Rundstedt's central reserve

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Michael Kenny
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#106

Post by Michael Kenny » 27 May 2021, 14:42

Sheldrake wrote:
27 May 2021, 10:43


These are the reports of German soldiers explaining military failure. There may be some institutional bias in favour of blaming the failures of the Luftwaffe.
Not just German soldiers explaining military failure. We have posters in this thread running the same excuse.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#107

Post by Cult Icon » 27 May 2021, 14:55

Excluding engineers the Pz division of the Army had approx. 5 combat battalions (infantry & recon). SS had had 7.

In an offensive this could be split into 5- 7 battalion sized- battlegroups. Or more if there are some 2-company groups for small missions. A 2-battalion sized battlegroup could be organized for a larger battle if it was tactically appropriate.

So with the 21.Pz, 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS, 2.Pz, Pz Lehr this would be maximum 36 battalion-sized battlegroups, lesser with casualties incurred June 6-15.


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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#108

Post by Michael Kenny » 27 May 2021, 15:01

Cult Icon wrote:
27 May 2021, 14:55


So with the 21.Pz, 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS, 2.Pz, Pz Lehr this would be maximum 36 battalion-sized battlegroups.................
They would be defeated the same way those units were in real life.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#109

Post by Michael Kenny » 27 May 2021, 15:30

Sheldrake wrote:
27 May 2021, 10:43


2. The reports for the weeks leading up to D Day list the losses, civilian and military of the supposedly intense pre D Day aerial bombardment on airfields, coastal batteries and radar installations. Apart from the damage to railways, these are very light considering the efforts made and the aircraft lost.
These raids were but a part of the overall effort. Air operations were spread throughout the coastal areas and not just Normandy as it would give the game away. No one is saying Air Power won the campaign but neither can anyone dismiss it as of no consequence. The Allies, unlike the Germans, had a balanced Army on land, sea and air and one should not fall into the trap laid by the 'we wuz outnumbered' delusionals. They want to ferment bickering between Allied branches (artillery won it/no tanks won it/no my dads regiment won it) as it distracts from the total failure/defeat of the German army in Normandy

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#110

Post by Cult Icon » 27 May 2021, 15:37

I have not read Mic Kenny's posts for a decade.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#111

Post by Michael Kenny » 27 May 2021, 16:24

Cult Icon wrote:
27 May 2021, 14:29
G, the Grimsbosq attack, ...................However if many small battles erupt all across the front, the defensive fire from British-Canadian artillery will be diluted instead of concentrated. Eg. The Grimsbosq attack, inflicting hundreds of casualties,
Difficult as it is to decipher this gibberish I finally managed to crack it on my replica enigma machine. It appears to be a re-wording of Reynolds (page 204 Steel Inferno)& Meyer(12th SS, 5.4, page 165 hardback) where the mighty SS rush to stop the Allies crossing the Orne at Grimbosq on 6th-9th August 1944. It is thought to be a great German victory despite them not managing to eliminate the bridge. Indeed so great is the prowess of these warriors that though they were attacked by 44 Mitchells they managed to fire back and hit 36 of them whilst suffering 'minimal' casualties. It is not known if all the 36 were hit by Wunsche personally or if others joined in and fired them. After failing to defeat the Allies at Grimbosq the Germans rushed over to their next defeat at TOTALIZE.
Last edited by Michael Kenny on 27 May 2021, 16:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#112

Post by Michael Kenny » 27 May 2021, 16:33

Cult Icon wrote:
27 May 2021, 15:37
I have not read Mic Kenny's posts for a decade.

I guess if you routinely invent 'facts;' about the Normandy Campaign then lies about other matters are no big deal


Check the date:
Cult Icon wrote:
13 Dec 2018, 19:36
Once again, not reading what I was saying Kenny. "Global statements" characterizing the entire PzWaffe from a very small number of examples. Was I talking about German losses? Nope. I was talking about German reports. This is a recurring problem with these exchanges.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#113

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 May 2021, 18:22

Juan G. C. wrote:
27 May 2021, 09:27
It isn't another hand wave. When Mori asked me to indicate and specify the point and date in history changed, I explained:
Okay, thanks, I did miss that. While we could argue the real world effects of a successful Beck-Goerdler putsch - or its likelihood - that is fine.

However, it still does not consider what the "central reserve" would consist of or where it would deploy.

For example, if II. SS-Panzerkorps stayed in France that does not accelerate the organization, equipment, and training of the two division's Panther battalions. I./SS-Pz-Regt 9 had 34 Panthers as of 1 June at Mailly, of which 30 were operational, and a total of 40 by 10 June with 39 more in route (11 departed 7 June, 24 on 8 June, 4 on 9 June). I./SS-Pz-Regt 10. was even weaker and was never engaged on Normandy. Both divisions were also missing its Panzerjäger Abteilung and were still weak, especially in infantry despite organizing for seven and six months respectively before they were sent east, although casualties in the Ostfront operations were minor. 10. SS appears to have had an effective strength of about 14,100 versus a Sollstärke of 17,996, while 9. SS effectives was about 17,000. Furthermore, it seems likely if II. SS was used as a "central reserve" it would be for the Riviera rather than northern France. That at least was the mission of the more complete 9. SS before it was sent east.

Otherwise,

Lehr was complete (again except for its Panther battalion) and ws back from its Hungarian adventure by 15 May.
12. SS was complete.
2. Panzer was complete.
21. Panzer was complete, but awaiting the rest of its Panzer IV lang and was effectively at half strength (98 of them IIRC)
17. SS-Panzergrenadier was complete, more or less, but lacked mobility.

116. Panzer was incomplete and was just beginning training as a division.
1. SS was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
2. SS was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
9. Panzer was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped
11. Panzer was still arriving from the Ostfront, was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#114

Post by Kingfish » 27 May 2021, 23:44

Cult Icon wrote:
27 May 2021, 14:55
In an offensive this could be split into 5- 7 battalion sized- battlegroups. Or more if there are some 2-company groups for small missions. A 2-battalion sized battlegroup could be organized for a larger battle if it was tactically appropriate.

So with the 21.Pz, 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS, 2.Pz, Pz Lehr this would be maximum 36 battalion-sized battlegroups, lesser with casualties incurred June 6-15.
Not enough.

By mid June 2nd army will have (correct me if I'm wrong) 7 infantry and 2 armored divisions ashore. By my count that works out to 71 battalions of infantry not counting the numerous independent brigades and commando units. Already the ratio of attacker to defender is well below the 3:1 most often cited as a minimum requirement. Add the fact that a sizeable portion of those 36 German battalions are fixed in static defense and things look bleaker still.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#115

Post by Juan G. C. » 28 May 2021, 10:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 May 2021, 18:22

Okay, thanks, I did miss that. While we could argue the real world effects of a successful Beck-Goerdler putsch - or its likelihood - that is fine.

However, it still does not consider what the "central reserve" would consist of or where it would deploy.

For example, if II. SS-Panzerkorps stayed in France that does not accelerate the organization, equipment, and training of the two division's Panther battalions. I./SS-Pz-Regt 9 had 34 Panthers as of 1 June at Mailly, of which 30 were operational, and a total of 40 by 10 June with 39 more in route (11 departed 7 June, 24 on 8 June, 4 on 9 June). I./SS-Pz-Regt 10. was even weaker and was never engaged on Normandy. Both divisions were also missing its Panzerjäger Abteilung and were still weak, especially in infantry despite organizing for seven and six months respectively before they were sent east, although casualties in the Ostfront operations were minor. 10. SS appears to have had an effective strength of about 14,100 versus a Sollstärke of 17,996, while 9. SS effectives was about 17,000. Furthermore, it seems likely if II. SS was used as a "central reserve" it would be for the Riviera rather than northern France. That at least was the mission of the more complete 9. SS before it was sent east.

Otherwise,

Lehr was complete (again except for its Panther battalion) and ws back from its Hungarian adventure by 15 May.
12. SS was complete.
2. Panzer was complete.
21. Panzer was complete, but awaiting the rest of its Panzer IV lang and was effectively at half strength (98 of them IIRC)
17. SS-Panzergrenadier was complete, more or less, but lacked mobility.

116. Panzer was incomplete and was just beginning training as a division.
1. SS was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
2. SS was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
9. Panzer was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped
11. Panzer was still arriving from the Ostfront, was weak, incomplete, and poorly equipped.
Thanks, very useful information.

Regarding where would the central reserve be deployed, all sources indicate that Rundstedt wanted it to be on the area around and south of Paris, on both sides of the Seine.

As regards what it would consist of, it is more difficult, for one has to considero how a different situation at other fronts and different events would affect which units are sent to France, and their condition (and even their names, as one of the first measures of a Beck-Goerdeler government would be to merge the Waffen-SS into the Army, so no more SS divisions or corps).

Nevertheless, I think at least the Panzer Lehr, the 21. Panzer, the 2. Panzer, the former 12. SS Panzer (with other name), the former 17. SS Panzergrenadier (idem), and the 116. Panzer.

Rundstedt also wanted mobile infantry divisions in his central reserve. The 715th infantry division, which was sent to Italy after Anzio, was part of it. If the Germans withdraw to the Gothic line after Anzio, It can remain in France.

If the former II SS Panzer Corps remains in the Riviera then it is probable that other units that were located there IOTL would have been deployed in the north.

PS. What do you think would have been the real world effects of a Beck-Goerdeler putsch?
Last edited by Juan G. C. on 28 May 2021, 16:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#116

Post by Gooner1 » 28 May 2021, 14:07

Cult Icon wrote:
26 May 2021, 14:22
I think the dispositions would be completely different so historical maps would not be valid.

The consequences of a better result in the East- and without two encirclements- would lead numerous Pz divisions in fighting condition, leading to a larger accumulation in the West.
Well the original post has the German armour concentrated around Paris so you are right the dispositions would be different.
And so long as allied air power is still around in this scenario the 'numerous Pz divisions in fighting condition' would still be arriving dispersed and in a piecemeal fashion and with a gaping hole in their front line.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#117

Post by Cult Icon » 28 May 2021, 15:58

Gooner1 wrote:
28 May 2021, 14:07
Well the original post has the German armour concentrated around Paris so you are right the dispositions would be different.
And so long as allied air power is still around in this scenario the 'numerous Pz divisions in fighting condition' would still be arriving dispersed and in a piecemeal fashion and with a gaping hole in their front line.
The plugging of the gaps was addressed in my earlier comments.

The two encirclements and also the armored concentration on the southern wing of AGS, ordered to stand fast at Krivoi Rog seems to have prevented the rehabilitation of many units, long overdo to be withdrawn.

The already greatly reduced 1.SS "LAH" literally attacked to the death at Korsun, hence its condition at Normandy (filled with new personnel, lacking training). It was also caught in encirclement and broke out. Nevertheless it was adequate in its defensive assignments particularly holding its chain of villages, GOODWOOD, ATLANTIC, SPRING, etc. 11.Pz was also heavily involved in these events, being a principal assault force at Zhitomir-Berdichev and also in the relief of the Korsun pocket.

The failed relief attack of XXXXVIII. Pz corps at Tarnopol cost around 1,200 casualties. Much of this belong to the 9.SS division as it was the principal force. A bloody deput.

There are also many Pz divisions that may have seen service in the West, but were knocked out in the East. Interestingly the 3.SS, 5.SS, 19.Pz (among others) were refitted and used in the heaviest combat that summer despite also being participants.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#118

Post by Gooner1 » 28 May 2021, 16:33

Cult Icon wrote:
28 May 2021, 15:58
The plugging of the gaps was addressed in my earlier comments.
Missed them. I hope it wasn't along the lines that German casualties not occurring on the Eastern Front suddenly become available in Normandy?

From the British OH
"In these first few days the bombing of transportation targets was concentrated on routes leading to the battle area. By day, bombers and fighters of the American Eighth Air Force attacked such junctions as Lisieux, Falaise, Flers, Argentan and Laigle astride the two main rail and road routes from Paris, and in the Nantes-Rennes-Laval area routes running north from the Loire. The heavies were supplemented by mediums of the Ninth Air Force attacking subsidiary junctions between the two main areas. On top of all this came the British and American fighters and fighter-bombers ranging over the roads and railways between the choke-points. The combined effort was on an immense scale but the area was large, the country was close and the routes many. It was not expected that all day-movement could be stopped but the delaying effect was immediate and considerable. The Panzer Lehr division was forced to move after daylight on a very wide front, using five roads"

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#119

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 May 2021, 16:59

Juan G. C. wrote:
28 May 2021, 10:49
Thanks, very useful information.

Regarding where would the central reserve be deployed, all sources indicate that Rundstedt wanted it to be on the area around and south of Paris, on both sides of the Seine.
Sources probably indicate that because that is exactly how they were deployed.
As regards what it would consist of, it is more difficult, for one has to considero how a different situation at other fronts and different events would affect which units are sent to France, and their condition (and even their names, as one of the first measures of a Beck-Goerdeler government would be to merge the Waffen-SS into the Army, so no more SS divisions or corps).
So the quarter million or so fanatical Nazis who had sworn allegiance to Adolf Hitler would roll over and wait for nice belly rubs while the Beck-Goerdeler government decides what new name they should be given? That smacks of fantasy.
Nevertheless, I think at least the Panzer Lehr, the 21. Panzer, the 2. Panzer, the former 12. SS Panzer (with other name), the former 17. SS Panzergrenadier (idem), and the 116. Panzer.
As I mentioned, 116. Panzer Division was not really operational in June 1944 as it was still organizing and training. It was the third division of XLVII Panzer Korps with 2. and 21. that was nominally "in reserve" on the right bank of the Seine north of Paris, but it is unlikely it could have been used any earlier than it was.
Rundstedt also wanted mobile infantry divisions in his central reserve. The 715th infantry division, which was sent to Italy after Anzio, was part of it. If the Germans withdraw to the Gothic line after Anzio, It can remain in France.
More points of departure? Anyway, he had bewegungs divisions, they were just deployed close behind the bodenständige divisions. If they are pulled farther from the coast, the coastal crust becomes that much weaker. The 715. Infanterie Division was nominally motorisiert rather than bewegung. It would most likely stay in Southern France with the newly renamed SS as part of the central reserve.
If the former II SS Panzer Corps remains in the Riviera then it is probable that other units that were located there IOTL would have been deployed in the north.
What "other units" are those? Both 9. and 11. Panzer were shattered and rebuilding...and the remnants of 11. Panzer Division were still on trains in route from the Ostfront on 6 June.

If the information I supplied was useful, you might want to take it in and assess the implications of it.
PS. What do you think would have been the real world effects of a Beck-Goerdeler putsch?
The earlier deaths of Beck and Goerdeler.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#120

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 May 2021, 17:17

Cult Icon wrote:
28 May 2021, 15:58
The failed relief attack of XXXXVIII. Pz corps at Tarnopol cost around 1,200 casualties. Much of this belong to the 9.SS division as it was the principal force. A bloody deput.
That appears to be the assumption, but it may well be an error. The various casualties reported for 9. SS at Tarnapol - Reynolds's (probably using Tieke) "1,200" and Vuksic's more precise "1,383" seem to conflate the total losses in the operation, including Panzerverband Friebe, with those just of the SS.

However, in a post-Normandy casualty reconciliation, 9. SS accounted for just 3,152 battle casualties for the period from 1 January-31 August 1944. Once the numbers for 23 June-1 July, 1,145, and for 1 July-31 August, 2,370, recorded at the time by 5. Panzerarmee are deducted, even accounting for the overlap of 1 July and the inflated nature of preliminary casualty reports, there just doesn't seem to be room for such casualties being incurred in three days of April in the East. I suspect the real casualties suffered by the SS in its Ostfront slog to Tarnapol were in the range of hundreds rather than thousands.
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Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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