OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
One of the curious things about the Dragoon operation is the lack of fight in the Germans trapped in Marseilles and Toulon. Despite orders to "Fight to the last cartridge" they surrendered rather quickly, and it was demolition and blockage of the Harbor that prevented their use until late September. Compared to Brest, they were easy conquests. You get the feeling the Germans should have strengthened the land defenses. But maybe they had strong landward defenses, and just weren't interested in fighting with the spirit that the Brest defenders showed.
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
BTW, the Official Army history "Rivera to the Rhine" has some interesting background on why Dragoon was possible in August 1944 after being cancelled in April 1944. It seems that without Devers holding on the supplies set aside for Anvil, they would've been used in Italy, and no 3 division attack would've been possible in mid-August. The attack would've had to come later, probably in Mid September.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Indeed, but then the Pacific was always Marshall's and the American's whip hand. It quickly became obvious at Casablanca that the British were again ignoring France in order to pursue a Mediterranean strategy, which Marshall had only conditionally agreed to in July 1942. His attitude was why continue BOLERO's buildup in Britain if those troops, equipment, and supplies were to go nowhere,Aber wrote: ↑12 May 2021, 11:23And yet at Casablanca IIRC he did not strongly oppose King's 30% for the Pacific, or reinstate Bolero.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑12 May 2021, 01:17Plans? There were none really fixed other than the misnamed SLEDGEHAMMER, which he was not all that keen on AFAICR. His intent was to get American and British forces onto the Continent in France in 1943, mostly because as he saw it the British would come up with endless excuses not to do it unless some time was fixed. Once that intent was satisfied, serious planning could begin.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
The final preconference meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their commander in chief took place in the White House on the afternoon of January 7, two days before the chiefs were scheduled to leave. Roosevelt asked Marshall if the military were united in agreement to advocate a cross-Channel operation. Marshall replied that they were not, especially the planning staff. The minutes record the chief of staff as saying that he “regarded an operation in the north more favorably than one in the Mediterranean but the question was still an open one.” Further, of the two most likely Mediterranean operations—Sardinia and Sicily—the latter, while more difficult, was more desirable. “He said that he personally favored an operation against the Brest peninsula. The losses there will be in troops, but he said that, to state it cruelly, we could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the BRIMSTONE Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future.” While ROUNDUP would also entail losses, Marshall said, there would be “no narrow straits on our lines of communications, and we could operate with fighter protection from the United Kingdom.” When the North African operation was completed, the president noted, the Allies would have a half million surplus troops there; where were they to be employed? Marshall “pointed out that we were already training divisions for the BRIMSTONE Operation in case a decision was made to mount it.” (Foreign Relations, Conferences at Washington and Casablanca, pp. 509-10, 512. The minutes of the January 7 meeting and of all the formal J.C.S. and C.C.S. meetings at the Casablanca Conference are printed in this volume. The army history of the conference is Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1959], pp. 18-42.)
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Every diversion from the cross-Channel operation served as a “suction pump” which drew in more and more Allied resources, Marshall declared at the January 16 C.C.S. meeting; but he did admit that “operations against Sicily appeared to be advantageous” given the number of Allied troops that would remain in North Africa after victory there. That evening the J.C.S. met with President Roosevelt. It was clear that the British would not cooperate in a cross-Channel invasion before 1944 unless the Germans showed signs of weakening, Marshall stated. The joint chiefs had concluded, therefore, that Operation HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, should be undertaken. The British had not yet been informed of this, Marshall noted; he hoped first to obtain their agreement on Pacific strategy. (Ibid., pp. 583, 597.)
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Not quite that simple. Post the Torch decision, the British were expecting Bolero to continue, while the US slowed it down to a crawl (apart from air forces) without officially changing position. It may have looked to the British that the US was ignoring France in favour of the Pacific.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑12 May 2021, 17:28Indeed, but then the Pacific was always Marshall's and the American's whip hand. It quickly became obvious at Casablanca that the British were again ignoring France in order to pursue a Mediterranean strategy, which Marshall had only conditionally agreed to in July 1942. His attitude was why continue BOLERO's buildup in Britain if those troops, equipment, and supplies were to go nowhere,
Last edited by Aber on 13 May 2021, 11:41, edited 1 time in total.
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
True, but not completely fair.
At the end of January 1943 there were less than 20k US Ground Forces in the UK, and 36k Services of Supply. The UK would obviously not take seriously suggestions of a 1943 invasion of France without commitment of a US Army Group. Logistics would not make it possible to build up US forces in time for a 1943 invasion.
IIRC the April 1942 plan was for 30 US divisions in the UK by April 1943 for a 1943 invasion. However the real world intervened.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Oh, I agree, it is never that simple. In this case, to make TORCH work required taking the 1st and 34th Inf and the 1st Armd divisions from the buildup in Britain, leaving only the 29th In to the BOLERO "buildup". Then from that point all the divisions available went to reinforce TORCH or prepare for HUSKY. And then they started sucking personnel from divisions still training, setting back their readiness and delaying their BOLERO deployments. The inadequacy of the American mobilization planning in terms of matching it to strategic requirements gets highlighted yet again. Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.Aber wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 11:31Not quite that simple. Post the Torch decision, the British were expecting Bolero to continue, while the US slowed it down to a crawl (apart from air forces) without officially changing position. It may have looked to the British that the US was ignoring France in favour of the Pacific.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Not forgetting that the US forces (and the British too) still had much to learn tactically and operationally before being a match for their German opponents.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Oh, I agree, it is never that simple. In this case, to make TORCH work required taking the 1st and 34th Inf and the 1st Armd divisions from the buildup in Britain, leaving only the 29th In to the BOLERO "buildup". Then from that point all the divisions available went to reinforce TORCH or prepare for HUSKY. And then they started sucking personnel from divisions still training, setting back their readiness and delaying their BOLERO deployments. The inadequacy of the American mobilization planning in terms of matching it to strategic requirements gets highlighted yet again. Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Which makes the decision to do TORCH one of the Allies best!Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Regards
Tom
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
But at the time nobody said it out loud.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Have you ever seen "Yes Minister" I don't want the truth. I want something I can tell Parliament!Aber wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 19:42But at the time nobody said it out loud.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
This is why there is a statue of Brooke outside the Ministry of Defence. He prevented what could have been the worst disaster(s) in British Military History the 1942 and 1943 cross channel invasions.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Well, um, exactly. I've never argued anything different.Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 18:33Not forgetting that the US forces (and the British too) still had much to learn tactically and operationally before being a match for their German opponents.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Oh, I agree, it is never that simple. In this case, to make TORCH work required taking the 1st and 34th Inf and the 1st Armd divisions from the buildup in Britain, leaving only the 29th In to the BOLERO "buildup". Then from that point all the divisions available went to reinforce TORCH or prepare for HUSKY. And then they started sucking personnel from divisions still training, setting back their readiness and delaying their BOLERO deployments. The inadequacy of the American mobilization planning in terms of matching it to strategic requirements gets highlighted yet again. Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Which makes the decision to do TORCH one of the Allies best!Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Regards
Tom
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Yes, but he was right partly for the wrong reason. The "million tons of shipping" was never really "saved"; he was simply hitting a target of opportunity. The unfortunate part is it ended up contributing to making a hash of the well-ordered, albeit unrealistic, American mobilization plans.This is why there is a statue of Brooke outside the Ministry of Defence. He prevented what could have been the worst disaster(s) in British Military History the 1942 and 1943 cross channel invasions.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Uh.. yes. The German units the Germans trapped in Marseilles and Toulon were category III static divisions and demoralized naval gunners. At Brest there was a last minute reinforcement of a Para Div. a category I unit in all respects. Commanded by Ramcke a tough commander and skilled tactician. The veteran French formations that invested and assaulted Marseilles and Toulon were a bit vicious and perhaps frightend the garrisons into early surrender. The French had also built the fortifications, and understood how they were supposed to work and what the Germans might have done to improve them. Middleton started with poor support, difficult logistics and deteriorating weather. Everyone hoped Brest would fall in a few days like Cherbourg of St Malo. Ramcke refused.rcocean wrote: ↑12 May 2021, 16:25One of the curious things about the Dragoon operation is the lack of fight in the Germans trapped in Marseilles and Toulon. Despite orders to "Fight to the last cartridge" they surrendered rather quickly, and it was demolition and blockage of the Harbor that prevented their use until late September. Compared to Brest, they were easy conquests. You get the feeling the Germans should have strengthened the land defenses. But maybe they had strong landward defenses, and just weren't interested in fighting with the spirit that the Brest defenders showed.
Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation
Not necessarily, were the Allies not expecting to take Tunisia relatively quickly? If the Vichy government had chosen to resist the Germans or if Hitler had decided not to send forces to Tunisia, the Torch campaign might have been over before the end of November, the whole North African campaign before the end of January.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑13 May 2021, 16:55Basically, once the decision to do TORCH was made, any chance of a 1943 invasion of France was gone.
Churchill and Brooke might have then found it very difficult to resist the calls for a 1943 invasion of France.