The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

[KDF33]

KDF what's to stop 4th Panzer army from participating in this scenario against Moscow? It cannot attack Leningrad alone, as half of 3rd Panzer army was attached for the operation plus VIII air corps, both of which will be used against Moscow here. So other than the missing 2nd and 5th panzer divisions which didn't show up until October the entire 4th panzer army could and probably would (if Moscow as the strategic objective in August) attack the Soviet forces east of the Luga line and converge on Moscow.

Well, it depends on what we are discussing. Transferring 4th Panzer Group to HGM or using it to attack east of Luga?

If we're talking about attacking towards the east, then PzG 4 will be moving against Northwestern Front, and thus won't directly support the forces moving along the Moscow axis.

If we're talking about a redeployment as historically happened, then this implies (1) time to complete the redeployment and (2) forgoing all offensive action with Heeresgruppe Nord.

It's not clear to me that this will lead to a better outcome for the Germans than what happened historically.

Also, units redeployed from HGS formed 29% of the forces of AOK 2 and PzG 2: 7 out of 24 divisions.

-9. Panzer
-16. Infanterie (mot.)
-25. Infanterie (mot.)
-56. Infanterie
-95. Infanterie
-262. Infanterie
-296. Infanterie

11. Panzer was also redeployed from HGS during September, but took part in the Vyazma rather than Bryansk pincer.

[stg 44]

KDF what's to stop 4th Panzer army from participating in this scenario against Moscow? It cannot attack Leningrad alone, as half of 3rd Panzer army was attached for the operation plus VIII air corps, both of which will be used against Moscow here. So other than the missing 2nd and 5th panzer divisions which didn't show up until October the entire 4th panzer army could and probably would (if Moscow as the strategic objective in August) attack the Soviet forces east of the Luga line and converge on Moscow.

Well, it depends on what we are discussing. Transferring 4th Panzer Group to HGM or using it to attack east of Luga?

If we're talking about attacking towards the east, then PzG 4 will be moving against Northwestern Front, and thus won't directly support the forces moving along the Moscow axis.

It's not clear to me that this will lead to a better outcome for the Germans than what happened historically.

I never said anything about transferring it to AG-Center. I said east knowing exactly what you said above, because Northwest Front and the northern most part of Western Front would be then dealt with by PzGrp 4. The historical placement of 4th PzGrp would be filled by 2nd PzGrp in this scenario, so literally there is no place for PzGrp 4 to deploy other than to attack east. Plus there is the Staraya Russa offensive to deal with.

Also, units redeployed from HGS formed 29% of the forces of AOK 2 and PzG 2: 7 out of 24 divisions.

-9. Panzer
-16. Infanterie (mot.)
-25. Infanterie (mot.)
-56. Infanterie
-95. Infanterie
-262. Infanterie
-296. Infanterie

11. Panzer was also redeployed from HGS during September, but took part in the Vyazma rather than Bryansk pincer.

When did these transfers happen and what was the OOB of AOK and PzG2 in August and October for comparison? Given that there would not be a Bryansk pocket and those division were more worn down in October than August the transfers may have been necessary given the larger distances needed to be covered as of October when PzG 2 was coming up from Ukraine toward Moscow.

Plus in this scenario the Panzer corps that attacked Tikhvin would remain with 4th PzG so theoretically would be added to the overall forces plunging east in August much from the north rather the south as 2nd PzG did in October.

[stg 44]

-Source for early September.
-Source for early October.

They are GKO decrees, both signed by Stalin.

Ahem:

On the establishment of the number of spacecraft for September and the 4th quarter of 1941 and on the holidays of food rations for non-profit organizations.

The State Defense Committee decides:

1. To establish the supply of food rations to the Red Army for September and the 4th quarter of 1941 for a number of 7,400,000 people.

2. To approve the distribution of rations by fronts and districts, based on the following number of troops:

These are guestimates for needs, not actual troop strengths.

[KDF33]

These are guestimates for needs, not actual troop strengths.

That is incorrect. They reflect actual troop strength, generally 15-20 days prior. Thus, the figures dated 11 September are circa for the very last days of August.

[stg 44]

These are guestimates for needs, not actual troop strengths.

That is incorrect. They reflect actual troop strength, generally 15-20 days prior. Thus, the figures dated 11 September are circa for the very last days of August.

Did you miss the part it said for September AND 4th quarter? And that ration strength isn't necessarily actual strength?:
From the following article:
Zetterling, N., & Frankson, A. (1998). Analyzing World War II eastern front battles1. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 11(1), 176–203.

Verpflegungsstarke

Ration strength, that is the number of men the unit
was ordered to provide with necessary substance. Thus
it could include sick, wounded, prisoners of war, nonmilitary manpower and manpower from other military
organisations.

Iststarke

Actual strength, includes all men that are part of
the unit's composition. Men on leave or temporarily
detached to other units are included. Also men sick or
wounded are included if they are assumed to return to
service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this
strength category does not give the actual number of
men available for service with the unit at the given time.

Also elaborated on here:
https://books.google.com/books?id=Xa6HL ... th&f=false

If you can demonstrate that the Red Army operated differently I'd be very interested in knowing.

[History Learner]

I did. That conclusion is not self-evident.

Also, what was the operational readiness of the mobile formations at the end of the Smolensk operation? The forces employed in Taifun had significant time for R&R, especially those engaged on the decisive Vyazma direction.

Except it is, and in black and white no less. Stolfi produced German quartmaster and railway reports to show what their logistical needs were and then placed them into context of what was documented as running on the railways and from there through the trucks. As presented, and explicitly stated by Halder in his diaries and other documentation, they had sufficient logistics on hand by about the second week or so of August to start the offensive. If you disagree with this, then you need to either explain how the Germans didn't know their own logistical needs and somehow missed recording their own trains/truck usage. Given the performance of AGC in August-September, that is a very tall order.

To answer your question, in the first week or so of August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies got about five to six days of rest before going to immediate combat from then on until after Kiev was wrapped up in the third week of September. The OP has strenuously avoided setting a firm date for the POD, but presumably it occurs somewhere between August 19th and September 7th; for the purposes of this discussion, I will henceforth consider the retreat as being ordered on the 19th.

-Source for early September.
-Source for early October.

They are GKO decrees, both signed by Stalin.

And these aren't actual troop strength reports either, but estimates being used for the basis of food rations in the holiday season. Beyond that, I think it is obvious to anyone that citing October is meaningless and I've already provided a link that shows why serious doubt must be cast on the September figures when compared with the October figures alone, before considering how badly Soviet reporting broke down in 1941 which makes such degrees automatically suspect. Khrivosheev, for example, estimates up to half a million unreported losses occurred during this time.

Very interesting. It doesn't show that the Soviets were "300,000 men" weaker than at the beginning of Taifun, however. Combined with GKO figures, we can look at Soviet force evolution at the beginning of August / September / October.

Western Front: 388,000* / 511,000 / 510,000
Reserve Front: 466,000 / 491,000 / 410,000
Central/Bryansk Front: 284,000 / 294,000 / 294,000

Total: 1,138,000* / 1,296,000 / 1,214,000

That's a difference of just 76,000 men between early August and early October. Note the asterisk next to the figure of 388,000 for Western Front: that dataset is an Army count, whereas all the other figures are for the Front overall. Thus, it probably misses a few units directly subordinated to Western Front. This suggests that Soviet strength on the Moscow axis in early August was virtually identical to that of October.

Only if one takes the GKOs at face value, which as noted above, there is no reason to. Glantz has his citations for July 31st and September 30th, which are obviously better given Glantz had more ability to study the situation with copious archival information that the Soviets in the moment could not produce. Furthermore, when you square losses with known replacement data, the numbers much more closely align with what Glantz has to say.

As noted previously, the Germans had 55 divisions with Heeresgruppe Mitte in August, against 72 at the time of Taifun. Among the mobile formations, the Germans had in August 9 Panzer and 5 motorized Infanterie divisions. On October 2, they had 14 Panzer and 8 motorized Infanterie divisions.

Those formations had also benefited from R&R in September. Most prominently, their operational tank strength must have been considerably higher than in early August.

To put things into perspective, the two Panzer Groups contained just 26% of Heeresgruppe Mitte's manpower, but suffered 41% of the combat casualties between 22.6 - 31.7.1941.

No, actually, as already noted previously. Beyond the fact you've ignored I've already suggested 4th Panzer Army would be used to help secure the Northern flank, Stolfi provides in his work data for what the German armored forces were like in August:

German Tanks Available for the Advance on Moscow in August 1941
The figure of 65 percent of the original German tank strength gives a realistic picture of the numbers of tanks the
Germans would have used in an offensive against Moscow in the first half of August 1941. The percentage is
pessimistic with respect to the remaining striking power of the panzer groups. When the Germans attacked the
Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 with 3,102 battle tanks, a significant percentage would have been under repair for
the attrition associated with the assembly for Barbarossa. This was particularly true among the panzer divisions
concentrated at the last moment in Wave 4b for the offensive.23 Tanks under repair on 22 June can be estimated at
10 percent, but the important point is that the striking power of the German panzer force was not 3,102 battle tanks
but approximately 90 percent of that figure. All German estimates of tank strength after 22 June 1941 use
percentages of an original strength of 3,102. This strength was never available because the Germans attacked on 22
June with about 2,792 combat-ready tanks (and 310 in repair). Thus, the Germans on 13 August would have been
attacking with an estimated 65 percent of the tanks available on 22 June, but approximately 72 percent of their
striking power on the first day of the war. Actual percentages would be slightly different, but the percentages used
by the Germans to measure remaining striking power would have to be adjusted upward.

By about 13 August 1941, the Germans had suffered Soviet combat action losses of approximately 12 percent of
their original tanks. For Army Group Center, with 1,780 battle tanks in its divisions when it attacked earlier in
June, this translates into 214 German battle tanks "knocked out" by Soviet combat action on the eve of the
hypothetical German advance on Moscow. During the same period the German tanks of Panzer Groups 2 and 3
destroyed and captured 3,273 Soviet tanks. Although German tanks did not damage all of the Soviet tanks that
were destroyed in the Soviet totals, the exchange ratios in tank losses were 1 German tank lost to 15 Soviet. By
early August 1941, the German tank formations and infantry divisions had inflicted fearsome tank losses on the
Soviets, and the panzer units unquestionably had enough striking power to advance to Moscow and beyond.

As noted earlier, the Soviets were down to about 350 tanks, meaning the Germans would have a decisive armor advantage.

They should definitely be counted, given that they faced Heeresgruppe Mitte. Whether or not they could have successfully counterattacked is irrelevant to the issue, which is that they would tie down German divisions regardless.

Then it is a double standard on your part to continue to dismiss 4th Panzer Army, which I've already indicated is providing flank security for AGC. Likewise, since Central/Briansk Front is tied down with 2nd Army, that means 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies really only have to deal with Western and Reserve Fronts.

This is the crux of the matter. Can you detail how exactly you suggest the Germans "encircle and destroy" Western and Reserve Fronts, when they previously failed to achieve just that during the Smolensk operation?

Can you explain how they couldn't, given they did historically in Vyzama? More specifically to the situation in August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were basically already at their jumping off points by the time of the PoD and Guderian was arguing to do exactly what ended up being done in October.

This part is only relevant if the first step can be shown to have been feasible.

I believe I have done so.

These divisions were sent where the Germans were attacking in September, in the north and in the south. Had the Germans been attacking in the center, that is where, presumably, they would have been sent.

Why HGN and HGS would have an easier time, with no help from HGM, is lost on me.

Because you've just deprived the forces facing them of critical reinforcements at a crucial juncture of the campaign? Leningrad was on the edge of falling in August-September while the OP specifies AGS is moving forward against light resistance since Southwestern Front is falling back as fast as it can to avoid being encircled. Can you explain why things would be as hard for the Germans against fewer Soviets on those axis of advance?

Not automatically. Soviet production centers were in the rear; using alternate routes instead of Moscow doesn't automatically mean longer transit times.

Look at this map. It wouldn't take longer to send weapons produced at Nizhny Tagil or Chelyabinsk to Tikhvin by transiting through Kirov and Vologda than through Moscow.

Except it does, because we can look at the railways in question and see massively longer transit times given only two low capacity railways connect to Leningrad with the loss of Moscow. Likewise, you've already conceded the lower capacity limits which means fewer logistics on its own for the Soviets.

Heh? That's a disputable framing of the Caucasus campaign.

Not really, given their static nature for the most part until other Soviet formations were able to clear out Army Group A from the Caucasus.

The German Tikhvin offensive was a forlorn affair - they pushed along a narrow corridor to the city just to get counterattacked on the flanks and retreat to their starting line.

And now the divisions that counter-attacked them are busy in front of Moscow, so end result is-even if said divisions prevent the Germans from taking Moscow-that Leningrad is cut off and forced to surrender.

I know that Glantz mentioned Moscow, but again look at this map. The importance of Tikhvin is not merely that it links to Moscow; with the Finns occupying the Svir river line, it is the last remaining rail link connecting Lake Ladoga to the rest of the USSR.

In other words, capturing and holding Tikhvin means that Leningrad cannot be resupplied from anywhere.

Sure but because capacity limits and travel times, most of said supplies came through or originated in Moscow anyway, so again, same end effect.

[KDF33]

Did you miss the part it said for September AND 4th quarter? And that ration strength isn't necessarily actual strength?:

The GKO decrees on Army rations were updated monthly, reflecting fluctuations in strength. See this one for October, for instance.

I don't know what to tell you. It is widely known that these figures reflect actual strength. Indeed, most figures for Soviet strength come for these reports - Glantz uses them widely, for instance.

Ration strength, that is the number of men the unit
was ordered to provide with necessary substance. Thus
it could include sick, wounded, prisoners of war, nonmilitary manpower and manpower from other military
organisations.

[...]

If you can demonstrate that the Red Army operated differently I'd be very interested in knowing.

Well yes, RKKA terminology isn't the same as that of the Wehrmacht. The Soviets, for instance, had separate ration reports for men hospitalized. Again, and I hope saying this won't offend you, but if you were familiar with these reports, you wouldn't be arguing this point.

[stg 44]

Did you miss the part it said for September AND 4th quarter? And that ration strength isn't necessarily actual strength?:

The GKO decrees on Army rations were updated monthly, reflecting fluctuations in strength. See this one for October, for instance.

I don't know what to tell you. It is widely known that these figures reflect actual strength. Indeed, most figures for Soviet strength come for these reports - Glantz uses them widely, for instance.

If it is so widely known then it shouldn't be a problem to produce some source the explains that specifically.
Also why did the October one cover different categories, like the hospitals of the interior? Why do we accept the September document that specifically states that the rations for were for the holidays AND 4th Quarter of 1941? Seems like the documents are refering to different collections of categories, not the same thing, so no it is not a fluctuation in strength, rather it is counting different categories for different things.

Ration strength, that is the number of men the unit
was ordered to provide with necessary substance. Thus
it could include sick, wounded, prisoners of war, nonmilitary manpower and manpower from other military
organisations.

[...]

If you can demonstrate that the Red Army operated differently I'd be very interested in knowing.

Well yes, RKKA terminology isn't the same as that of the Wehrmacht. The Soviets, for instance, had separate ration reports for men hospitalized. Again, and I hope saying this won't offend you, but if you were familiar with these reports, you wouldn't be arguing this point.

I'm willing to accept that if you have some way of showing that the ration allocations actually matched the strength on the ground. No offense taken, but again if it is so simple and everyone knows it then some sort of definition link should be readily available. Unfortunately many of those things that 'everyone knows' have a way of being debunked when people cross reference foot notes. For example like Glantz getting wrong German replacements in 1941, but Greg Liedtke (he posts on this forum BTW, so you can ask him directly) has the receipts that show what the actual flow of replacements were. Or Glantz potentially double counting troops that Per70 pointed out.

Now it may be that there are simply no better comprehensive numbers to be had, which is why the GKO numbers are frequently used, in which case I'd understand, but you would need to acknowledge that that data is simply flawed. However I would think that the Red Army front reports would be more accurate about telling us what actual strengths were within the limitations of reporting in 1941 given the situation than the stuff that made it up to the GKO.

[KDF33]

However I would think that the Red Army front reports would be more accurate about telling us what actual strengths were within the limitations of reporting in 1941 given the situation than the stuff that made it up to the GKO.

The GKO decrees are precisely that: a summation of the various Front reports, on the basis of which rations for the next month were allocated.

Take the October decree, which reflects reporting for the last days of September or very early October (after the Kiev liquidation):

Western Front: 510,000
Reserve Front: 410,000
Bryansk Front: 294,000

For a total of 1,214,000.

Compare to Krivosheev's strength figures for the Moscow Defensive Operation:

Western Front (October 2): 558,000
Reserve Front (October 2): 448,000
Bryansk Front (September 30): 244,000

For a total of 1,250,000.

That's a total difference of 3%. The slight differences are easily accounted for with the variance in dating, as well as the shuffling of units between the 3 Fronts.

If you want more details, this forum's Russian posters can likely provide it. I suggest you ask here.

[stg 44]

However I would think that the Red Army front reports would be more accurate about telling us what actual strengths were within the limitations of reporting in 1941 given the situation than the stuff that made it up to the GKO.

The GKO decrees are precisely that: a summation of the various Front reports, on the basis of which rations for the next month were allocated.

Take the October decree, which reflects reporting for the last days of September or very early October (after the Kiev liquidation):

Western Front: 510,000
Reserve Front: 410,000
Bryansk Front: 294,000

For a total of 1,214,000.

Compare to Krivosheev's strength figures for the Moscow Defensive Operation:

Western Front (October 2): 558,000
Reserve Front (October 2): 448,000
Bryansk Front (September 30): 244,000

For a total of 1,250,000.

That's a total difference of 3%. The slight differences are easily accounted for with the variance in dating, as well as the shuffling of units between the 3 Fronts.

If you want more details, this forum's Russian posters can likely provide it. I suggest you ask here.

I appreciate the links and your willingness to engage on the issue without it becoming an acrimonious argument.

Your definition still points to this being an overestimation of strength based on estimated ration needs for the following month, not what the strength actually was the previous month or at the moment of the report. At least to me it reads like it is saying what the estimated needs will be going forward, not what it was at that moment but influenced by what numbers were reported to them. So the gold standard remains Red Army HQ reports for each front if those are available. I think I have seen scans of documents with those numbers before, so they likely exist somewhere.

I'm more willing to accept the numbers in the October report because of what it is covering vs. the September report, which is estimating for the entire 4th quarter, doesn't cover the hospitals, and has a number of ordered changes to organization and how rations are to be distributed to units moving around, which is absent in the October report.

[historygeek2021]

You shouldn't take Glantz at face value. He gets the German side of the equation VERY wrong. For example 90% of casualties were replaced as we know from work others have done like Liedtke in "Enduring the Whirlwind" and Nigel Askey "Operation Barbarossa", but Glantz for some reason thought that most of those losses weren't replaced. Glantz's archival data about Soviet forces is generally quite excellent with some exceptions, but in regards to the German side his data is badly out of date and largely repeating flawed older sources.

After all if German forces were as weak as Glantz claimed by the end of Soviet offensive actions in September how did they in the first two weeks of October inflict nearly 1 million casualties on the Soviets for only 50,000 casualties? All that after encircling Leningrad, defeating Soviet offensives to recapture Smolensk, and capturing Kiev and taking over 600,000 PoWs there. Something doesn't add up if we accept Glantz as even 75% accurate. More likely he was incredibly wrong, because he only did original research in Soviet archives, only speaks/reads Russian, and just uses secondary if not tertiary sources on the German side.

Glantz can claim it was losses in August-September that led to the Soviet defeat at Vyazma-Bryansk, but as noted Soviet forces got so many replacements in that month that they were nearly as strong in October as early September. 80k men was not a significant enough difference between those months especially if AG-Center was as worn down as Glantz claimed. This is exactly what I mean about Glantz's lack of analytical ability.

AG-Center was not heavily reinforced; 4th panzer group replaced 2nd panzer group, which had moved into Ukraine and was attacking from a very different direction than the rest of AG-Center against forces that were not part of the Western Front and had been badly worn down in the fight for Ukraine. There were two fresh panzer divisions brought in, which was the biggest change.

How do you think Soviet forces in Ukraine could have attacked north against AG-Center when they were being defeated along the Dniepr before Guderian showed up? Central Front was largely smashed by the 2nd week of August and by the end of the month STAVKA finally accepted reality and disbanded the front. After all Guderian had destroyed nearly the entire 28th army by August 8th and had little enemy opposition left east of Roslavl. Bryansk front could have attacked his flank, but they did that historically and were defeated:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0 ... 0%B8%D1%8F

The only difference heading east instead of south would mean is where pockets would be formed and destroyed; Bryansk Front would attack Guderian's flank like they did historically and fail as they did historically. Central Front might exist a little while longer without Guderian's attacks south after say August 14th, but it was in the process of being smashed by von Weich's 2nd army anyway (see the Gomel pocket) and Southwest Front was struggling to hold the Dniepr, ultimately failing well before Guderian showed up, so wasn't in a position to attack north.

Stalin refusing to abandon Kiev actually saved the USSR because Hitler then wasted vital time cleaning up the flanks and to secure Ukrainian resources rather than striking at the center of Stalin's power.

How do you arrive at the 90% replacement figure? This chart from DRZW Volume V shows that only 23% of OstHeer losses were replaced through July 1941, and only 37% through August 1941.

DRZW states that by the second half of August, the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60 percent, and that of the mobile divisions had fallen to 50%.

[KDF33]

Except it is, and in black and white no less. Stolfi produced German quartmaster and railway reports to show what their logistical needs were and then placed them into context of what was documented as running on the railways and from there through the trucks. As presented, and explicitly stated by Halder in his diaries and other documentation, they had sufficient logistics on hand by about the second week or so of August to start the offensive. If you disagree with this, then you need to either explain how the Germans didn't know their own logistical needs and somehow missed recording their own trains/truck usage. Given the performance of AGC in August-September, that is a very tall order.

I don't question the ability of HGM to advance on the Moscow axis at some point in August. The assumption that this would produce results on par with Taifun, and that it would lead to a better outcome than what happened historically, is where I disagree.

To answer your question, in the first week or so of August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies got about five to six days of rest before going to immediate combat from then on until after Kiev was wrapped up in the third week of September.

Yes, and what was the state of those Panzer divisions compared to early October?

To give you an idea of what this looks like, here's Panzergruppe 2's operational readiness in early September:

3. Pz: 54 / 161 = 34% on September 4
4. Pz: 83 / 162 = 51% on September 9
17. Pz: 52 / 128 = 41% on September 10
18. Pz: 93 / 207 = 45% on September 9

Total: 282 / 658 = 43%

What do you think the readiness rate for PzG. 3 and 2 was, say, on August 5, after an almost uninterrupted fighting advance of 45 days?

And these aren't actual troop strength reports

As explained, they are the summation of troop strength reports dated 15-20 days prior.

Beyond that, I think it is obvious to anyone that citing October is meaningless and I've already provided a link that shows why serious doubt must be cast on the September figures when compared with the October figures alone

What link?

before considering how badly Soviet reporting broke down in 1941 which makes such degrees automatically suspect. Khrivosheev, for example, estimates up to half a million unreported losses occurred during this time.

Those figures aren't calculated by deducting registered losses from previous strength reports. They are literally based on the most recent monthly strength reports.

Only if one takes the GKOs at face value, which as noted above, there is no reason to. Glantz has his citations for July 31st and September 30th, which are obviously better given Glantz had more ability to study the situation with copious archival information that the Soviets in the moment could not produce.

Glantz uses the GKO decrees for Soviet strength figures. In When Titans Clashed, he produces a table comparing Axis-to-Soviet force evolution. It is reproduced here.

What do we find? Glantz gives a total of 5,647,000 men in the active Fronts on 5.7.1942 - which corresponds to GKO decree 1986 on food rations, dated... 5 July 1942. How about the figure of 6,101,000 men for 2.2.1943? Yup, that's GKO decree 2817 on food rations, also dated 2 February 1943! How about 6,903,000 for 27.7.1943? Again, it corresponds to GKO decree 3822 on food rations, dated 27 July 1943.

Furthermore, when you square losses with known replacement data, the numbers much more closely align with what Glantz has to say.

Do they? How do you know?

No, actually, as already noted previously. Beyond the fact you've ignored I've already suggested 4th Panzer Army would be used to help secure the Northern flank, Stolfi provides in his work data for what the German armored forces were like in August:

[...]

There's not an ounce of actual data in this odd tangent by Stolfi.

As noted earlier, the Soviets were down to about 350 tanks, meaning the Germans would have a decisive armor advantage.

Past the border battles and until the end of the campaign, the Germans always had a significant advantage in armored forces.

Then it is a double standard on your part to continue to dismiss 4th Panzer Army, which I've already indicated is providing flank security for AGC. Likewise, since Central/Briansk Front is tied down with 2nd Army, that means 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies really only have to deal with Western and Reserve Fronts.

How is PzG. 4 providing flank security for HGM? It's on the Luga line in early August. Does it get pulled out of the line and sent to HGM? Or does it attack Northwestern Front, like stg 44 suggested?

Can you explain how they couldn't, given they did historically in Vyzama? More specifically to the situation in August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were basically already at their jumping off points by the time of the PoD and Guderian was arguing to do exactly what ended up being done in October.

At Vyazma, the Germans launched a double-envelopment using 8 Panzer, 4 motorized Infanterie and 33 Infanterie divisions, + 1 Panzer and 2 Infanterie divisions in reserve.

Of these units, 2 Panzer divisions were reinforcements arrived during September (380 tanks between them) and 3 more were transfers from the two other army groups with close to a month to restore their readiness levels (~454 tanks). Three more were already with HGM but had recuperated for at least two weeks during September (~542 tanks).

What you propose is jumping off, almost immediately, from your positions in front of Smolensk, without a pause to build-up supplies or restore operational numbers. Besides, in August the entire HGM amounts to 55 divisions, including your units that will hold against Central Front.

Realistically, I can see you being able to launch a pincer against Vyazma with similar mobile, but weaker infantry strength, at the cost of stripping all Panzer assets and foregoing attacks against the Central Front. Given time needed to rehabilitate mobile formations as well as concentrate assets, I don't see you attacking until August 20th.

To do this, you will also need to completely stop minor offensive action against the Soviets in HGM's area for about 2 weeks.

And even if you do push on to Moscow, come October you'll be holding a salient running roughly from Staraya Russa through Kalinin to Moscow, and then through Kaluga back to Roslavl. The Leningrad region will remain in Soviet hands, as well as the Bryansk-Tula-Kursk region, the vast majority of the left-bank Ukraine, and the Crimea.

Your ability to hold the Moscow region during the winter will be much in question.

I believe I have done so.

Again, I invite you to think through the outcome of your proposed campaign plan.

Because you've just deprived the forces facing them of critical reinforcements at a crucial juncture of the campaign? Leningrad was on the edge of falling in August-September while the OP specifies AGS is moving forward against light resistance since Southwestern Front is falling back as fast as it can to avoid being encircled. Can you explain why things would be as hard for the Germans against fewer Soviets on those axis of advance?

The OP can specify what he wants. The fact of the matter is that in your scenario, PzG. 4 is now moving east, therefore the drive on Leningrad stalls on the Luga line. Likewise, HGS simply doesn't have the strength to break Southwestern and Southern Fronts by itself. Whatever Soviet units would be re-routed to Moscow wouldn't change that fact.

Except it does, because we can look at the railways in question and see massively longer transit times given only two low capacity railways connect to Leningrad with the loss of Moscow. Likewise, you've already conceded the lower capacity limits which means fewer logistics on its own for the Soviets.

I don't dispute the reduced capacity. I question the assumption that this would lead to a collapse of the Soviet position.

As for transit times, again that's not obvious.

Not really, given their static nature for the most part until other Soviet formations were able to clear out Army Group A from the Caucasus.

In your scenario, the Luga line would also be static.

And now the divisions that counter-attacked them are busy in front of Moscow, so end result is-even if said divisions prevent the Germans from taking Moscow-that Leningrad is cut off and forced to surrender.

In your scenario, the Germans are nowhere near Leningrad. They're on the Luga line.

Sure but because capacity limits and travel times, most of said supplies came through or originated in Moscow anyway, so again, same end effect.

How do you know the proportions of supplies that passed through Moscow vs the northern lines?

[KDF33]

DRZW states that by the second half of August, the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60 percent, and that of the mobile divisions had fallen to 50%.

That makes little sense, though. Combat and non-combat losses for June - August amounted to 500,859 men, and replacements to 175,000. This would imply that total combat strength of the Ostheer amounted to ~800,000 men out of a total of ~3 million. Given how just the 88 Infanterie divisions deployed had an establishment strength of 858,000 men in their infantry regiments, I don't see how this can be true, unless the definition of "combat strength" used is ridiculously narrow.

[stg 44]

How do you arrive at the 90% replacement figure? This chart from DRZW Volume V shows that only 23% of OstHeer losses were replaced through July 1941, and only 37% through August 1941.

1941 ostheer losses and replacements.png

DRZW states that by the second half of August, the combat strength of the OstHeer's infantry divisions had fallen to 60 percent, and that of the mobile divisions had fallen to 50%.

Fair question, the answer is that the number you quote doesn't cover all replacements, especially all those in the 'march battalions'. Those on average had 790 per battalion before the fighting even started. For AG-North 24 of their 28 divisions had such a battalion. They covered a bit over 2/3rds of AG-North's losses in June and July. On top of that AG-North received 35,000 replacements from June-August and another 20,000 in September. In their situation this meant that the average infantry battalion was still at 78% strength by October and for motorized battalions it was 82% as their losses were generally lower and they were favored for replacements. That's based on averages given replacements and casualties for the AG. That is all from Liedtke's "Enduring the Whirlwind". AG-North still had 73% of their starting armor strength during the encirclement of Leningrad in September.

AG-Center was doing even better with 161,340 replacements including those from the march battalions vs. 198,398 casualties, so nearly 82% of casualties replaced. Liedtke does some maths and comes up with the figure of over 90% of combat strength retained assuming all replacements were directed toward combat battalions.

Also remember none of those numbers covers wounded returning to units, which were not counted as replacements. This is where Nigel Askey's books come in as he covers the full spectrum of losses (including sick and unfit for non-combat reasons, which was nearly 400,000 men by the end of December) and recovered/replacements; 509,000 sick/wounded men were returned to units from July-December 1941, so counting replacements/recuperated vs. all losses for Barbarossa forces there was only a shortage of 223,587 men by the end of December 1941, aka considerably less than 10% of Barbarossa forces. P.178 of his volume IIB of the Operation Barbarossa series with a table breaking everything down by month.

DRZW apparently only counts a very specific category of replacement and makes some very flawed assumptions based on that.

[per70]

The GKO decrees on Army rations were updated monthly, reflecting fluctuations in strength. See this one for October, for instance.

I don't know what to tell you. It is widely known that these figures reflect actual strength. Indeed, most figures for Soviet strength come for these reports - Glantz uses them widely, for instance.

I looked into the relationship between the ration and combat strength figures for Southwestern Front a few years ago, and got some great feedback from Art. Might be worth taking a look at.

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