Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Discussions on all aspects of the United States of America during the Inter-War era and Second World War. Hosted by Carl Schwamberger.
Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4379
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Richard Anderson » 05 May 2021 15:50

rcocean wrote:
05 May 2021 14:53
Can you explain this further? First you say we had "accurate knowledge" of the airfields. We never did recon before December 8th, so how did we have accurate knowledge? Then you say that Breton wanted to "Check what was on the airfields at dawn". This conflicts with what the official Historian says in the "They fought with what they had".
Better still, go to one of the ur-sources of the "official history" https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/doc ... 22-048.pdf There is little evidence the FEAF had any knowledge of the actual number, location, or characteristics of the Japanese airfields on Formosa, other than there were in fact Japanese airfields on Formosa.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

rcocean
Member
Posts: 532
Joined: 30 Mar 2008 00:48

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by rcocean » 05 May 2021 18:00

Admiral hart reminds me of Brett. He was well thought of before December 7th, and the Asiatic Fleet was an important command, especially since it became a "hot spot" after July 1941 oil embargo. Yet, despite having combat experience in the Philippines and Java, he was more or less benched after he returned to the USA. FDR gave him a medal, and that was that. He later became a US Senator and lived to 1971.

Maybe its the fact that Churchill, the RN, and the Dutch all complained about him, which is why he had to leave Java in Feb 1942. Guess they agreed with MacArthur that Hart was "defeatist". Or maybe it was MacArthur labeling him a coward for running off on a Submarine on December 25th (or early AM Dec 26th depending on who you read). Leaving by sub without seeing MacArthur first, was odd. And so was taking a sub. He could have stayed and flown out later with several of his staff. As it was he was more or less out of touch till Jan 2nd when he popped up unexpectedly in Java to the surprise of the Dutch!

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2372
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 05 May 2021 20:27

To all,

The Washington War by James Lacey pages 227-229
As defeats piled up in the Pacific, things were little better in the Atlantic theater. All America had by way of an agreed war plan was the big concept of “Germany first” and holding the line in the Pacific. As a slogan it was peerless, but as a war strategy in the early months of 1942 it was useless. For the Japanese could not be held, and the Americans would have no way of getting at the Germans for many months yet. That, however, did not mean that the Germans had no way to get at America. German U-boats were having their best months of the war in both the North Atlantic and their new happy hunting grounds off the U. S. East Coast.
In mid-January the U-boats appeared along the Atlantic coast and soon thereafter in the Gulf of Mexico. Operation DRUMBEAT was beginning. Caught unprepared by Hitler’s declaration of war on America, the German submarine chief, Admiral Karl Donitz, had only six U-boats ready to send into the western Atlantic, but they were crewed by his best men and captains. Commander Rodger Winn’s London-based Submarine Tracking Room marked their passage. As Winn tracked the submarines across the Atlantic he sent a detailed message to Admiral King informing him of the looming threat. King alerted area commanders, but did nothing else.
For the Germans, DRUMBEAT was a second “Happy Time,” as they sank 48 ships in January, 73 ships in February, and 95 in March. In just three months the Allies lost well over a million tons of shipping, many of them precious oil tankers. Worse, the American Navy did not sink its first U-boat until well into April. It was a naval catastrophe far worse than Pearl Harbor, and if it continued the war was lost. The blame for this unprecedented disaster falls squarely on King’s shoulders, as he allowed his deep seated distrust for the British to color his military judgment. Though the British gave the Americans their best advice, based on over two years of experience fighting U-bots in the North Atlantic, King refused to listen. Thus, basic measures such as instituting a convoy system along the coast were not implemented. Worse, in what amounts to nearly criminal neglect, the lights along the Eastern Seaboard were not extinguished until mid-April 1942, allowing U-boat commanders to lie well offshore and pick off targets silhouetted against city lights. Miami alone threw up a six-mile glow, creating a deadly gauntlet for ships navigating around the Gulf Stream. This murderous situation continued because local communities from Atlantic City to Florida raised hell about having their tourist seasons ruined. Over 250 ships were lost before the Navy acted to turn off the lights.
In dire need, King asked Marshall for help. Marshall reacted instantly. On March 26, he ordered all Army commands possessing aircraft capable of searching over the Atlantic’s open seas to turn their full attention to looking for U-boats. He even went so far as to temporarily turn operational control of these aircraft over to the Navy. Even this doubling of the number of aircraft available for hunting U-boats was almost wasted because King refuse to accept British advice on how to organize and integrate search units.
Appalled at their ally’s catastrophic losses, the Admiralty put Commander Winn on a plane and flew him to Washington. Told by King’s chief of staff, Rear Admiral R. S. Edwards, that the “Americans wished to learn their own lessons and had plenty of ships with which to do so,” Winn exploded: “The trouble, Admiral, is it’s not only your bloody ships you are losing; a lot of them are ours.” The upshot of Winn’s withering criticisms was that King finally ordered the creation of a “tracking room” to integrate all intelligence, ship locations, and anti-U-boat operations.
Realizing that his Army Air Forces pilots were not sufficiently trained for hunting U-boats, General Arnold established a training and research site for anti-submarine warfare at Langley Field, Virginia. He then offered to establish a Coastal Air Command, run by the Army Air Forces, to help search for U-boats. In making his offer, Arnold was adopting the British model where the RAF, in close cooperation with the Royal Navy, controlled all land-based aircraft assigned to submarine duty. He told King that the Army would handle the specialized training, run the airfields, and handle all the logistic and maintenance chores, but would take all of its orders from the Navy. This was not good enough for King, who was already anticipating the day when the Army Air Forces would gain its independence and feared the Navy would be stripped of its aviation. Consequently, King replied that if he did not own the whole thing he wanted none of it. The battle between Arnold and King was still raging in May, when Arnold threw up his hands and dumped the problem in Marshall’s lap. In the meantime, ships were sinking, thousands of tons of precious cargo were lost, and hundreds of men drowned.
Marshall did not turn his full attention to the problem until mid-June. When he did, he was flabbergasted at the pettiness of the argument and the profound effects the resulting delay was having on the war effort. In a pointed letter to King, Marshall stated: “The loss by submarine off the Atlantic seaboard and the Caribbean now threaten the entire war effort. . . of the 74 ships allocated to the Army by the War Shipping Administration, 17 have already been sunk. . . I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy in critical theaters. . .” King remained unmoved.
Marshall swallowed hard and told Arnold to turn the entire operation over to the Navy. More months passed as the Navy put its own administrative backbone in place, replicating an infrastructure the Army had already built. Without a doubt, King was the man to snap the Navy out of its post-Pearl Harbor shock. Still there is little in this affair that accrues to his credit. In fact, his main biographer, Thomas B. Buell, never mentions these events. Because he disliked the British, and over a point of internal politics rising out of his fear of an -an independent air force-still years in the future, King made a very bad situation inestimably worse.

rcocean
Member
Posts: 532
Joined: 30 Mar 2008 00:48

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by rcocean » 06 May 2021 00:02

we had accurate knowledge of and locations for the airfields in question. Breton wanted to launch a reconnaissance mission to check what was on the airfields at dawn. He claims he did not receive a response for his request to launch the mission. Historians have found evidence backing up Bretons claim, but no evidence of anything yes or no from MacArthurs HQ.
From reading the Brereton Diaries and official AAF history (Volume 1), I think I've got a handle on this. At 5 AM Brereton went to Macarthur and requested permission to bomb Takao harbor. MacArthur supposedly said no. Then Brereton requested a recon mission, which was ok'd by 8 AM. At 1010 Sutherland supposedly Ok'd the recon mission again AND the bombing THE airfields. The recon mission was delayed due to the bombers being send aloft, due to attack warning between 8-10 AM.

The Key is that the "Dawn Mission" that MacArthur supposedly turned down was a mission to bomb the Transports and warships in Takao harbor - not the airfields. Its only later that Brereton requested a photo recon mission of the airfields for a dusk bombing mission. While there were no photographs of the air fields, but we had a GENERAL idea of their location and number. Something like: in a 50 mile radius of Takao, the Japanese have about 20 airfields. That's not being totally in the dark, but close to it.

BTW, its approximately 500 miles from Takao to Manila. That means with time to get to altitude, it would've taken about 3-4 hours for a B-17 to get there, take pictures and get back. The recon photos then needed to developed, analyzed, and copied. That's another reason a "Dusk Mission" was chosen.

Key passages:
10:10 Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to take charge of operations from Clark Field with instructions to dispatch a photo reconnaissance mission in force at once to southern Taiwan area.
10:14 General Brereton received a telephone call from General MacArthur. General Brereton stated that since the attack was not made on Clark Field that bombers will be held in readiness until receipt of reports from reconnaissance missions. Lacking report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late afternoon. The decision for offensive action was left to General Brereton.
10:20 The staff was called in and informed of General Brereton's telephone conversation with General MacArthur. General Brereton directed that a plan of employment of our Air Force against known airdromes in Southern Formosa be prepared.
10:45 Employment of Air Force directed by General Brereton as follows: Two (2) heavy bombardment squadrons to attack known airdromes in Southern Formosa at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit. Forces to be 2 squadrons of B-17's. Two (2) squadrons of pursuit to be on the alert to cover operations of bombardment. Pursuit to be used to fullest extent to insure safety of bombardment.

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2372
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 06 May 2021 01:42

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 01:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 23:28
Agreed. Set aside the question of MacArthur; what was it that made Hart order his forces dispersed? Two flag officers, roughly the same age and experience, and the one with actually more experience in Asia underestimates the Japanese...
Yep. Go figure. I suspect that Hart simply read the war warning from CNO and said something on the order of "HOLY SHIT! Maybe we ought to prepare for a possible war." MacArthur worried about overstepping his bounds with the Philippine government and playing into the hands of the Japanese...along with wondering how to be the very model of a modern generalissimo. Stark and Short worried about a myriad of other irrelevancies. Sometimes its the commanders who can simply focus on the single most important thing of the moment that wins...sort of like Alexander the Great going straight for Darius hell for leather.
So Hart prepared for war?? Really? So, what actions if any did Admiral Hart take to defend the Philippines? I copied this from a post I did in June 2010.

Now a little discussed matter, why does everyone give the US Navy a pass on the defense of the Philippines? They had enough submarines stationed in the Philippines to sink the entire invasion force, yet as far as I know they did nothing or virtually nothing! Here is a list from Wiki:
* 1 heavy cruiser (USS Houston)
* 1 light cruiser (USS Marblehead)
* 13 World War I–era destroyers:
o USS Paul Jones
o USS John D. Edwards
o USS Alden
o USS Whipple
o USS Edsall
o USS Stewart
o USS Barker
o USS Parrott
o USS Bulmer
o USS John D. Ford
o USS Pope
o USS Peary
o USS Pillsbury
* 1 destroyer tender (USS Black Hawk)
* 29 submarines:
o USS Porpoise
o USS Pike
o USS Shark
o USS Tarpon
o USS Perch
o USS Pickerel
o USS Permit
o USS Salmon
o USS Seal
o USS Skipjack
o USS Sargo
o USS Saury
o USS Spearfish
o USS Snapper
o USS Stingray
o USS Sturgeon
o USS Sculpin
o USS Sailfish
o USS Swordfish
o USS S-36
o USS S-37
o USS S-38
o USS S-39
o USS S-40
o USS S-41
o USS Seadragon
o USS Sealion
o USS Searaven
o USS Seawolf[1]
* 5 gunboats:
o USS Asheville
o USS Tulsa
o USS Oahu
o USS Luzon
o USS Mindanao
* 1 yacht (USS Isabel)
* 6 minesweepers:
o USS Finch
o USS Bittern
o USS Tanager
o USS Quail
o USS Lark
o USS Whippoorwill
* 2 tankers:
o USS Pecos
o USS Trinity)
* 1 ocean-going tugboat (USS Napa)
* 4 seaplane tenders:
o USS Langley
o USS Childs
o USS William B. Preston
o USS Heron in support of Patrol Wing TEN (VP 101 and VP 102) with 28 PBY-4 Catalina flying boats
* 1 submarine rescue vessel (USS Pigeon)
* 3 submarine tenders:
o USS Holland
o USS Canopus
o USS Otus
* various other ships, including 6 motor torpedo boats that formed Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three
* 1 2-masted schooner USS Lanikai

Mike

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 805
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 01:45

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 06:56
daveshoup2MD wrote:
05 May 2021 05:17
Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 01:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 23:28
Agreed. Set aside the question of MacArthur; what was it that made Hart order his forces dispersed? Two flag officers, roughly the same age and experience, and the one with actually more experience in Asia underestimates the Japanese...
Yep. Go figure. I suspect that Hart simply read the war warning from CNO and said something on the order of "HOLY SHIT! Maybe we ought to prepare for a possible war." MacArthur worried about overstepping his bounds with the Philippine government and playing into the hands of the Japanese...along with wondering how to be the very model of a modern generalissimo. Stark and Short worried about a myriad of other irrelevancies. Sometimes its the commanders who can simply focus on the single most important thing of the moment that wins...sort of like Alexander the Great going straight for Darius hell for leather.
Yep, back at you.

Above, did you mean Kimmel and Short?
Yes, brain fart, I suppose a reaction to finding out that one of the most self-righteous of American generals was actually a paragon of virtue, beloved by all and sundry. You learn something every day.
Indeed.

Stark is an interesting example; he and Marshall both had similar challenges in the short of war period, and each dealt with them with (roughly) equal levels of success, but FDR clearly saw Marshall as irreplaceable and Stark as ... not.

Although to be fair, Stark's command in the UK had great responsibilities, and based on the USN's record in European and North African waters, he was successful.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 805
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 01:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 15:45
Can we all just agree that "Breton" is a resident of Brittany, but the general's name in question was Brereton, as in Lewis Hyde Brereton? And George Grunert,
Don't forget President Rosenberg, secretaries Bull, Simpson, and Cox, General Marshal, and Admiral Clark?

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 805
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 02:04

rcocean wrote:
05 May 2021 18:00
Admiral hart reminds me of Brett. He was well thought of before December 7th, and the Asiatic Fleet was an important command, especially since it became a "hot spot" after July 1941 oil embargo. Yet, despite having combat experience in the Philippines and Java, he was more or less benched after he returned to the USA. FDR gave him a medal, and that was that. He later became a US Senator and lived to 1971.

Maybe its the fact that Churchill, the RN, and the Dutch all complained about him, which is why he had to leave Java in Feb 1942. Guess they agreed with MacArthur that Hart was "defeatist". Or maybe it was MacArthur labeling him a coward for running off on a Submarine on December 25th (or early AM Dec 26th depending on who you read). Leaving by sub without seeing MacArthur first, was odd. And so was taking a sub. He could have stayed and flown out later with several of his staff. As it was he was more or less out of touch till Jan 2nd when he popped up unexpectedly in Java to the surprise of the Dutch!
Hart was born in 1877; he retired in July, 1942 (at the mandated age of 65) and recalled within days for service on the Navy's General Board until 1945, when he retired again, at the end of the war. This sort of advisory or diplomatic post is exactly what a number of men of his generation were assigned to: obvious examples were Malin Craig and Stanley Embick in the Army, and Harry Yarnell and William Standley in the Navy.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 805
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 02:16

Delta Tank wrote:
05 May 2021 20:27
To all,

The Washington War by James Lacey pages 227-229
Lacey, a career army officer, is critical of King ... shocking.

His priorities in trying to advance his thesis that: "the more I delved into the clashes that made up the Washington war, the clearer it became that these titanic rows almost always led to better outcomes than would have prevailed had there been a single man or apparatus directing events” are, um, interesting, as has been said.

Lacey devotes a page to D-Day and a chapter to the Morgenthau Plan. Even if the punitive blueprint for postwar Germany had been adopted — it wasn’t — the largest amphibious operation in history deserves better.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ ... story.html

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 805
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by daveshoup2MD » 06 May 2021 02:26

Delta Tank wrote:
06 May 2021 01:42
Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 01:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 23:28
Agreed. Set aside the question of MacArthur; what was it that made Hart order his forces dispersed? Two flag officers, roughly the same age and experience, and the one with actually more experience in Asia underestimates the Japanese...
Yep. Go figure. I suspect that Hart simply read the war warning from CNO and said something on the order of "HOLY SHIT! Maybe we ought to prepare for a possible war." MacArthur worried about overstepping his bounds with the Philippine government and playing into the hands of the Japanese...along with wondering how to be the very model of a modern generalissimo. Stark and Short worried about a myriad of other irrelevancies. Sometimes its the commanders who can simply focus on the single most important thing of the moment that wins...sort of like Alexander the Great going straight for Darius hell for leather.
So Hart prepared for war?? Really? So, what actions if any did Admiral Hart take to defend the Philippines? I copied this from a post I did in June 2010.

Now a little discussed matter, why does everyone give the US Navy a pass on the defense of the Philippines? They had enough submarines stationed in the Philippines to sink the entire invasion force, yet as far as I know they did nothing or virtually nothing!
Have you read the history of the Asiatic Fleet? How about Force Z? How did sending a surface action force without air cover into harm's way work out for Prince of Wales and Repulse?

As far as the USN's submarine force, ever read anything about the problems with the submarine force's most modern torpedo design?

Asiatic Fleet fought and won the only action approximating a victory against the IJN before the Coral Sea; there was a reason why Balikpapan could be fought and won.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 8858
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 May 2021 03:26

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 15:45
Can we all just agree that "Breton" is a resident of Brittany, but the general's name in question was Brereton, as in Lewis Hyde Brereton? And George Grunert,
Rich, how could we possibly agree on such a disputable fact? :p

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 8858
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 May 2021 05:13

rcocean wrote:
06 May 2021 00:02
From reading the Brereton Diaries and official AAF history (Volume 1), I think I've got a handle on this. ...
For some reason my notes set the PI times a hour earlier. for events before about 07:00, then aligns after that. Looking over Costellos account 'The Pacific War' attacking Tako harbor is not mentioned. Costello has Sutherland insisting on a reconnaissance mission first in response to Brereton requesting permission from MacArthur to launch a air attack "at once". Costello places this exchange between Brererton & Sutherland between 05:00 & 06:00. A second conversation between Breton & Sutherland occurred at 07:15, with no permission to launch any photo or other recon mission resulting. When the Baguio & Tueguegareo airfields were bombed between 09:00 & 10:00 Bereton requested permission yet again for a air attack & Sutherland told him it was not yet granted. Costello cites MacArthurs postwar statements he was unaware of any requests for a air attack or reconnaissance missions.

Other items from Costello: A cable from 'Washington' was received by Macs staff at 05:30 directing Mac to "execute RAINBOW 5 War Plan at once".

At 06:12 a message from Adm Harts HQ was logged into Macs HQ stating the Sea Plane tender William B Preston had reported being under attack by Japanese planes.

User avatar
EKB
Member
Posts: 679
Joined: 20 Jul 2005 17:21
Location: United States

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by EKB » 06 May 2021 08:47

Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 01:43
The idea that multiple war warnings went out seems incomprehensible to us today. OTOH, we gave multiple warning in 2002 that what the government thought it was doing WRT Iraq was harebrained, the idea we would be greeted with flowers was insane, and an occupation force similar to that required for postwar Germany was necessary, but we and others expressing similar qualms were pooh-poohed...then look at Korea, Vietnam, Beirut, and so on, and you might infer that "figuring it out" in advance is not the norm, but rather is an exception.

Please note that this is not 1939. Careless, unauthorized use of words like "occupation" or "invasion" will cause the Pentagon’s marketing department to blacklist you as a hippie, Russian asset.
PIC Mattis 3.png
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transc ... indonesia/
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2372
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 06 May 2021 12:00

daveshoup2MD wrote:
06 May 2021 02:16
Delta Tank wrote:
05 May 2021 20:27
To all,

The Washington War by James Lacey pages 227-229
Lacey, a career army officer, is critical of King ... shocking.

His priorities in trying to advance his thesis that: "the more I delved into the clashes that made up the Washington war, the clearer it became that these titanic rows almost always led to better outcomes than would have prevailed had there been a single man or apparatus directing events” are, um, interesting, as has been said.

Lacey devotes a page to D-Day and a chapter to the Morgenthau Plan. Even if the punitive blueprint for postwar Germany had been adopted — it wasn’t — the largest amphibious operation in history deserves better.

Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ ... story.html
I know Jim Lacey, I can get him maybe, he did once before, to come up on the net and you can address your comments to him. However, I noticed you did not refute what he wrote about King’s action in relation to the U-boat assault. What is that old saying, “if the facts aren’t on your side argue the law”.

Mike

Delta Tank
Member
Posts: 2372
Joined: 16 Aug 2004 01:51
Location: Pennsylvania

Re: Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

Post by Delta Tank » 06 May 2021 12:14

daveshoup2MD wrote:
06 May 2021 02:26
Delta Tank wrote:
06 May 2021 01:42
Richard Anderson wrote:
05 May 2021 01:50
daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 23:28
Agreed. Set aside the question of MacArthur; what was it that made Hart order his forces dispersed? Two flag officers, roughly the same age and experience, and the one with actually more experience in Asia underestimates the Japanese...
Yep. Go figure. I suspect that Hart simply read the war warning from CNO and said something on the order of "HOLY SHIT! Maybe we ought to prepare for a possible war." MacArthur worried about overstepping his bounds with the Philippine government and playing into the hands of the Japanese...along with wondering how to be the very model of a modern generalissimo. Stark and Short worried about a myriad of other irrelevancies. Sometimes its the commanders who can simply focus on the single most important thing of the moment that wins...sort of like Alexander the Great going straight for Darius hell for leather.
So Hart prepared for war?? Really? So, what actions if any did Admiral Hart take to defend the Philippines? I copied this from a post I did in June 2010.

Now a little discussed matter, why does everyone give the US Navy a pass on the defense of the Philippines? They had enough submarines stationed in the Philippines to sink the entire invasion force, yet as far as I know they did nothing or virtually nothing!
Have you read the history of the Asiatic Fleet? How about Force Z? How did sending a surface action force without air cover into harm's way work out for Prince of Wales and Repulse?

As far as the USN's submarine force, ever read anything about the problems with the submarine force's most modern torpedo design?

Asiatic Fleet fought and won the only action approximating a victory against the IJN before the Coral Sea; there was a reason why Balikpapan could be fought and won.
No! Do tell! When was this war?? Oh my god!! How did I miss this!

My comment was: “ Now a little discussed matter, why does everyone give the US Navy a pass on the defense of the Philippines? They had enough submarines stationed in the Philippines to sink the entire invasion force, yet as far as I know they did nothing or virtually nothing!” The navy had problems with their torpedoes, when did they discover that? Before the war or after the war began? When did the navy decide that the torpedo was faulty and the problem was not crew performance? Gee, and after Admiral Lockwood figured out what was wrong with the torpedo and initiated corrective action, the commander of the submarines in Australia refused to believe anything was wrong with the torpedo that he helped design.

The Germans also had trouble with their torpedos in the beginning of the war. Instead of blaming the crew, they immediately looked at the torpedo. I think that little tidbit of information explains a lot about the culture of the US Navy!

Now, the Navy torpedo problem was caused by, the US Army or just MacArthur?

Mike

Return to “USA 1919-1945”