OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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daveshoup2MD
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#241

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 19:00

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 16:49
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:22
As far as NGS goes, more NGS is always good;
Sure, except when communications with the NSFC parties was lost...or if, like TORCH and HUSKY, it was before the JASCO and NSFC were developed as a result of TORCH and HUSKY. Plus, all those battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and the lack occasionally had other things to do.
using landing craft to provide NGS is a waste of landing craft. That's what battleships, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates, sloops, gunboats, etc were for...
You seem to imagine that the LCS, LCF, LCT(R), LCG, and others were developed because they were cool and someone wanted to waste shipyards and material building them. They were actually developed iteratively to perceived requirements for direct fire support and increased in size and capability until the LCS(L). Most were actually conversions of obsolescent craft, so did not take away much from landing vessel construction.
The OP question was could an OVERLORD equivalent and an ANVIL/DRAGOON equivalent been mounted simultaneously or at least closer in time; the answer yes, and one way to have helped make it possible was not diverting landing craft from amphibious lift assignments to NGS assignments.

The assumptions are coming from you in all this. You know what those amount to...

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#242

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 19:03

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 17:21
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:47
Amphibious assaults are infantry-heavy, by definition.
Which, obviously, must mean the investment by the Americans and British in armored amphibious assault means was unnecessary?
No, and please point out where that has been suggested. I'll wait.

Was there a gradient, however, between "necessity" and "nice to have"?

Yes.

Carry on


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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#243

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 19:05

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 17:22
Peter89 wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 09:23
daveshoup2MD wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 00:54
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .
Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.
Except there wasn't even an Allied victory at Dieppe : D

If we want to twist words beyond their meaning, the Germans have lost the Battle of France, because it was nothing more than just a stepstone in their way towards defeat, and the BEF got valuable experience how to evacuate. Also it wasn't a battle, but a campaign, and it wasn't in France, because it was also fought in the Low Countries. But those are not really the Low Countries, because the key movements took place in the Ardennes. But that wasn't the key movement, because the key movement was taking place in Berlin. But in fact the key wasn't what the Germans were doing, but what the Allies were doing, so... etc.
Why anyone would voluntarily interact with ljadw at this point is simply beyond me.
The joy of asking him to explain how knocking off 5,000 Canadian volunteers was a victory for the Allies.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#244

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 19:06

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 17:25
Sheldrake wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 16:50
If you want to receive some enlightenment to your questions read through the report on the Conference on Assault Landings. In particular the Orientation part of the conference included presentations on the particular problems of a cross channel assault and a review of the lessons of Dieppe.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... 273/rec/13

Op Overlord was not planned in isolation from the operations conducted in the Mediterranean, but in the view of those planning the methoids for Op Overlord there were fundamental differences between Op Husky and the operation they were planning. Here is an extract from the Combined Operations report on Op Husky
....officers concerned in across channel operations should bear in mind the fundamental differences between the two problems, "HUSKY" enjoyed tideless waters, fine weather, moderate defences and a surprised and half hearted Italian garrison, Such conditions are unlikely to obtain in operations against the N.W. coast of Europe.
it is on page 13 of this report archived on CARL
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital ... d/51/rec/2
Considering the mess the HUSKY storm made of the timing of the landings, calling it "fine weather" may have been a bit of a stretch... :lol:
British understatement, I'm sure. ;)

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#245

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 19:12

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:25
daveshoup2MD wrote:
01 May 2021, 04:03
LCT fire support conversions came about in roughly the same period; and although both types were used in 1944 in Normandy, there's no evidence their presence was any more (or less) significant than the presence of additional capital ships, monitors, cruisers, destroyers, escort destroyers (Hunts), heavily-gunned sloop type escorts (RN "Birds" or USN/USCG PGs), or any other type of non-beaching hull equipped with additional guns and/or rockets.

Using landing craft for these purposes, when any other shallow draft vessel - up-gunned steel-hulled PCs and PCEs, for example - would have been more than adequate, was a poor use of landing craft.
Of the 73 LCT-2 built by the British, two were converted as the initial experimental LCF(2) and six as the initial LCT(R)2, because there was a perceived need for both, but also because of the perceived faults in the design, chief of which was its inability to beach on anything other than a steeply sloped (greater than 1/32) beach.

Of the 337 LCT-3 built by the British, 16 were converted to LCF(3), 20 to LCG(3) in 1943, and 2 more to LCG(3) in 1944 for USN crews. Twenty were converted to LCT(R)3 in 1943 and 1 more in 1944, while 13 more were built as such in late 1943 and early 1944. By that time the issues with the LCT-3 design were also well known. It also required a steeply sloped gradient (1/35) for beaching, while its 10 meter greater length than the LCT-2 on the same beam made it prone to damage from longitudinal flexing.

Of the 797 LCT-4 built by the British, 10 were converted and 12 were built as LCF(4) in 1943-1944, with one later converted again to LCG(4) in 1944. Seven were converted to LCG(4) and 9 were built as such, in addition to the LCF converted to LCG.

Of the 170 LCT-5 received by the British as Lend-Lease, 57 were converted to LCT(A), 2 to LCT(HE), and 3 to LCT (CB), specifically for the requirements of NEPTUNE. In many cases they were apparently "clapped out" after extensive use as standard LCT.

None of the US-built and USN-operated LCT-5 and LCT-6 that I can find were converted to support vessels.

None of that indicates that they were a "waste". Rather, the RN converted and built them for specific perceived requirements and the USN happily agreed.

Meanwhile, the steel-hulled PCR were originally planned as minesweepers and the first were not commissioned in British service until July 1943, rather late for HUSKY. The first USN ones were not commissioned until early 1944, rather late for NEPTUNE (the General Board thought them a poor design). The steel-hulled PC-451 class later was the basis for the PGM-9 class in 1944, after the failure of the PGM-1 class, based on the SC-497 class Sub-chaser.

Doesn't that make the steel-hulled gunboats a poor use of steel-hulled SC and PC? :D Seriously, the PC and PCE were extensively used in amphibious operations, as rescue and control craft and rarely were used as originally conceived as ASW and mine warfare vessels.
The question this was all prompted by was if there was enough landing craft and transports to mount an OVERLORD-equivalent and an ANVIL-equivalent closer in time than they were historically; given the amount of amphibious lift created by the allies in 1942-44, the answer is yes.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#246

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 19:15

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:49
Beyond that, if the Allies needed additional armor afloat for an assault in 1943-44, the specialist capacity was available; more than 163 US-built LSTs were in commission by the end of February, 1943, according to the tables in Friedman's U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft - 130 days prior to HUSKY, and more than twice as many as you list for HUSKY, for that matter. 23 more commissioned in March; 19 in April; 20 in May; 25 in June; 27 in July, 1943, and etc...
Beyond that, when will you acknowledge the LST was not an assault amphibious vessel with a specialist capacity for landing tanks?
I can dig out the numbers of LCIs and LCTs as well, but it's too nice a day at the moment. Suffice it to say, if more medium tanks were needed in landing vessels in the ETO at some point in 1943-44, there were plenty to chose from, including for the operations suggested by the OP...
Er, no need, thank you. The first LCT-5 was completed and accepted in June 1943, the second in July 1942. By the end of February 1943, 470 were completed, when production was halted in favor of increased ASW vessels. Production did not begin again until June 1943, when one was completed, with none in July, and then ten in August.

The first LCI(L) wasn't completed until September 1942, with 270 completed by the end of February, when production was scaled back in favor of ASW assets. However, its production never completely ceased and another 82 were completed by the end of August.

Given that the NEPTUNE requirement was for 814 LCT of all types and DRAGOON 158 and that as of 1 June 1944, the USN and RN in Europe had just 1,019 on hand, with another 58 still working up on the US East Coast, 1 on the US West Coast, and 142 in the Pacific and Indian oceans, that was problematically tight, especially considering the expected versus the actual serviceability rates.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#247

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 19:20

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:54
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 16:34
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021, 07:24
And HUSKY was successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943.
Um, Syracuse was captured at 2100 10 July, the port operating party entered before noon on 11 July, and the first 12 ships planned to unload there D+3 were departing the port after unloading by 1800 on 13 July. Augusta was abandoned at 0500 on 12 July, but the harbor was shelled and it was not secured until just before noon on 13 July and the usable quay found was in operation by that evening. Gela was more problematic, since the pier was demolished by the Italians before they evacuated, so the American forces, a rump army, were supplied over the beaches until the capture of Palermo.
Eight Allied divisions landed on July 10, under two army headquarters, and fought, correct? Or did they all stop shooting until 1800 on 13 July?
Pretty close, and they were supported "over the beaches" exclusively for those first three days, because a lot of those LST and LCT were hauling supplies, rather than combat-loaded troops. However, the campaign lasted for a few more than those three days, so stating it was "successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943" is a stretch. More like the Seventh US Army was supported for the first two of six weeks over the beaches and the British Eighth Army was supported for the first three days of six weeks over the beaches.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#248

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 19:37

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 19:00
The OP question was could an OVERLORD equivalent and an ANVIL/DRAGOON equivalent been mounted simultaneously or at least closer in time; the answer yes, and one way to have helped make it possible was not diverting landing craft from amphibious lift assignments to NGS assignments.
It was only possible to do it simultaneously by curtailing all operations using LST and LCT in Italy, which would have eliminated the execution of DIADEM and the possibility of annihilating 10. Armee (and, yes, of course Clark screwed that up to, but hindsight...)

I've already noted the narrow margins WRT LCT. NEPTUNE required 238 LST for the assault and follow-on, DRAGOON 77, while there were 229 in the UK, 25 in the Med, 95 on the US East Coast working up, and 101 in the Pacific. NEPTUNE required 94 LCI(L), DRAGOON 121. There were 245 in the UK, 91 in the Med, 89 on the East Coast, 41 on the West Coast, and 132 in the Pacific.

LST requirements are a none-starter, recall Churchill's famous quote. LCI(L) look better, so you can land more unsupported infantry if you want.
The assumptions are coming from you in all this. You know what those amount to...
Those landing craft were not diverted to NGS assignments, they did not fulfill the role of NGS, they were direct-fire support for the landings, because it was perceived - quite correctly - that NGS was not a panacea. It could not target everything, it was not always available when needed, and communications to it frequently broke down.

You seem to assume yourself the requirement was imaginary? Why? Are you trying to make an ASS out of both U and ME?
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#249

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 19:40

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 19:03
No, and please point out where that has been suggested. I'll wait.
Oh, and here I thought the assumptions game was in play? :D
Was there a gradient, however, between "necessity" and "nice to have"?

Yes.
Sorry, but that is your assumption based apparently on the belief that there never was a perceived requirement for landing support craft, when it was actually an integral part of USN and RN amphibious doctrine. However, if you have some proof that they were just a "nice to have" rather than developed to fulfill and actual requirement, I'll be happy to see it.
Carry on
Ditto.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#250

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 19:43

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 19:05
The joy of asking him to explain how knocking off 5,000 Canadian volunteers was a victory for the Allies.
You are too easily amused. I gave up on he/she/it when the references supplied by he/she/it proved to be doctored and he/she/it refused to acknowledge the forgery.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#251

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021, 20:19

BTW, if you want a thorough, albeit USN-centric view of the situation regarding landing craft and ships, see S.E. Morison, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XI, The Invasion of France and Germany 1944-1945, pp. 52-56.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#252

Post by Sheldrake » 02 May 2021, 20:29

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:29
So, an appeal to an unnamed authority - "remarks, probably by Mountbatten" .

And, FWIW, the professional heads of the respective American and British services were the Combined Chiefs of Staff ... the CCS. See:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/FRW ... WW2-1.html



#1 The reference wasn't not an unnamed authority, but to a source document linked from post #202 generated by Mountbatten's HQ.

#2 This was a view accepted by the Combined Combined Staffs, the professional heads of the respective American and British services. No one slammed the table at Quadrant and said "Good god if we landed seven divisions in Husky you can land more than three in Overlord!" Nope they built the additional landing craft to land two more divisions.

The constraint was not the number of divisions afloat but the number of beaches that could be assaulted on D Day.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#253

Post by Juan G. C. » 02 May 2021, 21:37

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:30
Juan G. C. wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:02
In relationship with my OP, I have a problem with this excerpt from United States Army in World War II.:Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 which I quoted earlier:
On 18 February an uneasy compromise emerged. The 21st Army Group staff, whether relying on American assurances of higher serviceability or on a reassessment of their own needs, dropped 7 LST's from the requirement of 42, and 30 LCI (L) 's from the requirement of 51. It was then proposed that 20 LST's and 2 1 LCI (L) 's be taken from Anvil (the vessels to depart the Mediterranean for the United Kingdom not later than 1 April) and, by way of compensation for the LST's, to transfer to the Mediterranean the 6 more or less unwanted AKA's, which represented roughly their equivalent in vehicle lift and were more suitable for amphibious employment under Mediterranean weather and tidal conditions than in the Channel . The remaining deficit of 15 LST's, it was hoped, might be absorbed by the various "probabilities" — higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production. Upon the last- named source Eisenhower put in a strong bid for at least 7 new LST's, which might be used in the build-up even if they could not arrive in time for the assault.
Does anyone have any idea why the 21st Army Group staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, given that even after they dropped it, it was still hoped the the remaining deficit (15 LST) could be absorbed by "higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production" and so these could not have been the reason for the dropping?
Because, as it says, it was a compromise more acceptable to them than any other options...and, I suspect, because it helped delay ANVIL to the point where the CIGS hoped it would be cancelled.

I note you found why the AKA were not utilized in NEPTUNE. :D
I mean, the British were saying: "We need so much landing craft, and the only form of having It is cancelling ANVIL, so se must cancel ANVIL and use the landing craft allocated to It for NEPTUNE". And the Americans were saying: "We don't need so much landing craft, we can do well with what we have with [higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". And the British say OK, we don't need 7 LST and 30 LCI (L). But there is still a deficit of 15 LST. How can we make it up?" And the Americans say: "[higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". 8O It makes no sense to me.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#254

Post by ljadw » 02 May 2021, 22:15

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 19:05
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 17:22
Peter89 wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 09:23
daveshoup2MD wrote:
29 Apr 2021, 00:54
ljadw wrote:
28 Apr 2021, 10:47
It was more than a raid, but less than an invasion
The losses : losses do not determine if an operation is successful .Jubilee could have been a failure with 10 % losses : example : if the forces had to return halfway the Channel with 10 % losses , because of the attacks from the LW and U Boats .
If losses of FC were higher in 1940 ,but they still defeated the LW, the Battle of Britain would still be a British victory .
The losses of the RAF and British human losses were higher than German losses in operation Cerberus,but that is not a valuable argument to say that Cerberus was a German victory .
Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.
Except there wasn't even an Allied victory at Dieppe : D

If we want to twist words beyond their meaning, the Germans have lost the Battle of France, because it was nothing more than just a stepstone in their way towards defeat, and the BEF got valuable experience how to evacuate. Also it wasn't a battle, but a campaign, and it wasn't in France, because it was also fought in the Low Countries. But those are not really the Low Countries, because the key movements took place in the Ardennes. But that wasn't the key movement, because the key movement was taking place in Berlin. But in fact the key wasn't what the Germans were doing, but what the Allies were doing, so... etc.
Why anyone would voluntarily interact with ljadw at this point is simply beyond me.
The joy of asking him to explain how knocking off 5,000 Canadian volunteers was a victory for the Allies.
That they were volunteers is meaningless .And the Canadians lost more men during the Battle of the Scheldt .Will you say that these losses are proving that the Battle of the Scheldt was a failure ?
The amount of losses can not be used to argue that an operation was a failure or a success .
If you want no losses : do not fight .
Failure or success is proved by the fact that the aims of the operation are not /are fulfilled . Not by the losses that were caused by the operation .
The Canadian contingent in Hong Kong was eliminated in December 1941 : 1975 men . But this is not a proof of the defeat of Hong Kong . The proof is that Hong Kong was captured .

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#255

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021, 22:27

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021, 19:15
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021, 18:49
Beyond that, if the Allies needed additional armor afloat for an assault in 1943-44, the specialist capacity was available; more than 163 US-built LSTs were in commission by the end of February, 1943, according to the tables in Friedman's U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft - 130 days prior to HUSKY, and more than twice as many as you list for HUSKY, for that matter. 23 more commissioned in March; 19 in April; 20 in May; 25 in June; 27 in July, 1943, and etc...
Beyond that, when will you acknowledge the LST was not an assault amphibious vessel with a specialist capacity for landing tanks?
I can dig out the numbers of LCIs and LCTs as well, but it's too nice a day at the moment. Suffice it to say, if more medium tanks were needed in landing vessels in the ETO at some point in 1943-44, there were plenty to chose from, including for the operations suggested by the OP...
Er, no need, thank you. The first LCT-5 was completed and accepted in June 1943, the second in July 1942. By the end of February 1943, 470 were completed, when production was halted in favor of increased ASW vessels. Production did not begin again until June 1943, when one was completed, with none in July, and then ten in August.

The first LCI(L) wasn't completed until September 1942, with 270 completed by the end of February, when production was scaled back in favor of ASW assets. However, its production never completely ceased and another 82 were completed by the end of August.

Given that the NEPTUNE requirement was for 814 LCT of all types and DRAGOON 158 and that as of 1 June 1944, the USN and RN in Europe had just 1,019 on hand, with another 58 still working up on the US East Coast, 1 on the US West Coast, and 142 in the Pacific and Indian oceans, that was problematically tight, especially considering the expected versus the actual serviceability rates.
LST = Landing Ship Tank. It's a landing ship. It lands tanks. On the beach.

Wait, here's one doing just that during HUSKY ... "...Tanks from LST 2 helped repulse a German counter attack on the beachhead on July 11, immediately after disembarking."

Source: https://www.army.mil/article/10067/lst_in_wwii

LCTs - I presume this is a typo, but "The first LCT-5 was completed and accepted in June 1943, the second in July 1942." Quite a trick, if not.

470 LCTs by the end of 1943; 270 LCIs by the end of February, according to your numbers above, of which (also according to your numbers above) only 224 LCT 2/3/5 and c. 163 LCI(L) were assigned to HUSKY. So, from a total of 740 in existence (by your own numbers) only 387 were assigned to HUSKY. So, quite clearly, there were another 350 - at least - available.

Your summary sentence is illuminating: "Given that the NEPTUNE requirement was for 814 LCT of all types and DRAGOON 158 and that as of 1 June 1944, the USN and RN in Europe had just 1,019 on hand, with another 58 still working up on the US East Coast, 1 on the US West Coast, and 142 in the Pacific and Indian oceans, that was problematically tight, especially considering the expected versus the actual serviceability rates."

Need - 972
Active (setting aside those working up, again using your numbers): 1161.

No shortfall in terms of resources.

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