OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#226

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 08:38

Sorry for the late reply, I've been on vacation.

First, some corrections...I should have double checked this before posting, since its from some years back.

23 LSI, LSC, and LSG. Three, HMS Bulolo, Hilary, and Largs were configured as LSI(HQ). Of the actual assault transports, six were LSI(L), two LSI(M), five LSI(S), and three LSI(H). There were two LSC (Landing Ship, Carrier, each with 21 LCM and a maximum of 295 troops). There were also two LSG (Landing Ship, Gantry, each with 15 LCM and a maximum of 215 troops). Four of the LSI(S) served with the Western Task Force, the others with the Eastern Task Force.

There were at least 86 LST of all types, including one of the "Maricaibos" and the three British LCT-1.

509 “major” landing craft (LCT, LCM and LCI), including c. 224 LCT 2/3/5 and c. 163 LCI(L)
1,225 “minor” landing craft (LCA, LCM, LCPR, LCVP, and LCV)
1,742 Total

In addition the following were used in transporting troops and equipment, apparently all were in use on D-Day:
329 ancillary vessels (coastal craft, barges, lighters and so forth)
237 merchant vessels and troop transports

Most of the British troop strength were transported in 17 "troopships", which were mostly repurposed liners. Motor transport for the British forces and stores for both forces were on 45 cargo vessels. Another 20 vessels carried a mixed cargo of troops, vehicles, ammunition, and one or two LCM as deckload. Four were sunk in route and two were bombed at the beachhead. In addition, 14 US Liberty ships, loaned to the Eastern Task Force, also carried a mix of cargo and troops, usually with a deckload LCM. Those 34 vessels carried from 43 to 464 troops, but typically about 150.

The American forces were lifted on 2 AP, 19 APA, 7 AK, and the 4 RN LSI(S).

The rest were a miscellany; there were six ships dedicated to carrying packaged gasoline and one the same for water.

With that they were able to move a HUSKY D-Day lift of:

Commonwealth forces:

13 infantry brigades
2 armoured brigades (and part of 1 Canadian Tank Brigade)
4 divisional headquarters and troops
2 corps headquarters and troops (including three Commandos, an SAS “Regiment” and a Special Raiding “Squadron”)

US forces:

10 infantry regiments
7 tank battalion
4 divisional headquarters and troops
1 corps headquarters and troops (including three Ranger battalions)

The NEPTUNE amphibious forces included the following allocations:

10 APA
3 LSI(HQ)
22 LSI(L)
9 LSI (H)
11 LSI(M)
238 LST
1,045 “major” landing craft (814 LCT, 37 LCI(S), and 194 LCI(L))
1,381 “minor” landing craft (462 LCA, 267 LCM, 608 LCVP, and 44 LCP(L))
2,719 Total (the total of 4,266 known to have been “operational” on D-Day include all small craft, such as LCS(S), LCS(M), LCS(L), LCG, and LCF, as well as oddities like LCP(L) Smokers and LCA Hedgehog that I eliminated to give a better comparison)

In addition the following were used in transporting troops and equipment to the continent in June, although it is unknown how many were used on D-Day:

736 ancillary vessels (coastal craft, barges, lighters and so forth)
864 merchant vessels and troop transports

With that they were able to move a NEPTUNE D-Day lift of:

Commonwealth forces:

11 infantry brigades
5 armoured brigades (plus 6 RE Assault Squadrons, 2 RM Armoured Support Regiments and a separate battery, and 2 Crab regiments, the rough equivalent of 2 more armoured brigades)
4 divisional headquarters and troops
2 corps headquarters and troops (including six Commandos)

US forces:

10 infantry regiments
6 tank battalions
3 divisional headquarters and troops
2 corps headquarters and troops (including two Ranger battalions)
Your ship designations are mixed up.
I'm sorry to hear that.
The British "LSI" was the equivalent (in role, not capacity, generally) of the US "APA: - troop transports with the ability to self-unload because of the ship's ability to carry and crew a boat group of landing craft in the LCA-LCVP-LCM types. The US AKA was similar, except the basic task was carrying cargo. In a general sense, three or four USN APAs and a USN AKA could move and land an infantry RCT in the assault, with a reinforced infantry battalion per APA and the RCTs heavy equipment in the AKA. British LSIs tended to be smaller, and the British didn't really develop an equivalent of the AKA.
Well, the British LSI(L) was equivalent to a US APA in role and capacity, generally, the LSI(M) and LSI(S) were considerably smaller and had no real American equivalent...the closest would be the APD. The LSI(H) was different still and again had no US equivalent either, Then there are very unique British designs like the LSC and LSG.
An LST - the US-built for the purpose types or the British tanker conversion - was designed to move medium tanks, not troops. Conflating LSTs and LSIs is the equivalent of conflating APAs and LSTs and so says nothing about amphibious lift for medium tanks, so its very unclear what you're trying to establish here.
Since I wasn't comparing them as anything other than landing ships, I'm not sure what I conflated? BTW, the TLS, like the TLC, was initially intended as a means of carrying tanks, vehicles, and troops into an amphibious assault, not just tanks. The “Maracaibo” conversions could hold 18 Churchills or 22 25-ton tanks or 33 trucks. The “Boxers” (LST-1) could hold 13 40-ton or 20 25-ton tanks (in the hold) and as many as 36 3-ton trucks (on the main deck). The purpose-bui;t US design, the LST-2, could hold 13 40-ton or 20 25-ton tanks and 35 (or 36) 2.5 or 3-ton trucks loaded to a max gross weight of 10 tons). They all carried about 207 men, but could carry more for short trips (calculated as "about 500" from experience) where the lack of accommodations was unimportant.

It may surprise you, but few of the LST in NEPTUNE embarked tanks for the assault, primarily because it was not considered an assault vessel, For example, my Dad's AAA AW Btry landed on UTAH from an LST...on 14 June. The AAA AW Btry's landed on D-Day were embarked on LCT. The issue was complicated at Sicily by the shallow waters surrounding most of the beaches, which necessitated the use of ponton causeways, since when they grounded they were typically a couple of hundred yards from water shallow enough for vehicles to drive off into. The main limitation on beaching on the LST-2 was actually its load limit. It was designed to ground on a 1/50 slope, carrying a 500-ton load, 72 tons of fuel, 50 tons of water, and a full crew and troop complement. A full load of tanks would mean a 700-720 ton load, with vehicles on the main deck it would go to 850 tons or more. In that case it would have to land on a much steeper beach – 1/30 or more.
You'll note APAs and AKAs were present for TORCH and HUSKY, of course; here are some of them during HUSKY:
How odd? I don't think I ever said they weren't? Both AP and APA were present for HUSKY, as were AKA, but no AK or AKA were present for NEPTUNE.
Likewise, USS LSM-1 was not commissioned until May, 1944; (see link http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/14/14001.htm, so it's also unclear LSM could have been present for HUSKY.
My bad, LCM, not LSM.
Even going by your figures, the infantry brigade/RCT numbers were 23 for HUSKY and 21 for NEPTUNE, so that is actually in HUSKY's favor; special operations units of various types are eight for HUSKY and eight for NEPTUNE, so that's presumably close to a wash. Joslyn lists the British 8th and 27th armoured brigades, Canadian 2nd Armoured Brigade, and the US Army's 3rd and 6th armoured groups for the NEPTUNE assault; in rough equivalents, that's 15 medium tank battalions. HUSKY had roughly the same, between the US, British, and Canadian assault divisions.
British 7th Armoured Division was also part of NEPTUNE's assault force, it was a large component of FORCE L. So add four medium tank battalion equivalents, giving 19 versus a nominal 14 for HUSKY, but the devil is in the details. The effective equivalent in HUSKY was considerably smaller due to the lack of LCT (and inexperience). For the British it was four and one-third armoured regiments and for the Americans it was effectively about 19 medium tank platoons...ten and two-thirds tank battalions compared to the 15 assaulting in NEPTUNE (see below).
The HUSKY assault force was very close to the NEPTUNE assault force in terms of maneuver battalions.
In terms of infantry, yes. In terms of armor? No. For example, KOOL Force (essentially 2d Armd Div (-) and the 18th RCT, executed the assault with two platoons of Company I, 67th Armored...ten medium tanks. They actually debarked at 0200 on 11 July, nearly 24 hours after anchoring. The rest were embarked on the LST, while most of the combat and administrative vehicles were embarked on seven Liberty ships, which had to be offloaded into LCM and LCT. The 16th RCT and 26th RCT in DIME Force executed the assault each with the support of just a platoon - 5 medium tanks. JOSS Force landed with one company of the 67th Armored attached to each of the three RCT of the 3d Inf Div. At least CENT Force had an entire tank battalion attached...but only had six LCT-5, so was limited to just 30 of the 54 medium tanks available for the assault. The British were in the same boat, just two tank regiments were available for the two assault divisions in ACID Force and the same for the two divisions of BARK Force, and they too were limited by the number of LCT available.

The problems associated with the HUSKY assault force and its peculiar nature are well addressed in [url]file:///C:/Users/richt/AppData/Local/Temp/p4013coll8_60.pdf[/url].

So in HUSKY the RCT/Brigade was sometimes supported in the assault by a rump company of tanks...if they had them. In NEPTUNE they were supported by a battalion of tanks...mostly because of the results of HUSKY and AVALANCHE, which demonstrated that tanks on the beach were key to success and in minimizing casualties.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Aber
Member
Posts: 1124
Joined: 05 Jan 2010, 22:43

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#227

Post by Aber » 02 May 2021, 09:27

daveshoup2MD wrote:
01 May 2021, 21:00
There are some others one could include:
Could you add a nightime/daylight indicator to the list? :wink:


Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#228

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 16:34

daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:24
And HUSKY was successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943.
Um, Syracuse was captured at 2100 10 July, the port operating party entered before noon on 11 July, and the first 12 ships planned to unload there D+3 were departing the port after unloading by 1800 on 13 July. Augusta was abandoned at 0500 on 12 July, but the harbor was shelled and it was not secured until just before noon on 13 July and the usable quay found was in operation by that evening. Gela was more problematic, since the pier was demolished by the Italians before they evacuated, so the American forces, a rump army, were supplied over the beaches until the capture of Palermo.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#229

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 16:49

daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22
As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good;
Sure, except when communications with the NSFC parties was lost...or if, like TORCH and HUSKY, it was before the JASCO and NSFC were developed as a result of TORCH and HUSKY. Plus, all those battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and the lack occasionally had other things to do.
using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
You seem to imagine that the LCS, LCF, LCT(R), LCG, and others were developed because they were cool and someone wanted to waste shipyards and material building them. They were actually developed iteratively to perceived requirements for direct fire support and increased in size and capability until the LCS(L). Most were actually conversions of obsolescent craft, so did not take away much from landing vessel construction.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#230

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 17:21

daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:47
Amphibious assaults are infantry-heavy, by definition.
Which, obviously, must mean the investment by the Americans and British in armored amphibious assault means was unnecessary?
There was enough amphibious shipping available to the Allies to put the equivalent of 4-5 reinforced divisions ashore in North Africa in November, 1942, 7-8 in Sicily in July of 1943, and 8-9 in Normandy in June of 1944.
And required the immediate capture of a port in order for them to be reinforced by anything other than light tanks. The amphibious doctrine as used in TORCH was modified to meet the perceived requirements. HUSKY and AVALANCHE were transitional, NEPTUNE and DRAGOON were matured doctrine.
Presumably the mix of maneuver elements that went into the assault forces for operations in 1944 could have been varied from the historical, to either "smaller but heavier" or "larger but lighter" ... whether the potential swing was large enough to provide for near-simultaneous landings in Normandy and Provence, or more dispersed (in time) but "heavier" landing forces is another question, but it is certainly one that could be considered.
For smaller but heavier there was a requirement for more LCT. For larger but lighter there was a requirement for more APA and AKA. NEPTUNE was a compromise that used all available resources (except those still sustaining SHINGLE, which were not assault vessels). A simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON would require more ships and craft.
According to Friedman's US Amphibious Ships, 163 US-built LSTs commissioned between December, 1942, and March 1, 1943; at even 20 medium tanks per hull, that's a capacity for moving and landing 3,340 medium tanks... five months before HUSKY. Obviously, not every LST "just" carried tanks, but still ...
Yes, and half of those or more were used in HUSKY. It was the same with the LSI(L), even though they had never actually tested debarking troops direct from them in operational conditions in the Med before the landings. IIRC in some cases they actually cross-decked from the LCI(L) to LCT for the actual landing because of worries regarding the beaching capability of the new vessel.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#231

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 17:22

Peter89 wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 09:23
daveshoup2MD wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 00:54
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .
Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.
Except there wasn't even an Allied victory at Dieppe : D

If we want to twist words beyond their meaning, the Germans have lost the Battle of France, because it was nothing more than just a stepstone in their way towards defeat, and the BEF got valuable experience how to evacuate. Also it wasn't a battle, but a campaign, and it wasn't in France, because it was also fought in the Low Countries. But those are not really the Low Countries, because the key movements took place in the Ardennes. But that wasn't the key movement, because the key movement was taking place in Berlin. But in fact the key wasn't what the Germans were doing, but what the Allies were doing, so... etc.
Why anyone would voluntarily interact with ljadw at this point is simply beyond me.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#232

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 17:25

Sheldrake wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 16:50
If you want to receive some enlightenment to your questions read through the report on the Conference on Assault Landings. In particular the Orientation part of the conference included presentations on the particular problems of a cross channel assault and a review of the lessons of Dieppe.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 273/rec/13

Op Overlord was not planned in isolation from the operations conducted in the Mediterranean, but in the view of those planning the methoids for Op Overlord there were fundamental differences between Op Husky and the operation they were planning. Here is an extract from the Combined Operations report on Op Husky
....officers concerned in across channel operations should bear in mind the fundamental differences between the two problems, "HUSKY" enjoyed tideless waters, fine weather, moderate defences and a surprised and half hearted Italian garrison, Such conditions are unlikely to obtain in operations against the N.W. coast of Europe.
it is on page 13 of this report archived on CARL
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... d/51/rec/2
Considering the mess the HUSKY storm made of the timing of the landings, calling it "fine weather" may have been a bit of a stretch... :lol:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#233

Post by Juan G. C. » 02 May 2021, 18:02

In relationship with my OP, I have a problem with this excerpt from United States Army in World War II.:Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 which I quoted earlier:
On 18 February an uneasy compromise emerged. The 21st Army Group staff, whether relying on American assurances of higher serviceability or on a reassessment of their own needs, dropped 7 LST's from the requirement of 42, and 30 LCI (L) 's from the requirement of 51. It was then proposed that 20 LST's and 2 1 LCI (L) 's be taken from Anvil (the vessels to depart the Mediterranean for the United Kingdom not later than 1 April) and, by way of compensation for the LST's, to transfer to the Mediterranean the 6 more or less unwanted AKA's, which represented roughly their equivalent in vehicle lift and were more suitable for amphibious employment under Mediterranean weather and tidal conditions than in the Channel . The remaining deficit of 15 LST's, it was hoped, might be absorbed by the various "probabilities" — higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production. Upon the last- named source Eisenhower put in a strong bid for at least 7 new LST's, which might be used in the build-up even if they could not arrive in time for the assault.
Does anyone have any idea why the 21st Army Group staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, given that even after they dropped it, it was still hoped the the remaining deficit (15 LST) could be absorbed by "higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production" and so these could not have been the reason for the dropping?

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#234

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 18:25

daveshoup2MD wrote:
01 May 2021, 04:03
LCT fire support conversions came about in roughly the same period; and although both types were used in 1944 in Normandy, there's no evidence their presence was any more (or less) significant than the presence of additional capital ships, monitors, cruisers, destroyers, escort destroyers (Hunts), heavily-gunned sloop type escorts (RN "Birds" or USN/USCG PGs), or any other type of non-beaching hull equipped with additional guns and/or rockets.

Using landing craft for these purposes, when any other shallow draft vessel - up-gunned steel-hulled PCs and PCEs, for example - would have been more than adequate, was a poor use of landing craft.
Of the 73 LCT-2 built by the British, two were converted as the initial experimental LCF(2) and six as the initial LCT(R)2, because there was a perceived need for both, but also because of the perceived faults in the design, chief of which was its inability to beach on anything other than a steeply sloped (greater than 1/32) beach.

Of the 337 LCT-3 built by the British, 16 were converted to LCF(3), 20 to LCG(3) in 1943, and 2 more to LCG(3) in 1944 for USN crews. Twenty were converted to LCT(R)3 in 1943 and 1 more in 1944, while 13 more were built as such in late 1943 and early 1944. By that time the issues with the LCT-3 design were also well known. It also required a steeply sloped gradient (1/35) for beaching, while its 10 meter greater length than the LCT-2 on the same beam made it prone to damage from longitudinal flexing.

Of the 797 LCT-4 built by the British, 10 were converted and 12 were built as LCF(4) in 1943-1944, with one later converted again to LCG(4) in 1944. Seven were converted to LCG(4) and 9 were built as such, in addition to the LCF converted to LCG.

Of the 170 LCT-5 received by the British as Lend-Lease, 57 were converted to LCT(A), 2 to LCT(HE), and 3 to LCT (CB), specifically for the requirements of NEPTUNE. In many cases they were apparently "clapped out" after extensive use as standard LCT.

None of the US-built and USN-operated LCT-5 and LCT-6 that I can find were converted to support vessels.

None of that indicates that they were a "waste". Rather, the RN converted and built them for specific perceived requirements and the USN happily agreed.

Meanwhile, the steel-hulled PCR were originally planned as minesweepers and the first were not commissioned in British service until July 1943, rather late for HUSKY. The first USN ones were not commissioned until early 1944, rather late for NEPTUNE (the General Board thought them a poor design). The steel-hulled PC-451 class later was the basis for the PGM-9 class in 1944, after the failure of the PGM-1 class, based on the SC-497 class Sub-chaser.

Doesn't that make the steel-hulled gunboats a poor use of steel-hulled SC and PC? :D Seriously, the PC and PCE were extensively used in amphibious operations, as rescue and control craft and rarely were used as originally conceived as ASW and mine warfare vessels.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#235

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 18:29

Sheldrake wrote:
02 May 2021, 00:03
You may offer your opinions, but I return to the observations made by Combined Operations that the problems of the cross channel operation were qualitatively different to any operations in the Mediterranean. See the remarks, probably by Mountbatten in the Op HUsky Combined Ops lessons learned. See post #202

This was a view accepted by the Combined Joint Staffs, the professional heads of the respective American and British services. No one slammed the table at Quadrant and said "Good god if we landed seven divisions in Husky you can land more than three in Overlord!" Nope they built the additional landing craft to land two more divisions.

All this repetition of how many successful operations were conducted is just gassing.

I suggest you are missing something in your analysis. ;)
So, an appeal to an unnamed authority - "remarks, probably by Mountbatten" .

And, FWIW, the professional heads of the respective American and British services were the Combined Chiefs of Staff ... the CCS. See:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/FRW ... WW2-1.html


COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF [2]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff, known also as CCS, was established by the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister as a result of the United States-United Kingdom military staff conference held in Washington from December 24, 1941, to January 14, 1942. The first meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was held on January 23, 1942, and the organization was continued throughout the war. It reported to the President and to the Prime Minister. It collaborated in the formulation and execution of policies and plans concerning the strategic conduct of the war, the broad program of war requirements, the allocation of munitions resources, and the requirements for overseas transportation for the fighting services of the United Nations.

The United States members were the (US) Joint Chiefs of Staff, described below. The British members were a representative of the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which consisted of the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff, or the Washington representative of each. The representative of the Prime Minister was Field Marshal Sir John Dill and later Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. The Washington representatives of the (UK) Chiefs of Staff Committee, who normally met with the United States members in place of their principals, were the senior officers from their respective services on the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. In the course of the war, the First Sea Lord was represented by Admiral Sir Charles Little, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Admiral Sir Percy Noble, and Admiral Sir James Somerville; the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was represented by Lt. Gen. Sir Coville Wemyss and Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready; and the Chief of the Air Staff was represented by Air Marshal D. C. S. Evill, Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh, and Air Marshal Douglas Colyer.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization included the Combined Secretariat and a number of committees, described separately below. Each of these had both United States and British members, the United States members being also the members of the corresponding Joint Chiefs of Staff organization in nearly all cases. The overseas commands that were essentially interallied in character (Allied Force Headquarters; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces; and the Southeast Asia Command) were under the general control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

And, it was actually six assault divisions afloat for NEPTUNE - US 1st, 4th, 29th; British 3rd, 50th; Canadian 3rd.

So, I'd suggest avoiding passive aggressive comments, and engage factually with the discussion or drop out.

Carry on.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 02 May 2021, 18:31, edited 1 time in total.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#236

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 18:30

Juan G. C. wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:02
In relationship with my OP, I have a problem with this excerpt from United States Army in World War II.:Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 which I quoted earlier:
On 18 February an uneasy compromise emerged. The 21st Army Group staff, whether relying on American assurances of higher serviceability or on a reassessment of their own needs, dropped 7 LST's from the requirement of 42, and 30 LCI (L) 's from the requirement of 51. It was then proposed that 20 LST's and 2 1 LCI (L) 's be taken from Anvil (the vessels to depart the Mediterranean for the United Kingdom not later than 1 April) and, by way of compensation for the LST's, to transfer to the Mediterranean the 6 more or less unwanted AKA's, which represented roughly their equivalent in vehicle lift and were more suitable for amphibious employment under Mediterranean weather and tidal conditions than in the Channel . The remaining deficit of 15 LST's, it was hoped, might be absorbed by the various "probabilities" — higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production. Upon the last- named source Eisenhower put in a strong bid for at least 7 new LST's, which might be used in the build-up even if they could not arrive in time for the assault.
Does anyone have any idea why the 21st Army Group staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, given that even after they dropped it, it was still hoped the the remaining deficit (15 LST) could be absorbed by "higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production" and so these could not have been the reason for the dropping?
Because, as it says, it was a compromise more acceptable to them than any other options...and, I suspect, because it helped delay ANVIL to the point where the CIGS hoped it would be cancelled.

I note you found why the AKA were not utilized in NEPTUNE. :D
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#237

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 18:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 08:38
Sorry for the late reply, I've been on vacation.

First, some corrections...I should have double checked this before posting, since its from some years back.
True.

Beyond that, if the Allies needed additional armor afloat for an assault in 1943-44, the specialist capacity was available; more than 163 US-built LSTs were in commission by the end of February, 1943, according to the tables in Friedman's U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft - 130 days prior to HUSKY, and more than twice as many as you list for HUSKY, for that matter. 23 more commissioned in March; 19 in April; 20 in May; 25 in June; 27 in July, 1943, and etc...

I can dig out the numbers of LCIs and LCTs as well, but it's too nice a day at the moment. Suffice it to say, if more medium tanks were needed in landing vessels in the ETO at some point in 1943-44, there were plenty to chose from, including for the operations suggested by the OP...

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#238

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 18:50

Aber wrote:
02 May 2021, 09:27
daveshoup2MD wrote:
01 May 2021, 21:00
There are some others one could include:
Could you add a nightime/daylight indicator to the list? :wink:
I'll put it on my "to do" list...

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#239

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 18:52

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:29
And, it was actually six assault divisions afloat for NEPTUNE - US 1st, 4th, 29th; British 3rd, 50th; Canadian 3rd.

So, I'd suggest avoiding passive aggressive comments, and engage factually with the discussion or drop out.

Carry on.
Given the assault elements of the 29th Inf Div were attached to the 1st Inf Div and the 29th Inf Div was actually considered a follow-on division as part of FORCE B, the same advice may apply?

Meanwhile, technically the divisions "afloat" (including the "preloaded" divisions) for NEPTUNE were actually the 1st, 2d, 4th, 29th, and 90th US, the 3d, 7th Armoured, 50th, and 51st British, and 2d Canadian..
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#240

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 18:54

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 16:34
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:24
And HUSKY was successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943.
Um, Syracuse was captured at 2100 10 July, the port operating party entered before noon on 11 July, and the first 12 ships planned to unload there D+3 were departing the port after unloading by 1800 on 13 July. Augusta was abandoned at 0500 on 12 July, but the harbor was shelled and it was not secured until just before noon on 13 July and the usable quay found was in operation by that evening. Gela was more problematic, since the pier was demolished by the Italians before they evacuated, so the American forces, a rump army, were supplied over the beaches until the capture of Palermo.
Eight Allied divisions landed on July 10, under two army headquarters, and fought, correct? Or did they all stop shooting until 1800 on 13 July?

Post Reply

Return to “What if”