OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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rcocean
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#331

Post by rcocean » 10 May 2021, 17:04

1
. It ended any possibility of the Germans containing the Normandy invasion on the line of the Loire - Seine.
2. It brought an additional army of two corps into France, the main theatre of operations.
3. The liberation of Marseilles and Toulon was a valuable addition to allied logistics. No Op Dragoon and they would need to be captured. As an added benefit the railway north had not been subjected to air interdiction and could be repaired more quickly than the line from Cherbourg.
4. It brought a French Expeditionary Corps to France that could be expanded to an army.
All this was going to happen anyway. German troops in Southern France would've retreated back to Germany, in any case, otherwise, Patton's 3rd Army would've cut them off. The Germans would've left troops in Toulon and Marseilles and fought to keep those ports out of American hands, but eventually they would've fallen just like Brest did. And after the occupation of the Po Valley, the French Corps would've been transferred To France. So, its just a matter of timing. By destroying the Germans in Italy in July/August 1944, we would've been in a better position in Nov/Dec 1944. Marseilles would've been open by then, and we could have transferred large numbers of Troops to France, since there was no war in Italy. There was a reason why Alanbrook, Alexander, and others were opposed to Dragoon. It wasn't just some blind spot, they had good military reasons.

And you can talk about how important Marseilles was before Antwerp was opened, but so what? All the offensives south of the Ardennes Before Feb 1945, didn't accomplish anything decisive. Patton and Devers pushed the Germans back to the Siegfried line and the upper Rhine.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#332

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 May 2021, 23:44

rcocean wrote:
10 May 2021, 17:04
...

All this was going to happen anyway. German troops in Southern France would've retreated back to Germany, in any case, otherwise, Patton's 3rd Army would've cut them off.
Im skeptical Patton could have cut much off. The first week of September the entire 12th Army group had 14 divisions west of Paris, all south of the Oise river & north of Troyers. Four more were scattered about the Breton peninsula besieging ports. From the Oise to the Swiss border is apporx 300 km/ At 11 km defense front for a US infantry division thats 28 divisions required. Of course Bradleys AG must cover its rear towards Army Group G to the SE, so even at a defense front of 22 km its 'difficult' (sarcasm alert). Then there is the problem of extending the US advance/supply the 225 south to the Swiss border. 12 AG was still embroiled in problems of transport of fuel and ammunition. The advance they accomplished to the Meuse river & Nancy was sustained by leaving behind substantial corps and army combat support. In other words the 12th AG forward element lacked the combat support the US Army depended on.

Lacking a 6th AG invading from the south the elements of Army Group G are intact, and they have a alternate route to northern Italy. Unless one proposes Alexanders armies bounce over the Appines & overrun the Po region in A few weeks of August and September.


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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#333

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 01:31

Lacking a 6th AG invading from the south the elements of Army Group G are intact, and they have a alternate route to northern Italy. Unless one proposes Alexanders armies bounce over the Appines & overrun the Po region in A few weeks of August and September.
Having Alexander's armies go into Po Valley and destroy the German Armies in August was exactly the point of Alanbrooke's strategy of not doing Dragoon, and either landing at Trieste, or doing no landing at all. Given that the Allies nearly broke through WITHOUT the French corps or several veteran US Division (36, 45, etc.) its hard to see how the Germans would've stopped them.

No doubt cancelling Dragoon would've severely hampered 3rd army ability to drive straight into Germany via Metz and the area south of the Ardennes in September and the fall of 1944. . But then what did Patton accomplish with Marseilles open and the 6th army group on his flank? Little more than capturing Metz and pushing the Germans back to the Siegfried line. Montgomery made the point that the key area was North of the Ardennes where we could capture the Ruhr. Its hard to see what Dragoon accomplished. Its nice we got Marseilles so soon, but we still couldn't drive into Germany till Feb/March 1945. Again, the whole point is not should we have taken Marseilles, its when and how.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#334

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 May 2021, 01:50

rcocean wrote:
10 May 2021, 17:04
And you can talk about how important Marseilles was before Antwerp was opened, but so what? All the offensives south of the Ardennes Before Feb 1945, didn't accomplish anything decisive. Patton and Devers pushed the Germans back to the Siegfried line and the upper Rhine.
You can talk about how important Marseilles was, full stop. From 3 September 1944 through 30 April 1945, 4,123,794 long tons of American supplies came through the Southern French ports, 27 percent of all American supplies landed on the Continent from 6 June 1944 to 30 April 1945, just shy of eight months. Antwerp landed 2,658,000 long tons of cargo, 17.4 percent of the total, albeit over a shorter period of time, from 26 November 1944 to 30 April 1945, just over five months. So the Southern French ports were critical overall. The southern French ports managed 17,254.36 tons per day, Antwerp 17,148.39 tons per day. The advantage Antwerp had was a more robust rail connection, that from Marseilles north was limited to about 12,000 tons per day, which led to congestion at the port, but that problem was endemic at American ports due to the failure of ASF to provide sufficient truck companies to work port clearance.
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rcocean
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#335

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 02:10

I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#336

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 02:41

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:10
I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.
IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#337

Post by ljadw » 11 May 2021, 12:39

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:41
rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:10
I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.
IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.
This is using hindsight,and hindsight was not possible for Marshall in 1942/1943 .
Dragoon was not essential to the success of Overlord,because in August 1944 the Germans were already defeated in Normandy ,without Dragoon .

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#338

Post by EwenS » 11 May 2021, 12:54

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:41
rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:10
I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO. If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters. After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.
IOW, if Dragoon and Marseilles were absolutely essential to success of Overlord, then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it? And that means, an invasion of North Africa, and the consequent build up in the MTO, were essential to victory in the ETO, since that's the only way you get Dragoon. And therefore Marshall was wrong in 1942 and 1943 to oppose going into the Med.
Don’t forget the other option. No Marseilles probably means that Operation Chastity would have gone ahead to provide the additional port facilities to keep the armies supplied.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Chastity

rcocean
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#339

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 17:08

I wasn't talking ONLY about Overlord, and that's why I wrote:
then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it?
. But thanks anyway. :)

As for Hindsight, yeah that's the way history is. Its going back and look what happened and judging people's actions. In any case, Marshall's failure to factor in the the need for the Ports in Southern France in his proposed plans for an invasion of France prior to June 1943, isn't hindsight. It ties into the more general criticism Alanbrook was making of Marshall's proposed invasion plans, namely Marshall hadn't thought any further than the actual landing. Once we got ashore it was a big blank. As alanbrook stated
Marshall's plan didn't go past landing on the coast...whether we are to then north, east, south, or west, Marshall couldn't say. Whether we are to play baccarat or chem de fer at Touquet, or bathe at the Paris Plage is not stipulated"
.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#340

Post by Sheldrake » 11 May 2021, 18:08

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 17:08

I wasn't talking ONLY about Overlord, and that's why I wrote:
then how could any invasion of France and Conquest of Germany have succeeded without it?
. But thanks anyway. :)

As for Hindsight, yeah that's the way history is. Its going back and look what happened and judging people's actions. In any case, Marshall's failure to factor in the the need for the Ports in Southern France in his proposed plans for an invasion of France prior to June 1943, isn't hindsight. It ties into the more general criticism Alanbrook was making of Marshall's proposed invasion plans, namely Marshall hadn't thought any further than the actual landing. Once we got ashore it was a big blank. As alanbrook stated
Marshall's plan didn't go past landing on the coast...whether we are to then north, east, south, or west, Marshall couldn't say. Whether we are to play baccarat or chem de fer at Touquet, or bathe at the Paris Plage is not stipulated"
.
To be fair to Marshall, Brooke's remarks concern Marshall's visit in April 1942. The 1943 Op Overlord Plan was by the COSSAC Planning team, headed by Brooke's nominee Frederick Morgan. Morgan looked at landing sites from Portugal to the North Cape and did not recommend any South of France landings.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#341

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 May 2021, 19:11

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 02:10
I think we can all agree that having Marseilles was a good thing to have. But I'd hate to argue that it was absolutely essential to victory in the ETO.
Sure we can all agree, especially since you are creating a straw man. Unless you can point out who said it was "absolutely essential to victory in the ETO"?
If you do, that makes Marshall's plans for shutting down the MTO at Casablanca in Jan 43 and/or invading France in 1943 (cf "Roundup" or "Sledgehammer") in 1942, non-starters.
Since Marshall's "plans" at Casablanca did not involve "shutting down the MTO at Casablanca". When asked by Roosevelt if the American military were all agreed on a cross-Channel attack, he replied they were not, especially the planning staffs, and he himself, "“regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one.”
After all, Dragoon was only possible in Aug 1944, because we had already have lots of troops in the MTO.
Given that DRAGOON was only possible by stripping away one of three American corps in Italy, as well as the CEF, at arguably a critical point, I suspect there must have been fewer than "lots of troops in the MTO".
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#342

Post by rcocean » 11 May 2021, 22:13

So what were Marshall's plans at Casablanca? When asked by FDR in December 1942 he supported an invasion of the Brest Peninsula. According, the Official army History, at Casablanca, he proposed concentrating troops to invade France and labeled further action in the MTO as a "diversion". If you want to quibble that these views don't equal "Shutting down the MTO" than go at it. He got no support from FDR and as stated in the history (Matloff Strategic Planning for coalition warfare 1943-44)"In the end, General Marshall had to yield" and accept no invasion of France in 1943, and an attack on Sicily.

Further, either one of two situations existed. Either capturing Marseilles in August 1944, and using its port capacity in September, was essential to the victory in the ETO -or it wasn't. Marshall didn't think it was. Because he was willing to CANCEL Anvil in April 1944, and he was willing to invade Northern France in 1942 and 1943 when it was impossible to concurrently invade Southern France.

If people assert that we would have gotten Marseilles and its port capacity without Dragoon, well join the party. That's what the British thought too. that's ONE reason they were against Dragoon.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#343

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 May 2021, 01:17

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 22:13
So what were Marshall's plans at Casablanca?
Plans? There were none really fixed other than the misnamed SLEDGEHAMMER, which he was not all that keen on AFAICR. His intent was to get American and British forces onto the Continent in France in 1943, mostly because as he saw it the British would come up with endless excuses not to do it unless some time was fixed. Once that intent was satisfied, serious planning could begin.
When asked by FDR in December 1942 he supported an invasion of the Brest Peninsula. According, the Official army History, at Casablanca, he proposed concentrating troops to invade France and labeled further action in the MTO as a "diversion".
Sure. He also supported the idea of a landing in the Pas de Calais and likely would have agreed to other landing sites if he could get a firm commitment from the British.
If you want to quibble that these views don't equal "Shutting down the MTO" than go at it. He got no support from FDR and as stated in the history (Matloff Strategic Planning for coalition warfare 1943-44)"In the end, General Marshall had to yield" and accept no invasion of France in 1943, and an attack on Sicily.
Quibble? Moi? I'm hurt. Anyway, if you did not rely on exaggeration and straw men so much, then I would have no need to quibble.
Further, either one of two situations existed. Either capturing Marseilles in August 1944, and using its port capacity in September, was essential to the victory in the ETO -or it wasn't. Marshall didn't think it was. Because he was willing to CANCEL Anvil in April 1944, and he was willing to invade Northern France in 1942 and 1943 when it was impossible to concurrently invade Southern France.
That is a false dichotomy, since by itself capturing or not capturing Marseilles has zero "essential" value for anything. Again, who is it that expressed the essentialness of Marseilles for victory in the ETO?

And, again, by spring 1944, Marshall was likely willing to CANCEL almost anything - Lend-Lease to the USSR, FORAGER, tickets to the Cotton Club, in order to get an actual commitment from the British on NEPTUNE.
If people assert that we would have gotten Marseilles and its port capacity without Dragoon, well join the party. That's what the British thought too. that's ONE reason they were against Dragoon.
Who "people" is that? The British thought that? When? The southern French ports, if taken by the Allied Northern Group of Armies, would ahve required a diversion from the pursuit northeast and a dissolution of strength. It would just as likely end up like Brest or, worse, the Biscay ports. Given the realities of American logistical problems in September-November that likely would have had wide ramifications on the course of the war.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#344

Post by Aber » 12 May 2021, 10:54

rcocean wrote:
11 May 2021, 01:31
Given that the Allies nearly broke through WITHOUT the French corps or several veteran US Division (36, 45, etc.) its hard to see how the Germans would've stopped them.
This is the core of the argument - Dragoon involved taking a large portion of the forces in Italy out of action for 2 months of good weather, in return for the benefit of transferring them to France. NB planning assumptions would be that the Germans would severely damage the ports in any case.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#345

Post by Aber » 12 May 2021, 11:23

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 May 2021, 01:17
Plans? There were none really fixed other than the misnamed SLEDGEHAMMER, which he was not all that keen on AFAICR. His intent was to get American and British forces onto the Continent in France in 1943, mostly because as he saw it the British would come up with endless excuses not to do it unless some time was fixed. Once that intent was satisfied, serious planning could begin.
And yet at Casablanca IIRC he did not strongly oppose King's 30% for the Pacific, or reinstate Bolero.

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