Rundstedt's central reserve

[Michael Kenny]

What was the objective of 12 SS Pz Division on 7th June? Authie? The German immediate counter-attack on 7th June was a failure, a flop and a fiasco. After all, this was the most vulnerable time for an amphibious landing and a mission that the Germans had been preparing for and yet staff work was sloppy, coordination between units was non-existent and the tactical handling of the forces involved was disastrous.

12th SS had not been detected and they made a surprise attack into the flank of the advancing Canadian Units. They were actually behind the lead Canadians but despite this advantage they were held at Les Buissons just 2 miles north of Authie. They could not have been in a better position and yet they completely failed to fully exploit their advantage.

[Cult Icon]

The two encirclements resulted in a huge loss of equipment. If anything there would be more forces available in the West than the II SS Pz Korps.

Quantifying is necessary, I believe.

I would have to check. I have a few books that have various figures. In front of me is Zetterling and this estimates 300 tanks and AG lost in the Korsun Pocket. The Kamenets–Podolsky pocket saw a similar scale of loss. This of course does not include the many equipment and motor vehicles, etc. abandoned by the personnel of the Army during their breakout. IF this interests someone else than by all means they can do it... IIRC Art back in the ACG days extracted the statistics. Sadly the forum and all of his data is now lost.

This could fully equip two Pz corps, ballpark.

The Korsun pocket was related to Operation Vatutin/ Zhitomir-Berdichev offensive that occurred before. The Pz units were extracted out of the frontline for counterstrikes leading to an ideal opportunity..

[Kingfish]

No doubt. The mass of Allied troops on the Normandy ground at the end of June 6th is just too huge to be defeated immediately. Things are a little different by D+6 or so, as someone noted above.

What do you mean? Wouldn't the Allied force be even huger by D+6?

The balance of strength was hugely favorable to Allies on D-Day. But a few days later, as the Germans sent troops, and Allies didn't have more airborne divisions to land (all spent on D-Day), situation got close to strength parity. I'm quoting from memory here: you certainly want to look into detailed figures. You may also check wargames on this campaign: their OOB are very detailed and handy for such analysis.

I suppose that depends on what "strength parity" means. If its a simple tally of "ass in the grass" then yes the two sides were roughly close to parity. However, if combat potential, especially offensive combat potential, is the determining factor then the ratio swings heavily in the allied direction.

[Mori]

I suppose that depends on what "strength parity" means. If its a simple tally of "ass in the grass" then yes the two sides were roughly close to parity. However, if combat potential, especially offensive combat potential, is the determining factor then the ratio swings heavily in the allied direction.

Sure. Should be quantified. Also in terms of supply. In the few wargames simulating supply, it appears that Allies have many more guns ashore than shells to fire them.

[Cult Icon]

Another option to a "rapid victory" is a more mundane. It is if the counteroffensive by I SS and II SS Pz Corps takes place in 1-2 weeks, and before the landing of VII Corps (B) and their execution of EPSOM.

So the I SS Pz Corps moves up to the beachhead, with the II SS Pz Corps following. The balance of forces would shift to the side of the Germans, equal if not more than the opponent. Meaning that their overstretched units would not be burdened with holding ground AND attacking. And, given a more favorable result in the Eastern Front Nov 43- May 1944 there are two more Pz Corps in France, uncommitted.

I do not believe that the ineffective style of hasty counterattack (with no Fliegerkorps support to suppress Allied positions with hundreds of sorties everyday and strong artillery offensive) to counter EPSOM with the newly arrived 9.SS, KG 2.SS, and 1st SS PzGR would have been employed or is a valid model to "forecast" the conditions of a planned German corps counterattack by I SS and II SS. These forces were new to combat in the West, were ordered to attack on the spot (and in the case of 1st SS PzR, unhappy too due to the bad ground conditions) to relieve the hard-pressed SS-PGR 26 holding an expanding salient-- and did not learn the same lessons that the I SS Pz Corps already did.

These lessons appear to been learned rather quickly by I SS Pz Corps and in a matter of days by their units' changing employments. Guderian refers to the new tactical employment of Pz forces in June (Stug/PzJager) while July reports of German Pz division and regiment commanders discuss the same thing. The guidance for tactical commitment was to disaggregate the Pz regiment into small armor-infantry teams with infantry leading. The attacks would be executed fast and with the objectives were short- almost raid-like activity. Night attacks preferred. I call this the "creeping forward" method. This became the standard mode of counterattack.

Of course this by no means would lead to a defeat of the "Second front". Eg. With two Pz Divisions, the sector held by Pz Lehr gradually creeps forward towards Bayeux and there is a gradual creep forward overall in the I SS and II SS Pz corps area. The Allies could plan another landing to divert and separate the other PZ Corps, or if the British-Canadians survive until VII Corps arrives.

[Aber]

Another option to a "rapid victory" is a more mundane. It is if the counteroffensive by I SS and II SS Pz Corps takes place in 1-2 weeks, and before the landing of VII Corps (B) and their execution of EPSOM.

So the I SS Pz Corps moves up to the beachhead, with the II SS Pz Corps following. The balance of forces would shift to the side of the Germans, equal if not more than the opponent. Meaning that their overstretched units would not be burdened with holding ground AND attacking.

The Overlord plan EXPECTED that by D+8 the Germans would have reinforced Normandy and would have a 25% advantage in divisions, with 10 Panzer divisions available - 21PZ, 12SS, 17SS, Lehr, 116Pz, 2Pz, 11Pz, 2SS, 1SS and 19Pz. This is what Montgomery planned to defeat.

The guidance for tactical commitment was to disaggregate the Pz regiment into small armor-infantry teams with infantry leading. The attacks would be executed fast and with the objectives were short- almost raid-like activity. Night attacks preferred. I call this the "creeping forward" method. This became the standard mode of counterattack.

But not suitable for continuous offensive, as would get battered by Allied artillery, and suffer from Allied counterattacks. The Germans are not going to win in an attrition battle against Allied firepower.

[Cult Icon]

But not suitable for continuous offensive, as would get battered by Allied artillery, and suffer from Allied counterattacks. The Germans are not going to win in an attrition battle against Allied firepower.

I think that this is a bogus and poor argument perpetuated by the recent wave of revisionist British-Canadian historians. If you familiarize yourself with the German perspective and statistics you would see this.

These creeping tactics were meant to minimalize "allied firepower", and they did, given how the British-Canadians were bottled up with defense/counterattacks and were unable to seize Caen until CHARNWOOD in July. The casualties of the I SS PZ Corps in these numerous small attacks were, in sum, not high and lower than if they exposed themselves in a classic attack. They however, lacked the grand style and rapid results of a classical corps attack, which required assembly areas, air cover, a more balanced artillery force correlation.

This also brings the question that if there are 6 Pz divisions instead of 3-4, and 18 battlegroups launch a classical offensive , if even the artillery ammunition available for divisional and AGRA artillery are enough to suppress all of this.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I suppose that depends on what "strength parity" means. If its a simple tally of "ass in the grass" then yes the two sides were roughly close to parity. However, if combat potential, especially offensive combat potential, is the determining factor then the ratio swings heavily in the allied direction.

Sure. Should be quantified. Also in terms of supply. In the few wargames simulating supply, it appears that Allies have many more guns ashore than shells to fire them.

Bradleys accounts are spotted with complaints about artillery ammunition "shortages". Tracing them out it appears three things were going on. 1. Resistance in Calvados, Gerows V Corps, was larger than expected. The Germans were not following the Allied plan and making a fighting withdrawal out of Normandy. So a higher ammunition use as the attrition battle developed. 2. Ditto for Collins VII Corps which had priority for most anything in accomplishing its mission of capturing Cherbourg ASAP. More resistance & the siege of Cherbourg lasting a week drew ammunition deliveries northwards to VII Corps. 3. The storm of late June disrupted supply delivery for five+ days, with material crossing the beaches effectively zero for three days. The loss of 30,000+ tons delivery of all classes material to US 1st Army in latter June showed. A month later in late July 1st Army was able to expend massive quantity of artillery ammunition in support of Op COBRA, so despite larger than planned expendenture & disruptions the US 1st Army received enough to win the June/July attrition battle, and have a hefty reserve for the late July break through battle.

Theres a degree of PoV here as well. I strongly suspect the US Army shortages would have looked like a god given corncoupia to the German artillery commanders. The US commanders complain their supply is only 75% of what they'd like to have had & only 120% of planned. The 7th Army staff were considering that deliveries to their depots & batteries were half, a quarter, & at the end 10% of requirement.

[Michael Kenny]

, given how the British-Canadians were bottled up with defense/counterattacks and were unable to seize Caen until CHARNWOOD in July...........

By defending Caen-Falaise the Germans made themselves an anvil for the Allied sledgehammer.

[EKB]

But not suitable for continuous offensive, as would get battered by Allied artillery, and suffer from Allied counterattacks. The Germans are not going to win in an attrition battle against Allied firepower.

I think that this is a bogus and poor argument perpetuated by the recent wave of revisionist British-Canadian historians. If you familiarize yourself with the German perspective and statistics you would see this.

The Germans fared no better in mechanized counter-attacks. They frequently violated rules in their own tactics manuals. They sent panzers into villages without sufficient recon, and no infantry support. They developed no techniques for breaching thick hedge lines and instead used roads that were easily blocked. When panzers did drive off road, tank destroyers and towed guns waited to ambush them.

Occasionally the Germans regained ground with a panzer counterattack, before Allied troops could dig a network of deep communications trenches or fighting holes. I'm not sure about British policy on constructing earthworks, but when American troops expected to attack the next morning after a short rest, they were reluctant to dig deep fighting pits that would be abandoned soon after. Sometimes the Germans were able to exploit this weakness.

Because German troops fought defensively more often than the Allies, it's probably safe to say that the German army's earthworks technique was more sophisticated.

[Cult Icon]

EKB your post is rather irrelevant and comes across as ill-informed & biased. My comment is referring to the jingoist/allied biased type of history that display very poor understanding of German forces' operating methods, unit history, and very poor knowledge of armored warfare on the Eastern Front, which composed the vast majority of their war experience. This, plus a biased agenda, leads to wrong analysis. When I started studying these subjects many of these allied biased histories and the people who peddle them mislead me & continue to mislead others. A good example of a book related to this thread- and that is a mixed bag- is Marc Milner's Canadian-biased book "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day ". I liked the book a lot for its Canadian coverage but the German coverage was wanting. Most of it is sourcing Hubert Meyer. There was an agenda stated right in the intro; the historian was bitter at how British historiography downplayed Canada and wanted to make the 3rd Division look as good as possible...!

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In the British-Canadian sector the German "combined arms team" broke down and the I SS Pz Corps were overstretched. The German PZ divisions had never fought so poorly before for that matter due to the extreme tactical environment. So they were forced to disaggregate their tank forces and used recon battalions to hold ground. Their forces are designed to fight as entire divisions and grouped in a corps, just like those of their opponents. An interesting aspect is how when they left the West and went east after the Ardennes, that the I SS Pz Corps were once again employed in a classical attack with Fliegerkorps support and had it's last victory in the East.

As for June the Pz Lehr and 21.Pz were both engaged, the 12th SS initially held an overextended L-shaped 15 mile front (with a gigantic gap on its left wing, which the British attempted to exploit with Operation Perch), during which this breach was plugged by the newly arrived 2.Pz. The 12.SS Recon battalion was not performing its doctrinal role; it was holding the left wing gap! Prior to EPSOM this line was reduced to an overlong 12 miles. After it it was reduced to 8 miles.

Only the Allies could perform proper offensives in Normandy. The overstretched I SS Pz Corps in June would have to do with the "creeping method", where they peeled off small forces to seize points, hills, and villages. Then retaken. And taken again. This back and forth happened a lot with the Pz Lehr division, particularly in Tilly-sur-selles, which was chosen as the gateway to Bayeux.

As for Alt history, the addition of two jumbo Pz divisions, the 9.SS and 10.SS with the I SS Pz Corps would have material effect on the situation once they were transported to the front. Bayeux could be engaged with two-three Pz divisions instead of one. The "creep forward" would have a lot more progress as the front condition would no longer be one of overstretch. This would release a lot of forces from holding ground and commit themselves to the attack.
Once Bayeux is taken the British-Canadian beachhead can start to be compressed. The next uncommitted Pz Corps could then be released for deployment before or after. And the next...

[Michael Kenny]

When I started studying these subjects many of these allied biased histories and the people who peddle them mislead me & continue to mislead others. A good example of a book related to this thread- and that is a mixed bag- is Marc Milner's Canadian-biased book "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day ". I liked the book a lot for its Canadian coverage but the German coverage was wanting. Most of it is sourcing Hubert Meyer. There was an agenda stated right in the intro; the historian was bitter at how British historiography downplayed Canada and wanted to make the 3rd Division look as good as possible...!

Good job Milner used an 'unbiased' German-based history by Meyer. Meyer the historian who ...........wanted to make the 12th SS Division look as good as possible...!

Below is a map showing the frontage in Normandy. Claims that 12th SS initially held an overextended L-shaped 15 mile front are complete bunk. Having an open flank is not the same as holding ground.

The German PZ divisions had never fought so poorly before for that matter due to the extreme tactical environment. So they were forced to disaggregate their tank forces and used recon battalions to hold ground.

What an extraordinary piece of random luck that this happened. You would think that the Allies would have had a plan in place to deal with the threat of an attack by a full panzer Division instead of relying on chance to solve the problem for them. If I were that braggard Monty I would have claimed it was my intention to keep attacking the Germans and force them to deploy their tanks in the front line so as to stop them assembling a force big enough to attack the beaches with any chance of success but who would believe such an obvious lie?

[Michael Kenny]

. A good example of a book related to this thread- and that is a mixed bag- is Marc Milner's ............. book "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day ".

Try his detailed account of how The Canadians stopped 12th SS attacking the beaches on June 7th 1944. It is a good account of the failure of the 12th SS in its first engagement in Normandy.

https://www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/ ... t-2012.pdf

[Mori]

Bradleys accounts are spotted with complaints about artillery ammunition "shortages". Tracing them out it appears three things were going on. 1. Resistance in Calvados, Gerows V Corps, was larger than expected. The Germans were not following the Allied plan and making a fighting withdrawal out of Normandy. So a higher ammunition use as the attrition battle developed. 2. Ditto for Collins VII Corps which had priority for most anything in accomplishing its mission of capturing Cherbourg ASAP. More resistance & the siege of Cherbourg lasting a week drew ammunition deliveries northwards to VII Corps. 3. The storm of late June disrupted supply delivery for five+ days, with material crossing the beaches effectively zero for three days. The loss of 30,000+ tons delivery of all classes material to US 1st Army in latter June showed. A month later in late July 1st Army was able to expend massive quantity of artillery ammunition in support of Op COBRA, so despite larger than planned expendenture & disruptions the US 1st Army received enough to win the June/July attrition battle, and have a hefty reserve for the late July break through battle.

Theres a degree of PoV here as well. I strongly suspect the US Army shortages would have looked like a god given corncoupia to the German artillery commanders. The US commanders complain their supply is only 75% of what they'd like to have had & only 120% of planned. The 7th Army staff were considering that deliveries to their depots & batteries were half, a quarter, & at the end 10% of requirement.

Thanks for the long reminder, much appreciated.

Not sure whether that's a factor, but is there something about artillery being more effective defensively (when enemy troops expose themselves) than offensively (when enemy troops are protected by field fortifications)? This would suggest that context matters a lot when comparing supply of shells.

Back to the question starting this thread, this could mean that the Allied shortage of ammunition would hamper their progress but wouldn't give any German counterstrike more effective. Again, quantifying is mandatory to think further than that.

[Mori]

The German PZ divisions had never fought so poorly before for that matter due to the extreme tactical environment. So they were forced to disaggregate their tank forces and used recon battalions to hold ground. Their forces are designed to fight as entire divisions and grouped in a corps, just like those of their opponents.

Just commenting on this statement, because I'm not certain it's correct. The tactical practice is more around the ad-hoc Kampfgruppe, and breaking down a panzer division into several KG, as well as agglomerating units from other organizations into such KGs, is the norm, not the exception. This not only happened late war after units were worn down but already in summer 1941. I recently found long training instructions for panzer divisions which were all about the KG tactics, and they were from winter 1940-1941, even before Barbarossa started.