German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

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Cantankerous
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German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Cantankerous » 12 Mar 2021 17:34

Did any of Hitler's most trusted generals warn the Führer against being overconfident of victory over Great Britain and the USSR just because the Wehrmacht had overrun Poland, Benelux, and France with considerable ease? I read that Field Marshal Gert Von Rundstedt noted the stark reality of “Ost-krieg" versus what had played out in the West vis a vis France and Great Britain militarily, and that several German generals cautioned Hitler about waging a two-front war in Europe.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by historygeek2021 » 14 Mar 2021 21:30

The only voice against Operation Barbarossa in the senior ranks was Admiral Raeder, not because he had any idea that it wouldn't work, but because he thought it would take resources away from his department, the navy. The opinion of most military leaders around the world, not just in Germany, was that Germany would easily defeat Russia within a month or two.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Sid Guttridge » 14 Mar 2021 21:38

Hi Cantankerous,

Fromm, head of the Ersatzheer, wanted a year's worth of replacements built up for the invasion of Russia but had only five months worth at the outbreak of Barbarossa. They were used up in two. In December 1941 he sent a memorandum to von Brauchitsch suggesting that a compromise peace with the Soviet Union was advisable.

Albert Speer wrote, "Fromm knew how to present a problem clearly: he had presence and had diplomatic tact. Sitting there, his sword pressed between his knees, hand on hilt, he looked charged with energy; and to this day I believe that his great abilities might have prevented many a blunder at the Fuhrer’s headquarters. After several conferences, in fact, his influence increased”.

As early as 22 March 1942 Fromm informed Keitel that he was worried that large scale offensive operations were not feasible in 1942 because of manpower and munitions shortages and when the offensive into the Caucasus began that summer Fromm told Speer that it was a luxury Germany could ill-afford in the “poor man’s” situation in which it found itself.

Matters came to a head after the Soviet encirclement of the German forces at Stalingrad in November 1942. Fromm recognised the moment as decisive and put his career on the line by submitting another memorandum to OKW detailing the virtual impossibility of Germany winning the war with the resources available and urging immediate peace negotiations while Germany’s conquests were at their peak. As von Brauchitsch was no longer there to act as a buffer, Fromm’s memorandum went directly to Hitler and Keitel. However, it was precisely what Hitler and his cronies did not want to hear. Hitler was determined that the military situation could again be overcome by sheer willpower on his part, while Goering made totally unrealisable promises to supply the surrounded troops. The result was their total annihilation.

Far from being recognised as prescient, Fromm, whose only son had died during the debacle, was damned as a professional Cassandra and Speer was instructed not to bring him to Fuhrer headquarters again.

Fromm continued to attend Fuhrer conferences as head of the Ersatzheer, but thereafter lost direct access to Hitler.

Colonel General Fromm was arguably more important than any single German field marshal. Probably the only reason that he wasn't made a field marshal was that this rank could only be held by someone in command of troops in the field, which he wasn't. We could do with a good English-language biography of him.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Peter89 » 15 Mar 2021 15:07

There is also General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes, who made a series of reports about the economical disaster that the invasion of the SU will present.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Sean Oliver » 19 May 2021 05:04

One of the major problems with answering this question is the lack of pre-invasion steno notes from conferences between Hitler and OKH or perhaps other correspondence which might shed light on any debates over Barbarossa, especially concerning its objective. They simply don't exist, and Halder's 'diary' is not detailed or specific enough to help much.
Apparently there was consternation over Barbarossa, but the last time 'the Generals' (Halder and Brauchitsch) expressed dismay at launching another attack, it was before the invasion of France, and Hitler accused them of cowardice, etc. When France was defeated quickly, Hitler gloated over this fact that he "had been right" and the generals wrong. This was apparently enough to humiliate the Gen Staff into holding their tongues over Barbarossa.
It's often overlooked how much Hitler and the other senior Nazis had always hated the General Staff, even well before the war. The German war effort was completely dysfunctional and mainly consisted of Hitler demanding and ordering the opposite of whatever his generals recommended, which from the start was to avoid war altogether.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by historygeek2021 » 19 May 2021 06:32

Peter89 wrote:
15 Mar 2021 15:07
There is also General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes, who made a series of reports about the economical disaster that the invasion of the SU will present.
This is not what happened. See DRZW Volume IV/I, page 150. Thomas gave a few minor warnings to Keitel and Jodl about the interruption of raw materials deliveries from the Soviet Union that would arise from Barbarossa, and (incorrectly) warned them that motor-fuel and rubber supplies would be sufficient only until autumn 1941.

Keitel then tasked Thomas with drafting an economic profit-and-loss memorandum of what would be gained and lost from the war against the Soviet Union. The resulting memorandum written by Thomas was glowingly optimistic and confirmed Hitler's expectations about the economic bounty to be gained from Barbarossa. Thomas changed his tune because he wanted to be in charge of the economic management of the newly acquired territories. Instead Hitler fractured the administration between Rosenberg and Göring's Economic Control Staff.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Peter89 » 19 May 2021 10:41

historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Peter89 wrote:
15 Mar 2021 15:07
There is also General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes, who made a series of reports about the economical disaster that the invasion of the SU will present.
Thomas gave a few minor warnings to Keitel and Jodl about the interruption of raw materials deliveries from the Soviet Union that would arise from Barbarossa,
The "trade question" is indeed part of the problem, which is described by E. Ericson's Feeding the German Eagle.

This was not the single and only warning from him.

But he wasn't only working with Keitel, he was involved in the Hunger Plan as well, actively working together with state secretaries to formulate a possible solution to actually extract any food from European Russia, which was only possible, as they noted, due to the deliberate starvation of about 30 million people. Otherwise, the whole idea of "Breadbasket Russia" didn't work. Although it was Herbert Backe who pointed out that only Ukraine produced a surplus of food, and not the entire European Russia, Thomas was aware of this and spoke his mind, too.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and (incorrectly) warned them that motor-fuel and rubber supplies would be sufficient only until autumn 1941.
Not quite incorrectly. Germany did not possess the proper amount of POL to fight a prolonged war with the same standards as before 1941.

German fuel reserves amounted to 400kt at the outbreak of the war, 600kt at 1940 and 160kt at the beginning of 1942; that roughly equalled 5-6 weeks of operation (1942 July: 134kt, August: 146kt). Barbarossa actually annihilated the German fuel reserves, which could have been converted to either training or operations against the British.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Keitel then tasked Thomas with drafting an economic profit-and-loss memorandum of what would be gained and lost from the war against the Soviet Union. The resulting memorandum written by Thomas was glowingly optimistic
Which report are we talking about exactly? Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten, 13 Feb. 1941? Did you actually read it?

Hardly reports of glowing optimism:
Image

Also, he met Hitler only once, and the meeting resulted in the Führer's order that he does not want to see that naysayer again.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and confirmed Hitler's expectations about the economic bounty to be gained from Barbarossa.
Not quite.

He correctly foresaw that the economic exploitation, thus the economical "success" of the whole operation depended on a swift and decisive campaign with relatively light casualties. Even then, tens of millions of people had to be killed, and the infrastructure and production had to be captured more or less intact.

What made the relationship between Thomas and the leadership a bit more smooth immediately prior Barbarossa (especially after May 2) and during the opening phases of the campaign is that they agreed on this from very early on and it seemed the Wehrmacht might succeed. Even the Directive 21 forbids any aerial attack on Soviet industry before the Urals; it was expected that the Germans will be able to seize everything. Thomas, however, correctly foresaw that if the operations last beyond the autumn, the whole sense of it was doomed; Germany was not able to cope with the world's largest nation and the world's largest empire at the same time; it would inevitably lead economic problems beyond control. This is hardly an optimistic viewpoint, and it turned out it was the correct one.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by historygeek2021 » 19 May 2021 20:24

Peter89 wrote:
19 May 2021 10:41
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Peter89 wrote:
15 Mar 2021 15:07
There is also General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes, who made a series of reports about the economical disaster that the invasion of the SU will present.
Thomas gave a few minor warnings to Keitel and Jodl about the interruption of raw materials deliveries from the Soviet Union that would arise from Barbarossa,
The "trade question" is indeed part of the problem, which is described by E. Ericson's Feeding the German Eagle.

This was not the single and only warning from him.

But he wasn't only working with Keitel, he was involved in the Hunger Plan as well, actively working together with state secretaries to formulate a possible solution to actually extract any food from European Russia, which was only possible, as they noted, due to the deliberate starvation of about 30 million people. Otherwise, the whole idea of "Breadbasket Russia" didn't work. Although it was Herbert Backe who pointed out that only Ukraine produced a surplus of food, and not the entire European Russia, Thomas was aware of this and spoke his mind, too.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and (incorrectly) warned them that motor-fuel and rubber supplies would be sufficient only until autumn 1941.
Not quite incorrectly. Germany did not possess the proper amount of POL to fight a prolonged war with the same standards as before 1941.

German fuel reserves amounted to 400kt at the outbreak of the war, 600kt at 1940 and 160kt at the beginning of 1942; that roughly equalled 5-6 weeks of operation (1942 July: 134kt, August: 146kt). Barbarossa actually annihilated the German fuel reserves, which could have been converted to either training or operations against the British.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Keitel then tasked Thomas with drafting an economic profit-and-loss memorandum of what would be gained and lost from the war against the Soviet Union. The resulting memorandum written by Thomas was glowingly optimistic
Which report are we talking about exactly? Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten, 13 Feb. 1941? Did you actually read it?

Hardly reports of glowing optimism:
Image

Also, he met Hitler only once, and the meeting resulted in the Führer's order that he does not want to see that naysayer again.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and confirmed Hitler's expectations about the economic bounty to be gained from Barbarossa.
Not quite.

He correctly foresaw that the economic exploitation, thus the economical "success" of the whole operation depended on a swift and decisive campaign with relatively light casualties. Even then, tens of millions of people had to be killed, and the infrastructure and production had to be captured more or less intact.

What made the relationship between Thomas and the leadership a bit more smooth immediately prior Barbarossa (especially after May 2) and during the opening phases of the campaign is that they agreed on this from very early on and it seemed the Wehrmacht might succeed. Even the Directive 21 forbids any aerial attack on Soviet industry before the Urals; it was expected that the Germans will be able to seize everything. Thomas, however, correctly foresaw that if the operations last beyond the autumn, the whole sense of it was doomed; Germany was not able to cope with the world's largest nation and the world's largest empire at the same time; it would inevitably lead economic problems beyond control. This is hardly an optimistic viewpoint, and it turned out it was the correct one.
I mean, you either read DRZW Volume IV/I or you didn't. It's all there. Thomas issued a few negative warnings, then, at the request of Keitel, wrote a memorandum confirming Hitler's expectations of the economic bounty to be received from the Soviet Union. Some authors try to make Thomas out as a voice of reason. Müller just gives the facts.

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Peter89 » 20 May 2021 10:06

historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 20:24
Peter89 wrote:
19 May 2021 10:41
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Peter89 wrote:
15 Mar 2021 15:07
There is also General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamtes, who made a series of reports about the economical disaster that the invasion of the SU will present.
Thomas gave a few minor warnings to Keitel and Jodl about the interruption of raw materials deliveries from the Soviet Union that would arise from Barbarossa,
The "trade question" is indeed part of the problem, which is described by E. Ericson's Feeding the German Eagle.

This was not the single and only warning from him.

But he wasn't only working with Keitel, he was involved in the Hunger Plan as well, actively working together with state secretaries to formulate a possible solution to actually extract any food from European Russia, which was only possible, as they noted, due to the deliberate starvation of about 30 million people. Otherwise, the whole idea of "Breadbasket Russia" didn't work. Although it was Herbert Backe who pointed out that only Ukraine produced a surplus of food, and not the entire European Russia, Thomas was aware of this and spoke his mind, too.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and (incorrectly) warned them that motor-fuel and rubber supplies would be sufficient only until autumn 1941.
Not quite incorrectly. Germany did not possess the proper amount of POL to fight a prolonged war with the same standards as before 1941.

German fuel reserves amounted to 400kt at the outbreak of the war, 600kt at 1940 and 160kt at the beginning of 1942; that roughly equalled 5-6 weeks of operation (1942 July: 134kt, August: 146kt). Barbarossa actually annihilated the German fuel reserves, which could have been converted to either training or operations against the British.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
Keitel then tasked Thomas with drafting an economic profit-and-loss memorandum of what would be gained and lost from the war against the Soviet Union. The resulting memorandum written by Thomas was glowingly optimistic
Which report are we talking about exactly? Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten, 13 Feb. 1941? Did you actually read it?

Hardly reports of glowing optimism:
Image

Also, he met Hitler only once, and the meeting resulted in the Führer's order that he does not want to see that naysayer again.
historygeek2021 wrote:
19 May 2021 06:32
and confirmed Hitler's expectations about the economic bounty to be gained from Barbarossa.
Not quite.

He correctly foresaw that the economic exploitation, thus the economical "success" of the whole operation depended on a swift and decisive campaign with relatively light casualties. Even then, tens of millions of people had to be killed, and the infrastructure and production had to be captured more or less intact.

What made the relationship between Thomas and the leadership a bit more smooth immediately prior Barbarossa (especially after May 2) and during the opening phases of the campaign is that they agreed on this from very early on and it seemed the Wehrmacht might succeed. Even the Directive 21 forbids any aerial attack on Soviet industry before the Urals; it was expected that the Germans will be able to seize everything. Thomas, however, correctly foresaw that if the operations last beyond the autumn, the whole sense of it was doomed; Germany was not able to cope with the world's largest nation and the world's largest empire at the same time; it would inevitably lead economic problems beyond control. This is hardly an optimistic viewpoint, and it turned out it was the correct one.
I mean, you either read DRZW Volume IV/I or you didn't. It's all there. Thomas issued a few negative warnings, then, at the request of Keitel, wrote a memorandum confirming Hitler's expectations of the economic bounty to be received from the Soviet Union. Some authors try to make Thomas out as a voice of reason. Müller just gives the facts.
I've read through parts of that series many years ago, and I don't have it with me, so I can't check the reference you are talking about. If you have an e-format, I'd really appreciate it.

In any case, I believe you are quoting correctly. Thomas indeed confirmed some of Hitler's economic expectations, and did not go into the analysis of the military situation. He wrote that IF the Germans are able to seize the economic capacities of the SU with moderate damage, THEN they might be as beneficial as the Führer has hoped. But this was a condition that the German military could not meet, and not because of its own forces, but because of the Red Army and the Soviet state.

Of course, nobody knew, not even Thomas, how fierce and effective the Soviet resistance will be, and how big is the risk that Germany is running with the invasion - no doubt about that. Thomas was not a visionary, and not a general with exceptional intellect; he was a ruthless pragmatist, who did not fell into wishful thinking as much as the rest of the German leadership.

If you have the chance to read his original reports, especially the one I quoted, please do.

Thomas' views on the economic aspects of the Eastern campaign goes well beyond his famous reports. Same goes for his impact on Hitler, which was minimal.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 May 2021 15:29

Peter89 wrote:the whole idea of "Breadbasket Russia" didn't work. ...only Ukraine produced a surplus of food, and not the entire European Russia
As shown elsewhere, Germany imported 20% of its domestic caloric supply from occupied SU in 1942/3. This during a period when Germany did not occupy all of Ukraine and did not occupy the Black Earth regions (Voronezh-Rostov-Krasnodar) for an complete planting/harvest cycle. Had Germany retained its Blau conquests until mid-'43, it would have attained something like twice the OTL '42/'43 food loot or about 40% of its domestic food supply.

As with everything Barbarossa, it could have worked but not a 6-week timeline.

The notion, btw, that only Ukraine had food surplus is too absurd to give a countervailing cite. Just google "Chernozem" and "Kuban".
HistoryGeek2021 wrote:, you either read DRZW Volume IV/I or you didn't. It's all there. Thomas issued a few negative warnings, then, at the request of Keitel, wrote a memorandum confirming Hitler's expectations of the economic bounty to be received from the Soviet Union. Some authors try to make Thomas out as a voice of reason. Müller just gives the facts.
Peter89 is repeating discredited historiography based on Thomas' self-serving postwar biography, in which he alone foresaw disaster in Russia and everything would have been better if he, not Speer, had been economy Czar.

Isn't it immensely frustrating when people recite tired tropes like this? You know they're wrong but know also that they're operating against a background of interlocking errors based on bad history that remains, at popular level (i.e. AHF level), hegemonic. Thus telling them they're wrong requires telling them to read more, which feels dickish but is absolutely necessary.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Peter89 » 20 May 2021 16:16

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 May 2021 15:29
This is not going to lead anywhere nice or fruitful... if you have personal problems with me, please do send personal messages. There's no need to go down this road.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by historygeek2021 » 20 May 2021 16:50

Peter89 wrote:
20 May 2021 10:06

I've read through parts of that series many years ago, and I don't have it with me, so I can't check the reference you are talking about. If you have an e-format, I'd really appreciate it.
From DRZW Volume IV/I:
DRZW Vol IV 150.jpg
DRZW Vol IV 151.jpg
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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by Peter89 » 20 May 2021 18:14

historygeek2021 wrote:
20 May 2021 16:50
Peter89 wrote:
20 May 2021 10:06

I've read through parts of that series many years ago, and I don't have it with me, so I can't check the reference you are talking about. If you have an e-format, I'd really appreciate it.
From DRZW Volume IV/I:

DRZW Vol IV 150.jpg

DRZW Vol IV 151.jpg
Just as I thought, we are talking about the same document. Did you actually read it?

"Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten,", February 13, 1941, 517:
“Wenn es auch ungewiß erscheint, ob es gelingt, M.T.S. und Vorräte in großem Umfange vor der Vernichtung zu bewahren, wenn außerdem infolge der Einwirkungen eines Krieges im Höchstfalle eine 70%ige Ernte erwartet werden kann, so muß man doch berücksichtigen, daß der Russe gewöhnt ist, seinen Verbrauch schlechten Ernten anzupassen, und daß bei einer Bevölkerung von 160 Mill. auch eine kleine Senkung des je Kopf-Verbrauchs erhebliche Getreidemengen freimacht. Unter diesen Voraussetzungen könnte es möglich sein, den deutschen Zuschußbedarf für 1941 und 1942 zu decken.”
Long story short: even it is uncertain, IF the Germans are able to protect the Soviet foodstuff and agricultural machinery from destruction, and able to reap a 70% harvest, and the foodstuff quotas of 160 million of Soviet people are lowered, THEN can be a significant quantity of food obtained from the Soviet Union. Under these prerequisites is it possible, to cover the German needs for 1941-1942.

By the way, I think it is important to mark the path of this memorandum. In summary:

On January 22, Georg Thomas, Chief of the Wi Rü Amt held a presentation in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW, informed Chief of
the OKW Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel that his office was in the process of preparing a study addressing its misgivings with regard to the
planned operations against the Soviet Union.

A meeting on January 29 between Göring and ministerial representatives, including Backe and Thomas, addressed eastern questions and would have given Thomas the opportunity to explore other perspectives (ie.: deliberate mass starvation) within the field of civilian economic planning and, if he did not know already, learn about Backe’s proposals.

On February 20, the study Thomas had mentioned to Keitel in January was sent to Keitel, who in turn submitted it to Hitler. Göring received a
second copy.

On February 26 Thomas presented his paper to Göring in person, who gave it his approval. Göring himself had already received Hitler’s approval for his assumption of control over the entire economic administration in the Soviet territories to be occupied.

***

We are dealing with a delicate situation here, because I think the DRZW is right; Thomas did confirm Hitler's hopes for the possible benefits of the invasion. It didn't say that there is no food to be extracted from the Soviet Union. Thomas understood that they had a morally free hand to extract food from the Soviet population.

HOWEVER.

Hitler and the OKW was planning a short-term campaign with relatively moderate losses. Even the mention of serious losses or a protracted campaign would mean the collapse of Hitler's hopes, thus, the whole sense of the operation. It would only confirm the hopes of a wishful thinking gambler - and Hitler was one, actually.

The prerequisites that Thomas has mentioned, as well as the conditional equal a warning. And this has happened after a series of clashes (as you also correctly pointed out) between Thomas and the OKW / Hitler. Thomas said that IF the military would be able to achieve these aims, THEN Hitler could get from the SU what he wanted.

It also means: if they can't, they won't.

And they couldn't.

(By the way, it was the responsibility of the military to make a risk assessment.)
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 May 2021 18:38

Peter89 wrote:
20 May 2021 16:16
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 May 2021 15:29
This is not going to lead anywhere nice or fruitful... if you have personal problems with me, please do send personal messages. There's no need to go down this road.
My response was entirely substantive, stating that you are repeating interpretations injected into the historiography by Thomas's self-serving biography (and that you appear not to realize that Southwest Russia was a massive food surplus zone).
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: German generals' warnings to Hitler about overconfidence in German victory over UK and USSR

Post by historygeek2021 » 20 May 2021 18:41

Peter89 wrote:
20 May 2021 18:14

Just as I thought, we are talking about the same document. Did you actually read it?

"Die wehrwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer Operation im Osten,", February 13, 1941, 517:
If you have an e-format, I'd really appreciate it.

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