OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Sheldrake
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#76

Post by Sheldrake » 09 Apr 2021, 13:02

Gooner1 wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 11:45
Sheldrake wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 10:49
Slaps head...

Oh you don't mean revisiting the Casablanca conference and seeing if OP Roundup could be made to work in 1943? No side shows just the main effort on the obvious front. Just like how the American Civil War was won...
Montgomery thought it possible, in November and December '42 ...

The prolonged Tunisian campaign probably put paid to the opportunity even had Brooke been in favour of it.
Did he? What is the source for that?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#77

Post by Gooner1 » 09 Apr 2021, 15:30

Sheldrake wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 13:02
Did he? What is the source for that?
From 'Montgomery and the Eighth Army' edited by Stephen Brooks.

Letter to Alan Brooke 27 November 1942

" I have been thinking a good deal about our next moves when we have cleared up N. Africa. It is curious how very difficult it is to get any reliable news about what is happening over Tunis way, and as to what progress our force there is making. I am making plans to move on towards Tripoli after I have dealt with the Agheila position; but maintenance and supply will be the very devil; it is 750 miles from Benghazi, a very indifferent port, and there is only one road. However I daresay I will be able to do something about it.
After that I am not so sure. If the Bosche collects a really strong air force in Sicily and Italy I foresee great difficulties in any invasion of those parts.
It may well be that our offensive on land against the Germans would best be developed from England across the Channel; this obviates all difficulties of shipping, air support, & so on; we should be developing the offensive from a firm base.
It would be costly. But it would bring off a fight with the Germans.
I am quite certain that the way to deal with the German is to face up to him in battle, and fight him; it is the only way to deal with him, because then you kill him. The trouble with our British lads is that they are not killers by nature; they have got to be so inspired that they will want to kill, and that is what I tried to do with this Army of mine.
Given a large number of Americans I believe the invasion of western Europe could be brought off successfully next summer, about June when the weather is good. But the Army in England would have to be tuned up, and made battle worthy in no uncertain manner. However all these things are quite above my sphere; my immediate business is to finish off Rommel and get to Tripoli; but now and then one thinks of other things.”

Alan Brooke reply 12th December 1942
“...Your idea about future moves are NOT quite related to existing fact. In any case it is imperative to finish cleaning Germans out of North Africa first of all.”

The second letter goes into more detail but then Monty stays schtum.


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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#78

Post by Gooner1 » 09 Apr 2021, 15:59

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 15:48
So your argument is diversionary operations in Italy are not practical? & will usually be excessively costly?
Well the Allied Armies Italy could try and seize Elba if they wanted ... Sans US VI Corps and the F.E.C. I don't see how any operations by the rump A.A.I. in May/June '44 would not end up like the Battle for Cassino part II and part III. Rather futile battles that ground down fine infantry battalions for little appreciable gain.

With what we know, if the Allies were determined to launch Anvil in June, the AAI would best go on the defensive, wait until say August when enough enemy troops have been drawn off to France and then mount a proper offensive.
Or, perhaps even better, go completely over to the defensive and transfer a couple of Corps to 21st Army Group.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#79

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Apr 2021, 17:55

Gooner1 wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 15:30
Sheldrake wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 13:02
Did he? What is the source for that?
From 'Montgomery and the Eighth Army' edited by Stephen Brooks.

Letter to Alan Brooke 27 November 1942

" I have been thinking a good deal about our next moves when we have cleared up N. Africa. It is curious how very difficult it is to get any reliable news about what is happening over Tunis way, and as to what progress our force there is making. I am making plans to move on towards Tripoli after I have dealt with the Agheila position; but maintenance and supply will be the very devil; it is 750 miles from Benghazi, a very indifferent port, and there is only one road. However I daresay I will be able to do something about it.
After that I am not so sure. If the Bosche collects a really strong air force in Sicily and Italy I foresee great difficulties in any invasion of those parts.
It may well be that our offensive on land against the Germans would best be developed from England across the Channel; this obviates all difficulties of shipping, air support, & so on; we should be developing the offensive from a firm base.
It would be costly. But it would bring off a fight with the Germans.
I am quite certain that the way to deal with the German is to face up to him in battle, and fight him; it is the only way to deal with him, because then you kill him. The trouble with our British lads is that they are not killers by nature; they have got to be so inspired that they will want to kill, and that is what I tried to do with this Army of mine.
Given a large number of Americans I believe the invasion of western Europe could be brought off successfully next summer, about June when the weather is good. But the Army in England would have to be tuned up, and made battle worthy in no uncertain manner. However all these things are quite above my sphere; my immediate business is to finish off Rommel and get to Tripoli; but now and then one thinks of other things.”

Alan Brooke reply 12th December 1942
“...Your idea about future moves are NOT quite related to existing fact. In any case it is imperative to finish cleaning Germans out of North Africa first of all.”

The second letter goes into more detail but then Monty stays schtum.
Thanks for that quote. I'd seen it cited, but not been able to track it down. There is another claim Montgomery stated post war not invading NW Europe in 1943 was a mistake. Not tracked that one down. I don't know what involvement he had in any of the 1942 plans for a cross Channel attack. If he were involved in any of that it would lend some credence to the opinion in the quote.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#80

Post by Juan G. C. » 09 Apr 2021, 19:12

I fear this thread has gone off topic.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#81

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Apr 2021, 02:18

Juan G. C. wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 19:12
I fear this thread has gone off topic.
They usually do....

Anyway, the only really way to assess this is to look at the availability of the landing craft units and craft. So many units became operational and were rushed to Europe in spring 1944 I doubt there were enough to NEPTUNE and ANVIL simultaneously, unless one or both were pared back in scope. As I noted earlier, the landings on UTAH depended on the arrival of craft units in April, which tends to contraindicate the possibility of a February assault on UTAH.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#82

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Apr 2021, 06:01

Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 02:18
... As I noted earlier, the landings on UTAH depended on the arrival of craft units in April, which tends to contraindicate the possibility of a February assault on UTAH.
Another way to think of it is a % reduction in the size of the initial lift & early follow up.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#83

Post by nota » 10 Apr 2021, 07:23

I did a what if on the south of France FIRST AS IT WAS WEAKER

and follow in the north asap but a while later
allowing the landing craft and warships time to move/ resupply ect
and the germans to move some troops weaking the north

agree med weather allows earlier strike and think that is why it should be first
plus somewhat less troops needed it the first day in the south
do not think feb weather or even april would be doable unless very lucky in the channel

but both a once risks both and is an unneeded or wanted risk
they need overwhelming forces supplies air support ect
split it and it no longer is overwhelming

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#84

Post by Juan G. C. » 10 Apr 2021, 09:21

Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 02:18
Juan G. C. wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 19:12
I fear this thread has gone off topic.
They usually do....

Anyway, the only really way to assess this is to look at the availability of the landing craft units and craft. So many units became operational and were rushed to Europe in spring 1944 I doubt there were enough to NEPTUNE and ANVIL simultaneously, unless one or both were pared back in scope. As I noted earlier, the landings on UTAH depended on the arrival of craft units in April, which tends to contraindicate the possibility of a February assault on UTAH.
I beg your forgiveness, but I fear I don't understand you: who wants to assault UTAH in February? The simultaneous attack I am thinking about is one during June or late May. By the way, was ever a date for a simultaneous ANVIL set?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#85

Post by Juan G. C. » 10 Apr 2021, 11:31

I will try to resume and order what the different sources say to clear things up, although perhaps I end messing things more . Initially there was a deficit of 42 LST and 51 LCI (L). The americans propose a series of measures to make up for this deficit, "overloading transports (APA's), carrying vehicles in the APA's [and other transports?], using AKA's (cargo ships) in the initial lift, and finding (presumably from new production) an additional 27 LCT's" and also relying in greater serviceability and in general overloading transports and landing craft.

The 21st Army Group planning Staff objects to these measures: they do not separate the Ranger-Comando lift as if these troops were to be crowded in transports with other troops, and "to use LSI(L)'s, APA's, XAP's, and AKA's crammed with troops and vehicles on the first three tides, instead of LST's and LCI (L) 's, would not merely endanger these valuable ships and their contents, but, because of the time required to discharge vehicles, would delay uniting troops and vehicles into fighting formations ashore". Low vehicle discharge would seriosly retard the build up.

On 17 February the disagreement had narrowed to the use of attack transports instead of 42 LST for lifting 2,400 vehicles. On 18 February the 21st Army Group Staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, but the sources do not make clear why (Overloading? Greater serviceability? But these are proposed to make up for the deficit AFTER this drop) This leaves a deficit of 35 LST and 21 LCI (L). Then it is proposed to take from ANVIL 20 LST and 21 LCI (L) and, as compensation for the LST, to transfer 6 AKA to the MTO, I presume for ANVIL. This still leaves a deficit of 15 LST, which is hoped would be absorbed by greater serviceability, overloading and new american production.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#86

Post by Sheldrake » 10 Apr 2021, 16:05

Juan G. C. wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 11:31
The 21st Army Group planning Staff objects to these measures: they do not separate the Ranger-Comando lift as if these troops were to be crowded in transports with other troops, and "to use LSI(L)'s, APA's, XAP's, and AKA's crammed with troops and vehicles on the first three tides, instead of LST's and LCI (L) 's, would not merely endanger these valuable ships and their contents, but, because of the time required to discharge vehicles, would delay uniting troops and vehicles into fighting formations ashore". Low vehicle discharge would seriosly retard the build up.

On 17 February the disagreement had narrowed to the use of attack transports instead of 42 LST for lifting 2,400 vehicles. On 18 February the 21st Army Group Staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, but the sources do not make clear why
This may have reflected an arbitrary decision within 21st Army group to trim a certain percentage of vehicles as a compromise.

There were a lot of documents from the months before D Day reflecting horse trading about what should be loaded and what would be left as residue to follow later. There were lots of vehicles which had to be added into the loading as well as the decision as to what to leave until later. Lots of equipment was untested in the circumstances in which it might be used. Could a waterproofed Centaur tow a porpoise ammunition sled? Could two Centaurs fire from an LCT (A)? Who was responsible for planning the moves of the RAF AOP Squadrons? All of these decisions will have an impact on the loading plan. My notes extracted from Brigadier Parham's planning diary (Arty 2nd Army) contains entries which reflect the rather fluid discussions.

16 Feb Chief of Staff (COS) Conference. Bids called for for blocks of transport.

18 Feb - Chief of Staff conference - total deficit in vehicles 1300 vehicles up to D+6. Petroleum Port likely to be VP about D+10 – consider saving AA on Air fields as they likely to be close together. The rule for Assault divs – to 60 % then to 75%(D+2-D+6) then to WE

21 Feb 4. Bidding meeting 1700hrs re D+7-D+14. COS decreed
a. No Army AA less for Mulberry harbour, airfields and petroleum Port
b. No Army LAA except above + about one Bty 2 x Bridges in I Corps 2 Tps. (Pegasus Bridge)
c. Recommendation that 7.2” HA and 177(A) Fd cut out and one corps LAA cut out.

22 Feb Decision whether RAF wanted S/L on airfields - (no)

28 Feb - US 155 battalion confirmed as additional unit - (which will eventually be loaded to land no D Day)

4 March COS conference – everyone has overbid for craft. Not just for space but overloading the weight allowed in craft. The restrictions were hidden in an obscure appendix.

8 March It will take until D+14 to complete prearranged AA layouts. (a) beaches, Mulberry & Petroleum Port (b) all 10 airfields. (c) Orne Bridges (d) LAA for Corps and one LAA Regt as reserve. Residue -100 Bde & 2 x HAA

9 March Speculation about including 1 x HAA Regt in place of med arty.

14 March 8 x OP tanks on WE for Armd & Tk Bde HQ white scout cars for BC and COs to reach regts 20 march

20 March RAF want SL belt for night fighters from D+7- told to hurry up and put in bid

23 March “The big fact to emerge is that 83Gp considers that the AOP Sqns are under us and in fact for all intents and purposes are army units. =>
a. we should order endurance tests for the auster IV. b. Arrange to get a/c overseas c. Arrange the “whole service” Planning marshalling and transport for AOP.

1 April Urgent problem 93 LAA Regt. 27 crusaders triple 20mm SP not yet issued. 27 x triple 20mm towed by crusaders but NBG because electrically operated and power is inadequate and faulty

4 April 83 Group confirm no SL needed until D+17 85Gp say No 14 radar cannot be included in their landings as it cannot be waterproofed.

5 April M10s to be issued to BCs SP Atk Regts

7 April LAA electrically operated 20mm problems are not as bad a reported by unit. Makers checking. Checking whether towed triple 20mm can be waterproofed if not the solution is Crusader triple 20mm towing a bofors 40mm. Barberry (CRA 3 Cdn Div reports T14 radar included in 1st Lift. Memo to CoS that 1 x Regt HAA asked soon after D+17 is now D+38 and 9 AGRA only D+33-38

22 April 3. Crossland (9 AGRA) is briefed not needed until D+30

2 May Draft movement plan 2nd Army

17 May 2. Told by MGRA Monty turned down proposed Counter mortar organisation.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#87

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Apr 2021, 16:20

Juan G. C. wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 11:31
... and "to use LSI(L)'s, APA's, XAP's, and AKA's crammed with troops and vehicles on the first three tides, instead of LST's and LCI (L) 's, would not merely endanger these valuable ships and their contents, but, because of the time required to discharge vehicles, would delay uniting troops and vehicles into fighting formations ashore". Low vehicle discharge would seriosly retard the build up. ...
This overlaps in to complicating traffic management inshore when these larger ships are brought in. Given the tides and currents expect disruptions from ships maneuvering out of position, near collisions, and at least one collision. Theres a reason why breakwater structures were essential for the Mulberry harbors. Like I wrote earlier this is another high risk act where the odds are you look stupid doing it a the end of the day.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#88

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Apr 2021, 16:29

Juan G. C. wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 09:21
I beg your forgiveness, but I fear I don't understand you: who wants to assault UTAH in February? The simultaneous attack I am thinking about is one during June or late May. By the way, was ever a date for a simultaneous ANVIL set?
Eisenhower and Montgomery. Ditto WRT SWORD.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#89

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Apr 2021, 16:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
10 Apr 2021, 02:18
Juan G. C. wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 19:12
I fear this thread has gone off topic.
They usually do....

Anyway, the only really way to assess this is to look at the availability of the landing craft units and craft. So many units became operational and were rushed to Europe in spring 1944 I doubt there were enough to NEPTUNE and ANVIL simultaneously,
Even if separated by four months I'm estimating Op Neptune (in May) must still be pared back. Between combat and operating damage/losses and timing even a June NEPTUNE op could not have been as large as OTL. Paring back ANVIL does not look practical. OTL that & Op DRAGOON were towards the lower end, & we can't ask a large port be captured intact the first day or week. To get maximum value out of this operation the early build up needs to be as large as practical & that means committing LST, & the other craft for lighterage to beaches.

No matter how I look at it 'simultaneous' is the least desirable (well, second to no Anvil op) of the options in terms of maximum size landings. There may be a psychological advantage for the attacker, but I'm not up to guessing at that one. The spreading the two operations out, by early initiation of the ANVIL OP look in the rough the better course, even with a reduced Op NEPTUNE.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#90

Post by rcocean » 10 Apr 2021, 16:47

Any simultaneous attack would've had a grave impact on the Italian campaign. The French Corps for example was absolutely essential to the attack on the Casino front. That would've been lost, because the French would've demanded their troops be part of Anvil. I don't know how we would've been able to break out of Anzio and take Rome if the French Corps and 3 American divisions had been withdrawn in April 1944 for Dragoon in June.

Another point is that what would Hitler have done if we'd released the pressure on the Italian front, moved troops to Southern France for the expected invasion? Dragoon in August was a cake walk because the Germans were tied up in Normandy and had their hands full on the Eastern Front. The Normandy campaign instead of being helped by Dragoon, made Dragoon easier. quite the opposite of what you want from a secondary attack.

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