Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[TheMarcksPlan]

As for the British

What direct evidence do you have that Britain ever tried - or planned to try - to import vast amounts of black/brown foreign laborers to increase production?

Absent such evidence (I've looked and haven't found any), you have to argue that a Britain who perceived a non-zero existential threat in '40/'41, yet didn't make those plans, would have made those plans had the SU fallen.

While I can see how that is narrative is convincing if one holds a prior that Britain would never have made peace with Hitler's Germany, even then it's difficult to see how they respond in a timely and/or effective manner. If they start trying to move Indians and Africans to Britain in the midst of imperial collapse around the Indian Ocean, it's not at all clear that they find willing laborers. If they perceive the need for an unprecedented labor campaign in, say, early '43, it's difficult to see how this bears significant return before '45 - they need to set up a recruitment and training apparatus plus produce/buy the necessary capital. By contrast, Germany was substituting foreign for domestic labor from very early in the war - just without the urgency displayed after Moscow.

OTOH, if one does not hold the prior that Britain would never make peace with Hitler's Germany (as I do not), then one must consider political parameters regarding mass importation of black/brown laborers.

the Sikh regiments were generally considered some of the finest in the army

...and many other elite Indian units as well, such as the Ghurkas.

But these are small minority populations whose allegiance to the crown was nurtured over centuries of imperial policy that played off internal divisions to maintain the Raj. IIRC at least half the Indian Army was Muslim, another minority similarly more friendly to the Raj based on imperial politics.

Given the history of the Raj and the example of Bose's INA, one cannot simply project the behavior of India's millions from that of its elite military minorities.

In post-SU ATL in which Japan has also largely defeated China and is posing a much larger threat to India, I'd argue the allegiance of India's broad population is as likely Axis as Allied.

[TheMarcksPlan]

A single rail line that's hundreds of miles long is probably too vulnerable to airpower and special ops to function at normal capacity. You need to build in a 'fudge factor' of maybe about 50% reduction or more due to enemy action. The example that comes to mind is France 1944, except that was an entire rail network, not just one line. What's the supply rate of the Baghdad rail line per day?

I don't have a good source on the existing capacity of the Baghdad line. But if we look at German lines in the East by mid-'43, they had been built up massively to accommodate, e.g., the Kursk buildup. In Russia Germany spent billions of RM throughout '42-'43 to upgrade rail lines and repair them after partisan attacks. They built numerous completely new bridges, including nearly completing one over Kerch Strait. Here Germany can devote all that engineering capacity to a few MidEast lines.

The other factor is Siebel ferries and whatnot working the rivers like the Tigris and Nile.

Not only that, also the massive truck fleet used OTL for the Ostheer. If serious rail problems emerge in Mesopotamia, Germany can truck from Turkey and/or Caucasus.

It's hard to overstate the implications of no longer having to fight history's greatest-ever land war.

The problem is that the Allies were increasing the accuracy of their raids faster than the Germans were increasing the lethality of their defenses. I am not convinced the Germans could maintain their oil production through 1945 against the mass of Anglo-American air attack.

It's a big topic but I just can't see a daylight bombing campaign working against a post-SU Germany. As I've discussed elsewhere, American daylight bombing campaigns were trading air assets with the LW at ~4:1 attrition ratio in value terms. Big Week was actually worse at ~10:1, so longer-range escorts didn't solve the problem until the LW's collapse later that year.

It's fine to wage war this inefficiently if Russia's doing most of the fighting; absent the SU much less so. The LW doesn't collapse and is much, much stronger.

So a quick google search establishes that there are three large rivers basins in Stalin's rump empire flowing to the Artic Ocean.

Per Appendix D to Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, 23 ships went to the Soviet Arctic in '42 and 9 in '43 (June-August). These were mostly to establish Siberian bases for the ALSIB route. "Port facilities" were barges that carried supplies up the rivers. So I can't see this being a viable long-term supply route.

Also from GLS:

In early July 1942 the Office of LendLease Administration suggested opening a
route through the Bering Strait and Arctic
Ocean around the northern fringe of
Siberia to Murmansk and Archangel,
pointing out that the Russians claimed
they were using this route during the summer
months. Pursuing this idea, WSA
found some cargo vessels it considered
suited to arctic service, and in August
turned over seven of them and one tanker
to the Russians. But even the Russians apparently
found this arctic route too formidable and instead placed the ships on the
regular run to Vladivostok.

So even the Russians didn't want their ships on this route. Plus with no port facilities and only 2 months of remotely viable weather, I can't see this being a viable large-scale transport route.

The Iranian route to supply Stalin looks really dependent on communications via the Caspian Sea.

Assuming Stalin has a death wish and wants to fight on after Germany reaches Baku and Urals, the Caspian Sea quickly becomes non-viable. There's a plain all along its southern shore:



Once the Germans are halfway down the plain, it's only 150mi to the other end. So Caspian Sea shipping would be more vulnerable to air interdiction than shipping between Libya and Crete (200mi), which always required a massive convoy operation. There's no naval force capable of putting up a sufficient AA barrage so I don't see shipping here being viable.

Plus the logistics of supplying Stalin through Persia AND maintaining a ground force there capable of stopping the Germans on the western shore are orders of magnitude beyond what was available.

Stalin's objective will be to recapture Moscow and the Soviet heartland.

I envision Germany in the Urals by Fall '42, something with which you might not agree.

By Fall '42 in my ATL, SU has a population of 40-50mil and no oil, is a third-rate military power. I can't imagine Stalin wanting to fight on in that circumstance. Germans can easily move along the Siberian plain in '43 to take Tyumen, Magnitogorsk, Omsk, and Novossibirsk. They'll move into Kazakhstan, using Brandenbergers to spread Islamic uprisings everywhere (as happened in the Caucasus). IMO the obvious conclusion for Stalin is he can keep his (smaller) regime or lose everything to help the Allied cause. In that condition, I can't imagine Stalin acting altruistically rather than rationally.

Of course you probably disagree with my Eastern Front ATL.

I don't think the war ends in 1944 or 1945.

To be clear I meant only the European war and of course it's not a mathematical prediction.

Basically I see the US pivoting eastward, with FDR losing in '44. Without strong American support, Britain throws in the towel too.

It's possible too that Hitler overplays his hand and demands insane peace terms like a base in Scotland.

Then the war continues and it's a race between Sealion '45 and the A-bomb.

[Terry Duncan]

What direct evidence do you have that Britain ever tried - or planned to try - to import vast amounts of black/brown foreign laborers to increase production?

At the only point there was a direct threat to Britain, in summer 1940, we did not even conscript all available manpower, and after that there was not exactly a major manpower shortage needing the import of lots of extra labour. Even by the end of the war we were not enlisting all the manpower we had in WWI despite shortages in the army.

and many other elite Indian units as well, such as the Ghurkas.

But these are small minority populations whose allegiance to the crown was nurtured over centuries of imperial policy that played off internal divisions to maintain the Raj. IIRC at least half the Indian Army was Muslim, another minority similarly more friendly to the Raj based on imperial politics.

There were enough of these minorities to form a four million man volunteer army in India without too much effort let alone conscription. Anyhow, the point was that the British were generally willing to serve alongside other nationalities and had done so for a long time by WWII.

[TheMarcksPlan]

What direct evidence do you have that Britain ever tried - or planned to try - to import vast amounts of black/brown foreign laborers to increase production?

At the only point there was a direct threat to Britain

So there's no evidence of such a plan... Which is fine; it doesn't rule out your argument the plan would have been adopted.

But it also doesn't suggest that I simply "ignore" an important argument, as you accuse me of doing. Rather, I see something which was never planned nor even discussed, and against which serious political and logistical problems militate.

There were enough of these minorities to form a four million man volunteer army in India without too much effort let alone conscription.

Neither have I ever "ignored" the large Indian Army.

Rather, I have questioned the combat value of its vast bulk - most of which was never even equipped for combat, let alone used in it.

It is also highly dubious whether conscription was a viable option. It would as likely have helped Quit India as the Raj.

Finally, the Axis had its own massive auxiliary armies. Between Italy, Romania, and Hungary several million. If Spain joins up (as is likely post-SU), add another million or more. Plus the OTL Hiwis numbered in the millions and could have been larger post-SU.

I haven't centered these Axis auxiliaries in my arguments because they had dubious combat value. I.e. I treat them similarly to the Indian army.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I haven't centered these Axis auxiliaries in my arguments because they had dubious combat value.

I could go on...
Bose's INA numbered ~350k while recruiting exclusively from Indian PoW's and expatriates in Southeast Asia. I.e. it never had a chance to recruit in India. How big is it if Japan gets anywhere in India?

The Chinese Collaborationist Army numbered 683,000 OTL; if the Axis war is going better how big is it?

The Waffen-SS numbered ~500k. How big is it if Germany defeats SU and expands its recruitment area?

For non-US/UK/Dominion areas, the argument that Allied manpower greatly exceeded Axis relies on assuming that colonial peoples would reliably favor the Allies over the Axis. At the very least that's a bad assumption. In many cases it's demonstrably false (see Iraqi Uprising of 1941, Egyptian demonstrations and Britain threatening a coup against Farouk).

[Terry Duncan]

I haven't centered these Axis auxiliaries in my arguments because they had dubious combat value.

I could go on...
Bose's INA numbered ~350k while recruiting exclusively from Indian PoW's and expatriates in Southeast Asia. I.e. it never had a chance to recruit in India. How big is it if Japan gets anywhere in India?

The Chinese Collaborationist Army numbered 683,000 OTL; if the Axis war is going better how big is it?

The Waffen-SS numbered ~500k. How big is it if Germany defeats SU and expands its recruitment area?

For non-US/UK/Dominion areas, the argument that Allied manpower greatly exceeded Axis relies on assuming that colonial peoples would reliably favor the Allies over the Axis. At the very least that's a bad assumption. In many cases it's demonstrably false (see Iraqi Uprising of 1941, Egyptian demonstrations and Britain threatening a coup against Farouk).

The Japanese behaviour in SE Asia fairly quickly convinced many of the locals they were better of with the British. We could argue this forever, but the Allied Powers still had access to greater manpower. How much on either side can be relied on may vary, as well as how well using these other sources would be seen as acceptable can be debated, but the base figures are massively in favour of the Allies, as is the access to resources.

I would rather not derail this thread further, it is enough to say that German losses in Russia during 1941 and 1942 were significant and opening another front may not favour them.

[TheMarcksPlan]

We could argue this forever,

Gods and mods willing, we will (though not constantly)

but the Allied Powers still had access to greater manpower.

If Axis occupies all of Europe and Eastern China, probably even that wouldn't be true.

German losses in Russia during 1941 and 1942 were significant and opening another front may not favour them.

Nothing to argue with here except your spelling of favor. Probably the King added the extra "u" back in the day to increase your Stamp Act revenue!

[glenn239]

It is also highly dubious whether conscription was a viable option. It would as likely have helped Quit India as the Raj.

No doubt, but in the meantime it would have given the British the means to fight a Mesopotamian war like they did in WW1.

[glenn239]

It's fine to wage war this inefficiently if Russia's doing most of the fighting; absent the SU much less so. The LW doesn't collapse and is much, much stronger.

But the strength of the LW does not protect the German oil industry over the course of years. The problem is the strength and accuracy of the Allied attacks. There is no level of strength of the LW that matches the Allied capacity for aerial warfare. The Allied air attacks will grind the German oil industry down. The LW might inflict 20,000 or 30,000 aerial losses a year, but this is insufficient to dent the momentum of the Allied aerial buildup.

Per Appendix D to Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, 23 ships went to the Soviet Arctic in '42 and 9 in '43 (June-August). These were mostly to establish Siberian bases for the ALSIB route. "Port facilities" were barges that carried supplies up the rivers. So I can't see this being a viable long-term supply route.

These are two very different scenarios. The Allies in WW2 had three supply lines to the USSR. The Allies in this scenario do not. You've indicated that the Japanese attack the USSR and capture Vladivostok, and that Stalin is allowing supplies to transfer between Germany and Japan. This is contradictory. Stalin is at war with Japan and no supplies will be recieved by Japan from Germany via the TSRR. Or, Japan did not seize Vladivostok and Stalin is recieving millions of tons of supplies per year via this route.

Assuming that the Japanese have gone to war with the USSR, then the Allies have no choice but to expand the Artic route via the Siberian river basins. This route will be inferior to any of the three historical routes, but in conjunction with the Caspian Sea/Iran route, might be able to recover maybe 40% or so of the historical tonnage delivered, call it maybe 15% on the Artic route and 25% on the Iranian route.

So even the Russians didn't want their ships on this route. Plus with no port facilities and only 2 months of remotely viable weather, I can't see this being a viable large-scale transport route.

Americans and logistics are like ducks and water. When the rivers froze they'd send in the snow plows and use them as ice roads.

Assuming Stalin has a death wish and wants to fight on after Germany reaches Baku and Urals, the Caspian Sea quickly becomes non-viable. There's a plain all along its southern shore:

Hitler can do nothing to Stalin beyond the Urals - he's got thousands of miles of heartland. So Stalin has no incentive to make peace with Hitler because Hitler cannot deliver the knockout blow. Stalin will continue the war in hopes that he will recapture Moscow and the rest of the USSR as Germany starts losing the war in the West.

I see no issues in the Caspian Sea beyond Allied specialist logistics shipping such as LST's and such, once a production line is set up to assemble kits and available rail lines repaired and properly staffed. The only question is how much supply can be delivered.

Once the Germans are halfway down the plain, it's only 150mi to the other end. So Caspian Sea shipping would be more vulnerable to air interdiction than shipping between Libya and Crete (200mi), which always required a massive convoy operation. There's no naval force capable of putting up a sufficient AA barrage so I don't see shipping here being viable.

The Allies will establish their own land based airpower on the west side of the Caspian to cover communications, and the Allies can provide airpower for Stalin's front.

Basically I see the US pivoting eastward, with FDR losing in '44. Without strong American support, Britain throws in the towel too.

What I see is the US doubling down on airpower, the Germans overextending themselves beyond the Urals and into the Middle East, and the war entering a phase by 1944 where the Germans are on the defensive everywhere and losing ground. The German oil industry will be ground down. I see no basis for an Allied invasion of France in 1944, 1945, or even 1946.

[Takao]

Mr. Marcks is off base with 350k members.

350k was the estimate for the IIL(Indian Independence League). Only about 40k-50k joined the INA.

[TheMarcksPlan]

There is no level of strength of the LW that matches the Allied capacity for aerial warfare.

Were this true then obviously I'd have no leg to stand on.

Could the Allies beat 50 LW's? 10? 5?

I project ~4x OTL LW production (in value, not necessarily frames) in 44 had Germany beat SU in 42. Aside from more production, LW has better training due to Russian and (later) MidEast oil.

These are two very different scenarios. The Allies in WW2 had three supply lines to the USSR. The Allies in this scenario do not

Fair, point conceded - the Allies could have done significant LL to SU via Arctic.

But.only for ~2 months/year. If they can move 20% of LL flow for 1/5 of a year that's still only 4%.

You've indicated that the Japanese attack the USSR and capture Vladivostok, and that Stalin is allowing supplies to transfer between Germany and Japan. This is contradictory

Stalin makes peace with Germany AND Japan in 42, henceforth allows TSRR traffic. He's "paid" for it in oil (he has zero) and/or occupation credits.

The alternative to this arrangement:

Hitler can do nothing to Stalin beyond the Urals - he's got thousands of miles of heartland

From the Urals it's ~900 miles to Novosobirsk, after which Stalin has a small Siberian Duchy west of Lake Baikal (Japan takes everything East of the lake). Germans can cover that in 43 with 60 or so divisions easily, absent a peace. Then in 44 or even still during 43, Axis hunts Stalin out of some Siberian hole (if he's not been overthrown and executed yet).

For Germany to assign ~60 divs to finish a rump SU has little impact on Germany's anti-W.Allies war (though much impact impact on Japan's war absent German help).

Knowing that's how 43-44 goes absent peace, Stalin makes peace.

I see no issues in the Caspian Sea beyond Allied specialist logistics shipping such as LST's and such, once a production line is set up to assemble kits and available rail lines repaired and properly staffed. The only question is how much supply can be delivered.

Supplies are indeed the issue.

How do the Allies have shipping to simultaneously:

1. Send most LL to Persia
2. Send and maintain an army capable of stopping Ostheer in far northern Iran.
3. Send and maintain a massive air force to combat the LW.

The Allies don't have the shipping just to send - let alone maintain - 10 divisions in Persia even if US ignores Japan and assigns all US Army shipping to Persia (see spreadsheet upthread).

[pugsville]

I haven't centered these Axis auxiliaries in my arguments because they had dubious combat value.

I could go on...
Bose's INA numbered ~350k while recruiting exclusively from Indian PoW's and expatriates in Southeast Asia. I.e. it never had a chance to recruit in India. How big is it if Japan gets anywhere in India?

The Chinese Collaborationist Army numbered 683,000 OTL; if the Axis war is going better how big is it?

The Waffen-SS numbered ~500k. How big is it if Germany defeats SU and expands its recruitment area?

For non-US/UK/Dominion areas, the argument that Allied manpower greatly exceeded Axis relies on assuming that colonial peoples would reliably favor the Allies over the Axis. At the very least that's a bad assumption. In many cases it's demonstrably false (see Iraqi Uprising of 1941, Egyptian demonstrations and Britain threatening a coup against Farouk).

The Indian National army peaked at 50,000 men. the 350,000 figure is for IIL (the Indian Independence league) NOT the military organization.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The Indian National army peaked at 50,000 men. the 350,000 figure is for IIL (the Indian Independence league) NOT the military organization.

Pugsville is correct; TMP was wrong.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Upthread we've heard tell that any larger-scale Allied effort in the MidEast could have been kept in fuel by the Abadan oil refinery.

I have argued that, while Abadan's production was a factor, its output was already committed elsewhere. Therefore any in-theater use of Abadan's oil must be analyzed for the shipping impact of supplying those who, OTL, relied on Abadan.

Well of course TMP isn't smart enough to think of points that contemporaries didn't think of themselves; the British had anticipated this issue. From THE ROYAL NAVY IN EASTERN WATERS:

The
Middle East was now expected to contribute 14.5 million tons of oil in the
year beginning 1 July 1942, 10 per cent higher than the May figure, with 11.5
million tons from the Persian Gulf, although actual production would fall
some way short of this target.24 The higher planned output reflected the new
demands of sustaining the eastern war in India and Australasia, and the
impact of the supplies now lost to the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies
and Burma. If Abadan was lost, and the threat from German attack in the
west or north had now risen significantly, supplies could theoretically be made
good from the western hemisphere, but only by deploying 270 additional
tankers, which were not available. The consequence would be a reduction in
supply of 20 per cent in the West as well as the East. The board concluded that
the loss of the Persian fields would therefore be ‘calamitous’, as it would force
a drastic reduction in total war capacity, and probably the abandonment of
some operations.25
As the First Sea Lord emphasised, without Abadan and the Persian fields it
would be impossible to sustain Britain’s war effort in the Middle East, but also
to provide any significant aid to China through India, or to support the
southwest Pacific offensive at Guadalcanal from Australia later in the year.26
This reflected the fact that, following the loss of the oilfields in the Netherlands
East Indies and Burma, Abadan oil underpinned the Indian war effort,
including the American forces based there, and aid to China for the rest of the
war. p.360-61

So any argument that Abadan's output could be diverted to supply a large Allied effort in the MidEast, must reckon with the fact that Abadan already supplied the Aus-NZ economies, the Indian war effort, aid to China, and even Guadalcanal.

As my source notes, replacing Abadan's supply (as would be required were the Allies to use Abadan's output in the MidEast) would require 270 tankers - an impossibility in the mid-war years.

While my upthread spreadsheet on ATL Allied MidEast shipping capacity relieves the Good Guys of all POL shipments due to Abadan, this was noted as a generous allowance. It is confirmed as (overly) generous: the Allies would have faced insuperable problems replacing Abadan's output, had they used it for a bigger MidEast commitment. How much of Abadan's output would have been necessary to defend MidEast? I can't say right now. But I know that, even if zero is needed by the extra divisions and planes, they still can't even deploy an adequate force (let alone maintain one).

And again - I'm obviously not smart enough to think of these things myself. So take it from Harry Hopkins, who said: "The sea lines of communication are long and vulnerable, presenting an impractical proposition for military operations against strong enemy movement out of the Mediterranean." [recounted here]

----------

TMP bookmark: Abadan oil usage

[glenn239]

Could the Allies beat 50 LW's? 10? 5?

It's not a question of beating '10' Luftwaffes. It's a question of whether Allied airpower can fatally degrade German oil production regardless of the size of the Luftwaffe. I think the answer is yes, even if the Luftwaffe somehow manages to become x4 it's historical size.

But.only for ~2 months/year. If they can move 20% of LL flow for 1/5 of a year that's still only 4%.

I guessed 15%. You guess 4%. So let's say 10% and move on. That's about 500,000 tons of supply per year. Let's say the Iranian route of 1,000,000 tons per year absorbs half of its supply with Allied operations, the other half gets to Stalin. That's a million tons per year. If Stalin has 2 million troops under arms after being ejected from Europe, that's 3lbs per man per day. That's not enough to take Moscow, but it is enough to make the Eastern Front a major headache for 'Dolf. No doubt there will be tens of millions of refugees from the European theatre that fled the Nazis, so every ton of food the Allies ship is critical.

Also note that feeding refugees from Russian Europe presumably requires the refugees to move to the coast where the shipping is. That's two different, seperate, distinct problems. The first being supplying Stalin far inland, the second being to drop supplies on coastal enclaves with huge refugee populations from Moscow and elsewhere.

Stalin makes peace with Germany AND Japan in 42, henceforth allows TSRR traffic. He's "paid" for it in oil (he has zero) and/or occupation credits.

I'm not seeing why Stalin will make peace with Hitler. He will just fall back further into the heartland as necessary, just like in the Civil War. Stalin is not allowing one pound of supplies to Japan on the TSRR if Japan attacks Vladivostok.

From the Urals it's ~900 miles to Novosobirsk, after which Stalin has a small Siberian Duchy west of Lake Baikal (Japan takes everything East of the lake). Germans can cover that in 43 with 60 or so divisions easily, absent a peace. Then in 44 or even still during 43, Axis hunts Stalin out of some Siberian hole (if he's not been overthrown and executed yet).

Frankly I doubt the Germans ever make it to the Ural Mountains in strength. It's an entire campaigning season to go from Stalingrad to the Urals, so 1943 is burned and in 1944 the Allied pressure in the West will mean Hitler has bigger problems than arbitrary lines on a map.

How do the Allies have shipping to simultaneously:

1. Send most LL to Persia
2. Send and maintain an army capable of stopping Ostheer in far northern Iran.
3. Send and maintain a massive air force to combat the LW.

The Allies don't have the shipping just to send - let alone maintain - 10 divisions in Persia even if US ignores Japan and assigns all US Army shipping to Persia (see spreadsheet upthread).

I saw your upthread spreadsheet. It has nothing to do with the Caspian Sea region. An allied landing in Turkey is one thing for German logistics. An allied advance up the west bank of the Caspian Sea is entirely another thing altogether - the German logistics are far more difficult on the east bank of the Caspian than at the Straights! Your data indicates that a Liberty ship of 10,000 measurement tons can deliver 17,000 tons of supply to Iran per year. Allied divisions operated at 60lbs per man per day, (all in, including airpower I think), so let's say 50lbs per man per day. The Allies need 2.3 million tons of shipping per year to sustain 10 armored divisions in southern Russia covered by robust tactical airpower. 2.3 million tons is 134 Liberty ships. The Americans built 2,700 Liberty ships in WW2. This does not include 20,000,000 tons of British shipping.