D-Day Started while Hitler was Sleeping - Which Sources?

[ljadw]

To somehow tie the whole thing to a Hollywood movie from the 1960s is a real hoot.
The link to the YouTube clip remained personally in my memory, it was nothing more.

The later Bundeswehr was also led into this game, what a nonsense, hard to beat!

Keep it up, make my day!


Hans

The top man of the Bundeswehr, Speidel, was acting commander of HG B on 6 June,and thus involved in the discussion .
The only thing the media and the public wanted ,as usual, to know was : who was to blame .And the ideal candidate was Hitler.
The truth is that there was no one to blame .
The information from Blumentritt and Speidel was worthless,but,the situation would not be different with better information or if Hitler was awake earlier .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

You post,"....the situation would not be different with better information or if Hitler was awake earlier."

Once again you are expressing with absolutely spurious certainty something which simply cannot be known. Replace "would" with "might" and you may have a point, but as it stands it is completely blind speculation.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Hi ljadw,

You post,"....the situation would not be different with better information or if Hitler was awake earlier."

Once again you are expressing with absolutely spurious certainty something which simply cannot be known. Replace "would" with "might" and you may have a point, but as it stands it is completely blind speculation.

Cheers,

Sid.

A lot of 'spurious' posts in this thread. The OP asked a specific question and theres been a lot of efforts to digress any direction but that which answers the question.

Hi All

Interesting phrase that Von Ronstadt requested to release the Tanks when the Allied arrived at the beached of Normandy in th D-Day!
As that was the plan by the German Army!
Some how Hitler was sleeping and they delayed the order to release the tanks X hours till he woke up!!

Was that true?
Which source mentioned that ? Memoirs of Whom ?

I heard it in interview of Ex-Army officer!!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9YJyUGdyz4

Cheers

[ljadw]

The first claim :Rundstedt did not ask to release the tanks, but to commit 12 SS and PzL ,which is 2 PzD .
Point two : this was not the plan of the German Army.
Point three :Hitler was sleeping at the moment Rundstedt asked to commit these 2 PzD = at 4.30 AM .
Point four : the order was not delayed till Hitler woke up .Because 12 SS was released at 14.15 and PzL at 14.45 long after Hitler woke up .Besides: Jodl had the authority to release both divisions,without informing Hitler .
Thus the whole story is untrue .
The story was spread after the war by the same person who invented the story that Hitler was responsible for the evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk ,and this person was Blumentritt .
The reason is obvious .

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

You post,"....the situation would not be different with better information or if Hitler was awake earlier."

Once again you are expressing with absolutely spurious certainty something which simply cannot be known. Replace "would" with "might" and you may have a point, but as it stands it is completely blind speculation.

Cheers,

Sid.

OBW asked to release the 2 PzD at 04.30 h,they were far away from the coast (PzL 150 km ) and they would have to move while the allies had air superiority .Thus : out of the question .
If Hitler was awake at 04.30 and had said :yes ( for which there was no reason ),it would still be out of the question :the 2 divisions could only move successfully at night .
And, better information would not bring PzL faster to the coast .
The question ( avoided by most ''historians '' ) was : how do you bring a mobile division (here PzL ) with 15000 men and thousand tanks, trucks,cars ,that is 150 km away from the front, to the front in broad daylight,while the enemy has air superiority and that in a few hours ?
The simple answer is : it can't be done .
It took more than a day for PzL to arrive at the front,when it received the order to go at 14.45 . It would have lasted longer if it started at 4 .30 H .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

You post, "It took more than a day for PzL to arrive at the front,when it received the order to go at 14.45 . It would have lasted longer if it started at 4 .30 H ." So, you are saying that if it had started earlier it would have arrived later?

I am not sure a "I could have started earlier but I would have arrived later" excuse will wash in the real world!

A bewildered Sid.

[ljadw]

An advance of 150 km in broad daylight with an enemy who had air superiority would last longer than the same advance by night .
And, I did not say that it would have arrived later:that's your wrong interpretation .I said that the advance would have lasted longer .
Example:
PzL is leaving at 4.30 H (at the end of the night ) and arrives at 8.30 the day after = 28 hours
PzL is leaving at 16.45 ( an order to go at 14.45 does not mean a start at 14.45 ) and arrives at 10.45 the day after = 18 hours .An arrival at 6.45 was also possible .
In war time (and in peace time ) an earlier leaving does not mean an earlier arrival .
A lot of people who are now going to Spain by car for their holiday,do not leave at 6.00 in the morning, but at 6.00 in the evening,because it is easier to drive at night than by day and,they will win back the ''lost '' time .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

The issue is not how long the approach march took, but how soon it would take to get into position. Why would it take longer to get into position if the approach march had started early on 6 June rather than late on 6 June?

Speed was clearly of the essence and Allied air power in daylight wasn't going to stop the approach march completely in its tracks, even if it caused some losses and delay.

And where do you get your 28 hours, 18 hours and 14 hours from?

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

It is very possible that if the march had started early on 6 June ( let's say 6 AM at earliest ),the delay would have been bigger than if the division had moved at 6 PM ,due to the enemy's air superiority .
You are also underestimating the losses incurred by an advance in daylight : on 7 June on the road from Le Mans to Caen, PzL lost 5 tanks and 170 trucks, while the losses for the whole month of June were 51 tanks and 376 trucks .
And, again: I did not say that it would take longer to get into position if the advance had started early on 6 June, but that if it started early on 6 June this does not mean that the division would be sooner in position,as to be in position and to be ready would also depend on the moment the supplies and the heavy equipment/weapons would arrive and these were transported by train .And the trains would have very big problems to move in daylight .We are also not certain if (and yes,how many ) tanks were going by road or by train .If the tanks were doing 150 km by road, how many would still be operational when they arrived ?
Other point is that half of the tanks of PzL were on 6 June in Magdeburg on their way to the Easteren front .
28 hours and 18 hours are IFS.
Leaving at 4.30 H could result in a longer march than leaving at 6 .H .
4 years before, it took the tanks from von Kleist 10 days to go from Sedan to Dunkirk,with air superiority, a distance of more than 300 km ,and a lot of them were no longer operational at their arrival .And,there was a gap with the infantry/artillery and the supply forces .
The very big losses of PzL on 7 June (BEFORE they fought against allied forces ) is a proof that an advance at daylight on 6 June would not only be very risky but would not be a wise decision . It could result in the arrival of non operational parts of the division .
Not only would it not be a wise decision, but there was also no need to move the division at 4.30 ,as 2 hours before OBW told the chief of staff of 7th Army that there was no big action going on .
OBW was saying at 2.30 : nothing special and 2 hours later was asking to have the reserves of the WFS,knowing very well that they could not be committed on 6 and even not on 7 June . Besides : why should PzL go to Caen and not to the American sector ?
Jodl's refusal was very well justified .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

Apparently Panzer Lehr had 218 tanks and assault guns on strength on 1 June (https://weaponsandwarfare.files.wordpre ... /img_0.gif) and you cite 5 knocked out from the air on 7 June. So it looks as though around 2.5% might have been knocked on 6 June if the division had got moving that day. This does not look an incapacitating loss rate to me, certainly as far as its panzer regiment was concerned.

Furthermore, a standard panzer division had an establishment of nearly 2,500 motor vehicles in 1944 and Panzer-Lehr was rather better endowed than them, so the loss of 170 of them on 7 June, while serious, was also rather less than incapacitating.

Given what was at stake, the risk of such losses on 6 June seems very minor by comparison.

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Only ONE of the two tank battalions of PzL was available on 6 June,the other was going to the east ,thus the tank losses were relatively higher .And a part of its artillery was in Germany .
The FIRST units of PzL ( their strength is unknown ) arrived at Normandy at 13.00 H of 7 June .
There is no proof ,and it is even unlikely,that,if PzL had left in the early morning,it would have arrived earlier in Normandy and with better strength .
The losses of 84 SPW and 90 wheeled vehicles were considerable .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

That doesn't actually change my point. Even at 5% tank losses, that is hardly an incapacitating figure.

Of course, "There is no proof that......", because it never happened. On the other hand, the likelihood is that a start 10 hours earlier would have seen the division in position somewhat earlier than was actually the case.

As I posted before, "Given what was at stake, the risk of such losses on 6 June seems very minor by comparison."

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sheldrake]

It is very possible that if the march had started early on 6 June ( let's say 6 AM at earliest ),the delay would have been bigger than if the division had moved at 6 PM ,due to the enemy's air superiority .
You are also underestimating the losses incurred by an advance in daylight : on 7 June on the road from Le Mans to Caen, PzL lost 5 tanks and 170 trucks, while the losses for the whole month of June were 51 tanks and 376 trucks.........................<snip>
The very big losses of PzL on 7 June (BEFORE they fought against allied forces ) is a proof that an advance at daylight on 6 June would not only be very risky but would not be a wise decision . It could result in the arrival of non operational parts of the division .
Not only would it not be a wise decision, but there was also no need to move the division at 4.30 ,as 2 hours before OBW told the chief of staff of 7th Army that there was no big action going on .
OBW was saying at 2.30 : nothing special and 2 hours later was asking to have the reserves of the WFS,knowing very well that they could not be committed on 6 and even not on 7 June . Besides : why should PzL go to Caen and not to the American sector ?
Jodl's refusal was very well justified .

Ljadw, You are quoting figures that have been challenged. In Normandy 1944 Niklas Zetterling points out that the high figures for losses on the road were post war recollections by Bayerling without any access to documentation. There is an argument that there was a bias by German Generals to blame air power - i.e. the failure of the Luftwaffe. According to a report by Ritgen the commander of the repair and maintenance company of the Pz IV battalion these figures were exaggerated. There is a further report dated `10th June which says that the Lehr Division did not suffer significant losses on its march. The total losses for the month of June were 82 SW and 10 prime movers.

[Sheldrake]

Returning to the topic itself.

The question of whether Hitler was woken over the night of 5-6 June is important.

In case anyone has forgotten, Hitler was unhappy with the proposals made by Rundstedt and his staff for a defence inland. He appointed Erwin Rommel to command a new Army group to command the troops on the likely invasion front, removing Rundstedt from direct command. Rommel's shared Hitler's views about the importance of defeating the allies on the coast. All weapons pointing at landing beaches. All reserves close at hand for rapid counter attacks - except where they could only be released by OBWest or OKW

Everything in Rommel's concept depended on prompt effective actions on D Day - hence the name of the book and film - "The Longest Day."

So it really mattered that the Germans identified when and where D Day was happening. Everyone needed to be awake and at their posts

It was a risky strategy selected by Hitler which failed when tested. Lots of predictable problems had not been thought through.

1. There is no evidence of test exercises to check response times or identify problems in reporting "D Day" During the cold war NATO responses depended on political leaders being made rapidly aware of Warsaw Pact aggression. This was tested in annual communication exercises. Nothing seems to have been done to test what might happen on the eve of D Day.

2. There was no contingency Army Group B plan for what would happen if there was a D+1. ARKO 1st SS Panzer Corps artillery said that there was no prior survey of possible artillery positions or provision of 1:25,000 scale maps.

3. The assumption that the allies would not attack in poor weather allowed Rommel to absent himself from his HQ at the critical moment to visit his family.

Like much of the Third Reich the Atlantic Wall was bluff and wishful thinking. It should be no surprise that the plans to respond to a cross channel assault were also bluff. Whether it was Hitler or his staff who decided not to intervene promptly is irrelevant.

[wm]

I don't think awake Hitler at his post would be able to identify when and where D Day was happening unless he had resorted to haruspicy.
So it didn't matter if he was awake or not.