Operation Typhoon aimed at southern USSR in 1941

[Aida1]

The primary virtue of this ATL is enables Ostheer to use its PzGr's to do what they were best at: creating Kessels. This was a world-historical military capability; in few wars has an army been able to "Cannae" its opponent as routinely as did Ostheer in '41. OKH largely wasted this capability after Taifun: PzGr's 3 and 4 made a side-by-side push north of Moscow while PzGr2 operated so far south of them that linkup was feasible only on the most megalomaniacal reading of German capabilities in late fall. Ostheer's other mechanized formations to the north and south lacked optimal partners for double-envelopments.

While late-fall mud conditions weren't optimal for kessels - they would have developed more slowly and RKKA could have retreated from encirclement - even the threat of slower kessels could force abandonment of important strategic territory. Realistically, that important territory was in the South in Fall '41.

This sounds like the unrealistic demands made by OKH and Hitler in the fall of 1941. AGS was factually incapable to get any further by the end of october 1941. For the discussions between the OKH and AGS see Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion Boog,etc.. Fischer 1991 pp 611-615.

[ljadw]

Germany did NOT need more oil,and if it had more oil, it could not use it

viewtopic.php?t=255358#p2325926

Fuel was scarce already during the Poland campaign and there were very good reasons why much of the Heer was equipped with horses and wagons.
At the same time, in the Reich itself, motor vehicles were powered by wood gas wherever possible. This even applied to driving school tanks.
Otherwise, the principle was followed of transporting shipments by rail whenever at all possible.
There was plenty of need for extra fuel, it just wasn't available and therefore had to be rationed from day one.

It is wrong to say that there was plenty of need for extra fuel.
One example : Avgas
1940 : production/import : 966000 ton. Consumption :863000
1941 : P + I : 910000 .Consumption : 1,274,000 ton
1942 : P +I : 1,472,000 ton . Consumption :1,426,000
1943 + I : 1,917,000 ton . Consumption :1,825,000
1944 : P + I : 1,105,000 ton . Consumption : 1,403,000 . The problems in 1944 happened in the late summer and were caused by the loss of the Romanian imports and by the attacks on the synthetic plants and the railways .
But the LW had no oil problems during the battle of Berlin (winter 1943-1944 ) .
In 1943 BC lost 2000 aircraft in its attacks on Germany, in the first 5 months of 1944 it lost 950 aircraft .
8 th Air Force lost 716 aircraft in 1943 above Germany, in the 5 first months of 1944 1259 aircraft .
Source : Eagle in Flames P 251 .
After May 1944 the LW could still replace the losses of aircraft, but no longer the losses of pilots/crew.
That shipments were mostly transported by rail and not by cars (also by the Wallies ) was not caused by lack of oil,but by the fact that trains can transport more than cars and that the rail infrastructure in Continental Europe was much , very much better than the road infrastructure : before the war almost all good transports were done by rail, not by road .

[History Learner]

Truck production had nothing to do with oil shortage and the oil shortage of the Ostheer was not caused by production problems, but by transport problems : the problems to transport the oil to the front .In 1941,the German consumption of motor oil was the highest of the war .

Wages of Destruction, Pages 412, by Adam Tooze:

"In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for the motor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronic shortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotorization' of the Wehrmacht.68 It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots, due in large part to the shortage of air fuel.69 But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing its soldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-road experience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign.70 Shortages made themselves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations that in November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at its Brandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lacked the petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off the assembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to be arranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that there were no further interruptions.71​"

2 Murray is wrong ,twice .
a the cuts of fuel allotments for training were not impacting the ability of the LW to maintain the outputs of pilots
b they did not diminish the quality of the new pilots . (As usual, the bomber crews are neglected ).
In 1942 the following were trained
Fighter pilots : 2329
For bombers : 2499
For Observers :327
Transporters : 89
In 1943 :
Fighters : 5311
Bombers : 4595
Observers : 1278
Transporters :699
The big problem was not fuel , not aircraft , but that the losses were higher than the number of newcomers, which forced the LW to shorten the training .
Source : Stilla :Die Luftwaffe im Kampf um die Luftherrschaft .
Notes 1173 and 1239
There were in 1942 5295 new pilots/crew. In 1943 :12164 .

Why would they have to shorten the time of training? Because...fuel constraints.

About the Soviets : they went to Berlin with 127 million ton of oil (1945) , in 1941 they produced 31 million ton of oil .
The loss of the Caucasus oil would hurt the Soviets, but would not force them to surrender , because
a they consumed less oil during the war than before the war
b they had very big reserves of oil in June 1941
c a part of the losses were replaced by new oil fields : Baku 2 .

What was yearly production in 1945, what was overall consumption and how much did the Caucasus constitute in terms of said yearly production. Those are the only relevant metrics, so far you have not provided them.

[ljadw]

The training schools got the following oil amounts in 1944 ( Source : Stilla )
January : 3,300 ton
February : 3,700 ton
March : 4,100
April : 5,100
May : 5,100
June : 5,200
July :2,900
August : 1,500
September : 1,200
October : 0,700
November : 0,500
December : 0,500
We don't know why they got more in April,May, June and we don't know what the result was of this increase and what the result was of the decrease after June : it is possible that the results of decrease/increase were not very important as we don't know how many pilots left the schools during these months/were trained during these months .
We don't know if the decrease of oil allotments were caused by the decrease of the number of pilots that were trained or if they caused this decrease .

[History Learner]

The training schools got the following oil amounts in 1944 ( Source : Stilla )
January : 3,300 ton
February : 3,700 ton
March : 4,100
April : 5,100
May : 5,100
June : 5,200
July :2,900
August : 1,500
September : 1,200
October : 0,700
November : 0,500
December : 0,500
We don't know why they got more in April,May, June and we don't know what the result was of this increase and what the result was of the decrease after June : it is possible that the results of decrease/increase were not very important as we don't know how many pilots left the schools during these months/were trained during these months .
We don't know if the decrease of oil allotments were caused by the decrease of the number of pilots that were trained or if they caused this decrease .

Okay, the way to prove your case or mine is by showing us what the fuel allotments were in 1942 vs 1944, and then seeing the number of pilots trained in both years.

[danebrog]

As early as November 1940, in a conversation with General Thomas, Göring outlined the motives for the forthcoming eastern campaign in three points, the third of which is of particular interest:

1. pre-empt Russian attack
2. since the war against England will last longer => break through the English blockade to the east
3. "we must push through to the Caucasus in order to seize the Caucasian oil areas, since without them generous air warfare against England and America is impossible."

General Thomas, in particular, repeatedly emphasised the crucial importance of this region for the German war economy in his military economic studies. On 4 June 1941, he opened a meeting of the "Economic Staff East", which was to be responsible for the future economic management and exploitation of the territories to be occupied, with the words:
"Two main demands arise [...] besides the first aim of crushing the enemy Wehrmacht a) the destruction of the Bolshevik system b) an early exploitation of the economic potential of Russia, especially in the food and fuel fields."

At the beginning of June 1941, Göring also once again highlighted the essential economic driving forces for "Unternehmen Barbarossa" in his "Secret Guidelines for the Economic Exploitation of the Russian Territories to be Occupied".
It stated:
"b) in the case of industrial raw materials, the emphasis is on mineral oil. Among the projects which do not serve the food economy, the tasks connected with the production and removal of mineral oil have priority under all circumstances."

Planning took on a more concrete form in the spring of 1942. Thus, during a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, on 3 January 1942, Hitler stated:
"[...] he was determined to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus as soon as the weather became favourable. This direction of thrust was the most important; it was necessary to get at the oil and at Iran and Iraq."

On 25 February 1942, the naval command presented Hitler with a memorandum based on an assessment of the situation on 20 February, arguing for coordinated European-Japanese coalition warfare. The naval command clearly recognised that the oil supply was the Achilles' heel of German warfare.

As the quintessence of the situation meeting of 28 March 1942 preparing the new campaign, the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel General Halder, noted in his war diary:
"War will be decided in the East. [...] Target: Black Sea, closed sea; Batum - Baku."

[danebrog]

Although the German fuel situation at the beginning of "Barbarossa" was even more favourable than ever, some experts, above all General Thomas, recognised that a campaign against the USSR would lead to serious supply problems. With the beginning of hostilities on 22 June 1941, the consumption curve shot up rapidly, as predicted by the experts. The fact that a serious supply crisis did not materialise for the time being was mainly due to the unforeseeable increase in Romanian oil deliveries.
At the end of October 1941, what General Thomas had predicted was confirmed. The stocks were exhausted and the deficit in the mineral oil balance could no longer be compensated. As a consequence, the mineral oil allocation for the Wehrmacht and the civilian sector was cut.
In short, from this point on, fuel ran out because consumption was higher than production. This could only be compensated inadequately by a considerable increase in the output of the hydrogenation plants.
The General Quartermaster of the Army, General Eduard Wagner, had already announced during a meeting on 30 August 1941 that from January 1942 there would be no more supplies and that new fuel areas would have to be obtained. The experts were aware that a real compensation for the shortage could only be achieved by conquering the oil area around Majkop.
At the latest since the turn of the year 1941/42, these economic objectives finally dictated Hitler's calculations.

[danebrog]

If the ATL offensive were successful, then a certain deadlock would have been created in the oil supply.
Also, Western Allied oil supplies could no longer be routed via Persia, leaving only Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

I am already looking forward to the discussion of what will now happen in the international framework....

[ljadw]

The training schools got the following oil amounts in 1944 ( Source : Stilla )
January : 3,300 ton
February : 3,700 ton
March : 4,100
April : 5,100
May : 5,100
June : 5,200
July :2,900
August : 1,500
September : 1,200
October : 0,700
November : 0,500
December : 0,500
We don't know why they got more in April,May, June and we don't know what the result was of this increase and what the result was of the decrease after June : it is possible that the results of decrease/increase were not very important as we don't know how many pilots left the schools during these months/were trained during these months .
We don't know if the decrease of oil allotments were caused by the decrease of the number of pilots that were trained or if they caused this decrease .

Okay, the way to prove your case or mine is by showing us what the fuel allotments were in 1942 vs 1944, and then seeing the number of pilots trained in both years.

The problem was not the number of airmen that were trained in 1942 or 1944, but when these airmen became available for the front units .If the front units lost 200 airmen in a month and during that month they received only 100 replacements, there was a problem .The only way to solve this problem was not to increase the number of airmen that would start the training, but to shorten the training and to send that month 2 groups to the front units : one that was fully trained and one that was partially trained .The LW lost in a month of 1944 1000 airmen , but there were no 1000 airmen who finished that month the training . The only possibility was to shorten the training . It was always a question of time .
The front units needed quantity, not quality .It was better to receive 200 airmen of whom 100 partially trained than 100 airmen fully trained .
In 1942 239 Nachtjäger were trained ( source : Stilla ),in 1943 1664 . It is obvious that 1664 Nachtjäger were better than 239, even if they were less trained .

[ljadw]

Although the German fuel situation at the beginning of "Barbarossa" was even more favourable than ever, some experts, above all General Thomas, recognised that a campaign against the USSR would lead to serious supply problems. With the beginning of hostilities on 22 June 1941, the consumption curve shot up rapidly, as predicted by the experts. The fact that a serious supply crisis did not materialise for the time being was mainly due to the unforeseeable increase in Romanian oil deliveries.
At the end of October 1941, what General Thomas had predicted was confirmed. The stocks were exhausted and the deficit in the mineral oil balance could no longer be compensated. As a consequence, the mineral oil allocation for the Wehrmacht and the civilian sector was cut.
In short, from this point on, fuel ran out because consumption was higher than production. This could only be compensated inadequately by a considerable increase in the output of the hydrogenation plants.
The General Quartermaster of the Army, General Eduard Wagner, had already announced during a meeting on 30 August 1941 that from January 1942 there would be no more supplies and that new fuel areas would have to be obtained. The experts were aware that a real compensation for the shortage could only be achieved by conquering the oil area around Majkop.
At the latest since the turn of the year 1941/42, these economic objectives finally dictated Hitler's calculations.

Hm: this is debunked by the following
1 During the winter the LW was able to supply the encircled forces at Demjansk ,the KM was able to send U Boats to the coasts of the US .The Army was able to hold the front in the East .
2 Thomas was exaggerating : a short successful campaign in the East would not cause oil problems ,and even a long campaign did not cause oil problems : the WM was able to go to Stalingrad in the summer of 1942 and, this without the oil of the Caucasus .The stocks were not exhausted in October 1941 .The stocks of motor oil were at the end of 1941 379000 ton,of avgas 254000 ton .
3 The conquest of Maikop would not solve the oil problems,as it would take years to restart the Maikop production, to send the oil to Germany and to refine it .
In 1940 oil production (including imports ) was 6,888 million ton. Consumption was 5,856 million of which 3,005 million by the WM .
In 1941 it was 8,485 million with a consumption of 7,305 ,of which 4,567 by the WM .
In 1942 :8,965 million .Consumption 6,483 .WM : 4,410
In 1943 : 10,497.Consumption :6,971. WM : 4,762 .
There is no proof that the slight decrease of the fuel consumption by the WM was causing problems,that it was forced upon the WM.It is probable that it was a choice .
The consumption of Diesel decreased in 1942 from 1,856 million to 1,519 million,the consumption of motor oil from 2,504 to 2,089 and the consumption of the LW INCREASED in 1942 from 1,274 to 1,426 million ton .

[ljadw]

If the ATL offensive were successful, then a certain deadlock would have been created in the oil supply.
Also, Western Allied oil supplies could no longer be routed via Persia, leaving only Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

I am already looking forward to the discussion of what will now happen in the international framework....

The western oil supplies started in 1942 and the USSR did not collapse in 1941 .

[danebrog]

Hm: this is debunked by the following

Hm, it may be because of the language barrier that we are talking past each other:
Of course, the Wehrmacht did not run out of fuel overnight, but they had
A) (scarce) strategic reserves - by the way, almost until the end of the war.
B) hydrogenation plants, which were subsequently greatly expanded.
C) a fairly effective system for managing the available resources.

Nevertheless, the front-line units had to be very strict with their fuel allocations, which then also influenced operational mobility. Manstein described this in connection with the operations in '41 before Leningrad, where fuel consumption in particular caused considerable headaches.
Moreover, the fuel management of front-line units is a complicated issue: When Rommel withdrew a long way after Alamein because of insufficient fuel for operative warfare, this was doubted by higher authorities: After all, there would have been enough fuel for the entire way back....
Rommel is said to have had considerable problems explaining the special logistical requirements of mechanised units in operational warfare.

Moreover, not all fuel is the same:
The navy had an increased need for diesel, analogous to the intensification of the submarine war. I can't say anything about the heavy oil requirements of the surface units, I don't have any data or sufficient knowledge.

The air force, on the other hand, needed the lion's share of high-octane fuel. By the way, one of the main bottlenecks was not the amount of fuel, but the lack of suitable additives.
In the case of avgas, the situation was such that in '42 the allocations to the flight schools had to be cut in the meantime because it was needed at the front. By the time enough was available again, the flying weather was no longer optimal:
As far as the aforementioned connection between increased aircraft production, rising pilot losses, reduced training and fuel shortages is concerned, this was a cycle that negatively influenced each other and finally took on a momentum of its own that could no longer be controlled.
Stilla has described the interrelationships of this downward spiral quite well

But before I get bogged down in "sideshows" here, BTT:
My actual intention, however, was to point out that the Caucasus offensive was significantly influenced by strategic bottlenecks in fuel and crude oil supplies.
This was due to the two well-known factors: the stalemate of the offensive in '41 before Moscow and the entry of the USA into the war.
Until then, it had been speculated that with the fall of Moscow the campaign was essentially decided.
This on the subject of OTL

The western oil supplies started in 1942 and the USSR did not collapse in 1941 .

IF in ATL had been the main thrust of the Wehrmacht in '41 in the direction of the Caucasus and this had led to the conquest/elimination of the Caucasian oil region - then a stalemate would have arisen for both D and the SU with regard to these sources.
Since we are in a hypothetical universe from here on, I cannot for the life of me gauge whether this would have occurred already in '41 or only in '42. (Nor can I see that this part has already been dealt with in this thread). Nor can I judge what military-strategic and political effects this would have had on the further course of events on the Eastern Front.
But the quite essential supplies via Persia could then no longer take place.

[ljadw]

Rommel did not withdraw after Alamein because of fuel problems, but because he was defeated .

[ljadw]

As early as November 1940, in a conversation with General Thomas, Göring outlined the motives for the forthcoming eastern campaign in three points, the third of which is of particular interest:

1. pre-empt Russian attack
2. since the war against England will last longer => break through the English blockade to the east
3. "we must push through to the Caucasus in order to seize the Caucasian oil areas, since without them generous air warfare against England and America is impossible."

General Thomas, in particular, repeatedly emphasised the crucial importance of this region for the German war economy in his military economic studies. On 4 June 1941, he opened a meeting of the "Economic Staff East", which was to be responsible for the future economic management and exploitation of the territories to be occupied, with the words:
"Two main demands arise [...] besides the first aim of crushing the enemy Wehrmacht a) the destruction of the Bolshevik system b) an early exploitation of the economic potential of Russia, especially in the food and fuel fields."

At the beginning of June 1941, Göring also once again highlighted the essential economic driving forces for "Unternehmen Barbarossa" in his "Secret Guidelines for the Economic Exploitation of the Russian Territories to be Occupied".
It stated:
"b) in the case of industrial raw materials, the emphasis is on mineral oil. Among the projects which do not serve the food economy, the tasks connected with the production and removal of mineral oil have priority under all circumstances."

Planning took on a more concrete form in the spring of 1942. Thus, during a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, on 3 January 1942, Hitler stated:
"[...] he was determined to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus as soon as the weather became favourable. This direction of thrust was the most important; it was necessary to get at the oil and at Iran and Iraq."

On 25 February 1942, the naval command presented Hitler with a memorandum based on an assessment of the situation on 20 February, arguing for coordinated European-Japanese coalition warfare. The naval command clearly recognised that the oil supply was the Achilles' heel of German warfare.

As the quintessence of the situation meeting of 28 March 1942 preparing the new campaign, the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel General Halder, noted in his war diary:
"War will be decided in the East. [...] Target: Black Sea, closed sea; Batum - Baku."

What Goering said was not very wise
1 There was in 1940 and even in 1941 no fear for a Russian attack.Such an attack would only happen if Germany was defeated and if there was chaos as in November 1918 .
2 It was generally assumed that the fall of the USSR would very soon result in the capitulation of Britain .
3 The generous air war against England and America : this assumed that Britain would continue the war after the fall of the USSR. It assumes also that there would be a big air war against Britain ( such a war against America was impossible ) and that for this the oil of the Caucasus was needed .
Both assumptions are very unlikely :
if the war continued, the RAF and the USAAF would take the offensive and Germany would be condemned to the defensive . And why would Germany need more oil in a defensive war against Britain/US and why would the oil of the Caucasus be needed ? And how would this oil be transported to Germany ?And why would Germany win this war if it had more Avgas ?
In the HTL the LW fought against the Wallies and the USSR consuming 1,274 million ton of avgas in 1941,1,426 in 1942,1,825 in 1943 .Why would the LW need more fuel if it fought against the Wallies only than if it fought against the Wallies and the USSR .
Would it be not more logical that the LW would need less oil in the ATL?And that there would be no need for the oil of the Caucasus ?

[danebrog]

I did not want to analyse the Battle of Alamein, but to illustrate certain factors in relation to the logistical peculiarities of mechanised troops.
Sadly, this was probably not understood
To explain the background to Rommel's withdrawal in all its details at this point would also lead completely OT