OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#196

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Apr 2021, 07:08

rcocean wrote:
26 Apr 2021, 17:36
I'm getting confused as to what Torch has to do with launching Overlord or Anvil simultaneously. Torch was a bunch of Infantry guys landing on open - almost undefended unmined - beaches near the French North African Ports. With a few light tanks thrown in. We then tried to take the ports from the rear. There was little fighting. About 500 Army KIA for the whole Fight against the French. Even then, many of the landings were borderline disasters, with Landing craft being destroyed by the surf or dashed against rocks, or landing the troops miles from their assigned beaches. Fortunately, the French didn't really want to fight, had almost no tanks, and only a couple hundred (if that) obsolete airplanes.
The vast majority of the amphibious shipping used for TORCH was still in commission for HUSKY, which included a landing force that was substantially the same size as that used for NEPTUNE; and, of course, the vast majority of the amphibious shipping used for HUSKY was still around at the time of NEPTUNE and ANVIL/DRAGOON.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#197

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Apr 2021, 07:22

Sheldrake wrote:
26 Apr 2021, 19:54
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 23:01
Given the expeditionary forces lifted, largely over the beach in both of the "big" operations prior to NEPTUNE, seems open to question what was truly necessary, even for the NEPTUNE assault force lift of (roughly) nine division equivalents.
The missing piece of evidence is the report from OP JUBILEE.

All of the operations mounted in the Mediterranean before DRAGOON were launched with intention of achieving surprise. AVALANCHE was supposed to be landings on territory held by Italians. H Hours for Torch Husky and Shingle were in the middle of the night. These were the techniques that would have been used for a cross channel landing before Dieppe demonstrated that the Allies would need to fight their way ashore against an alerted enemy defending fortifications in some strength. The Overlord force had a much higher level of supporting firepower from small craft and LCTs with artillery.

Mountbatten was an observer for OP HUSKY. His HQ's report was that false lessons should not be learned. The two operations were not comparable.
Dieppe was in August, 1942, and was a frontal amphibious attack on a defended port, and it failed; what a shock. What element of any Allied amphibious operation that came afterwards in 1942-44 was comparable, in your opinion?

As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good; using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...


daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#198

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Apr 2021, 07:24

rcocean wrote:
26 Apr 2021, 22:08
Just off topic. From reading the naval reports on Torch its a wonder we ever got ashore and stayed. We were extremely fortunate that Darlan decided to make a deal with Ike and stop the fighting. And that the French, in general, were so lacking in airplanes, tanks, and men. The landings were NOTHING like Husky, Neptune, or Anvil. Undefended, unmined beaches. Small landing craft moving men and light tanks from Transports. once the ports were captured, the fleets unloaded their supplies (including almost all the vehicles and medium tanks) and then sailed back to the USA or the UK.

In North Africa we landed troops to take ports. And once the ports were taken, we could land the medium tanks, cargo, and vehicles needed to fight on. In Sicily, Normandy, and Anvil we had to land all this OVER THE BEACH. And we didn't count on taking a major port until weeks after the landing. One shudders to think how Sledgehammer would've ended had it been implemented.
And HUSKY was successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 27 Apr 2021, 07:48, edited 1 time in total.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#199

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Apr 2021, 07:47

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 02:22
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 23:01
Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 20:02
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 19:08
Getting back to the OP... or at least closer.
Oh, that's right, landing craft. Okay, here are some notes regarding that...
Appreciate the data; but there's an interesting point in all that; the Allies had five division equivalents in the assault forces for TORCH and eight divisions+ in the assault force for HUSKY, which was 10+ months before NEPTUNE. Obviously, combat and operational losses sidelined some ships ad craft during both operations, as well as BAYTOWN, AVALANCHE, and SHINGLE, but new-builds in the July, 1943-June, 1944 period would have been extensive, as well. Given the expeditionary forces lifted, largely over the beach in both of the "big" operations prior to NEPTUNE, seems open to question what was truly necessary, even for the NEPTUNE assault force lift of (roughly) nine division equivalents.
Can you clarify that. After rereading all three posts I'm unsure what you are getting at there. ?
Amphibious assaults are infantry-heavy, by definition. There was enough amphibious shipping available to the Allies to put the equivalent of 4-5 reinforced divisions ashore in North Africa in November, 1942, 7-8 in Sicily in July of 1943, and 8-9 in Normandy in June of 1944. Presumably the mix of maneuver elements that went into the assault forces for operations in 1944 could have been varied from the historical, to either "smaller but heavier" or "larger but lighter" ... whether the potential swing was large enough to provide for near-simultaneous landings in Normandy and Provence, or more dispersed (in time) but "heavier" landing forces is another question, but it is certainly one that could be considered.

According to Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, 163 US-built LSTs commissioned between December, 1942, and March 1, 1943; at even 20 medium tanks per hull, that's a capacity for moving and landing 3,340 medium tanks... five months before HUSKY. Obviously, not every LST "just" carried tanks, but still ...

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#200

Post by daveshoup2MD » 27 Apr 2021, 08:35

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 02:08
Yes, there are long lists of movements of formations Many of which correlate to deception operations. The trick is to determine which movements were in actual response. Correlation does not automatically equal cause. Since there were deception ops aimed at near every beach in Europe (hyperbole alert) its inevitable a lot of correlation would be seen. One of the items Holt notes is Bletchley Park had a priority for items relating to the deception ops. The analysis were watching for message traffic that would give the Deception group information of German reactions. To put it another way they had a feedback loop going allowing flexibility and tuning the ops to German predispositions and reactions. Or Hitler & his staff at OKW predispositions and reactions.
Sure, but for the Germans to move the 1st Pz Division to Greece in the summer of 1943 is pretty clearly a response to a perceived Allied threat; otherwise, it would have remained in France, or been sent to the Eastern Front or what have you.

However active the Greek resistance was, the Axis (Germans, Italians, Bulgarians, etc) would not need an armored division to keep it in check.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15584
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#201

Post by ljadw » 27 Apr 2021, 12:22

daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22
Sheldrake wrote:
26 Apr 2021, 19:54
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 23:01
Given the expeditionary forces lifted, largely over the beach in both of the "big" operations prior to NEPTUNE, seems open to question what was truly necessary, even for the NEPTUNE assault force lift of (roughly) nine division equivalents.
The missing piece of evidence is the report from OP JUBILEE.

All of the operations mounted in the Mediterranean before DRAGOON were launched with intention of achieving surprise. AVALANCHE was supposed to be landings on territory held by Italians. H Hours for Torch Husky and Shingle were in the middle of the night. These were the techniques that would have been used for a cross channel landing before Dieppe demonstrated that the Allies would need to fight their way ashore against an alerted enemy defending fortifications in some strength. The Overlord force had a much higher level of supporting firepower from small craft and LCTs with artillery.

Mountbatten was an observer for OP HUSKY. His HQ's report was that false lessons should not be learned. The two operations were not comparable.
Dieppe was in August, 1942, and was a frontal amphibious attack on a defended port, and it failed; what a shock. What element of any Allied amphibious operation that came afterwards in 1942-44 was comparable, in your opinion?

As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good; using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
Dieppe was not a failure .

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#202

Post by Sheldrake » 27 Apr 2021, 16:50

daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22
#
Sheldrake wrote:
26 Apr 2021, 19:54
daveshoup2MD wrote:
25 Apr 2021, 23:01
Given the expeditionary forces lifted, largely over the beach in both of the "big" operations prior to NEPTUNE, seems open to question what was truly necessary, even for the NEPTUNE assault force lift of (roughly) nine division equivalents.
The missing piece of evidence is the report from OP JUBILEE.

All of the operations mounted in the Mediterranean before DRAGOON were launched with intention of achieving surprise. AVALANCHE was supposed to be landings on territory held by Italians. H Hours for Torch Husky and Shingle were in the middle of the night. These were the techniques that would have been used for a cross channel landing before Dieppe demonstrated that the Allies would need to fight their way ashore against an alerted enemy defending fortifications in some strength. The Overlord force had a much higher level of supporting firepower from small craft and LCTs with artillery.

Mountbatten was an observer for OP HUSKY. His HQ's report was that false lessons should not be learned. The two operations were not comparable.
Dieppe was in August, 1942, and was a frontal amphibious attack on a defended port, and it failed; what a shock. What element of any Allied amphibious operation that came afterwards in 1942-44 was comparable, in your opinion?

As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good; using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
Dave Old chap,

If you want to receive some enlightenment to your questions read through the report on the Conference on Assault Landings. In particular the Orientation part of the conference included presentations on the particular problems of a cross channel assault and a review of the lessons of Dieppe.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 273/rec/13

Op Overlord was not planned in isolation from the operations conducted in the Mediterranean, but in the view of those planning the methoids for Op Overlord there were fundamental differences between Op Husky and the operation they were planning. Here is an extract from the Combined Operations report on Op Husky
....officers concerned in across channel operations should bear in mind the fundamental differences between the two problems, "HUSKY" enjoyed tideless waters, fine weather, moderate defences and a surprised and half hearted Italian garrison, Such conditions are unlikely to obtain in operations against the N.W. coast of Europe.
it is on page 13 of this report archived on CARL
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... d/51/rec/2

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#203

Post by daveshoup2MD » 28 Apr 2021, 05:31

ljadw wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 12:22
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22

Dieppe was in August, 1942, and was a frontal amphibious attack on a defended port, and it failed; what a shock. What element of any Allied amphibious operation that came afterwards in 1942-44 was comparable, in your opinion?

As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good; using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
Dieppe was not a failure .
In what way was it a success?

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#204

Post by daveshoup2MD » 28 Apr 2021, 05:39

Sheldrake wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 16:50

Op Overlord was not planned in isolation from the operations conducted in the Mediterranean, but in the view of those planning the methoids for Op Overlord there were fundamental differences between Op Husky and the operation they were planning. Here is an extract from the Combined Operations report on Op Husky
....officers concerned in across channel operations should bear in mind the fundamental differences between the two problems, "HUSKY" enjoyed tideless waters, fine weather, moderate defences and a surprised and half hearted Italian garrison, Such conditions are unlikely to obtain in operations against the N.W. coast of Europe.
it is on page 13 of this report archived on CARL
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... d/51/rec/2
First, who said otherwise? Second, in terms of sealift, the types of ships and craft used for HUSKY, from APAs and LSIs down through LSTs, LCIs, and LCTS, much less the small craft - were the same as those used for OVERLORD. When it comes to moving troops and putting them ashore - in the summer - in either ship to shore or shore to shore movements in European waters on sandy beaches, the drill is pretty much the same ... certainly in the days before vertical envelopment via rotary wing aircraft and ACLCs.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15584
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#205

Post by ljadw » 28 Apr 2021, 07:14

daveshoup2MD wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 05:31
ljadw wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 12:22
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22

Dieppe was in August, 1942, and was a frontal amphibious attack on a defended port, and it failed; what a shock. What element of any Allied amphibious operation that came afterwards in 1942-44 was comparable, in your opinion?

As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good; using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
Dieppe was not a failure .
In what way was it a success?
Soldiers were transported to the French coast,landed on the French coast and returned to Britain .
The negative side effect was the big losses .
It was never the intention to capture the port of Dieppe ,because the forces were to weak and because they could not hold Dieppe .

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#206

Post by daveshoup2MD » 28 Apr 2021, 07:44

ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 07:14
The negative side effect was the big losses .
It was never the intention to capture the port of Dieppe ,because the forces were to weak and because they could not hold Dieppe .
Well aware of that; that's why it as defined as a raid. Raids are not successful when landing force casualties approach 70 percent.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 15584
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#207

Post by ljadw » 28 Apr 2021, 10:47

It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#208

Post by daveshoup2MD » 29 Apr 2021, 00:54

ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .
Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#209

Post by Peter89 » 29 Apr 2021, 09:23

daveshoup2MD wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 00:54
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .
Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.
Except there wasn't even an Allied victory at Dieppe : D

If we want to twist words beyond their meaning, the Germans have lost the Battle of France, because it was nothing more than just a stepstone in their way towards defeat, and the BEF got valuable experience how to evacuate. Also it wasn't a battle, but a campaign, and it wasn't in France, because it was also fought in the Low Countries. But those are not really the Low Countries, because the key movements took place in the Ardennes. But that wasn't the key movement, because the key movement was taking place in Berlin. But in fact the key wasn't what the Germans were doing, but what the Allies were doing, so... etc.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#210

Post by Sheldrake » 29 Apr 2021, 10:03

ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
That is a quote from a German intelligence officer. He was wrong.

Probably the biggest single success of Op Jubilee was the delusion it created in OKW that they had defeated an invasion in 1942. It encouraged OKW overconfidence in the Atlantic Wall, in Hitler's intuition and the belief that the allies would attempt to capture a port. As a result millions of tons of concrete were wasted creating defences that would never be attacked and when the allies landed between the Orne and Vire rivers they were landing on the lowest but one defence priority in 84th Corps, which in turn had a lower priority than comparable sectors in the 15th Army secotor.

Op Jubilee was just a big raid. It needed to be big for two reasons:-

1. It needed to satisfy the British strategic objective of being seen to mount a cross channel operation in 1942 that could take pressure from the Red Army and demonstrate to the Americans how difficult a cross channel assault would be. There is a note in Brooke's diary that bigger than a single division but smaller than a corps was the minimum that could be risked.

2. Previous raids on the Lofoton Islands and St Nazaire had been able to achieve surprise with a battalion sized formations in coup de main operations - albeit at a heavy cost C 50% for St Nazaire. There had to be a test whether this would work on a larger scale. If so the cross channel assault problem would be greatly simplified. Landing 8,000 men and 50 tanks from hundreds of craft on a ten mile front throws up problems that did not apply when landing 500 commandos from a dozen boats on one beach.

Dieppe was a success on both counts, albeit at a higher cost than desirable. Hitler did order troops from the Eastern Front to France. There was a substantial list of lessons learned. Many of these are boring things about landing craft management, but it directly led to the invention of the AVRE which were so useful on D Day and afterwards. More important it stopped what Combined Ops might have considered damned fool ideas such as "we don't really need all these fire support craft: its a waste of landing craft."

Which brings us back the the tangential argument of this thread.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”