Soviet vs. Polska. Sep.1939.

[Rian]

Vladimir Beshanov in his "Krasnyj Blickrig" (p. 95) writes:

"32. Tank Brigade and 143. Rifle Division were ordered to capture Kobryn and then to attack towards Czerniany and Maloryty. In the night on 22 September tank company from 32. Tank Brigade together with infantry attached to it, burst into Horodec at the Królewski Canal after combat against a Polish unit. Casualties were 6 KIA, 2 WIA, two destroyed tanks. Prisoners captured - 30 Polish officers and 300 soldiers. One armoured fighting vehicle was directed on a reconnaissance mission towards Annopol, but it was burnt by the Poles; its crew was also killed."

Commander of 32. Tank Brigade, major Bolotov, writes about the same event in his after-campaign report:

"Until 14:00 on 22.09. brigade captured Kobryn, liquidating single enemy groups. In the night on 22.09. in the eastern part of the locality Horodec company fought a combat against enemy group. There were no casualties, 30 officers and 300 privates were captured."

Alex - what is Your explanation for these veeeery different data?? According You - Soviet commanders not falsifying reports about their units losses - but we have in this case two veeery different numbers. According to commander report - NO CASUALTIES. So why Beshanov wrote about 6 KIA, 2 WIA and two destroyed tanks???? So - if after victorious fight major Bolotov gave hmmm... not quite true data - why not commander of 52 ID - colonel Russijanov after defeated battle of Szack??

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

There was a mistake in one of my sources, in fact losses of 6th CC in Grodno were so heavy, not 16th RC.

Soviet casualties in combats for Grodno:

1. Men losses (KIA, MIA without a trace, WIA):

27th Tank Brigade - 20 KIA, 18 MIA, 26 WIA (64)
20th Motorized Brigade - 7 KIA, 22 WIA (29)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 25 KIA, 110 WIA (135)
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 6 KIA, 5 WIA (11)
119th Rifle Regiment from 5th Rifle Corps - ???
101st Rifle Regiment from 5th Rifle Corps - ???

In total 239 soldiers in mechanized units alone, without losses of both infantry regiments (!).

2. Armoured Fighting Vehicles (tanks + armoured cars):

27th Tank Brigade - 4 destroyed, 26 + 1 damaged (31)
20th Motorized Brigade - 2 + 1 destroyed (3)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 1 destroyed, 12 + 1 damaged (14) *
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 1 destroyed, 2 damaged

In total 8 + 1 destroyed, 40 + 2 damaged (51)

* Commander - komdiv Jeromienko - lost 3 tanks during the battle and all members of his crew were WIA (!).
Komdiv Jeromienko himself was WIA during the battle for Grodno too (when his third tank was knocked out).

If it comes to losses of infantry regiments (119th and 101st), especially losses of 119th must have been very heavy. While reading descriptions of combat actions of this regiment in Grodno, we can see, that it took heavy beating. It was almost completely disrupted during one of Polish counterattacks - only Soviet reinforcements rescued it.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Edit: 101st Infantry Regiment lost 7 WIA on 22 IX alone, when Soviet forces were mopping up the city.
(source: RGWA, 35086-1-495, k. 9)

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

By the way - many Soviet units which were not parts of either Ukrainian or Belarusian Fronts (but Reserves of High Command) invaded Poland in September of 1939 in the 2nd wave (crossing the border after 17 September 1939):

6, 7, 10, 13, 23, 25, 29, 30, 41, 58, 62, 64, 80, 84, 95, 113, 115, 121, 122, 124, 126, 130, 131, 134, 135, 140, 141, 146, 150, 163, 164, 169, 176 and 187 Rifle Divisions (= in total 34 additional rifle divisions)

14, 16, 20, 39 and 49 Tank Brigades (= in total 5 additional tank brigades)

Neither Krivosheev nor anyone else writes what losses did these units suffered (and certainly they suffered some).

By comparison forces of both Fronts (Ukrainian and Belarusian) numbered:

2, 4, 5, 8, 27, 33, 50, 52, 55, 100, 139, 143 and 145 Rifle Divisions (= 13 rifle divisions in Belarusian Front)
44, 45, 60, 72, 81, 87, 96, 97 and 99 Rifle Divisions (= 9 rifle divisions in Ukrainian Front)
= In total 22 rifle divisions

4, 6, 7, 11, 24 and 36 Cavalry Divisions (= 6 cavalry divisions in Belarusian Front)
3, 5, 9, 14, 16, 32 and 34 Cavalry Divisions (= 7 cavalry divisions in Ukrainian Front)
= In total 13 cavalry divisions

2, 6, 21, 22, 25, 27, 29 and 32 Tank Brigades (= 8 tank brigades in Belarusian Front)
4, 5, 10, 23, 24, 26, 36 and 38 Tank Brigades (= 8 tank brigades in Ukrainian Front)
20 [in Belarusian Front] and 1 [in Ukrainian Front] Motorized Brigades (= 2)
= In total 18 mechanized brigades

So as you can see forces invading Poland in the 2nd wave were almost as big as those from the 1st wave.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

By the way, Paul - you wrote some time ago:

organisation of recce btn. It consisted from: command (5 men), staff (6), political management (2), signal platoon (20), engineer squad (9), motorcycle company (53), armoured car company (49), tank company (41), cavalry squadron (88), support units (46). In total 328 men, 10 armoured cars, 10 tanks, 4 76mm AA guns, 8 37mm guns, 6 AT rifles.

But numbers don't match, 5 + 6 + 2 + 20 + 9 + 53 + 49 + 41 + 88 + 46 = 319 not 328.

Where is the mistake?

But - anyway - 328 or 365 doesn't make a big deal. Especially that, as I wrote before, I was mistaken while claiming that it was the Mechanized Group of 16 RC that lost 25 KIA and 110 WIA. In fact it was the Mechanized Group of 6 CC that lost 25 KIA and 110 WIA (as well as 13 tanks and 2 armoured cars destroyed or knocked out), while the Mechanized Group of 16 RC lost only 6 KIA, 5 WIA and 3 tanks destroyed or knocked out.

Even though, suffering 135 casualties by a force of 328 - 365 men is definitely possible.

If it comes to losses of 101 RR from 4 RD and 119 RR from 13 RD (both divisions from 5 RC) - they are not included in the casualties of Mechanized Group of 6 CC neither in casualties of any other of those 4 mechanized units that fought in Grodno (namely two mechanized groups, one tank brigade and one motorized brigade).

I know where these losses are included - they are included in casualty reports of Soviet 10. Army (6, 33 and 12 RDs - in total 42,145 men, 330 guns & mortars, 28 tanks). Strangely this Army was in Belarusian Front's reserve and crossed the Polish border not before 19.09.1939, advancing up to the line Niemen - Usza by the end of 19.09.1939 and up to the line Nowogrodek - Horodyszcze by the end of 20.09.1939, encountering almost no resistance along its march road and being involved only in a few skirmishes during the campaign, the last of which was on 27.09.1939.

Yet despite this very little combat involvement, this Army is reported to have suffered (this report is quoted by Polish historian Czeslaw Grzelak in his book "Kresy w Czerwieni" - losses of Belarusian Front with breakdown for individual armies) around 30% of all KIA and almost 38% of all WIA casualties suffered by this Front !!!

And I discovered why this army suffered so huge losses despite being in reserves and not fighting at all. Beshanov writes that 5th Rifle Corps was shifted to this army (he doesn't provide the exact date but it is obvious from his description that it was not earlier than on 20.09.1939 and probably after the end of the battle of Grodno).

This explains everything because, as we already discussed in this thread, two regiments from two rifle divisions of this Corps (101 RR and 119 RRs from 4 and 13 RDs of 5 RC) participated in heavy combats for Grodno.

It is thus certain that losses of 10. Army from that report (30% of all KIAs and almost 38% of all WIAs of Belarusian Front in total) include losses of these two regiments from Grodno. Moreover - vast majority of losses of 10. Army must be losses of these two regiments from Grodno. Question is if the report includes losses of these regiments for the entire battle of Grodno and for the entire campaign, or maybe, for example, just since 21.09.1939?

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Polish POWs in Soviet captivity, September 1939:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Historian R. Szawłowski quotes & comments Soviet sources on the battle of Szack (28 - 30.09.1939):

Ogłoszone sowieckie dokumenty archiwalne zawierają dość obszerny materiał na temat bitwy prowadzonej przez 52 dywizję strzelecką pod Szackiem 28/29 IX 1939. Dotyczy on m. in. wyraźnie dla ich strony „wstrząsającego" faktu zniszczenia tam przez Polaków bolszewickiego batalionu pancernego [75]. Brak miejsca pozwala jedynie na wyrywkowe wykorzystanie powyższego materiału. Według meldunku 52 DS, bez daty, o działaniach w dniach 27-29.9.1939 [76], już 27 września 28 samodzielny batalion saperów, który otrzymał rozkaz dowódcy dywizji przeprawienia się przez Bug w rejonie Włodawy i zbudowania tam mostu do przeprawy,

„wykonał marsz bez osłony piechoty (...) bez środków ubezpieczenia i rozpoznania. (...) został ostrzelany ogniem z karabinów i broni maszynowej. Utracił kilku rannych (w tym dowódcę batalionu mjr. Kisielowa) i zaczął wycofywać się na Piszczę, prosząc o wsparcie. 27. 9. około 24.00 do sztabu dywizji w Małorycie nadszedł meldunek z 28 samodzielnego batalionu saperów z informacją, że batalion jest wystawiony na atak ogniowy przeciwnika, poniósł straty i wycofuje się w kierunku Piszczy".

Jeśli chodzi o bitwę w rejonie Szacka 28/29 IX, w tym samym dokumencie czytamy m. in.:

„W Szacku rano 28. 9. przybiegł obywatel, który zameldował dowódcy 411 samodzielnego batalionu czołgów, że w lesie na południe od Szacka chce złożyć broń szwadron nieprzyjaciela [77]. Dowódca samodzielnego batalionu czołgów, nie sprawdzając tej informacji, bez środków ubezpieczenia i rozpoznania, i nie meldując dowódcy dywizji, poprowadził batalion w kolumnie. Przeciwnik przepuścił kolumnę do przesmyku między jeziorami Lucimier [Lucemierz] i Krugłoje [Czarne] i z bliskiej odległości otworzył bezpośredni ogień artyleryjski. W rezultacie 7 czołgów zostało zniszczonych. 28. 9. o 11.00 do sztabu dywizji nadszedł krótki meldunek od dowódcy 54 dywizjonu artylerii przeciwpancernej o zagładzie 411 samodzielnego batalionu czołgów w rejonie Kacka, o natarciu dużych sił przeciwnika i o przejściu do obrony dywizjonu artylerii przeciwpancernej z oddziałem 112 ps oraz usilną prośbą o wsparcie".

Następują wiadomości o improwizowanych „środkach zaradczych" oraz braki łączności, w tym także szefa sztabu z dowódcą dywizji, płk. Russijanowem (czy Russinowem), który „dowodził grupą ludzi" i „znajdował się w bezpośredniej styczności z nieprzyjacielem".

„Noc, brak łączności z dowódcą dywizji i bezprzewodowej z oddziałami, sprzeczne informacje o nieprzyjacielu, a niekiedy paniczne o ciężkim położeniu swoich oddziałów, rozrzuconych na dużych odległościach jeden od drugiego - wytworzyły w sztabie napiętą sytuację".

Cytowany meldunek sowiecki wspomina o zajęciu (powinna być mowa o zdobyciu) przez Polaków Szacka, skąd (przeciwnik) prowadził

„silny ogień karabinów maszynowych, przechodził do kontrataku, zarzucał nasze wojska granatami. Położenie naszych jednostek, skierowanych w rejon Szacka z różnych pułków i batalionów, nie mających należytej łączności, uzupełnionych w 80% rezerwistami, bez jednolitego dowództwa i działających w warunkach boju nocnego, było niezwykle ciężkie. 28. 9. między godz. 23.00 a 24.00 został ciężko ranny dowódca dywizji. W wojsku dowiedziano się o tym w momencie przejścia nieprzyjaciela do kontrataku i przerwaniu się jego batalionu z m. Mielniki do alma. Wydarzenia te wytworzyły wrażenie okrążenia. Nieostrzelane oddziały zaczęły się wycofywać i częściowo rozproszyły się po lesie".

Wreszcie, według tego samego meldunku sowieckiego:

„Przeciwnik został zatrzymany ogniem artylerii oraz oddziału zbiorczego i zaczął się wycofywać. (...) Na tym odcinku bój zakończył się 29. 9 o 9.00". Mówi się o tym, że „część" sił polskich przeprawiła się na zachodni brzeg Bugu. „Z powodu przemęczenia oddziałów nie było możliwości ścigania przeciwnika. Pododdziały 58 i 112 ps walczące pod Szackiem, w rezultacie nocnego boju i złego dowodzenia przez część dowódców, rozproszyły się w lesie i zostały uporządkowane dopiero 29. 9 o 9.00".

Straty własne meldunek sowiecki określa następująco:

„6 czołgów T-26, czołgi T-37, 5 traktorów „Komsomolec". Ciężko ranny dowódca dywizji Rusjanow. Od ran zmarł dowódca 411 samodzielnego batalionu czołgów, kpt. Iieseniuk, zabity sekretarz WKP/b/ 208 pah, st. lejt. Toronin, ponadto zginęło 4 oficerów [młodszych], jeden oficer polityczny i około 75 szeregowców i podoficerów; raniono 184 ludzi. (...)".

Straty własne, co do ogólnych liczb raczej zaniżone, „skompensowano" sobie wyolbrzymionymi do śmieszności rzekomymi stratami strony polskiej: zginąć miało 700 ludzi (a więc prawie dziesięciokrotnie więcej niż żołnierzy sowieckich!), o rannych w ogóle się nie mówi [78]; do niewoli wzięto rzekomo 600 ludzi.

To samo dotyczy rzekomego stosunku strat własnych do strat strony polskiej w walkach 30 IX 1939. Tutaj datowane Włodzimierz Wołyński, 1. 10. 1939,godz. 6.00, sprawozdanie operacyjne sztabu 5 armii podaje [79]:

„52 DS - w wyniku walk 30. 9. na rubieży: Orchów, Zalesię, Szack, jez. Lucimier [Lucemierz], wzięła do niewoli do 1100 jeńców i 4 oficerów Sztabu Generalnego (...). Na polu boju pozostało 524 zabitych Polaków".

Liczba wyraźnie zawyżona, nawet jeśli wziąć pod uwagę polskich żołnierzy, wówczas wymordowanych (por. s. 384-386). O polskich rannych ponownie nie ma najmniejszej wzmianki.

Natomiast straty własne określa się na 60 zabitych i około 200 rannych (oraz uszkodzonych 6 czołgów, tankietka, 2 traktory „Komsomolec"). Ale następne sprawozdanie sztabu 5 armii z 1.10.1939, godz. 12.00, określa straty nieodwracalne Polaków już na 540, natomiast straty własne obniża z 60 na 40 (a więc „poprawiony" stosunek strat własnych w zabitych do analogicznych polskich jak 1:13,5!); liczbę własnych rannych obniża do 170, dodaje natomiast 46 zaginionych bez wieści. Dalej czytamy bzdury o tym, że „resztkami rozbitych oddziałów oficerskich dowodzą gen. Sikorski i Kleeberg" (sic!)."

Later I will translate this.

Source:

R. Szawłocki, "Wojna Polsko-Sowiecka 1939" ("Polish-Soviet War 1939"), pages 235 - 237. Chapter VI, sub-chapter 14 ("14. Combats along the Central Section in the light of Soviet information and disinformation").

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

The first interesting thing is that despite the fact that Soviet sources admit that the battle of Szack was a complete failure and chaos for the Soviets, Soviet soldiers panicked and were dispersed, commander of the Soviet division was seriously wounded, one Soviet tank battalion was destroyed (its commander was KIA), etc. - they still claim that Polish casualties in that battle were something like 12 times bigger than Soviet...

In general while describing most of battles Soviets claim Polish losses being 10 - 20 times bigger than Soviet.

=======================================

I-16 described as shot down over Poland in September 1939:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

BTW - it seems that 5. Army suffered around 70% of all casualties suffered by the Ukrainian Front.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Collapse of the Polish plan of defending the Romanian Bridgehead due to the Soviet Invasion:
(and evacuation of Polish forces to Romania and Hungary between 17 and 21 September)

Organisation of defence by Groups "Stryj" and "Dniestr" - 16 September 1939:

Military operations on the Romanian Bridgehead 17 - 21 September 1939:

3 BG - Polish 3rd Mountain Brigade
10 BK - Polish 10th Cavalry Brigade (motorized)

Scans from the book "Przedmoście Rumuńskie 1939" by Wojciech Włodarkiewicz.

======================================

And here goes translation of that text (see above) about the battle of Szack:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1570717

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

A Soviet propaganda "documentary" movie from 1940 - here link to Part 1 (of 8):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32HBqgQ5NZ8



Here part 5 - since 4:32 some Poles speak, what a babble :



In part 3 since 5:54 some of the already "liberated" Hutsul people can be seen:

Apparently they are "very happy" of being forced to participate in this Communist parade:



Here something more about Hutsul people, whose culture fully benefited from Polish tolerance:



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hutsuls

http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huculi

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthre ... ost9710519

Polish 49th "Huculski" Rifle Regiment from 11th "Carpathian" Infantry Division during parade (late 1930s):

We can see that the leading officer has traditional Goral & Hutsul ciupaga (valaška) instead of sabre:

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Apparently veteran of the defence of Lwow in 1939:

He mentions gen. Januszajtis (who was in Lwow in September 1939), capitulation of Lwow to the Soviets, the Soviets releasing ordinary POWs as was agreed, his return home, being arrested by NKVD in November, etc.:

http://www.historydocumented.com/2009/0 ... h-patriot/

He died this year, on 27 February 2011.

[mirekw]

There were also small personal and material air losses among Soviets units in IX-X 1939. During invasion on Poland VVS RKKA had lost 11 killed airmen (from all reasons). When you look at Krovoshein's book, there is mentionen only 4 airmen killed during this war, which is of course wrong and not full data.

All names of killed Soviet airmen you may find in my book "Czerwone gwiazdy sojusznik czarnych krzyży nad Polską. Lotnictwo sowieckie na Kresami wrzesień - październik 1939. Red Stars – Black Cross's Ally over Poland. Soviet Aviation over East Part of Poland in September, October 1939.", printed in Warsaw in 2008, p. 169 (name, rank, place and death's reason).

During this war the most dangerous enemy was the Soviet air force's own anti-aircraft artillery, which fired at anything that flew overhead. There were a few air combats between Polish and Soviet side. All this information are in my book and about it you may see the link:

http://www.kecay.com/mirek.htm

Regards,
mirekw

[mirekw]

In early October 2011 appeared in Poland article, which I am the author. It is dedicated to little known history of Soviet aviation activities on the Polish in September and October 1939. This issue is very often underestimated in various studies. Soviet airmen led active combat operations against the Poles from 17 September to 6 October 1939. During this period, have done a few thousand sorties: most reccon flights, less on bombing and shelling the Polish army.
Russians to the invasion of Poland gathered 3,300 combat aircraft. With this size used operationally much less. In the text presented to the state of Soviet aviation, its combat operations in 1939. I gave examples of air fights between Polish and Soviet aircraft and other combat operations. Russians shot down in aerial combat at least 4 aircraft (P.11, p.23, RWD-8, R-XIII).
Article is titled "Soviet Air Force over the borderlands in 1939," The text has 10 pages (page 68-77) and is illustrated with 21 black and white photographs.

Lotnictwo sowieckie nad Kresami w 1939 r., Lotnictwo nr 10/2011, s. 68-77. http://magnum-x.pl/index.php?option=com ... &Itemid=11

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Regarding my post above, dated 27 Mar 2010 19:43, below is a more detailed Soviet Order of Battle:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1827822

A little summary of Soviet divisions and brigades which took part in the invasion:

A) Cavalry Divisions (13 - 14):

1) Took part in 1st echelon - 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 24, 32, 34, 36
2) Took part according to some sources - 2

Comments:

2 - ???

B) Tank Brigades (19 - 22; one ruled out):

1) Took part in 1st echelon - 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 36, 38
2) Took part in 2nd echelon - 7, 14, 29, 32
3) Took part in 3rd echelon - 49
4) Took part according to some sources - 16, 18, 20, 39

Comments:

16 - did not exist according to Drig.
18 - ???
20 - Leningrad Military District
39 - formed in September in Moscow MD, in October 7 Army Latvian border

C) Mot. Rifle Brigades (2):

1) Took part in 1st echelon - 1, 20

D) Rifle Divisions (57 - 63; four ruled out):

1) Took part in 1st echelon - 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 25, 27, 33, 44, 45, 50, 52, 60, 72, 81, 87, 96, 97, 99, 100, 121, 131
2) Took part in 2nd echelon - 8, 10, 14, 15, 23, 29, 41, 51, 55, 58, 62, 64, 80, 95, 113, 115, 122, 124, 126, 130, 135, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 150, 164, 169, 187
3) Took part in 3rd echelon - 30, 84, 176
4) Took part according to some sources - 12, 42, 89, 93, 109, 134, 152, 163, 183, 197

Comments:

12 - ???
42 - formed not before January 1940
89 - formation didn't take place
93 - ???
109 - ???
134 - formed after 9 September
152 - ???
163 - Moscow Military District, since August 1939
183 - formation planned on 9 September, didn't take place
197 - the same as 183

E) Air Defense (PVO) Divisions (1):

1) Took part (which echelon?) - 3

==========================================================

Grand total:

71 - 78 divisions and 21 - 24 brigades took part in the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939.

4 more divisions and 1 brigade took part according to some sources, but we ruled them out.

==========================================================

Edit:

Tank Brigades:

(...)

2) Took part in 2nd echelon - 7, 14, 29, 32

However, according to a report written after the end of the campaign by S. M. Krivoshein, commander of 29th Tank Brigade, the brigade crossed the Polish border at 5:00 on 17.09.1939 and until 12:00 captured the town of Nieśwież.

Also a similar report written by Major Bolotov - chief of staff of 32nd Tank Brigade - says that the brigade crossed the Polish-Soviet border and entered Polish territory already at 5:00 in the morning on 17.09.1939.

So counting 29. and 32. Tank Brigades as 2nd echelon (i.e. units crossing the border on 18.09.1939 or later) is wrong.

It seems, that there are also other divisions and brigades which are wrongly counted as 2nd echelon.

Especially among rifle divisions counted as 2nd echelon, many in fact crossed the border already on 17.09.1939.

This most probably refers at least to these five rifle divisions: 8, 55, 139, 143, 145.

And link to my 2009 post in another thread about casualties of Soviet armour (but since that time I've found also some new sources and verified some of casualty numbers posted there - in few cases there are discrepancies in data between sources):

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t#p1341371

[Rian]

Supplementing data on the losses of Soviet troops in Grodno (KIA, MIA without a trace, WIA):

27th Tank Brigade - 20 KIA, 18 MIA, 26 WIA (64)
20th Motorized Brigade - 7 KIA, 22 WIA (29)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 25 KIA, 110 WIA (135)
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps:
- 59th independent reconnaissance battalion from 2nd Rifle Div. - 6 KIA, 5 WIA (11)
- 69 reconnaisance battalion from 100th Rifle Div. - according list of killed soviet soldiers in 1939 - 2 KIA at 21 IX
5th Rifle Corps:
119th Rifle Regiment from 13th Rifle Div. - according list of killed soviet soldiers in 1939 - regiment lost in september 1939 30 KIA (all in Grodno?), ??WIA
14th Recon battalion from 13th Rifle Div. - according list of killed soviet soldiers in 1939 - 1 KIA in Grodno
42nd Artillery Regiment from 13th Rifle Div. - according list of killed soviet soldiers in 1939 - 1 KIA in Grodno
101st Rifle Regiment from 4th Rifle Div. - minimum 7 WIA at 22 IX


So... If all soldiers from 119 Rifle regiment were killed in Grodno - Soviet losses in Grodno was 92+ KIA, 18 MIA, minimum 170 WIA = 280+ casualties