Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

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Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#196

Post by Peter89 » 04 Jun 2021, 10:49

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 08:11
Peter89 wrote:You are checking the numbers for A-4, but that doesn't cover the maintenance of the units.
My spreadsheet only addresses deployment.

You're right that fuel is a bigger part of maintenance than of deployment; I should have applied the "Fuel Adjustment" to maintenance as I did with deployment in my rough estimate upthread. When I add maintenance to the spreadsheet I'll remember that.

Per A-5, btw, food was 11-13% of maintenance requirements.
Yes, just like I wrote, food was about 11%, POL was about 50%, etc.

But, the point is that no such thing as an average day with an average soldier existed. Belligerents used to build up strength and resources, stockpile every kind of material, then launched an offensive which ran until exhaustion.

It's not that if there is no POL incoming, then the army will perish.

Also, the American deployment / maintenance numbers were the highest of all belligerents, so it does not mean that an army could not exist with much, much less supplies or could not be deployed with way less shipping.

Besides, in case of a German attack on Turkey, the British offered the Turks every kind of help, of which the Turks gladly took the aircrew training options and the weapon deliveries. The Turkish army, which was the biggest non-belligerent army in Eurasia, did not lack the numbers, but modern weaponry, signal equipment, motorization, rolling stock, etc. So for me it is questionable how many Allied troops exactly had to be deployed in Turkey to defend it against Germany.

The British Empire & co. also built up a logistical base at Suez, which was not the same as the Persian Corridor, but ran parallel of it. By late 1942, they supported many battle-hardened units, which were probably the most experienced ground units in Allied OOB. The British did not need to deploy units with full of their equipment, etc. to the theatre; and not from the British Isles either.

The combined Suez-Persian Gulf logistical base, in conjunction with Turkish cooperation,
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 08:11
But again: even with ALL Army and Soviet LL shipping devoted to the MidEast, US can deploy only ~5 divisions to the MidEast by September '42 (rounding up from 4.4 to give you room to push the Arabs into famine - happened to the Bengalis so it's not beyond the British Empire to do so). Even were maintenance air forces shipping 100% free, that's not enough to stop the smallest German army.
The Americans were not the only possible Allies in the theatre.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 08:11
Peter89 wrote:this is why the complexity of this matter is well beyond the scope of my knowledge...We simply cannot know, or at least I can't know what were the British capable of in late 1942 or early 1943.
You're plenty smart and have sufficient data to know whether Allies could have fielded, say, 20 more divisions in the Middle East in late '42. It's a simple matter of ships and distance. You're invoking uncertainty on the margins to avoid seeing the bigger picture. Even if all food and fuel were sourced in-theater, it doesn't get the Allies anywhere close to 20 more divisions in the MidEast in late '42, not even if they stop defending India and Australia and abandon Torch and Bolero.
Thanks, but I think it's not being smart, but to know the limits of my capabilities.

For example, for the Haifa-Beirut railway, they used Australian engineers, African workers, steelwork from India, England and USA, ballast, stone and cement from local colonies, etc. All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking? Of course, the sources of these materials and labour were interchangeable as well. In my opinion, it is impossible and futile.

To answer your question directly, if the "Allies" incorporate Turkey, then an obvious yes is my answer. If Middle East covers the region from Iran to Sudan, then my answer is also yes. If the British and Americans could deploy an EXTRA 20 divisions into Turkey, then my answer is probably no.

But, this is also subject to change, because late 1942 was a period in the war when the American industrial giant just began to flex its muscles. What was true in late 1942 might not be true in mid-1943, and definately not true in late 1943.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 08:11
Beyond the simple math, we have contemporaries like Hopkins and Alanbrooke answering the question for us.
German capabilities were vastly overestimated after the fall of France.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 08:11
Peter89 wrote:the Germans planned Operation Gertrude OTL
Because I'm not very interested in Gertrude, and meant to start a separate thread, can we clarify a specific question?

If a post-SU Turkey allows Germany passage through Anatolia or joins the Axis - i.e. the fighting starts at the Turkish border - do you find it plausible that the Allies could have held Syria, Palestine, and Iraq?
For me it is extremely hard to imagine such a scenario, because the Turks, quite unlike the Iberians, always supported the underdog until the outcome of the war became clear. I think the Allies would try to hold the Basra-Abadan region and the Suez base, for which they had adequate means. Of course, I can imagine an army that could crush both areas and the Allied units in the theatre, but I think it's a bit far-fetched.

I can think of two scenarios which would be plausible:
1.) Absent Barbarossa, the Germans attack Turkey in mid 1941.
2.) Barbarossa present, the Germans attack Turkey in mid 1942 with limited goals.

I am not sure if such thing as "post-SU" could have existed, because as many contemporaries pointed out, the whole idea was wrong, and the Germans simply could not fight until the Pacific Ocean. The Luftwaffe was incapable of carrying out its role in the plan, and it was not clear how many troops had to be stationed in the occupied lands. What I am sure about is that we can have no actual knowledge about such a scenario, these are just guesses.

For me the most obvious guess is that any extra success in the SU would require the German units spent in the peripheries (which you correctly said in other threads), but that would mean, for example, that the Allies would held Africa by late 1942, probably mastering the Mediterranean sea as well. That could mean two things; first, their troops would be available in sufficient numbers to help defend Turkey, against, let's say, 20 German divisions trying to make their way through the sea. Second, the shipping lanes would be secure, and there would be less or no need to sail around Africa.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#197

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Jun 2021, 15:49

Peter89 wrote: the point is that no such thing as an average day with an average soldier existed.
Once again you're using the noise to nullify the signal.

I could just as well argue that, because not every Romanian soldier was average, it's feasible that Romania conquers the MidEast without German assistance.
Peter89 wrote:It's not that if there is no POL incoming, then the army will perish.
I never said that.

Once again I'm looking at the broad logistical picture, within which variance will of course occur between days and units.
Peter89 wrote:The Americans were not the only possible Allies in the theatre.
Obviously. But I'm using ALL American deployment shipping and don't see how get more than 5 divisions to MidEast - I'll note that you refuse to make a counter-estimate. If America stopped doing anything but fighting in the MidEast, British Empire would have to pick up slack elsewhere, which would require British shipping diverted from OTL tasks. They'd have to reinforce Aus/NZ, for example, which the U.S. has abandoned in the 5-divs ME scenario.

Again and again I'm being extremely generous to the Allies by assuming US could send ALL Army shipping to ME; it's seems unfair to nitpick me on small/obvious issues.
Peter89 wrote:For example, for the Haifa-Beirut railway, they used Australian engineers, African workers, steelwork from India, England and USA, ballast, stone and cement from local colonies, etc. All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking?
All of these resources are already committed to the OTL forces around MidEast/India.

I could see you making an argument that resources could have been shifted from Burma/India to ME. That would be a strategic tradeoff, you imply that OTL theater resources were just idle in 1942: that they could be devoted to a stronger defense of Turkey/ME - without any cost to the Allies elsewhere.
Peter89 wrote:If the British and Americans could deploy an EXTRA 20 divisions into Turkey, then my answer is probably no.
Good, thanks. Yes, I mean extra.
Peter89 wrote:What was true in late 1942 might not be true in mid-1943, and definately not true in late 1943.
On what basis are you confident in your late '43 judgment? It'd still be difficult, IMJ, and I'd post some numbers to show you why - Except you seem to reject the idea that we can analyze this numerically so that seems wasteful of my time.

Your position of epistemic uncertainty is fine - I disagree but whatever. But given your broad epistemic uncertainty regarding my assertion that we CAN know a rough limit on MidEast Allied force potential, how can you then assert "definitely" that the Allies could deploy/maintain 20 more divisions than OTL in late '43? See the contradiction there?

I suspect you're breezily confident in the one case and wracked with uncertainty in the other because the former fits your preconceived notions.

...which is fine, we have all biases. But it's also why I quantitative reasoning is necessary in many cases to overcome them.
Peter89 wrote:I can think of two scenarios which would be plausible:
Ok, fine. You don't want to answer my question. That's fair, it's not the thread topic.
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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#198

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Jun 2021, 15:58

Peter89 wrote:All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking?
Meant to respond specifically to this, which is a valid point but needs clarification.

Specifically, GLS tells us engineering materials were ~9% of maintenance requirements in ETO.

I could say more but again if you refuse to engage with quantitative analysis, I won't. I don't mean that rudely, I'm just respecting your position that we can't say anything useful on this topic (but again - then how can you make your confident conclusions?).
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Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#199

Post by Peter89 » 04 Jun 2021, 16:59

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 15:49
Peter89 wrote: the point is that no such thing as an average day with an average soldier existed.
Once again you're using the noise to nullify the signal.

I could just as well argue that, because not every Romanian soldier was average, it's feasible that Romania conquers the MidEast without German assistance.
Peter89 wrote:It's not that if there is no POL incoming, then the army will perish.
I never said that.

Once again I'm looking at the broad logistical picture, within which variance will of course occur between days and units.
Peter89 wrote:The Americans were not the only possible Allies in the theatre.
Obviously. But I'm using ALL American deployment shipping and don't see how get more than 5 divisions to MidEast - I'll note that you refuse to make a counter-estimate. If America stopped doing anything but fighting in the MidEast, British Empire would have to pick up slack elsewhere, which would require British shipping diverted from OTL tasks. They'd have to reinforce Aus/NZ, for example, which the U.S. has abandoned in the 5-divs ME scenario.

Again and again I'm being extremely generous to the Allies by assuming US could send ALL Army shipping to ME; it's seems unfair to nitpick me on small/obvious issues.
Peter89 wrote:For example, for the Haifa-Beirut railway, they used Australian engineers, African workers, steelwork from India, England and USA, ballast, stone and cement from local colonies, etc. All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking?
All of these resources are already committed to the OTL forces around MidEast/India.

I could see you making an argument that resources could have been shifted from Burma/India to ME. That would be a strategic tradeoff, you imply that OTL theater resources were just idle in 1942: that they could be devoted to a stronger defense of Turkey/ME - without any cost to the Allies elsewhere.
Peter89 wrote:If the British and Americans could deploy an EXTRA 20 divisions into Turkey, then my answer is probably no.
Good, thanks. Yes, I mean extra.
Peter89 wrote:What was true in late 1942 might not be true in mid-1943, and definately not true in late 1943.
On what basis are you confident in your late '43 judgment? It'd still be difficult, IMJ, and I'd post some numbers to show you why - Except you seem to reject the idea that we can analyze this numerically so that seems wasteful of my time.

Your position of epistemic uncertainty is fine - I disagree but whatever. But given your broad epistemic uncertainty regarding my assertion that we CAN know a rough limit on MidEast Allied force potential, how can you then assert "definitely" that the Allies could deploy/maintain 20 more divisions than OTL in late '43? See the contradiction there?

I suspect you're breezily confident in the one case and wracked with uncertainty in the other because the former fits your preconceived notions.

...which is fine, we have all biases. But it's also why I quantitative reasoning is necessary in many cases to overcome them.
Peter89 wrote:I can think of two scenarios which would be plausible:
Ok, fine. You don't want to answer my question. That's fair, it's not the thread topic.
What we know historically is this. The British approximately had the following units in the theatre in autumn 1942:

1.) The Persia and Iraq Command had (8 divisions, 2 brigades):
- British 7th Armoured Brigade
- 10th Indian Motor Brigade
- 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division
- 5th Infantry Division
- 56th (London) Infantry Division
- 5th Indian Infantry Division
- 6th Indian Infantry Division
- 8th Indian Infantry Division
- 10th Indian Infantry Division
- 31st Indian Armoured Division

2.) Middle Eastern Command had (11 divisions, 6 brigades):
1st Army Tank Brigade
1st Armoured Brigade
12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade
2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade
21st Indian Infantry Brigade
British 23rd Armoured Brigade
Australian 9th Division
2nd New Zealand Division
South African 1st Infantry Division
4th Indian Infantry Division
British 44th (Home Counties) Infantry Division
British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division
British 51st (Highland) Infantry Division
British 1st Armoured Division
British 7th Armoured Division
British 8th Armoured Division
British 10th Armoured Division

Plus other smaller units and the forces devoted to the assault on Madagascar.

This is over 20 divisions with adequate air cover, armour, supplies, naval forces and ever increasing logistical capabilities.

There was also the Turkish Army, with at least 48 divisions of various combat value, supplies.

The Axis forces would be or would not be there at El-Alamein. The Germans would be or would not be in the Caucasus.

If the Axis forces are still in NA: the British ME Command has just to hold the line until Torch and the followup would trap and crush all Axis forces, most of the forces could be diverted to Turkey.
If the Axis forces are not in NA: the British ME Command could divert almost all of its forces to Turkey.

If the Germans are in the Caucasus: the Allies can divert the Persian Corridor LL to Turkey, including 10,000 motor vehicles in 1942 alone. Not to mention other deliveries to the Soviets.
If the Germans are not in the Caucasus: the Allies could improve the Turkish Army's situation by diverting some of the LL to Turkey.

In any case, on the original German maps of the region there is no proper airfield except a few in the Caucasus (eg. in Jerevan), there can be no forward supply depots and the railways and waterways supporting the invasion would be inadequate to sustain a large army for a long time. Also, the railways would be interdicted by different gauges, bodies of water or dozens of kms of mountains. In my opinion, no sustained fight is realistic with these logistical foundations.

If the Germans decide to improve their LOCs, the Allies would buy time, and they were working much more effectively in this regard. So if the Germans, let's say spend half a year to consolidate their gains in the Caucasus and in the Balkans, the Allies' buildup would reach a degree where almost everything is possible, including the diversion of most forces from NA, as the Germans will have no means to return to the continent after they've been kicked out.

Thus, I think the Germans had two options:
1.) A short, sharp invasion with little and fast preparations. The range of the invasion is limited, and they can hope that the defense will collapse.
2.) A raid-like attack.

If the defenders refuse to collapse, the Germans would exhaust their offensive power, and would be slowly grinded down.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#200

Post by Peter89 » 04 Jun 2021, 17:05

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Jun 2021, 15:58
Peter89 wrote:All these materials fall under the category of "engineering materials", but how on earth can we calculate the shipping requirements for such an undertaking?
Meant to respond specifically to this, which is a valid point but needs clarification.

Specifically, GLS tells us engineering materials were ~9% of maintenance requirements in ETO.

I could say more but again if you refuse to engage with quantitative analysis, I won't. I don't mean that rudely, I'm just respecting your position that we can't say anything useful on this topic (but again - then how can you make your confident conclusions?).
Listen TMP, I demonstrated that the Allies (British) used resources from every corner of their worldwide empire. I admit, I don't know how can I calculate the shipping requirements for building airfields, ports, etc. under these conditions. It's not that I can't add 2 to 2. I have the exact numbers for the railway buildings, and it's not a walk in a park. Stuff and labour were coming from six-seven directions, including from local sources. If you calculate, for example, the shipping requirements for building up an airfield in Turkey, I will not argue with you. I can't do it.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#201

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:11

Hello guys,

I found some interesting, original pieces. Enjoy!

Turkish defenses on the western frontiers
Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#202

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:12

Turkish Army dispositions

Image

The German estimate of the Turkish Army was 1.2-1.5m, divided into 47 Infantry Divisions, 4 Mountain Divisions, 3 Cavarly Divisions, 1 Motorized / mechanized division, and other smaller units.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#203

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:19

Turkish Air Force dispositions

Image

The German estimate was 14-14 bomber and fighter squadrons, with 4 recce squadrons and 2 coastal squadrons.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#204

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:20

Turkish fuel dumps and war industry

Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#205

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:25

Roads and railroads in Turkey. West

Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#206

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:28

Roads and railroads in Turkey. East

Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#207

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:29

Turkish Anti-Aircraft defenses


Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Peter89
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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#208

Post by Peter89 » 07 Jun 2021, 15:32

Turkish airfields and their German-style categorizations


Image
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#209

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Jun 2021, 16:59

Peter89 wrote:
07 Jun 2021, 15:11
Hello guys,

I found some interesting, original pieces. Enjoy!

Turkish defenses on the western frontiers
Image

None of what you posted displays
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Peter89
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Posts: 2369
Joined: 28 Aug 2018, 06:52
Location: Europe

Re: Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

#210

Post by Peter89 » 08 Jun 2021, 17:20

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
08 Jun 2021, 16:59
Peter89 wrote:
07 Jun 2021, 15:11
Hello guys,

I found some interesting, original pieces. Enjoy!

Turkish defenses on the western frontiers
Image

None of what you posted displays
What doesn't it display? Sorry, I don't get what you mean here.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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