Rundstedt's central reserve

[Michael Kenny]

The failed relief attack of XXXXVIII. Pz corps at Tarnopol cost around 1,200 casualties. Much of this belong to the 9.SS division as it was the principal force. A bloody deput.

That appears to be the assumption, but it may well be an error.................

So you believe 'deput' the wrong numbers down?

[Cult Icon]

The plugging of the gaps was addressed in my earlier comments.

Missed them. I hope it wasn't along the lines that German casualties not occurring on the Eastern Front suddenly become available in Normandy?

Go back to page 1 and read Juan/my comments then. I addressed a lot of aspects.

This allied biased little clique...

[Gooner1]

Go back to page 1 and read Juan/my comments then. I addressed a lot of aspects.

All I got was "The two encirclements resulted in a huge loss of equipment. If anything there would be more forces available in the West than the II SS Pz Korps." which considering 'the West' stretched from the Arctic to the Aegean doesn't address the issue of how more German troops end up in Normandy despite the withdrawal of the Panzer divisions to a central reserve, nor address the issues of the 'immediate and considerable' effect of Allied air power on German movements.

This fact biased little clique...

FTFY.

[Cult Icon]

Partial casualties in June XXX Corps (British). May have 7th Armoured division figures. :

June 6-30, 50th ID: 3,336 men

8th Armoured Brigade (4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards): 125
24th Lancers: 35
Sherwood Rangers 40

Pz Lehr June 6-30: 3,468 men

One of these sides had vastly superior air and fire support, and one vastly outnumbered the other...

[Aber]

One of these sides had vastly superior air and fire support, and one vastly outnumbered the other...

But this is where they ended up:

30 June 1944.PNG (643.77 KiB) Viewed 824 times

7 Panzer divisions against 2nd Army.

[Gooner1]

Partial casualties in June XXX Corps (British). May have 7th Armoured division figures. :

June 6-30, 50th ID: 3,336 men

8th Armoured Brigade (4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards): 125
24th Lancers: 35
Sherwood Rangers 40

Pz Lehr June 6-30: 3,468 men

One of these sides had vastly superior air and fire support, and one vastly outnumbered the other...

And one side was doing most of the attacking.
BTW you left out casualties suffered by those elements of 352nd and 716th Divisions that opposed XXX Corps.

[EKB]

EKB your post is rather irrelevant and comes across as ill-informed & biased. My comment is referring to the jingoist/allied biased type of history that display very poor understanding of German forces' operating methods, unit history, and very poor knowledge of armored warfare on the Eastern Front, which composed the vast majority of their war experience. This, plus a biased agenda, leads to wrong analysis ...

Only the Allies could perform proper offensives in Normandy. The overstretched I SS Pz Corps in June would have to do with the "creeping method", where they peeled off small forces to seize points, hills, and villages. Then retaken.

Handing over more equipment to Waffen-SS officers would not make them smarter.

And why should they jam more vehicles on already congested roads? They tried that during the rückmarsch from Normandy and we have photo evidence of the results.

Few SS officers attended the best staff schools. Nazi ideology made them weak. Often their tactics showed the finesse and nuance of a battering ram. No amount of fancy hardware can overcome bad leadership and there was no way for the regular army to insulate itself from the worst of these characters. If anything, the SS divisions learned the wrong lessons on the Eastern Front and tried to re-fight past battles using the wrong methods for the Western Front.

The Germans could not hope to make substantial gains except in long stretches of bad weather that could ground Allied tactical air support and flying artillery spotters. Maybe the SS labs should have developed a fleet of cloud-seeding aircraft.

[Richard Anderson]

Partial casualties in June XXX Corps (British). May have 7th Armoured division figures. :

1,136

June 6-30, 50th ID: 3,336 men

Actually, 3,520 battle casualties.

8th Armoured Brigade (4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards): 125
24th Lancers: 35
Sherwood Rangers 40

841 for the brigade in total.

Pz Lehr June 6-30: 3,468 men

Lehr in June reported 2,972
2. Pz-Div 1,391
1. SS UNK, but some hundreds
2. SS 416
9. SS 1,145
10. SS 571
12. SS (6-27 June) 3,892

BTW, I. SS Panzer Korps reported June losses as 9,032, but of course that counts some of the losses already given above

One of these sides had vastly superior air and fire support, and one vastly outnumbered the other...

They must have cheated...

[David Thompson]

Two posts from Cult Icon and one from Richard Anderson, all containing personal comments about other AHF members, were removed pursuant to the forum rules.

[Juan G. C.]

Thanks, very useful information.

Regarding where would the central reserve be deployed, all sources indicate that Rundstedt wanted it to be on the area around and south of Paris, on both sides of the Seine.

Sources probably indicate that because that is exactly how they were deployed.

AFAIK they weren't deployed there.

As regards what it would consist of, it is more difficult, for one has to consider how a different situation at other fronts and different events would affect which units are sent to France, and their condition (and even their names, as one of the first measures of a Beck-Goerdeler government would be to merge the Waffen-SS into the Army, so no more SS divisions or corps).

So the quarter million or so fanatical Nazis who had sworn allegiance to Adolf Hitler would roll over and wait for nice belly rubs while the Beck-Goerdeler government decides what new name they should be given? That smacks of fantasy.

Initially they would be told that Hitler was dead and that the Army was suppressing a Party Putsch. The incorporation of the Waffen-SS into the Army would take place under that pretext. Most of their leaders would be taken into protective custody and replaced by Army officers, and units whose obedience is doubtful disarmed (except, of course, units fighting in the front, but I doubt they would rebel when facing the enemy). With most nazi leaders arrested and perhaps shot, they won't be in a state to rebel when the new government shows its true face.

Nevertheless, I think at least the Panzer Lehr, the 21. Panzer, the 2. Panzer, the former 12. SS Panzer (with other name), the former 17. SS Panzergrenadier (idem), and the 116. Panzer.

As I mentioned, 116. Panzer Division was not really operational in June 1944 as it was still organizing and training. It was the third division of XLVII Panzer Korps with 2. and 21. that was nominally "in reserve" on the right bank of the Seine north of Paris, but it is unlikely it could have been used any earlier than it was.

Ok. However, without the 116. we already have five Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. And, given the better situation in the Eastern front, perhaps another Panzer division can be brought to the West.

Rundstedt also wanted mobile infantry divisions in his central reserve. The 715th infantry division, which was sent to Italy after Anzio, was part of it. If the Germans withdraw to the Gothic line after Anzio, It can remain in France.

More points of departure? Anyway, he had bewegungs divisions, they were just deployed close behind the bodenständige divisions. If they are pulled farther from the coast, the coastal crust becomes that much weaker. The 715. Infanterie Division was nominally motorisiert rather than bewegung. It would most likely stay in Southern France with the newly renamed SS as part of the central reserve.

It isn't another point of departure, but a decision the new government and high Command would have probably taken.

[Westphalia1812]

If anything, the SS divisions learned the wrong lessons on the Eastern Front and tried to re-fight past battles using the wrong methods for the Western Front.

Eh...the same can be said about a good portion of the "regular" army officers. Or were their counterattacks more successful?

[Kingfish]

Ok. However, without the 116. we already have five Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. And, given the better situation in the Eastern front, perhaps another Panzer division can be brought to the West.

Which will give you roughly two panzer divisions in a reserve role to cover a 60 mile front. The other three/four are forced into a static defensive positions - just like in the OTL - to cover for the now destroyed Atlantic wall divisions.

That will not get you this:

PS. No secrets: I admit here that I am searching for a way to defeat the Normandy landings.

[Cult Icon]

My post was erased. In re-examining it they certainly come across as unnecessarily condescending and accusing some of lack of reading on the German perspective and the repeating of inaccurate myths & stereotypes about the German conduct in Normandy & the West.

Certainly such differences of opinion cannot be changed in an efficient, time-saving manner so I will leave it at that. Overall I find the British-Canadian-American opinion on the German army in the popular literature to be wanting and guilty of spreading overgeneralizations/myths. This is why I appreciate AHF, documents, and the German materials as they are far more accurate than the opponent's take or a biased perspective.

[Cult Icon]

This "SS divisions" learn the wrong lessons on the Eastern Front stereotype seems to originate from the Brigadier general Kurt Meyer's often quoted comments about using East front tactics (from his memoir "Grenadiers") about his command style in early village fights. I believe this is about the night attack on Brettevillle in particular, where they tried to bounce it with a two-company Panther tank charge and a company of recon infantry.

In response to Meyer's comment is the often quoted bit from a Canadian soldier opining that that "they think we are Russians" and another from an officer saying that the attack had no tactical skill.

This is a very popular anecdote in the literature and have shaped perceptions by extending an overgeneralization. A bit like how Wittmann's actions at villers-bocage oversold the power of the Tiger Tank.

EKB am I on the money?

[Cult Icon]

But this is where they ended up:
30 June 1944.PNG

7 Panzer divisions against 2nd Army.

1. These new "friends" came in after the salient was formed from the 4 mile front of SS-PzgR26. The offensive was called off after the counterattack. One of these is probably a KG (2.SS). This unit used KG Weidinger in action, the rest of the division was parceled up as a firebrigade in the US sector. Also some of these units are depleted from prior combat. The 21.Pz and 12.SS were (approx.) over half infantry each. Lehr was pretty much finished. It was down to the last inf battalion (approx.) of 901/902 and would be withdrawn and sent against the US sector. 6 divisions plus a battlegroup, minus 2. The KG Weidinger (2.SS) would soon leave, too.

2. Not really relevant, my comments were focused on the situation BEFORE the ammunition and reserves were accumulated for sequential set-piece offensives. Basically once EPSOM started the Germans in Normandy were finished and had no place to return.

3. My posting of statistics was more about showing the air power, naval artillery, and superior artillery had a ways to go to write-off a Pz division. Took time and a lot of attrition.