Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[pugsville]

You're suggesting that the Germans can take the Persian Gulf ports in one campaign season in 1942? Seems unlikely.

No, not in '42.

I'm not exactly sure how the campaign unfolds, week-by-week. One reason I appreciate the discussion - it's helping to reveal the issues and possible course.

Here's one possible version of the timeline but only provisional:

• May '42: Ostheer offensive begins against 40% weaker SU. Because German permanent casualties in Barbarossa were 300k lower, Germany has 15 extra divisions (or equivalents), which it deploys as follows: 4 in Norway (to defend, absent LW forces transferred for Malta attack), 1 in Sicily (to land on Malta), 3 in Italy for transfer to North Africa, 8 in France (therefore Hitler avoids spending on Atlantic Wall).
• July '42: Axis takes Malta. 3 divisions begin transfer to North Africa. Rommel waits for them on Gazala line.
• August: Ostheer begins transferring ~30 divisions west: 25 to Spanish border, where they join existing forces to compel Franco into the war. 5 begin moving to Thrace to force Turkey's hand. Entirety of Caucasus in German hands by end of month.
• September: SU makes peace (or even not, if you like), HG-A continues advance down Caspian plain from Azerbaijan into Iran (has SU allowed the British into northern Iran?). Delayed Gazala battle with 3 extra German divisions; 8th Army losses greater than OTL Gazala. Of Ostheer's 130 divisions, 15 more begin moving to Thrace (5 already in Thrace begin moving to Aegean Islands), 25 already in France, 40 remain in East, 10 in Iran, 35 demobilized.
• October: LW has 1,000 more planes in Crete/Libya and Sicily forces transferred forward after Malta: Germany has air superiority over Egypt. Rommel at El Alamein building up supplies.
• November: Rommel advances to the Nile. HG-A, advancing with 10 divisions on Caspian plane, mauls Polish and Indian forces, checked at mountain passes by American divisions. Germany has 20 divisions facing Turkey from Thrace and Aegean, most of LW is either in Eastern Med or Caucasus. Germany has destroyed/engaged in Iran the Empire/Polish forces meant to help it resist Germany. Turkey acquiesces to Germany crossing its borders (or joins Axis for territorial gains at Greece's expense). Spain, facing ~40 divisions on its borders, joins Axis.

From there it's a couple months buildup for Germany in Turkey, then offensives on Mesopotamian and Levantine Axes with 20 divisions coming out of Turkey. Say March '43 start. Rommel builds up on the Nile in this period.

Allies are now facing 36 German divisions in the Mideast - 20 Turkey, 10 Iran, 7 Egypt (could be more in Egypt but leaving that for now). There is no reasonable prospect whatsoever of Allies matching that force level. They have to concentrate somewhere.

IMO their best course is to concentrate on the Mesopotamian Axis to protect Abadan/Khuzestan, loss of which has catastrophic global consequences:

-They to have supply India/Australia theaters' fuel from Western Hemisphere at ~6-8x the shipping cost.
-Their only Iranian port would be Bushire, which is low-capacity and has only one road connection onward, which means they lose the western half of Iran.

By concentrating in Mesopotamia they can probably hold somewhere north of Basra against the initial German offensive. They lose Suez and the Levant; Mediterranean becomes an Axis lake.

Now, as you correctly identify, it's a matter of Axis vs. Allied logistics. Axis supplies will be via the below routes:



Solid lines rail, dashed road. On the red line I've added the Mardin-Diyarbakir link between Turkish and Iraqi railways. This was nearly complete OTL and the Germans are sure to complete it.

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This is a more difficult picture for the Axis getting to Basra than I initially envisioned.

Allied success at holding Basra (for now, pending further discussion) depends, however, on concentrating there and giving up the Mediterranean. Is that politically feasible? I don't know.

Anyways, thanks again for the discussion Glenn, it's giving me much to think about.

Rommel could not supply the troops he had how does he supply three more? He can't.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Rommel could not supply the troops he had how does he supply three more? He can't.

You're right, I've completely forgotten even to mention logistics anywhere in this thread. Thank you for reminding me. Thank God a real expert has joined the thread.

[glenn239]

You're right, I've completely forgotten even to mention logistics anywhere in this thread. Thank you for reminding me. Thank God a real expert has joined the thread.

I've got no doubt that under your scenario premise the Germans can do some business where ever they pick. It's just that what we're talking of here is six vast fronts - the Urals, Iran, Turkey/Iraq, Egypt, France, Spain-North Africa. All of them will need a big slice of Germany's limited supply of mechanized divisions.

[glenn239]

How much shipping capacity to the MidEast (preferably in MT but as you like) was available to Allies in latter 42 and 43? I have stated my estimate, what's yours?

We've established that port capacity is the main stumbling block in 1942 so I'm more interested in that then the shipping details. Forget Torch and Roundup, that could be enought.

What we haven't confirmed is the Axis port capacities and rail capacities out of the Black Sea. I don't think the ports you identified in the Black Sea can handle the supply chain you estimated. I also doubt that it would be as much as the Allied capacity in the Persian Gulf as of August 1942. Then, factor in that the Axis are far from their supply heads trying to reach Tehran and Basrah, and I don't think the Axis can cut the Lend Lease line to the USSR.

[Tom from Cornwall]

-Libya's maximal unloading capacity for whole theater doesn't imply that, unless theater-max reached, there's no need for cranes at specific ports.

I think I understand your point - I was just looking at "ULTRA" signals to see whether they shed light on delivery of port infrastructure to help with repair to Benghazi in early '42 after it had changed hands a couple of times in a couple of months.

Why "Benghazi and Benghazi,"Tripoli and Tripoli" in the last dispatch?

That just seems to be the way the British sent these signals - all times, locations, ship names, unit numbers, etc were repeated to avoid confusion to avoid confusion.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

Why "Benghazi and Benghazi,"Tripoli and Tripoli" in the last dispatch?

That just seems to be the way the British sent these signals - all times, locations, ship names, unit numbers, etc were repeated to avoid confusion to avoid confusion.

Regards

Tom

ULTRA message protocol used that sign to designate "repeat" IIRC.

[Tom from Cornwall]

ULTRA message protocol used that sign to designate "repeat" IIRC.

Yes, and practice of repeating certain words, numbers, names, etc seems to have been pretty standard - certainly in British signals.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

In response to references in this and other threads to the flap that Marshall appeared to have got himself into about Russia in July 1942, I thought this section of a Sitrep on the situation in Russia as understood in Air Ministry in London and sent to Middle East would be of interest (source: CAB79/22/26 - dated 3 Aug 42):

Last sentence is worthy of reflection - although obviously its validity can be challenged.

Regards

Tom

[TheMarcksPlan]

We've established that port capacity is the main stumbling block in 1942 so I'm more interested in that then the shipping details.

I'm satisfied that the Allies could have expanded port capacity pretty rapidly, had they prioritized it, but at cost of the very earliest deployment shipments and/or some Soviet LL via the Persian Corridor. Just for example, US shifted in April '42 from building ports at Umm Qasr in Iraq (for British LoC) to building up Khoramshar and Bandar Shapur (for Soviet LL). By April US had the following equipment at Umm Qasr, which was apparently sufficient to begin a port expansion program:

Plant and enough equipment to begin had been brought down from the ships at Basra. There were 3 pile rigs and 5 tractors, a grader, 3 shovels, 2 truck cranes, 2 concrete mixers, 8 air compressors, 11 dump trucks, and 20 miscellaneous vehicles.

But then later that month:

a message arrived from Washington: "Consideration is now being given to a revision of your projects. Suspend all operations on Umm Qasr project until further instructions." ...Behind this sudden termination of the American construction projects in Iraq and the transfer of the engineer forces to Iran lay a fundamental change in high policy. [shift to Soviet LL shipments]

Source.

The equipment on-hand for the Umm Qasr mission was not, by American standards, large. Naught but shipping limited American ability to do both Iranian (Soviet LL) and Iraqi (British LoC) projects at once, had we invested the shipping capacity to move the required materials to the Gulf.

Forget Torch and Roundup, that could be enough [shipping].

Whether it is or isn't enough is a quantitative problem. From GLS v.1, we know the exact amount of cargo (in MT) shipped to US army abroad:



From this table, I get 9.7mil MT shipped to Europe/N.Afr up to June '43. Using a 3:1 ratio of cargo shipped there versus MidEast, that means ~3.2mil MT more could have been shipped to MidEast, by ignoring Torch and Roundup.

If no MidEast-deployed units had any maintenance/replacement shipping requirements whatsoever, that would get ~11divs to the MidEast (no air forces).

MidEast divs would, of course, have maintenance/replacement shipping requirements, however. Maintenance was, by Army averages, ~1/3 of deployment shipping. Even if we assume (by your "half of OTL maintenance" standard for MidEast) that it's 1/6 you can't get much more 7-8 divs to the MidEast (and no air forces) by using Torch/Roundup shipping alone. You have to assume massively-curtailed Pacific ambitions, as does my 15-div (+large air force) projection for maximal feasible US presence in 3Q '43 (that case neglects additional port-building resources but whatever, they're small in the big picture).

How many divisions do you think the US could have shipped to MidEast (and maintained there) by 3Q '43?

[TheMarcksPlan]

What we haven't confirmed is the Axis port capacities and rail capacities out of the Black Sea.

True statement and I've been frustrated in my research efforts to find 1940's port capacities for places like Samsun, Zonguldak, Batumi, Sokhumi, Sochi, Novorossisk, Izmir, Kusadasi, Alexandretta, Mersin, Beirut, and Haifa (anybody know?). Not readily Google-able, at least not in English.

On the broader strategic picture, though, I don't see much uncertainty here. Supporting 35 divisions through these ports in 3Q '43 requires ~300k tons monthly; we know that 150k tons arrived in Libya in April '42 (see upthread cite). I just can't imagine that Libya had ~half the port capacity as the entire eastern Black Sea and Mediterranean. Additionally, I think Germany/Axis would have been able to make up whatever shortfalls we can conceive by building up port infrastructure (Germany was the world's second-largest economy at this time). Finally, Germany can send shipments overland from Berlin to the Caucasus and to a functional river-crossing in Istanbul that requires a few dozen MFP's running a short ferry service over the Straits.

You will object with prima facie plausibility as you already have:

The ports in southern Turkey are not reliable because the Allies hold Cyprus and Palestine.

That doesn't recognize my argument, which relies on the timeline I laid out upthread:

• 1. Turkey acquiesces to German pressure in November '42 (or joins the Axis), after which
• 2. Germany is able to mount in early 1943 an offensive from southern Turkey into Levant/Palestine simultaneous with
• 3. A reinforced drive from Egypt and
• 4. A German drive from the Caucasus.

...as the Allies can't check all of these early '43 Axis offensives simultaneously, they forfeit the eastern Med (inc. Cyprus, which is either evacuated or donates PoW) and focus on holding Basra/Khuzestan. The initial German buildup in Turkey for the Levant/Palestine offensive goes by road (mainly) and rail; it's not limited by maintenance shipping.

The alternative to forfeiting the Eastern Med is losing an army group with it.

...as a result of which, Germany controls ports in southern Turkey and Palestine/Levant unmolested in 3Q '43 (but Allies still hold Basra and Khuzestan).

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My logistical picture in 3Q '43, then, assumes - I'll admit it - that Turkey, Syria, Palestine, and Caucasian SU had significantly greater port capacity in 1943 than did Libya. I don't think that's an unreasonable assumption but I'm open to evidence otherwise.

------------------------

Given the foregoing relative logistical pictures (this post and the preceding), it's obvious to me that Allies can't hold Basra/Khuzestan merely by forgoing Torch/Roundup. Good guys need a passive Pacific position just to add 15 American divisions to a theater with 35-40 German divisions (and that's assuming that Abadan can supply all fuel, which it certainly could not absent additional cost to replace Abadan's supply to Indian and Chinese theaters or abandonment of those theaters).

They might be able to hold Basra/Khuzestan though? That's what I'm re-evaluating at the moment, thanks to your comments and ongoing research. Critical factors, IMO, include:

• Axis truck logistics from Levant/Palestine ports and Diyarbakir/Mardin railheads towards Basra/Khuzestan. Hundreds of thousands of MV's are released from Ostheer so it's feasible, IMO, to see the Axis putting many more than 35-40 divs in the field. Allies cannot defend against >50 German divisions - that seems obvious, right?
• Allied logistical tradeoffs between building up air power (impacts Axis logistics) and building up minimal land forces to hold Basra/Khuzestan (air power won't matter if the armies can't hold north of Basra).

[Gooner1]

[*]Axis truck logistics from Levant/Palestine ports and Diyarbakir/Mardin railheads towards Basra/Khuzestan. Hundreds of thousands of MV's are released from Ostheer so it's feasible, IMO, to see the Axis putting many more than 35-40 divs in the field. Allies cannot defend against >50 German divisions - that seems obvious, right?

The Germans had hundreds of thousands of MT able to be released from the Ostheer?

[glenn239]

What we haven't confirmed is the Axis port capacities and rail capacities out of the Black Sea.

True statement and I've been frustrated in my research efforts to find 1940's port capacities for places like Samsun, Zonguldak, Batumi, Sokhumi, Sochi, Novorossisk, Izmir, Kusadasi, Alexandretta, Mersin, Beirut, and Haifa (anybody know?). Not readily Google-able, at least not in English.

On the broader strategic picture, though, I don't see much uncertainty here. Supporting 35 divisions through these ports in 3Q '43 requires ~300k tons monthly; we know that 150k tons arrived in Libya in April '42 (see upthread cite). I just can't imagine that Libya had ~half the port capacity as the entire eastern Black Sea and Mediterranean. Additionally, I think Germany/Axis would have been able to make up whatever shortfalls we can conceive by building up port infrastructure (Germany was the world's second-largest economy at this time). Finally, Germany can send shipments overland from Berlin to the Caucasus and to a functional river-crossing in Istanbul that requires a few dozen MFP's running a short ferry service over the Straits.

Of that list I suspect that Novorossisk is about the biggest port, that its actual capacity was more than the 1,500,000 tons annual I read somewhere for traffic in 1940. What are the rail links like between this port and Iraq/Iran?

That doesn't recognize my argument, which relies on the timeline I laid out upthread:

I didn't say the ports in question were not useable, I said not reliable, meaning, subject to enemy action.

...as the Allies can't check all of these early '43 Axis offensives simultaneously, they forfeit the eastern Med (inc. Cyprus, which is either evacuated or donates PoW) and focus on holding Basra/Khuzestan. The initial German buildup in Turkey for the Levant/Palestine offensive goes by road (mainly) and rail; it's not limited by maintenance shipping.

If the Germans get the Turkish rail network intact (as per your scenario), then sure. But if Turkey rejects the demands, (on the calculation that they can withdraw into Syria and Iraq), then the rail net will be heavily damaged and the situation is murkier.

The alternative to forfeiting the Eastern Med is losing an army group with it.

I think the Allies can always retreat southwards to escape destruction, using their naval power to establish supply whereever the front line happens to arrive at once the Germans have exhausted themselves offensively.

My logistical picture in 3Q '43, then, assumes - I'll admit it - that Turkey, Syria, Palestine, and Caucasian SU had significantly greater port capacity in 1943 than did Libya. I don't think that's an unreasonable assumption but I'm open to evidence otherwise.

Noted.

Given the foregoing relative logistical pictures (this post and the preceding), it's obvious to me that Allies can't hold Basra/Khuzestan merely by forgoing Torch/Roundup. Good guys need a passive Pacific position just to add 15 American divisions to a theater with 35-40 German divisions (and that's assuming that Abadan can supply all fuel, which it certainly could not absent additional cost to replace Abadan's supply to Indian and Chinese theaters or abandonment of those theaters).

Torch was a huge campaign logistically. I don't know the exact figures but in looking at the statistics I would surmise maybe 6 million tons of shipping between November 1942 and May 1943?

They might be able to hold Basra/Khuzestan though? That's what I'm re-evaluating at the moment, thanks to your comments and ongoing research. Critical factors, IMO, include:

Possibly. What seems evident most of all is that the war you are describing is being fought on a far vaster scale than the real war. These operational regions are each vistas of breathtaking size. To get to Basrah, we're talking an advance of roughly from the German border to Madrid in Spain. Iran alone comprises a theatre as volumous as the Eastern Front! Then, throw Turkey, Egypt, Spain, North Africa and the Ural Mountains on top. In these scales the bulk of the Axis armies - horse drawn infantry divisions - are not of much use. Only the smaller fraction of panzer and grenadier divisions seem handy.

Axis truck logistics from Levant/Palestine ports and Diyarbakir/Mardin railheads towards Basra/Khuzestan. Hundreds of thousands of MV's are released from Ostheer so it's feasible, IMO, to see the Axis putting many more than 35-40 divs in the field.

I question whether as many trucks and mechanized divisions can be released from Russia as you are assuming if Stalin does not surrender and Hitler is forced to contemplate a series of operations to try and reach the Urals against Red Army resistance.

[TheMarcksPlan]

If the Germans get the Turkish rail network intact (as per your scenario), then sure.

if Stalin does not surrender and Hitler is forced to contemplate a series of operations to try and reach the Urals against Red Army resistance.

This conversation is unmanageable if we disagree about which ATL we are in. I'm perfectly happy to concede everything is more difficult if you don't accept my priors.

I've summarized my "One more panzer group" ATL in another ATL's OP here. My view is decidedly not that Ostheer is pressing towards the Urals in '43. They have taken the Central Urals in '42 and, if Stalin holds out, the '43 Ostheer campaign is a relatively small one towards Novossibirsk and Central Asia. The latter shuts off any hope of Persian Corridor aid.

My latest ATL specifies that German Uboat production increases over OTL from late-40 or early '41. It follows logically from the conditions in my older ATL's but isn't something I've made explicit until recently - i.e. it would be a new introduction into our ongoing discussion in this thread. I won't ask you to incorporate it at this point but it has been in the background of my thinking. More German Uboats means more shipping losses up 3Q '43, which makes supporting a large MidEast Allied presence absolutely infeasible, IMO.

As for Turkey, I've laid out some evidence of her likely acquiescent/Axis status here.

---------------------------------------

Do we agree that Germany getting the Turkish railway intact implies Allied loss of Suez and the Levant, setting up the 3Q '43 battle for Iraq/Iran along the lines I've specified? If so, maybe we can analyze those conditions if you're willing.

For other ATL conditions, maybe we can have explicitly-separated sub-discussions or something.

[TheMarcksPlan]

To get to Basrah, we're talking an advance of roughly from the German border to Madrid in Spain.

Can I suggest that the most productive aspects of this exchange are our respective quantitative analyses of various logistical capabilities? These have some value regardless of specific ATL conditions.

On getting the Basra, it's my burden to show a feasible logistical path. That depends on shipping and port capacities, then Turkish/Iraq railways, then German trucking capacity. Comparing distances with other campaigns doesn't seem relevant. Distance is only part of the logistical equation - magnitude of effort the other. Germany sent the world's second-largest field army >1,000 miles across land. Here they're sending a smaller force and have at least partial sea logistics.

Torch was a huge campaign logistically. I don't know the exact figures but in looking at the statistics I would surmise maybe 6 million tons of shipping between November 1942 and May 1943?

For US, the exact statistics are contained in the US Army shipping tons I gave upthread:

Of that list I suspect that Novorossisk is about the biggest port, that its actual capacity was more than the 1,500,000 tons annual I read somewhere for traffic in 1940. What are the rail links like between this port and Iraq/Iran?

This map is fairly accurate regarding Iraq/Iran: 2 lines from north Caucasus into Iran; none directly into Iraq. There are more lines in Russia than shown on the map but those aren't the bottleneck.

I think the Allies can always retreat southwards to escape destruction, using their naval power to establish supply whereever the front line happens to arrive at once the Germans have exhausted themselves offensively.

Does that apply when LW is operating strongly over an area? That looks like the Malta Convoys situation to me.

For the Levant, it depends on holding Suez too, right?

[Tom from Cornwall]

For the Levant, it depends on holding Suez too, right?

There do seem to be a whole set of files in the UK National Archives that cover planning for the ironically named Operation "Wonderful" which would probably cover much of the information on the communications infrastructure in the Levant in early 1942. Stuff like this:

Nicholas Tamkin has used some of them at least in his article and book.

Thanks for inducing me to look at those - as he says the 'Northern Front' has been rather swept under the carpet by historian's concentration on what actually happened. His work has highlighted, yet again, how many of the decisions being made about what was happening were also being affected by contingency planning about what might happen.

Regards

Tom