History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Except it is, and in black and white no less. Stolfi produced German quartmaster and railway reports to show what their logistical needs were and then placed them into context of what was documented as running on the railways and from there through the trucks. As presented, and explicitly stated by Halder in his diaries and other documentation, they had sufficient logistics on hand by about the second week or so of August to start the offensive. If you disagree with this, then you need to either explain how the Germans didn't know their own logistical needs and somehow missed recording their own trains/truck usage. Given the performance of AGC in August-September, that is a very tall order.
I don't question the ability of HGM to advance on the Moscow axis at some point in August. The assumption that this would produce results on par with
Taifun, and that it would lead to a better outcome than what happened historically, is where I disagree.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
To answer your question, in the first week or so of August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies got about five to six days of rest before going to immediate combat from then on until after Kiev was wrapped up in the third week of September.
Yes, and what was the state of those Panzer divisions compared to early October?
To give you an idea of what this looks like, here's Panzergruppe 2's operational readiness in early September:
3. Pz: 54 / 161 = 34% on September 4
4. Pz: 83 / 162 = 51% on September 9
17. Pz: 52 / 128 = 41% on September 10
18. Pz: 93 / 207 = 45% on September 9
Total: 282 / 658 = 43%
What do you think the readiness rate for PzG. 3 and 2 was, say, on August 5, after an almost uninterrupted fighting advance of 45 days?
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
And these aren't actual troop strength reports
As explained, they are the summation of troop strength reports dated 15-20 days prior.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Beyond that, I think it is obvious to anyone that citing October is meaningless and I've already provided a link that shows why serious doubt must be cast on the September figures when compared with the October figures alone
What link?
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
before considering how badly Soviet reporting broke down in 1941 which makes such degrees automatically suspect. Khrivosheev, for example, estimates up to half a million unreported losses occurred during this time.
Those figures aren't calculated by deducting registered losses from previous strength reports. They are literally based on the most recent monthly strength reports.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Only if one takes the GKOs at face value, which as noted above, there is no reason to. Glantz has his citations for July 31st and September 30th, which are obviously better given Glantz had more ability to study the situation with copious archival information that the Soviets in the moment could not produce.
Glantz uses the GKO decrees for Soviet strength figures. In
When Titans Clashed, he produces a table comparing Axis-to-Soviet force evolution. It is reproduced
here.
What do we find? Glantz gives a total of 5,647,000 men in the active Fronts on 5.7.1942 - which corresponds to GKO decree 1986 on food rations, dated... 5 July 1942. How about the figure of 6,101,000 men for 2.2.1943? Yup, that's GKO decree 2817 on food rations, also dated 2 February 1943! How about 6,903,000 for 27.7.1943? Again, it corresponds to GKO decree 3822 on food rations, dated 27 July 1943.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Furthermore, when you square losses with known replacement data, the numbers much more closely align with what Glantz has to say.
Do they? How do you know?
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
No, actually, as already noted previously. Beyond the fact you've ignored I've already suggested 4th Panzer Army would be used to help secure the Northern flank, Stolfi provides in his work data for what the German armored forces were like in August:
[...]
There's not an ounce of actual data in this odd tangent by Stolfi.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
As noted earlier, the Soviets were down to about 350 tanks, meaning the Germans would have a decisive armor advantage.
Past the border battles and until the end of the campaign, the Germans
always had a significant advantage in armored forces.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Then it is a double standard on your part to continue to dismiss 4th Panzer Army, which I've already indicated is providing flank security for AGC. Likewise, since Central/Briansk Front is tied down with 2nd Army, that means 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies really only have to deal with Western and Reserve Fronts.
How is PzG. 4 providing flank security for HGM? It's on the Luga line in early August. Does it get pulled out of the line and sent to HGM? Or does it attack Northwestern Front, like stg 44 suggested?
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Can you explain how they couldn't, given they did historically in Vyzama? More specifically to the situation in August, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies were basically already at their jumping off points by the time of the PoD and Guderian was arguing to do exactly what ended up being done in October.
At Vyazma, the Germans launched a double-envelopment using 8 Panzer, 4 motorized Infanterie and 33 Infanterie divisions, + 1 Panzer and 2 Infanterie divisions in reserve.
Of these units, 2 Panzer divisions were reinforcements arrived during September (380 tanks between them) and 3 more were transfers from the two other army groups with close to a month to restore their readiness levels (~454 tanks). Three more were already with HGM but had recuperated for at least two weeks during September (~542 tanks).
What you propose is jumping off, almost immediately, from your positions in front of Smolensk, without a pause to build-up supplies or restore operational numbers. Besides, in August the entire HGM amounts to 55 divisions, including your units that will hold against Central Front.
Realistically, I can see you being able to launch a pincer against Vyazma with similar mobile, but weaker infantry strength, at the cost of stripping all Panzer assets and foregoing attacks against the Central Front. Given time needed to rehabilitate mobile formations as well as concentrate assets, I don't see you attacking until August 20th.
To do this, you will also need to completely stop minor offensive action against the Soviets in HGM's area for about 2 weeks.
And even if you do push on to Moscow, come October you'll be holding a salient running roughly from Staraya Russa through Kalinin to Moscow, and then through Kaluga back to Roslavl. The Leningrad region will remain in Soviet hands, as well as the Bryansk-Tula-Kursk region, the vast majority of the left-bank Ukraine, and the Crimea.
Your ability to hold the Moscow region during the winter will be much in question.
Again, I invite you to think through the outcome of your proposed campaign plan.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Because you've just deprived the forces facing them of critical reinforcements at a crucial juncture of the campaign? Leningrad was on the edge of falling in August-September while the OP specifies AGS is moving forward against light resistance since Southwestern Front is falling back as fast as it can to avoid being encircled. Can you explain why things would be as hard for the Germans against fewer Soviets on those axis of advance?
The OP can specify what he wants. The fact of the matter is that in your scenario, PzG. 4 is now moving east, therefore the drive on Leningrad stalls on the Luga line. Likewise, HGS simply doesn't have the strength to break Southwestern and Southern Fronts by itself. Whatever Soviet units would be re-routed to Moscow wouldn't change that fact.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Except it does, because we can look at the railways in question and see massively longer transit times given only two low capacity railways connect to Leningrad with the loss of Moscow. Likewise, you've already conceded the lower capacity limits which means fewer logistics on its own for the Soviets.
I don't dispute the reduced capacity. I question the assumption that this would lead to a collapse of the Soviet position.
As for transit times, again that's not obvious.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Not really, given their static nature for the most part until other Soviet formations were able to clear out Army Group A from the Caucasus.
In your scenario, the Luga line would also be static.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
And now the divisions that counter-attacked them are busy in front of Moscow, so end result is-even if said divisions prevent the Germans from taking Moscow-that Leningrad is cut off and forced to surrender.
In your scenario, the Germans are nowhere near Leningrad. They're on the Luga line.
History Learner wrote: ↑31 Mar 2021, 02:42
Sure but because capacity limits and travel times, most of said supplies came through or originated in Moscow anyway, so again, same end effect.
How do you know the proportions of supplies that passed through Moscow vs the northern lines?