historygeek2021 wrote: ↑09 Jul 2021 18:13
Elsewhere, Richard gives us the total number of aircraft industry workers in each country:
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑29 Oct 2020 02:20
Okay, so then in 3Q43, the "final process of assembly" labor in the aviation industry (airframe, engines, and props) in Germany was 935,000 and the US was 910,851 (airframe), 296,949 (engines), and 157,593 (props), for a total of 1,365,393. Now do the productivity calculation.
He doesn't. There are two problems with the comparison: first, the German figure of 935,000 workers, sourced from
here, comprises a wider category of workers than those producing 'airframes, engines and propellers'. Namely, it includes workers producing 'Aircraft equipment' - presumably radios, weapons, etc. Second, the figure of 910,851 U.S. workers engaged in airframe production differs from the USSBS figure of 1,084,000 for 5/31/43. Presumably, the USSBS knew its U.S. data. The simplest explanation? Richard's figure excludes subcontractors:
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑09 Jul 2021 18:13
If we use Richard's figures, then I get:
A false impression. I've actually reconciled the two contradictory sets of USSBS figures. The correct figures are found
here, in pounds. In this
other report, the figures are given as metric ones, a confounding mistake.
The way the USSBS derived German airframe weights must be qualified: their figures aren't official German data, but rather estimates made by the authors, using unchanging airframe weights for each German aircraft type throughout the war years, not taking account of variance in weight between models, which tended to get heavier as the war progressed. It is left unsaid whether U.S. figures are calculated on the same basis, but given that they come from an official U.S. digest, I would tend to assume that they are more precise.
In any event, German figures include some small production outsourced to occupied countries, so at the end of the day, one slight discrepancy in one direction might well be corrected by another in the other direction.
On that basis, I have created a table to compare German and U.S. (without U.S. orders in Canada) production of airframes and parts:
Data is in pounds. It includes spare parts for both countries. The column 'Ratio' is German production expressed as a percent of that of the U.S. The column 'Bomb t.' is the tonnage (short tons) dropped on aircraft production targets in Europe by Allied strategic air forces, and is sourced from
here.
Beneath the blue line (row 18) is the USSBS data on manpower (including subcontractors) employed on airframe production, for both countries on the 31st of May of each year. Cases E19 to E21 are German figures expressed as a percent of the U.S. Cases G19 to G21 are what most interests us, and show productivity.
They are calculated thus, for each year:
German production for May + June / workforce on May 31st, divided by U.S. production for May + June / workforce on May 31st.
We see that German productivity was 65% of the U.S. in spring 1942 and 70.5% in spring 1943. This, however, would already constitute degraded figures due to (1) the replacement of German with foreign workers (most prominent in 1942) and, starting in the second quarter of 1943, (2) strategic bombing on aircraft production targets. By spring 1944, the effects of strategic bombing appear to have led to a collapse of German productivity, which by then was no more than 44.4% of the U.S.
If we correct for the negative effects of slave labor and early strategic bombing on German productivity, I would estimate 'real' German productivity in the aircraft industry at ~80% of the U.S.