major boost for them in the Grand scheme of things. But Southwestern front will not be able to interfere with Army Group Center in any meaningful way. There are two reasons for this.

First, they have evacuated the Kiev salient, which means they are not able to strike at their flanks (not initially). They can only confront Army Group Center head on.

Second, they will be disorganised after their rapid retreat, and will not be in a position to immediately go over to the attack. They will need time to get themselves sorted out, and by then, they will be facing a renewed attack from Army Group South.

Army Group Center wasn't ready to attack until October 1. That gives the Southwestern Front plenty of time to stabilize, and more importantly, for the Soviets to send reserves to the Western, Reserve and Briansk Fronts that wouldn't have been available in the OTL.

Only 39th Panzer Corps (minus 1 division) was transferred away from 3rd Panzer Group. They were deployed to strengthen the drive on Leningrad. Meanwhile, Panzer Group 4 had sent 56th Panzer Corps on a pointless diversion to Demyansks.

As you pointed out earlier, Army Group Center was heavily reinforced to be able to accomplish what it did in the OTL at Viazma. Every Panzer corps matters.

This is what David Glantz claimed in one of his books.

Glantz is the foremost English speaking expert on the Red Army during WW2. It would be nice if people listened to his conclusions instead of conjuring fantasies about the Soviet Union collapsing into nothingness if only Germany had done X, Y or Z ...

[History Learner]

In order to really change the outcome of the battle of Kiev, the Soviets would have needed to evacuate in late August. This would pre-empt the German attempt to encircle them. Panzer Group 2 had already begun its march south on August 25, but it didn't really get going until September 1 (when they got resupplied and reinforced). Its not clear what the Wehrmacht would have done if they saw the Red Army evacuating the salient.

The Germans would probably have driven forward in a vain attempt to prevent the Soviets from escaping, and closed in on nothing but thin air (and a few thousand unlucky Russians). They had already committed themselves to closing the Kiev pocket by mid August. Its seems unlikely that the Germans would stand idly by while the Soviets conduct a disorderly retreat: They would present a tempting target.

Such is why I have repeatedly asked the OP to define the date for us. Obviously far fewer will escape with a September PoD vs an August PoD, while such also effects German options/strategy. The question of Moscow or the flanks remained into late August, with Guderian in particularly still having options in the last 10 days or so of August.

But as for your scenario. The idea is that a Red Army evacuation of Kiev in late August would enable the Wehrmacht to mount an early attack on Moscow. ​This might seem to be true superficially, but the reality is more complex. In early September 1941, Army Group Center was still in the process of building up a supply stockpile that would enable them to execute Operation Typhoon. The state of their railways was still in an shaky position, and only a few trains per day were reaching Smolensk. This delayed the start of the offensive on Moscow until late September.

This simply isn't true:

To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

14. The additional track would comprise a substantial 15 percent over and above the track constructed among cities. See, for example, the mileages in Gen. d. Eisb. Tr. Aus-schnitte. Stand derStreckenwederherstellung. 1941-1942. U.S. NationalArchives. Records. German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041049.

15. Eisenbahntruppen. U.S. National Archives, German Army High Command. Microcopy, T-78. Roll 113, Fr. 6035898. See also Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13.

16. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 241.

17. Note the use of the rail system through Orsha. Vitebsk, and Smolensk in the first half of August 1941 in Generalma)or Windisch, Personal Diary of the German 9th Army Supply Officer German Language Copy) (from 1.8.1941-31.1.1942Ë5 February 1954), p. 7. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, MS P-201.

18. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 248. in which fourteen trains are noted as available for Army Group Center as of 18 July 1941, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. pp. 25. 26, in which twenty-four trains daily are noted as running to supply the center after 7 August 1941.

19. As early as 12 July 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army noted in a telephone call to the chief of staff that Army Group Center had enough supplies to maintain an armored drive to Moscow. He also notes that the infantry had only enough to get to Smolensk. It follows that as early as 12 July, the Germans were close to having logistics under control for a push almost straight through to Moscow. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 231.

As I already noted elsewhere, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies-the armies of AGC to do such an encirclement-were used through August and September to conduct operations on the flanks. Meanwhile, the infantry components of AGC were forced to fend off repeated Soviet counter-attacks along their front, in particular there was bitter fighting at Yel'nya which cost the Germans around 50,000 casualties and used up considerable supplies. If they needed a large stockpile of supplies, it doesn't show up in their historic operations.

Even if we assume that the Germans can launch the Operation Typhoon at this early date (which is by no means a given), there are some things that must be kept in mind. Namely, Army Group Center will be attacking without Panzer Group 4. This means they will only have two Panzer Groups and three Infantry Armys. The Moscow attack will unfold along a somewhat narrower front than OTL, with somewhat less offensive strength. And after Panzer Group 2 seals off the Bryansk pocket, it is going to stall out in the exact same place it did in OTL: Right in front of Tula. They were brought to a halt by a mixture of the mud, bad roads, poor resupply, and strong enemy resistance.

It is a given, as noted above, but beyond that nothing you cite here is valid for the situation in August and September. There is no mud, because the rains don't come until October and there is not strong enemy resistance because only five Soviet armies are formed in September, with most forming away from Axis; there are quite literally no Soviet forces able to offer resistance once Army Group Center does its Via'zyma-Briansk in August. If you feel otherwise, can you cite the forces available to do such?

Specifically as it pertains to Panzer Group 4, again, the relative force postures need to be considered here. According to Glantz,
Western, Reserve and Briansk Fronts on September 1st held 390 Tanks/AFVs; a month later, the three Fronts reported having about 1250 tanks. That is a difference of 70% fewer Soviet tanks in August/September than early October. German armored forces meanwhile were about 70-85% of their October rates on average. Relative to OTL, the force balance is massively more in favor of the Germans than OTL. Even better, as already noted, the weather is great so the Luftwaffe can be used much more effectively.

So after the Wehrmacht liquidates the Vyazma-Bryansk pocket, they will be continuing the drive on Moscow with only one Panzer Group and two Infantry Armys. Thats going to pretty much limit them to a direct attack against the gates of the Capitol. And meanwhile, there is a real possibility that the Red Army will send all their reserves against Army Group Center, rather than against Army Group South (because they haven't been gutted by the battle of Kiev). The Soviets mobilised five Reserve Armys in September 1941, and if they are all deployed to Moscow instead of the Ukraine, that will lead to a tough battle indeed.

Again, how? Armies formed over the course of a month are of no help and there is no defending force in Moscow nor defensive works built; STAVKA's entire reserve force on September 1st is literally four or five Rifle divisions. By all means, do explain how they stop an entire Panzer Group and two Infantry Armies from taking Moscow? Specifically as it pertains to those five armies, only one of them was forming near Moscow; the rest were either in the north closer to Leningrad or in the South closer to Kiev.

n the context of the 1941 campaign in the East, skipping the battle of Kiev to launch an early attack on Moscow might be a poor tradeoff. The Soviets suffered some 650,000 irrecoverable losses at Kiev. If they avoid that catastrophe, then the Red Army is going to be considerably stronger than OTL. (Even after you factor in the losses at Vyazma-Bryansk) They might well be able to fight the Germans to a standstill in front of Moscow, even without the help of the mud and snow. And if the Soviets do lose the Capitol, they will still be able to mount very strong counter-attacks and wear down the Wehrmacht to a greater extent than OTL.

Exchanged here for three fronts before Moscow, then the city of Moscow itself and the city of Leningrad. You've basically collapsed the Soviet transportation network, took out roughly 40% of their remaining industrial capacity and a vast portion of their manpower. If you are assuming the Soviets can somehow create the forces for these counterattacks-and they can't on the fly-how exactly do they even attack? Southwestern Front as you note is in a retreat and if it tries to attack AGC, it would be attacking 2nd Army covering the flanks from well defended positions that historically Southwest Front categorically failed to achieve any success against. Even further, Army Group South is right there to jump on the now exposed flank of the Soviet forces...

[History Learner]

With the Soviet pullback, AGS can take Kiev on its own and secure the Dnieper, especially the vital ore production sites and the like near it (including 60-80% of Soviet aluminum output).

Just a note. The Soviets had four aluminum plants at this time: One at Volkhov, one at Tikhvin, Zaporozhye, and Kamensk-Ural. The Volkhov and Tikhvin plants were fed with bauxite from the Tikhvin deposits. The Zaporozhye and Kamensk-Ural plants were fed with bauxite from the Kamensk-Ural deposits.

The Dnieper itself has no bauxite deposits. And the Germans didn't capture Zaporozhye until October 3. That gave the Soviets time to partially dismantle the aluminum smelter and ship part of it to the East.

Except here you have no Soviet forces defending Zaporozhye since they are retreating, which means the Germans are going to capture it much sooner. Further, there was indeed four facilities for aluminum production in the USSR but in terms of output the one along the Dnieper was responsible for 60-80% of the entire output of the USSR. You can't just place said plants anywhere, given their enormous electrical needs, which is why it was along the Dnieper in the first place, to take advantage of the river's hydropower.