Richard Anderson wrote: ↑17 Apr 2021, 16:28
sandeepmukherjee196 wrote: ↑15 Apr 2021, 20:15
And allied Intel knew nothing about the presence of 352nd Bang on the beach!
There is so much misinformation afloat on this issue that it now approaches the realm of mythos.
1. Somehow missing the point of this post. It is very informative no doubt.. but the context?
Really, I thought it is rather obvious. You were spreading the mythos that "allied intel knew nothing about the presence of 352nd Bang on the beach!" And that somehow that is a significant indicator of how an Allied landing could fail in the event the Germans were prescient as well as had the resources to mass three or more divisions along a 20 mile front, by noon on D-Day.
When the chips were down.. did the US 1st Army know that they will meet the 352nd on the beaches? Did they factor that in? Whether they were better off later with the best reserves decimated upfront, was not the context here.
When the chips were down it made not one iota of difference. Do you follow that context?
2. All the west to east and east to west talk too has confusing context here..since my posts have been about three Pz Divs concentrated against the British-Canadian beaches on the 6th afternoon. And no, it wasnt a "confined space" for those Three Pz Divs. And there is no point trying to write it all off with talk on how well the allies were prepared to meet the panzers. The makeshift, grossly understrength 21st Pz's performance is NOT representative of what the allies would have faced, had the HJ and Lehr ganged up with 21st and gone hell for leather, on the afternoon of the 6th, in unison. The Canadians in particular, would have had a hell of a fright. 2nd Army with much more experience in handling German armour, would have fared better. But still..
Since you brought up the yada yada 352nd on the beaches and OMAHA, I would think the context was obvious?
Cue the nifty black uniforms and silver lace big cats routine...in 1, 2, 3... :roll:
The Allies believed 21. Panzer would follow the standard German organization with one battalion of Panzer IV and one of Panthers. They knew where it was located and inferred it was the primary counterattack force. They also knew the locations of the other Panzer divisions, although they were unaware in many cases of their exact strength since the pro forma was not broken until July. They also calculated the time of arrival, with pretty good accuracy, and planned accordingly. They were unable to do the same with the infantry formations, so depended a lot on trying to identify the locations and armament of the fixed positions.