Delta Tank wrote: ↑
04 May 2021 13:08
LineDoggie wrote: ↑
04 May 2021 04:33
Delta Tank wrote: ↑
04 May 2021 01:26
Do you really know the events that happened on 8 December 1941 in the Philippines?
USAFFE Air was massacred and he was overall commander and had vacillated in hitting Formosa
ergo he was surprised when his refueling air element was murdered on the ground
or are you going to try and claim the aircraft weren't shot to hell by the Japanese?
No, I am not, but I still don’t think you guys know the story. Hit Formosa? Where? Just bomb the island or should they try to hit a specific target? What could 36 unescorted B-17s do?
The plan on the table was to attack the primary airfields, those known to be capable of handling Japanese multi engine bombers.
Did we have accurate target information?
We had accurate knowledge of and locations for the airfields in question. Breton wanted to launch a reconnaissance mission to check what was on the airfields at dawn. He claims he did not receive a response for his request to launch the mission. Historians have found evidence backing up Bretons claim, but no evidence of anything yes or no from MacArthurs HQ.
Why did the Japanese attack on the airfields come so late.
They were unable to take off due to a dense ground fog that lasted past 09:00. One small group of nine bombers were able to sortie as planned & attacked their target, a auxiliary airfield on northern Luzon. This group was detected by the radar station & a warning received at the interceptor group HQ.
Should the US planes have landed and refueled?
They did. The CAP had rotated at least twice since it first flew at dawn. After the alarm from the small raid @ 09:30 the CAP was reorganized. At around 10:15 (10:30 ?) a distant thunderstorm produced some radar returns that triggered a second warning & the CAP was reinforced. When no incoming bombers were found & the radar returns vanished a order went out to land the interceptors & send up a fresh CAP. The interceptors aloft landed en masse, but another CAP was not imeadiatly launched
Meanwhile the B17s were orbiting far to the south over a auxiliary airfield on Mindanao. Not long after 10:00 they were ordered to return to Clark Field to refuel possibly and arm for the raid Bereton wanted to execute.
Was their an Air Component Commander? Squadron Commanders? What actions did they do or fail to do that caused this disaster?
My take is they lost control of themselves. The alert had been started around 03:00 & Everyone had been awake since at least 03:30. Most had missed breakfast. They air and ground crew had been launching bombers to their 'hide' position over Mindanao, & more important preping unready interceptors and keeping a CAP aloft for five plus hours. The small 09:30 raid and false alarm a hour later confused them. These were not well trained combat veterans. The commanders failed to ensure a CAP was maintained & everyone was 'at lunch' when the Japanese attack finally arrived three or four hours late.
Why didn’t President Roosevelt activate the Philippines Armed Forces in October of 1940? Could that lack of action by FDR May have been the kernel of a lot of disasters in the Philippines.
In 1940 there was nothing to activate. The PI Army was a embryonic training organization, A glorified Officer & NCO school. A pool of lower ranks was partly identified, but were labeled reservists & lacked useful training. Most of the arms had not arrived. Neither were there tents barracks, hospitals, vehicles, kitchen equipment. All that was under construction & scheduled for completion circa 1946.
Standing up a PI Army was accelerated, but the US was also starting a mobilization to turn its 235,000 RA into 1,600,000 men & double the size of the Navy. So, there was a limit on what could be accelerated. Congress was concerned with runaway military costs & in mid 1940 was not in the mood to send more money to the PI government. In any case sending up 200,000 conscripts would not have activated a army. Training of the NCOs and officers could not have accelerated fast enough even had there been shelter, food, and equipment.