Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

[daveshoup2MD]

When MacArthur was asked to give an evaluation of Brett in July 1942, big Mac sent the following:

Brett is unquestionably highly qualified as an air technician and in air administrative duties of a productive or supply character. He is an unusually hard worker but his very industry leads him to concentrate at times upon unimportant details which tend to obscure a true perspective of more important matters. He is naturally inclined toward more or less harmless intrigue and has a bent (due perhaps to his delightful personality) for social entertainment and the easy way of life. He is unpopular with the Australian Administration who resent his lack of forthrightness and he does not command the confidence of the younger and fighting elements of the air corps here.

I would rate Brett’s service during the last three months under my command as only average. His relationship with the navy component is poor. His relations with my own headquarters have been personally most cordial but professionally he has been evasive. Although Brett has a very large staff; I do not consider it particularly competent. This may be due to his inability to select and place the right men in key positions or possibly he is unable properly to coordinate them. Andrews is a type of commander who needs a competent chief of staff and operations officer. If this change is made I suggest that he be permitted to bring these two staff officers with him and that men of corresponding rank here be returned with Brett

ROFLMAO

Seconded.

Not aware that Brett was ever surprised at the strategic and/r operational level by the enemy. Mac was ... at least three times.

And amazingly enough, it was never his fault, or that of his staff.

It was always the Navy's fault; or the Air Corps/Air Force's fault; or anyone else's fault but Mac and the gang...

Better choice in 1942 would have been leave what became ABDA to the British and Dutch; keep Hart as theater commander in what became SWPA with an Australian deputy (presumably Blamey, although he wasn't exactly a prize), and with Brett as air commander, with an RAAF deputy. Send Brereton to the MTO and ETO (where he served well as a tactical/strategic air force commander) and send Mac to China to entertain Chiang, and vice-versa. They can each try and out-do each other in umbrage. Mac and Chennault would have been perfect for each other.

That frees up Stilwell for the MTO/ETO, which would have been a good move.

[rcocean]

Thanks for the heads up on Bruce Gamble's in his 'Fortress Rabaul'. I'm sure Kenny would've had a harder time if he had come in April 1942 than in July 1942, but he probably would've had the same positive relationship with MacArthur. Its instructive how differently the two men treated their theater commander and his Chief of Staff. Kenny tried to talk to MacArthur every few days, so MacArthur knew what he and the AAF were doing. And at the very start he told Sutherland, that he was in charge of the Air Forces, and if he had a problem with that, then they should go in MacArthur's office and settle the matter.

Brett meanwhile, only saw MacArthur (excluding the introduction in March and farewell in July) six times. Per Kenny Brett hadn't talked to MacArthur in 30 days prior to being relieved. This despite the fact that Brett was 2 FLOORS BELOW MacArthur. Not only that, but Brett disliked Sutherland and refused to talk to him. All communication was done through Brett's Chief of Staff or by memo!

Per Gamble, Brett also thought his Australian Chief of Staff was gloomy incompetent. And Brett wrote the following to his wife in July 1942:

“General MacArthur has a wonderful personality when he desires to turn it on. He is, however, absolutely
bound up in himself. I do not believe he has a single thought for anybody who is not useful to him, and I believe he detests the Air Corps through his own inability to thoroughly understand it and operate it as he does ground
troops. There are rumors that he refuses to fly.”

Kenny found MacArthur to be the exact opposite. No wonder MacArthur was glad to get rid of Brett.

[daveshoup2MD]

“(MacArthur) is, however, absolutely bound up in himself.”

Fixed it for you. After Luzon in 1941-42, the hash Mac made of Buna-Gona in 1942, and his absolute failure in Korea in July, 1950 and again in October, 1950, no wonder Truman was glad to get rid of MacArthur.

Which doesn't have much to do with Krueger's fitness as a chief of staff candidate, other than demonstrating that he could handle prima donnas.

[rcocean]

Its interesting that Marshall was willing to send Andrews, who he was grooming for high command, to SWPA. But as shown by MacArthur's comment about a strong C-0-S, MacArthur wasn't exactly thrilled at the choice. I'm assuming Marshall wanted Andrews to go to the SWPA, straighten everything out, and then go onto to ETO when things heated up later in 1942 or early 1943. when MacArthur said he knew all three (Doolittle, Andrews, and Kenney) he wasn't' lying. He personally chose to jump Andrews two grades in rank and make him head of AF GHQ. in 1935. And one of Andrews aides at AF GHQ was....Kenney. And Doolittle was a well known interwar figure, who resigned from Regular service in 1930, and didn't return to active duty till June 1940 with the rank of major. Doolittle was made Lt Col on Jan 1942, lead the Doolittle raid, and was made Brigadier General in June 1942. Its no wonder MacArthur didn't choose him, since he had zero executive experience in handling a large Air Force unit. Unlike Kenney, who'd stayed in the army and was commander of the 4th Air Force.

According to various author's Andrews "Turned down Arnold's suggestion he go to SWPA". however when you trace it back you find zero sources. It sounds like another one of those historical anecdotes whereby one author just quotes another author, and the rest keep repeating it, without referencing any primary material.

[daveshoup2MD]

Its interesting that Marshall was willing to send Andrews, who he was grooming for high command, to SWPA. But as shown by MacArthur's comment about a strong C-0-S, MacArthur wasn't exactly thrilled at the choice. I'm assuming Marshall wanted Andrews to go to the SWPA, straighten everything out, and then go onto to ETO when things heated up later in 1942 or early 1943. when MacArthur said he knew all three (Doolittle, Andrews, and Kenney) he wasn't' lying. He personally chose to jump Andrews two grades in rank and make him head of AF GHQ. in 1935. And one of Andrews aides at AF GHQ was....Kenney. And Doolittle was a well known interwar figure, who resigned from Regular service in 1930, and didn't return to active duty till June 1940 with the rank of major. Doolittle was made Lt Col on Jan 1942, lead the Doolittle raid, and was made Brigadier General in June 1942. Its no wonder MacArthur didn't choose him, since he had zero executive experience in handling a large Air Force unit. Unlike Kenney, who'd stayed in the army and was commander of the 4th Air Force.

According to various author's Andrews "Turned down Arnold's suggestion he go to SWPA". however when you trace it back you find zero sources. It sounds like another one of those historical anecdotes whereby one author just quotes another author, and the rest keep repeating it, without referencing any primary material.

Given MacArthur's poor record in positions of high responsibility, his defeat on Luzon, his constant complaints about the Navy, and his inability to work with the SWPA Allies, and Marshall's opinion of Andrews as being especially well-qualified for theater-level command and coalition warfare, Marshall may have seen Andrews as an effective second and a way to move Mac off the stage ... which would have been only a benefit to the Allied war effort in 1942 and afterwards, and again in 1950...

[Delta Tank]

When MacArthur was asked to give an evaluation of Brett in July 1942, big Mac sent the following:

Brett is unquestionably highly qualified as an air technician and in air administrative duties of a productive or supply character. He is an unusually hard worker but his very industry leads him to concentrate at times upon unimportant details which tend to obscure a true perspective of more important matters. He is naturally inclined toward more or less harmless intrigue and has a bent (due perhaps to his delightful personality) for social entertainment and the easy way of life. He is unpopular with the Australian Administration who resent his lack of forthrightness and he does not command the confidence of the younger and fighting elements of the air corps here.

I would rate Brett’s service during the last three months under my command as only average. His relationship with the navy component is poor. His relations with my own headquarters have been personally most cordial but professionally he has been evasive. Although Brett has a very large staff; I do not consider it particularly competent. This may be due to his inability to select and place the right men in key positions or possibly he is unable properly to coordinate them. Andrews is a type of commander who needs a competent chief of staff and operations officer. If this change is made I suggest that he be permitted to bring these two staff officers with him and that men of corresponding rank here be returned with Brett

ROFLMAO

Seconded.

Not aware that Brett was ever surprised at the strategic and/r operational level by the enemy. Mac was ... at least three times.

And amazingly enough, it was never his fault, or that of his staff.

It was always the Navy's fault; or the Air Corps/Air Force's fault; or anyone else's fault but Mac and the gang...

Better choice in 1942 would have been leave what became ABDA to the British and Dutch; keep Hart as theater commander in what became SWPA with an Australian deputy (presumably Blamey, although he wasn't exactly a prize), and with Brett as air commander, with an RAAF deputy. Send Brereton to the MTO and ETO (where he served well as a tactical/strategic air force commander) and send Mac to China to entertain Chiang, and vice-versa. They can each try and out-do each other in umbrage. Mac and Chennault would have been perfect for each other.

That frees up Stilwell for the MTO/ETO, which would have been a good move.

Please name the three times MacArthur was surprised.

What power did the GOP have in 1941-1945? Specifically what was the “GOP” going to do?

Mike

[Delta Tank]

Its interesting that Marshall was willing to send Andrews, who he was grooming for high command, to SWPA. But as shown by MacArthur's comment about a strong C-0-S, MacArthur wasn't exactly thrilled at the choice. I'm assuming Marshall wanted Andrews to go to the SWPA, straighten everything out, and then go onto to ETO when things heated up later in 1942 or early 1943. when MacArthur said he knew all three (Doolittle, Andrews, and Kenney) he wasn't' lying. He personally chose to jump Andrews two grades in rank and make him head of AF GHQ. in 1935. And one of Andrews aides at AF GHQ was....Kenney. And Doolittle was a well known interwar figure, who resigned from Regular service in 1930, and didn't return to active duty till June 1940 with the rank of major. Doolittle was made Lt Col on Jan 1942, lead the Doolittle raid, and was made Brigadier General in June 1942. Its no wonder MacArthur didn't choose him, since he had zero executive experience in handling a large Air Force unit. Unlike Kenney, who'd stayed in the army and was commander of the 4th Air Force.

According to various author's Andrews "Turned down Arnold's suggestion he go to SWPA". however when you trace it back you find zero sources. It sounds like another one of those historical anecdotes whereby one author just quotes another author, and the rest keep repeating it, without referencing any primary material.

Given MacArthur's poor record in positions of high responsibility, his defeat on Luzon, his constant complaints about the Navy, and his inability to work with the SWPA Allies,

I could change a couple words and and your statement would fit Admiral Ernest King.

During the war General Marshall had to remind FDR that the US Army was not the enemy.

Mike

[rcocean]

Getting back to Krueger. He had an interview with Pogue and its in the Marshall Foundation records. Here's what Krueger said about Ike, Marshall, and MacArthur:

1. MacArthur's strategy was admirable. Just too damn bad about supplies. MacArthur was a man of great moral courage. When they asked him in Australia where he was going to put his northern defense line, he said the Owen Stanley range. It took a lot of wisdom.

2. Asked to Evaluate Marshall: Krueger said it was hard to do and out of his line. Marshall handled himself well in various high jobs. Didn't do so well in China. Some failures are made by everybody. Marshall was extremely intelligent. How understanding he was, Krueger didn't know. Every commander must have patience, moral courage and human understanding. Krueger summary: Marshall was clever. Grand with Congress. Fine mind.

3. Krueger had Ike as CoS in 1941 and said:

"

I am fond of Ike but the story is wrong which shows him making all the plans for my Army. He wasn't known in the maneuvers but later they wrote him up as if he ran the thing. Voltaire says that history is a lie agreed upon and there is a great deal of false information. Marshall came to the maneuvers in 1941. We had known each other for a good sized lifetime. He sent for me and knowing I had been head of war plans he asked me who was the best man for the job. I said I hated to tell him because I didn't want to lose the man, but I thought the best
man was my chief of staff, Eisenhower. Gen. Marshall said I am afraid I will have to take him
away from you.

Clark who was McNair's chief of staff had lots of correspondence with Eisenhower. I don't like it
when he says in his book, that Eisenhower was selected for the war plans job because of his
wonderful handling of the Louisiana maneuvers. He didn't do the plans.

[rcocean]

Its Marshall who finally got King to work with him and Arnold. Ike thought Admiral King was so abusive and wrong-headed he should have been shot for the good of the war effort. King didn't get along with Stimson or Forrestal either. I think its King's daughter who said "My father is even tempered. He's angry all the time."

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
3. Krueger had Ike as CoS in 1941 and said:

"

I am fond of Ike but the story is wrong which shows him making all the plans for my Army. He wasn't known in the maneuvers but later they wrote him up as if he ran the thing. Voltaire says that history is a lie agreed upon and there is a great deal of false information. Marshall came to the maneuvers in 1941. We had known each other for a good sized lifetime. He sent for me and knowing I had been head of war plans he asked me who was the best man for the job. I said I hated to tell him because I didn't want to lose the man, but I thought the best
man was my chief of staff, Eisenhower. Gen. Marshall said I am afraid I will have to take him
away from you.

Which in the context of the US Army makes sense. The CoS does not have the specific responsibility for making plans, or running operations. Thats largely split between the Commanding officer & the G3, with the other staff sections G1, -2, -4 contributing. The CoS coordinates or 'runs' the collective staff, tactical, operational, or strategic plans are primarily the venue of the '3 Shop'. As CoS in Krugers HQ Ike had the responsibility that all the staff sections do their part in concocting and assembling a plan in a timely manner, but he would not be doing the actual work of the G1, the G2, or G4 sections.

So no, Ike would have 'managed' certain parts of the planning & execution, the administrative details of the staff work, but Kruger & the operations section within the G3 would have been doing the work.

At the smaller unit level of the US practice the duties of the CoS are added in to the Executive officers task list.

[Delta Tank]

...
3. Krueger had Ike as CoS in 1941 and said:

"

I am fond of Ike but the story is wrong which shows him making all the plans for my Army. He wasn't known in the maneuvers but later they wrote him up as if he ran the thing. Voltaire says that history is a lie agreed upon and there is a great deal of false information. Marshall came to the maneuvers in 1941. We had known each other for a good sized lifetime. He sent for me and knowing I had been head of war plans he asked me who was the best man for the job. I said I hated to tell him because I didn't want to lose the man, but I thought the best
man was my chief of staff, Eisenhower. Gen. Marshall said I am afraid I will have to take him
away from you.

Which in the context of the US Army makes sense. The CoS does not have the specific responsibility for making plans, or running operations. Thats largely split between the Commanding officer & the G3, with the other staff sections G1, -2, -4 contributing. The CoS coordinates or 'runs' the collective staff, tactical, operational, or strategic plans are primarily the venue of the '3 Shop'. As CoS in Krugers HQ Ike had the responsibility that all the staff sections do their part in concocting and assembling a plan in a timely manner, but he would not be doing the actual work of the G1, the G2, or G4 sections.

So no, Ike would have 'managed' certain parts of the planning & execution, the administrative details of the staff work, but Kruger & the operations section within the G3 would have been doing the work.

At the smaller unit level of the US practice the duties of the CoS are added in to the Executive officers task list.

Having worked in a G3 section and having been aide to the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, the Chief of Staff of the division has his finger on the pulse of everything that happens or doesn’t happen. A number of decisions were flown by “the Chief” before being implemented (these were not tactical decisions, but he would have input). All three generals (CG. ADC-M, and ADC-S) in the division had been division Chiefs of Staff. Carl’s description of the CoS duties is correct. The CG and the Chief of Staff talked everyday, sometimes multiple times a day. The Chief’s office was next to the CG’s and he had his own door to the CG’s Office.

CG=Commanding General
ADC-M= Assistant Division Commander Maneuver
ADC-S= Assistant Division Commander Support

Mike

[LineDoggie]

Please name the three times MacArthur was surprised.

December 7th, 1941


1127 Local time 8 December 1941 when his air force was caught on the ground by the IJN and massacred in detail

25 November, 1950 when the Chicoms poured into his forces

[Delta Tank]

Please name the three times MacArthur was surprised.

December 7th, 1941


1127 Local time 8 December 1941 when his air force was caught on the ground by the IJN and massacred in detail

25 November, 1950 when the Chicoms poured into his forces

Do you really know the events that happened on 8 December 1941 in the Philippines?

Mike

[daveshoup2MD]

When MacArthur was asked to give an evaluation of Brett in July 1942, big Mac sent the following:

Brett is unquestionably highly qualified as an air technician and in air administrative duties of a productive or supply character. He is an unusually hard worker but his very industry leads him to concentrate at times upon unimportant details which tend to obscure a true perspective of more important matters. He is naturally inclined toward more or less harmless intrigue and has a bent (due perhaps to his delightful personality) for social entertainment and the easy way of life. He is unpopular with the Australian Administration who resent his lack of forthrightness and he does not command the confidence of the younger and fighting elements of the air corps here.

I would rate Brett’s service during the last three months under my command as only average. His relationship with the navy component is poor. His relations with my own headquarters have been personally most cordial but professionally he has been evasive. Although Brett has a very large staff; I do not consider it particularly competent. This may be due to his inability to select and place the right men in key positions or possibly he is unable properly to coordinate them. Andrews is a type of commander who needs a competent chief of staff and operations officer. If this change is made I suggest that he be permitted to bring these two staff officers with him and that men of corresponding rank here be returned with Brett

ROFLMAO

Seconded.

Not aware that Brett was ever surprised at the strategic and/r operational level by the enemy. Mac was ... at least three times.

And amazingly enough, it was never his fault, or that of his staff.

It was always the Navy's fault; or the Air Corps/Air Force's fault; or anyone else's fault but Mac and the gang...

Better choice in 1942 would have been leave what became ABDA to the British and Dutch; keep Hart as theater commander in what became SWPA with an Australian deputy (presumably Blamey, although he wasn't exactly a prize), and with Brett as air commander, with an RAAF deputy. Send Brereton to the MTO and ETO (where he served well as a tactical/strategic air force commander) and send Mac to China to entertain Chiang, and vice-versa. They can each try and out-do each other in umbrage. Mac and Chennault would have been perfect for each other.

That frees up Stilwell for the MTO/ETO, which would have been a good move.

Please name the three times MacArthur was surprised.

What power did the GOP have in 1941-1945? Specifically what was the “GOP” going to do?

Mike

1. Japanese attacks on Luzon, Dec. 8, 1941 (despite being west of the Dateline; very impressive);
2. NKPA invasion of the ROK, 1950;
3. CCF intervention in Korea, 1950.

GOP? Run Mac as a spoiler; Senate in 1942 or presidency in 1944.

[daveshoup2MD]

Given MacArthur's poor record in positions of high responsibility, his defeat on Luzon, his constant complaints about the Navy, and his inability to work with the SWPA Allies,

I could change a couple words and and your statement would fit Admiral Ernest King.

During the war General Marshall had to remind FDR that the US Army was not the enemy.

Mike

King was a great CNO and JCS member; strong advocate of Germany First; a master of joint and coalition warfare; and the most successful US naval senior commander in history ... MacArthur was surprised three times by three different enemies as a theater commander.