OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 21:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 May 2021 07:20
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 05:49
Just imagine if they'd tried to mount the BAND assault in Normandy, as well...

And, of course, that while six assault divisions were crossing the Channel in June, 1944, there were two reinforced assault divisions (or three) on their way to the Marianas, from much farther away and in (generally) larger ships, while most of another division had been landed in yet another theater by yet another pool of amphibious craft about two weeks earlier...
Sure, but then you get into the problem of sufficient ports to mount the assault from to add to the existing issues. To use the three Saipan divisions in a ship to shore operation you' might have to launch them from US ports to coordinate with the shore to shore operation out of England. Then there is the issue of space at the receiving end as well. BAND was finally deemed too close to the mass of coat artillery extending from Cabourg-Houlgate to Le Havre. For the same reason, SUGAR was not considered for the Cotentin because it was too close to Merville and the mass of batteries extending north to Barfleur. Fundamentally, the notion that the Allies could land anywhere, anytime is flawed, because they actually limited the potential landing places they would assault themselves based upon intelligence estimates of the defenses and their own estimation of the capabilities of those defenses. That the latter estimation was pretty much badly inflated is hindsight.

I also suspect that putting more divisions into the assault on a wider front would simply have exacerbated the logistical issues that developed due to the piss-poor decision making made by the ASF in Washington with regards to the planning assumptions made by the ETOUSA...which, curiously enough was originally a creature of ASF. Cutbacks to allocations of port and truck companies resulted in slow unloading over the beaches and ports, which was further slowed by lack of clearing capability for the supplies once landed and a disorganized depot system that required months to make reasonably functional; by the end of August, over 200 Liberty ships were swinging at anchor off the beaches waiting to unload, some of which had been idle there for weeks, while ADSEC had little idea of which ships contained what or what to prioritize for unloading...in June/July, 11,073 corn brooms, 12,789 cotton mops, 5,269 large garbage cans, and 32,616 reams of mimeograph paper were unloaded across the beaches (and yeah that's a cruel anecdote and those supplies may have been needed - the paper at least probably was - but it illustrates some of the issues that came with inexperience and attempting to supply large forces over the beach in a sustained continental war was compared to the early Mediterranean and Pacific island campaigns. Nor did those problems go away. As late as November, a major function of the officers of the Armor Section, 12th Army Group was to visit depots in Normandy in search of items like tank tracks, engines, transmissions, and the like, since COMZ had little idea of what was where.
The Western Task Force landed in Morocco after embarkation on the US East Coast, of course, so it's not like a transoceanic landing couldn't be done; same for the FORAGER landing force. and (IIRC) the Canadian 1st Division embarked in the UK and landed in Sicily for HUSKY without a stop along the way. Takes some planning, but certainly not impossible to conduct such an operation.

The point about FORAGER (and Biak, for that matter) is that even with even with six+ assault divisions going ashore in Normandy in June, 1944, the Allies had enough lift to put (roughly) another 3-4 assault divisions ashore in Provence (or Micronesia, or New Guinea) at essentially the same time, which makes it clear the OP was in the realm of the possible. Similar concentrations in time occurred (roughly) at the time(s) of HUSKY and TORCH, as well, which could have yielded dividends as well,

As far as some of the rest, it's potentially worth considering what problems arose in the Comm-Z for NW Europe, because of personnel churn, because of the need for the Americans and British to staff up two active theater commands (ETO and MTO), 2-4 army groups, at least two sets of theater-level services of supply, etc., both in terms of leadership and logistics units ... and not just the two armies; the naval shoreside establishments weren't exactly slender, either.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 21:50

Sheldrake wrote:
04 May 2021 12:05
Returning to the question I asked on several posts.

Regardless of whether hind sight allows us to argue that it might have been possible, what was the actual benefit going to be of launching Op Anvil simultaneously with OP Overlord? How was the strategic, or even operational outcome going to be improved significantly over the historic strategic allied victory in excess of anticipated results?

The only advantage I have seen so far was the argument that an earlier capture of Marseilles might have improved logistics in Q4 of 1944. That assumes that a simultaneous Op Anvil didn't also require a Transportation plan to isolate the target landing sector, which then trashed the rail connections to Marseilles. The other possibility is that this may have changed the German response from "fight for every inch", which led to the destruction of 7th and 5th Panzer armies to a delaying strategy that might have left half of France in German hands through the winter of 1944-45
Or, the German high command(s) are even more scattered in terms of what to do, which yields even more confusion, which leaves even more German forces isolated in various "pockets" to be contained? Or, the Germans decide "heimat" is the only obvious course and bug out for the prewar Franco-German border defenses and/or the Rhine?

No guarantees, but hitting an enemy on the defensive on multiple fronts in the same theater, simultaneously, with forces that can not be concentrated in space but can be concentrated in time generally pays dividends... whether you call it "getting inside the enemy's OODA loop" or "if a man can't skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does" ... not the easiest thing to organize, but if possible, it's been recognized as an advantage for a long time.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 21:52

Gooner1 wrote:
04 May 2021 12:36
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:53
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.

Most likely result of a near simultaneous Anvil/Neptune IMO is that all the Allied armies get stuck for longer than they were. Stuck in Normandy, stuck in Provence and stuck south of Rome.
Three assault divisions were enough to open up Provence, historically. How many would you think were needed?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 May 2021 22:33

daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:38
The Western Task Force landed in Morocco after embarkation on the US East Coast, of course, so it's not like a transoceanic landing couldn't be done; same for the FORAGER landing force. and (IIRC) the Canadian 1st Division embarked in the UK and landed in Sicily for HUSKY without a stop along the way. Takes some planning, but certainly not impossible to conduct such an operation.
Of course, but then I didn't say it couldn't be done, I was simply pointing out it was yet another layer of complexity for the policy makers and decisioneers :D to fret over. There were enough nerves historically that I simply question whether or not adding such complexity would have been even remotely acceptable.
The point about FORAGER (and Biak, for that matter) is that even with even with six+ assault divisions going ashore in Normandy in June, 1944, the Allies had enough lift to put (roughly) another 3-4 assault divisions ashore in Provence (or Micronesia, or New Guinea) at essentially the same time, which makes it clear the OP was in the realm of the possible. Similar concentrations in time occurred (roughly) at the time(s) of HUSKY and TORCH, as well, which could have yielded dividends as well,
Sure, if you want to bring in additional AP, APA, AKA, and AK, but they didn't have the additional LST/LCT required - at least more or less within the margin of error/comfort level/other strategic requirements to be satisfied they were operating with. They did have the LCI(L), but then if they had the AP/APA why do they need more infantry transports?
As far as some of the rest, it's potentially worth considering what problems arose in the Comm-Z for NW Europe, because of personnel churn, because of the need for the Americans and British to staff up two active theater commands (ETO and MTO), 2-4 army groups, at least two sets of theater-level services of supply, etc., both in terms of leadership and logistics units ... and not just the two armies; the naval shoreside establishments weren't exactly slender, either.
There was, insofar as I can tell, not much of any "personnel churn" in ASF. Remember, ETOUSA and Services of Supply/COMZ were effectively one and the same...one egg, but two chickens. ETOUSA was activated 8 June 1942 with responsibility for the “tactical, strategical, territorial, and administrative duties of a theatre Commander.” The ETOUSA commanding general “was to exercise planning and operational control over all U.S. forces assigned to the theater, including naval.” However, Services of Supply, ETOUSA was organized 24 May and was the core of personnel committed to the UK, especially after all of V Corps except for the 29th Division went to Africa five months later. Yes, ETOUSA begat NATOUSA, which became MTOUSA, and Services of Supply, ETOUSA supplied the initial infusion of men and units that became SOS, MTOUSA.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 22:51

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 May 2021 22:33
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:38
The Western Task Force landed in Morocco after embarkation on the US East Coast, of course, so it's not like a transoceanic landing couldn't be done; same for the FORAGER landing force. and (IIRC) the Canadian 1st Division embarked in the UK and landed in Sicily for HUSKY without a stop along the way. Takes some planning, but certainly not impossible to conduct such an operation.
Of course, but then I didn't say it couldn't be done, I was simply pointing out it was yet another layer of complexity for the policy makers and decisioneers :D to fret over. There were enough nerves historically that I simply question whether or not adding such complexity would have been even remotely acceptable.
The point about FORAGER (and Biak, for that matter) is that even with even with six+ assault divisions going ashore in Normandy in June, 1944, the Allies had enough lift to put (roughly) another 3-4 assault divisions ashore in Provence (or Micronesia, or New Guinea) at essentially the same time, which makes it clear the OP was in the realm of the possible. Similar concentrations in time occurred (roughly) at the time(s) of HUSKY and TORCH, as well, which could have yielded dividends as well,
Sure, if you want to bring in additional AP, APA, AKA, and AK, but they didn't have the additional LST/LCT required - at least more or less within the margin of error/comfort level/other strategic requirements to be satisfied they were operating with. They did have the LCI(L), but then if they had the AP/APA why do they need more infantry transports?
As far as some of the rest, it's potentially worth considering what problems arose in the Comm-Z for NW Europe, because of personnel churn, because of the need for the Americans and British to staff up two active theater commands (ETO and MTO), 2-4 army groups, at least two sets of theater-level services of supply, etc., both in terms of leadership and logistics units ... and not just the two armies; the naval shoreside establishments weren't exactly slender, either.
There was, insofar as I can tell, not much of any "personnel churn" in ASF. Remember, ETOUSA and Services of Supply/COMZ were effectively one and the same...one egg, but two chickens. ETOUSA was activated 8 June 1942 with responsibility for the “tactical, strategical, territorial, and administrative duties of a theatre Commander.” The ETOUSA commanding general “was to exercise planning and operational control over all U.S. forces assigned to the theater, including naval.” However, Services of Supply, ETOUSA was organized 24 May and was the core of personnel committed to the UK, especially after all of V Corps except for the 29th Division went to Africa five months later. Yes, ETOUSA begat NATOUSA, which became MTOUSA, and Services of Supply, ETOUSA supplied the initial infusion of men and units that became SOS, MTOUSA.
Having multiple headquarters - ETOUSA, NATOUSA, MTOUSA, etc. - split up the available personnel and increased the need for logistics units; as an example, without getting into personalities, if there's one 4.0 performer and one 3.0 performer, which command gets the one and not the other? If one puts the 4.0 into the "primary" theater, who's doing the planning in the "secondary" one?

When the second theater becomes the focus, does the 4.0 go there, to the new "primary" theater, and get replaced by the 3.0? Or does one stick with continuity, and leave the now "primary" theater with the 3.0 performer, and the 4.0 performer in the "now" secondary? And of course, depending on how far up the ranks they are, each brings along an "official family" of colleagues, assistants. and aides, men who are used to each other; those teams ether get split up, or moved around, or have to learn how to work with a new commander.

These are all very real elements in the human factors side of an organization, and there are potential tradeoffs from every personnel change, in terms of efficiencies, understanding, and speed of reaction and decision.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 May 2021 02:30

daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 22:51
Having multiple headquarters - ETOUSA, NATOUSA, MTOUSA, etc. - split up the available personnel and increased the need for logistics units; as an example, without getting into personalities, if there's one 4.0 performer and one 3.0 performer, which command gets the one and not the other? If one puts the 4.0 into the "primary" theater, who's doing the planning in the "secondary" one?

When the second theater becomes the focus, does the 4.0 go there, to the new "primary" theater, and get replaced by the 3.0? Or does one stick with continuity, and leave the now "primary" theater with the 3.0 performer, and the 4.0 performer in the "now" secondary? And of course, depending on how far up the ranks they are, each brings along an "official family" of colleagues, assistants. and aides, men who are used to each other; those teams ether get split up, or moved around, or have to learn how to work with a new commander.

These are all very real elements in the human factors side of an organization, and there are potential tradeoffs from every personnel change, in terms of efficiencies, understanding, and speed of reaction and decision.
I dunno? Are their ratings nailed or glued onto them? How do you tell a 4.0 from a 3.9? Who rates them?

Eisenhower as CG, ETOUSA, was tasked to create his staff for TORCH, which was basically a second hat for him (until ETOUSA became too much of a distraction and Andrews was placed in command) and he took who he saw fit for his staff, then drew on ETOUSA resources as he saw fit, which meant those he knew and liked. Others were chosen by Marshall to command the forces coming from the US that then came under Ike's command, like Patton and Fredendall. One was a good friend and worked out, the other...

Those are all very real elements in the human factors side of an organization and happened over and over again in World War II.

That however is not what I was referencing WRT the errors made by ASF in the run up to NEPTUNE.

BTW, NATOUSA and MTOUSA were not "multiple headquarters", they were the same one, but with a different designation, at different times. Apparently, American abbreviations could be very trying for British officers; I once ran across an extensive series of correspondence at Kew between a staff officer of British First Army and a British liaison officer at II U.S. Corps where the latter tried to explain to the former that Natousa was not a Berber village in Tunisia...
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 May 2021 03:26

Gooner1 wrote:
04 May 2021 12:36
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:53
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.
The intent of the proponents was to concentrate Allied efforts on the western region of Germany via France.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 05 May 2021 05:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 02:30
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 22:51
Having multiple headquarters - ETOUSA, NATOUSA, MTOUSA, etc. - split up the available personnel and increased the need for logistics units; as an example, without getting into personalities, if there's one 4.0 performer and one 3.0 performer, which command gets the one and not the other? If one puts the 4.0 into the "primary" theater, who's doing the planning in the "secondary" one?

When the second theater becomes the focus, does the 4.0 go there, to the new "primary" theater, and get replaced by the 3.0? Or does one stick with continuity, and leave the now "primary" theater with the 3.0 performer, and the 4.0 performer in the "now" secondary? And of course, depending on how far up the ranks they are, each brings along an "official family" of colleagues, assistants. and aides, men who are used to each other; those teams ether get split up, or moved around, or have to learn how to work with a new commander.

These are all very real elements in the human factors side of an organization, and there are potential tradeoffs from every personnel change, in terms of efficiencies, understanding, and speed of reaction and decision.
I dunno? Are their ratings nailed or glued onto them? How do you tell a 4.0 from a 3.9? Who rates them?

Eisenhower as CG, ETOUSA, was tasked to create his staff for TORCH, which was basically a second hat for him (until ETOUSA became too much of a distraction and Andrews was placed in command) and he took who he saw fit for his staff, then drew on ETOUSA resources as he saw fit, which meant those he knew and liked. Others were chosen by Marshall to command the forces coming from the US that then came under Ike's command, like Patton and Fredendall. One was a good friend and worked out, the other...

Those are all very real elements in the human factors side of an organization and happened over and over again in World War II.

That however is not what I was referencing WRT the errors made by ASF in the run up to NEPTUNE.

BTW, NATOUSA and MTOUSA were not "multiple headquarters", they were the same one, but with a different designation, at different times. Apparently, American abbreviations could be very trying for British officers; I once ran across an extensive series of correspondence at Kew between a staff officer of British First Army and a British liaison officer at II U.S. Corps where the latter tried to explain to the former that Natousa was not a Berber village in Tunisia...
A 4.0 and a 3.9 are one thing; a 3.0 and a 4.0 are something else. Again, without sniping at individuals, there is only so much talent to go around in any organization; between (at various times) ETOUSA, NATOUSA, MTOUSA, SHAEF, AFHQ, SACMED, Comm-Z, etc,, the best were spread pretty thin.

Picking a target and prioritizing what's needed to reach it is always helpful.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Gooner1 » 05 May 2021 11:18

daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:52
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.

Most likely result of a near simultaneous Anvil/Neptune IMO is that all the Allied armies get stuck for longer than they were. Stuck in Normandy, stuck in Provence and stuck south of Rome.
Three assault divisions were enough to open up Provence, historically. How many would you think were needed?
[/quote]

Three divisions were enough historically because by August 15th German Army Group G had been gutted for reinforcements for Normandy.

"Army Group G was a reasonably strong and well-balanced force in early June<>
"by concentrating his coastal defense preparations in those areas most likely to be targets of an amphibious assault and by carefully positioning his sixteen divisions, Blaskowitz could bring considerable pressure to bear against any one-, two-, or three-division ANVIL assault throughout the spring and early summer of 1944. Any Allied amphibious invasion attempt there could expect a heavy fight at the beachhead and no assurance of ultimate success."
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... era-4.html

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Sheldrake » 05 May 2021 12:05

daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:50
Or, the German high command(s) are even more scattered in terms of what to do, which yields even more confusion, which leaves even more German forces isolated in various "pockets" to be contained? Or, the Germans decide "heimat" is the only obvious course and bug out for the prewar Franco-German border defenses and/or the Rhine?

No guarantees, but hitting an enemy on the defensive on multiple fronts in the same theater, simultaneously, with forces that can not be concentrated in space but can be concentrated in time generally pays dividends... whether you call it "getting inside the enemy's OODA loop" or "if a man can't skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does" ... not the easiest thing to organize, but if possible, it's been recognized as an advantage for a long time.
I see where you are coming from. What you have described is a simplified version of the US Army's broad front mentality. (Though OODA loops is a dangerous buzz works. By and large the Germans were usually quicker off the mark, and inside the allied decision loop). However, those on both sides had principles of war. The British and Germans both held that one fundamental principle of war was concentration of force. It was German doctrine that at every level a commander had to decide on the point of main effort. Ignoring this and doing what you advocate violates this principle.

The idea of hitting an enemy on several fronts in the same theatre risks splitting your forces and allowing the enemy the chance to concentrate on each of the threats in turn. Good histpric examples are Napoleon in Italy 1796, Jackson's Valley Campaign 1862 and Tannenburg 1914, It has been argued that this what was wrong with the allied Gustav Line offensives in Winter 1944, and resolved in May 1944 by concentrating both armies on the Western side of the Appenines. If the Germans saw this happening on the coast of France they would be likely to see an opportunity rather than run for the Reich.

Not convinced thisn answers the question. What was the outcome of this strategy that would be even better than the historic?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 05 May 2021 13:20

Gooner1 wrote:
05 May 2021 11:18
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:52
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.

Most likely result of a near simultaneous Anvil/Neptune IMO is that all the Allied armies get stuck for longer than they were. Stuck in Normandy, stuck in Provence and stuck south of Rome.
Three assault divisions were enough to open up Provence, historically. How many would you think were needed?
Three divisions were enough historically because by August 15th German Army Group G had been gutted for reinforcements for Normandy.
[/quote]

Gee, If three divisions were sufficient I wonder what could have been done with four, or seven, or ten?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 May 2021 16:03

daveshoup2MD wrote:
05 May 2021 05:34
A 4.0 and a 3.9 are one thing; a 3.0 and a 4.0 are something else. Again, without sniping at individuals, there is only so much talent to go around in any organization; between (at various times) ETOUSA, NATOUSA, MTOUSA, SHAEF, AFHQ, SACMED, Comm-Z, etc,, the best were spread pretty thin.
Um, okay, but how do you know what their score is ahead of time? Fredendall was a 4.0 until he went home. So was Dawley. So was Lucas. And, absent TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE, you would have had no idea whether or not they were 4.0 or 0.0, but you would have had a nice tidy organizational structure that economized on personnel.
Picking a target and prioritizing what's needed to reach it is always helpful.
I see, so if the target picked is "Germany" don't you need to prioritize the troops and equipment to invade the Deustches Bucht? Or how about between Weser and Elbe? Rostock? Griefswald? Direct routes to Berlin, right?

We don need no stinkin peripheral targets like North Africa, where we have an opportunity to destroy to Axis armies. We don need no stinkin targets where we can leverage our strengths against Axis weakness.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Peter89 » 05 May 2021 16:52

Some historians like Douglas Porch even argues that the MTO was a pivotal theatre of war, and the fact that the Allies pushed out the Axis from Africa (and Asia) had a tremendous effect on the Axis diplomacy and strategy.

Without the Axis losses and Allied experiences in the MTO, he argues, the Allied high command might made the mistakes on a larger scale in an event of a premature invasion of France.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 02:49

Gooner1 wrote:
05 May 2021 11:18
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 21:52
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.

Most likely result of a near simultaneous Anvil/Neptune IMO is that all the Allied armies get stuck for longer than they were. Stuck in Normandy, stuck in Provence and stuck south of Rome.
Three assault divisions were enough to open up Provence, historically. How many would you think were needed?
Three divisions were enough historically because by August 15th German Army Group G had been gutted for reinforcements for Normandy.

"Army Group G was a reasonably strong and well-balanced force in early June<>
"by concentrating his coastal defense preparations in those areas most likely to be targets of an amphibious assault and by carefully positioning his sixteen divisions, Blaskowitz could bring considerable pressure to bear against any one-, two-, or three-division ANVIL assault throughout the spring and early summer of 1944. Any Allied amphibious invasion attempt there could expect a heavy fight at the beachhead and no assurance of ultimate success."
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... era-4.html
[/quote]

Historically, the Allies had six assault divisions afloat for NEPTUNE, three for FORAGER, and one for HURRICANE (Biak) in May-June, 1944; and that's with the differential in sealift between Channel or Med operations and Central Pacific operations, which probably pencils out as the equivalent for a couple more ... so there's the equivalent of 6-12 being avialable, depending on when a decision might have been made for a simultaneous attempt at Normandy and Provence.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 02:49

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
05 May 2021 03:26
Gooner1 wrote:
04 May 2021 12:36
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:53
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.
The intent of the proponents was to concentrate Allied efforts on the western region of Germany via France.
Subtle. ;)

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