Context is everything though isn't it? Churchill didn't have a single "concept" for victory - his views on possible routes to victory evolved in response to the changes in the overall situation. Churchill's concept in September 1939 would have been different to that in September 1940, September 1941, September 1942, etc, etc...Churchill's concept for Anglo-American victory was in line with the US "Victory Program of 1941": Allies would bomb Germany then, to avoid full-scale WW1-style battle, conduct expeditionary landings with smaller mechanized forces.
The plan was unworkable - risible actually. It tacitly assumed that, even were it possible to limit land warfare to small mechanized forces, expertise in such warfare would suddenly desert the Germans and inhabit the Allies.
If the Soviet Union had collapsed, no doubt his "concept" would have changed again.
I also note that there has been little, if any, reference in the discussion on the productivity of the German aircraft industry of either the impact of Allied bombing (and consequent dispersal and atomisation of production) nor of the generally recognised fall off in quality of those airframes produced. Perhaps that should be included as a factor?
BTW many thanks for the links to Mark Harrison's multitude of works and mention of Arming the Luftwaffe. The latter is definitely on my updated "most wanted" list!