German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 22 Jul 2021 19:04

Peter89 wrote:
22 Jul 2021 06:31
What do you mean by that?
I've discussed this on this board before but it's been a while. A good example is the disaster of Pz Bde 106 around Mairy on 8 Sept 44.

Let me start by listing the wrong lessons learned in the East.

Against the Russians, panzer commanders and units got used to making local counterattacks and operational level attacks with a minimum or no reconnaissance.
They got used to operating in an environment with little enemy air support. The Red AF was slow to respond to ground support needs that weren't planned in advance.
They were used to not having much in the way of artillery support and relied on direct fires or locally available weapons like the 81mm mortar for this.
Rapidity of their advance in multiple small columns would usually disrupt the enemy who had a poor communications net. Speed was seen as far more important than mass.

The 106th Pz Bde was commanded by Obrest Fritz Bake, a highly decorated panzer ace with tons of East Front experience. Many of the other unit commanders lower down were East Front veterans too. The unit had 36 Panther, 11 Jgpz IV and 119 half tracks of various sub-models assigned. Infantry from the 59th VG division supplemented the unit's own panzergrenadiers riding on the tanks. Air defense was limited to a handful of Sdkfz 251/21 triple 15mm AA guns. Some Sdkfz 251/9 with the 75/L24 and a few /2 with 81mm mortars were the only fire support.

Their opponent was the 90th Infantry division. Their assigned TD battalion was the 607th with towed 3" guns. The 712th tank battalion was also attached.

Bake had little or no idea how the 90th had deployed or about their strength along his advance route. He did no preparatory reconnaissance. He separated his command into two columns Strossgruppe A and B each with roughly half the unit's strength. The Germans rolled forward into the US lines starting about 0200.
About 0300 one column rolled past the 90th Division's artillery HQ where a Sherman on guard duty belatedly figured out the column was German and destroyed one of the last vehicles in the column bringing fire and destroying the tank in return. The HQ got on the communications net and alerted other parts of the division to the German advance.
In the East, the Germans would have expected that to bring confusion and an uncoordinated response. Here, the 90th's units went on alert and were loaded for bear. As dawn broke the column approached Mairy, occupied by 1/358 infantry and supported by a company from the 607th. The German column was surprised by heavy fire, losing a number of tanks and vehicles. They tried to flank the position to no luck and more losses. Artillery fire started falling on the column with devastating accuracy.
A battalion of the 359th Regiment supported by tanks from the 712th flanked the Germans cutting off their retreat. The column was all but annihilated losing 7 panthers and 48 halftracks.

The second column ran into a battalion of the 357th and more tank destroyers at Avril where it suffered heavy losses before pulling back. The whole German attack was an unmitigated disaster.
The brigade lost 60 halftracks, and had just 9 Panther and Jgpz IV left operational. The Germans lost almost 800 men killed or captured including many of the unit's senior officers.

In the US Army's Green Book on the Lorraine fighting, there's barely two paragraphs about this fight.

But it is typical of German panzer tactics at the time. From the Mortain counteroffensive to the Ardennes, the Germans regularly tried to attack into Allied units using small columns rapidly moving on multiple lines of advance with little reconnaissance and support. The result was uniformly predictable. They'd run into units that were well dug in, using combined arms--even when scratch units were defending, and come under artillery and air attack in very short order. Then their units would be counterattacked by fresh Allied troops coordinating with the defense.

The Germans learned the wrong lessons for fighting in the West in the East and never really had the time to unlearn them.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by historygeek2021 » 23 Jul 2021 18:40

T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jul 2021 19:04
Peter89 wrote:
22 Jul 2021 06:31
What do you mean by that?
I've discussed this on this board before but it's been a while. A good example is the disaster of Pz Bde 106 around Mairy on 8 Sept 44.

Let me start by listing the wrong lessons learned in the East.

Against the Russians, panzer commanders and units got used to making local counterattacks and operational level attacks with a minimum or no reconnaissance.
They got used to operating in an environment with little enemy air support. The Red AF was slow to respond to ground support needs that weren't planned in advance.
They were used to not having much in the way of artillery support and relied on direct fires or locally available weapons like the 81mm mortar for this.
Rapidity of their advance in multiple small columns would usually disrupt the enemy who had a poor communications net. Speed was seen as far more important than mass.

The 106th Pz Bde was commanded by Obrest Fritz Bake, a highly decorated panzer ace with tons of East Front experience. Many of the other unit commanders lower down were East Front veterans too. The unit had 36 Panther, 11 Jgpz IV and 119 half tracks of various sub-models assigned. Infantry from the 59th VG division supplemented the unit's own panzergrenadiers riding on the tanks. Air defense was limited to a handful of Sdkfz 251/21 triple 15mm AA guns. Some Sdkfz 251/9 with the 75/L24 and a few /2 with 81mm mortars were the only fire support.

Their opponent was the 90th Infantry division. Their assigned TD battalion was the 607th with towed 3" guns. The 712th tank battalion was also attached.

Bake had little or no idea how the 90th had deployed or about their strength along his advance route. He did no preparatory reconnaissance. He separated his command into two columns Strossgruppe A and B each with roughly half the unit's strength. The Germans rolled forward into the US lines starting about 0200.
About 0300 one column rolled past the 90th Division's artillery HQ where a Sherman on guard duty belatedly figured out the column was German and destroyed one of the last vehicles in the column bringing fire and destroying the tank in return. The HQ got on the communications net and alerted other parts of the division to the German advance.
In the East, the Germans would have expected that to bring confusion and an uncoordinated response. Here, the 90th's units went on alert and were loaded for bear. As dawn broke the column approached Mairy, occupied by 1/358 infantry and supported by a company from the 607th. The German column was surprised by heavy fire, losing a number of tanks and vehicles. They tried to flank the position to no luck and more losses. Artillery fire started falling on the column with devastating accuracy.
A battalion of the 359th Regiment supported by tanks from the 712th flanked the Germans cutting off their retreat. The column was all but annihilated losing 7 panthers and 48 halftracks.

The second column ran into a battalion of the 357th and more tank destroyers at Avril where it suffered heavy losses before pulling back. The whole German attack was an unmitigated disaster.
The brigade lost 60 halftracks, and had just 9 Panther and Jgpz IV left operational. The Germans lost almost 800 men killed or captured including many of the unit's senior officers.

In the US Army's Green Book on the Lorraine fighting, there's barely two paragraphs about this fight.

But it is typical of German panzer tactics at the time. From the Mortain counteroffensive to the Ardennes, the Germans regularly tried to attack into Allied units using small columns rapidly moving on multiple lines of advance with little reconnaissance and support. The result was uniformly predictable. They'd run into units that were well dug in, using combined arms--even when scratch units were defending, and come under artillery and air attack in very short order. Then their units would be counterattacked by fresh Allied troops coordinating with the defense.

The Germans learned the wrong lessons for fighting in the West in the East and never really had the time to unlearn them.
Incidents like this are what make me dubious of ATLs where Germany wins. When did the Germans ever enjoy tactical success against the Americans after Kasserine Pass? The U.S. Army was simply on a different level.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Cult Icon » 23 Jul 2021 20:00

T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jul 2021 19:04

But it is typical of German panzer tactics at the time. From the Mortain counteroffensive to the Ardennes, the Germans regularly tried to attack into Allied units using small columns rapidly moving on multiple lines of advance with little reconnaissance and support. The result was uniformly predictable. They'd run into units that were well dug in, using combined arms--even when scratch units were defending, and come under artillery and air attack in very short order. Then their units would be counterattacked by fresh Allied troops coordinating with the defense.

The Germans learned the wrong lessons for fighting in the West in the East and never really had the time to unlearn them.
You've been repeating this fictional story and ludicrous analysis over and over again for 10 + years...and misinforming yourself and the ignorant. Nobody who has seriously studied armored warfare in the Western front would believe that the Pz Brigades in Lorraine was the average tank action in the West...

The 11th Panzer was deployed immediately after the Pz Brigades failed (with 1-4 weeks training if you study their history), used an entirely different set of tactics, and pushed back the dug-in combat command of the US 4th Armored division despite the air support it enjoyed.

Basically you cherry picked the worst German tank unit performance of WW2, with the worst trained units (largely trained in August 1944) and claim that this is typical. The fighting in Normandy and the Ardennes is more representative of German capabilities or lack thereof.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Cult Icon » 23 Jul 2021 20:13

historygeek2021 wrote:
23 Jul 2021 18:40
Incidents like this are what make me dubious of ATLs where Germany wins. When did the Germans ever enjoy tactical success against the Americans after Kasserine Pass? The U.S. Army was simply on a different level.
The Ardennes??!

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Terry Duncan » 23 Jul 2021 20:20

historygeek2021 wrote:
23 Jul 2021 18:40
Incidents like this are what make me dubious of ATLs where Germany wins. When did the Germans ever enjoy tactical success against the Americans after Kasserine Pass? The U.S. Army was simply on a different level.
You can happily turn this around and ask when did the US ever manage to defeat the German army on anything like equal odds? The US may well have had a superiority in numbers and supply, but local tactical battles often went in the favour of the Germans otherwise the Normandy campaign wouldnt have lasted so long and Patton wouldnt have stalled at Metz.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Cult Icon » 23 Jul 2021 20:25

viewtopic.php?f=47&t=242054&start=165

Made some comments a while ago about the Pz brigades


FMS B-364 "Commitment of the 11th Panzer Division in the Lorraine", Hohne and Wietersheim

http://downloads.sturmpanzer.com/FMS/NARA_FMS_B364.pdf

11.Pz, Oct-Dec 1944

http://downloads.sturmpanzer.com/FMS/NARA_FMS_B416.pdf

11.Pz, Dec-1944-Feb 1945

http://downloads.sturmpanzer.com/FMS/NARA_FMS_B417.pdf
On the 11th Panzer Division

Wietersheim's US Army report
Patton's Vanguard: The United States Army Fourth Armored Division by Fox
Ghost Division by Gantz
Patton vs the Panzers, Zaloga has a chapter on the engagement but the coverage provided in the Osprey booklet " Panzergrenadier vs Armored Infantrymen" is better. This booklet covers FBB taking of Rodt against elements of the 7.AD, breakthrough at COBRA, and 11.Pz's counterattack.
On the topic of Panthers battalions in the West, the Panzer Brigade figured heavily in the fighting starting Sept 1944. In July 1944 under Hitler's orders- and Guderian's disapproval- there was an attempt to increase armored strength on the East and West fronts with the quick raising of Panzer Brigades which had an short operating existence. 101-110 were bare bones formations of circa 2,000 men, 36 Panthers and 11 Jagdpanzer IVs. These units had minimal service and support assets and no artillery. The second generation, 111-113 were larger units.

These were trained in circa 1-6 weeks and put together from newly produced material and cadres from units along with personnel provided by the replacement army. Reports from Panzer Brigade 108 indicate that these units lacked unit cohesion due to the varied nature of the personnel and how they didn't even know each other and also the extremely short training cycle. Also the design concept was meant to primarily defensive- the idea was to have this small, heavily armed and maneuverable unit counterattack breaches in the line. These units had only direct fire and no indirect fire capability.

"Kampfgruppe Walther and Panzer Brigade 107" and "Hold the Westwall, a History of Panzer Brigade 105, September 1944" provide detailed histories behind these two Panzer brigades. They were largely involved in screening actions and counterattacks and didn't suffer the fate of the brigades used in Arracourt. Most in the West were disbanded in the fall of 1944 as reinforcements to Pz divisions. 106th "F" was used into 1945.

The combat utility of Panzer Brigade 107 against Operation Market Garden was heavily limited by their lack of artillery and other supporting assets that a Panzer division would have had. But it was adequate as a screening/blocking force. It defeated the US 7th Armored division in the fights for Overloon.
Panzer Brigade disbandment:

101: integrated into 20. Panzer-Division on 21 September 1944
102: integrated into 7. Panzer-Division in November 1944.
103: It was used to form the stab for Panzer-Division Müncheberg on 8 March 1945.
104: integrated into 25. Panzer-Division in November 1944.
105: integrated into 9. Panzer-Division in September 1944.
106: fought on the Western front and ended the war in the Ruhr.
107: units are assigned to the newly formed 25. Panzergrenadier-Division October 1944.
108: integrated into 116. Panzer-Division in October 1944.
109: integrated into Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle in October 1944.
110: integrated into 13. Panzer-Division in November 1944.

111:integrated into 11. Panzer-Division on 1 October 1944.
112: integrated into 21. Panzer-Division on 23 September 1944.
113:integrated into 15. Panzergrenadier-Division on 1 October 1944

Of these:




105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113 fought in the West and their continuation bodies there were 9.Pz, 11.Pz, 21.Pz, 116.Pz, 15.PzG, 25.PzG. Only 106 remained independent.
Inspector General of the Armored forces proposal for Adolf Hitler:
Panzer-Brigade 105 to Panzer-Brigade 108 have been rapidly stood-up formations with the following characteristics:

a) Personnel without experience in the west and without experience in the tactical and technical requirements of a fully armored formation.
b) A uniquely valuable complement of armored vehicles and weapons.
c) Shortfalls of maintenance services and heavily reduced recovery services.

Characteristics of Panzer-Brigade 111 to Panzer-Brigade 113 and “Valkyrie” Units:

a) Command and control elements and signals personnel that have not had a chance to become cohesive.
b) Forces not cohesive due to a lack of unit/formation-level training.
c) Although fully equipped with tanks, an insufficient complement of other materiel, especially for maintenance and recovery services.


The prerequisite for the successful employment of all of the armored brigades is their integration into an organic armored formation—as is planned by the headquarters of the 5. Panzer-Armee—after their planned formation.
The armored brigades are to be used offensively only within the framework of armored formations that are themselves fully capable with regard to combat power and combat experience.
Otherwise, the results will be high personnel and materiel looses with corresponding combat success.
Because the remnants of the armored divisions that are still conducting operations can considerably increase their combat power in a short period of time through personnel and materiel replacements and the employment of personnel and materiel in them promises more success than in the armored brigades, I propose the integration of Panzer-Brigade 105 to Panzer-Brigade 108 and Panzer-Brigade 111 to Panzer-Brigade 113 into the armored divisions still being employed.
The following formations are to be consolidated:


Panzer-Brigade 105 and Panzer-Brigade 106 into the 9. Panzer-Division
Panzer-Brigade 107 and Panzer-Brigade 108 into the armored division of Heeresgruppe B
Panzer-Brigade 111 into the 11. Panzer-Division
Panzer-Brigade 112 into the 21. Panzer-Division
Panzer-Brigade 113 is to be consolidated with either the 21. Panzer-Division, the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division or the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division


Cf. BA-MA RH 10/90, p. 78 ff.
Panzer Brigade 107 was deployed at Arnhelm. 105 and 108 at Aachen. These three were used, for the most part, in screening activity and local counterattacks.

The ill fated ones were used offensively (106, 111, 112, 113) in the Vosges Panzer counteroffensive.
Hold the Westwall is an underrated and essential book for the battle of Aachen, "miracle in the West", and also the use of the Panther tank in the most disadvantageous circumstances of disorder and material weakness. It's stitched together primary sources, mostly from the vantage point of LXXXI. Armee-Korps.

PzB 105 is attached to various divisions, most often to the hollowed -out 9th Panzer Division. Also the hollowed out 116.Pz and elements to the 12th Infantry division, among others. The nemesis of the 9th Pz. is the US 3rd Armored Division and 3AD's perspective is significant in this book.

The Panthers of 9.Pz and 105 Panzer Brigade are, for the most part, spread out in the front line in isolation- individual Panthers alone as a strongpoint in screening duty, surrounded by what is often low-quality and unreliable infantry that has significant MIA in action. Or deployments at around platoon size. Some are placed in the rear for local counterattacks. A very unenviable position to be in particularly when powerful task forces of the 3rd Armored Division make contact- frequently happening to the Panthers of the corps in Sept 1944.

This tactical employment is completely at odds with the guidance provided by Panzer Brigade 108 that discouraged splitting up of Panthers and wanted them to be entirely concentrated.

In Sept 10-20, 9.Pz reports 133 tanks knocked out. From Sept 1 to Sept 18th PzB105 claims 43 Shermans knocked out. Despite their own heavy losses the use of PzB 105 and 9.Pz in the defensive battles are considered a success given the circumstances and Major Volkner is awarded the RK and is put in charge of Panzergrenadier regiment 11 for a counterattack at Arnhem. Afterwards he is put in command of Panzer Brigade 107.

Effectively once the PzB105 was attached to the 9.Pz it also benefited from its support and services. The dissolution of the unit involved splitting the remaining personnel in small groups and cross-pollinating 9.Pz's elements.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 23 Jul 2021 20:28

Cult Icon wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:00
T. A. Gardner wrote:
22 Jul 2021 19:04

But it is typical of German panzer tactics at the time. From the Mortain counteroffensive to the Ardennes, the Germans regularly tried to attack into Allied units using small columns rapidly moving on multiple lines of advance with little reconnaissance and support. The result was uniformly predictable. They'd run into units that were well dug in, using combined arms--even when scratch units were defending, and come under artillery and air attack in very short order. Then their units would be counterattacked by fresh Allied troops coordinating with the defense.

The Germans learned the wrong lessons for fighting in the West in the East and never really had the time to unlearn them.
You've been repeating this fictional story and ludicrous analysis over and over again for 10 + years...and misinforming yourself and the ignorant. Nobody who has seriously studied armored warfare in the Western front would believe that the Pz Brigades in Lorraine was the average tank action in the West...

The 11th Panzer was deployed immediately after the Pz Brigades failed (with 1-4 weeks training if you study their history), used an entirely different set of tactics, and pushed back the dug-in combat command of the US 4th Armored division despite the air support it enjoyed.

Basically you cherry picked the worst German tank unit performance of WW2, with the worst trained units (largely trained in August 1944) and claim that this is typical. The fighting in Normandy and the Ardennes is more representative of German capabilities or lack thereof.
Actually, 11th Panzer used very similar tactics and ended up fighting a mostly defensive battle after a couple of early minor successes. They were then beaten like the proverbial red headed step child by US combined arms actions around Arracourt. 4th Armored suffered significantly fewer losses than 11th Pzr and the supporting 15 Pz Gr and 599th VG did.
Mortain failed for the same reasons the Pz Bde battles then Arracourt failed for the Germans. They weren't fighting a controlled combined arms battle against an opponent that was.

Blaming that on poor training alone belies the fact that most of the senior commanders of these units were long time East Front veterans with considerable combat experience. They learned the lessons of fighting in the East well, but those lessons didn't work fighting in the West.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Cult Icon » 23 Jul 2021 20:53

T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:28

Actually, 11th Panzer used very similar tactics and ended up fighting a mostly defensive battle after a couple of early minor successes. They were then beaten like the proverbial red headed step child by US combined arms actions around Arracourt. 4th Armored suffered significantly fewer losses than 11th Pzr and the supporting 15 Pz Gr and 599th VG did.
Mortain failed for the same reasons the Pz Bde battles then Arracourt failed for the Germans. They weren't fighting a controlled combined arms battle against an opponent that was.

Blaming that on poor training alone belies the fact that most of the senior commanders of these units were long time East Front veterans with considerable combat experience. They learned the lessons of fighting in the East well, but those lessons didn't work fighting in the West.
The Germans were using effective combined arms from the first battles in Normandy. You know, with Panzer divisions.

With the Pz Brigades they had poor training and lack of combined arms instruments. The Pz Brigades were not "Panzer divisions", they were tank & SPW teams set up in a hurry. (even 1 week!)

You have a severe lack of reading on both Arracourt and Mortain, and your analysis is ludicrous. Get the sources I posted, which expose your fiction and read the FMS of 11.Pz. The 11.Pz used a set of tactics that were developed from the fighting in Southern France. The changed pace of combat is even described in the US 4th Armored division history vol. 1 by Fox.

There are a lot of books on Mortain I can recommend, but I doubt that you are interested so I won't waste my time as of this moment. After the Pz division counterattacks in the Lorraine, the situation went static. The factors behind this is irrelevant though.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 23 Jul 2021 22:09

Cult Icon wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:53
T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:28

Actually, 11th Panzer used very similar tactics and ended up fighting a mostly defensive battle after a couple of early minor successes. They were then beaten like the proverbial red headed step child by US combined arms actions around Arracourt. 4th Armored suffered significantly fewer losses than 11th Pzr and the supporting 15 Pz Gr and 599th VG did.
Mortain failed for the same reasons the Pz Bde battles then Arracourt failed for the Germans. They weren't fighting a controlled combined arms battle against an opponent that was.

Blaming that on poor training alone belies the fact that most of the senior commanders of these units were long time East Front veterans with considerable combat experience. They learned the lessons of fighting in the East well, but those lessons didn't work fighting in the West.
The Germans were using effective combined arms from the first battles in Normandy. You know, with Panzer divisions.
Even there, that's not true. Look at Villers Brocage for example. It's hardly the only example of a handful of unsupported panzers going into action against a much larger Allied force. The result is even when the Germans give far better than they took they end up losing the ground and the Allies continue to advance.
With the Pz Brigades they had poor training and lack of combined arms instruments. The Pz Brigades were not "Panzer divisions", they were tank & SPW teams set up in a hurry. (even 1 week!)
These units were originally intended for use in the East and set up with that in mind. That's why they lacked proper support in terms of reconnaissance, engineers, artillery, etc. They were to be "fire brigade" units to plug holes in the German lines when the Russians attacked.
You have a severe lack of reading on both Arracourt and Mortain, and your analysis is ludicrous. Get the sources I posted, which expose your fiction and read the FMS of 11.Pz. The 11.Pz used a set of tactics that were developed from the fighting in Southern France. The changed pace of combat is even described in the US 4th Armored division history vol. 1 by Fox.

There are a lot of books on Mortain I can recommend, but I doubt that you are interested so I won't waste my time as of this moment. After the Pz division counterattacks in the Lorraine, the situation went static. The factors behind this is irrelevant though.
In both cases, the German planned offensive failed miserably at high cost in equipment and manpower. The US units involved took fewer casualties and lost fewer armored vehicles. Those are facts. That the 4th stopped advancing, shifted to the defense, and even gave ground to take up better tactical positions is really just a nod to their superior use of combined arms, coordination of operation, and operational ability.

What change in tactics did 11th Panzer use there? My reading of it was their attack pattern was to use small fast moving columns that lacked combined arms support, just as the Germans did everywhere else in 1944 - 45.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Cult Icon » 23 Jul 2021 22:37

T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Jul 2021 22:09
My reading of it was their attack pattern was to use small fast moving columns that lacked combined arms support, just as the Germans did everywhere else in 1944 - 45.
You read?

sources?

Your posts on armored warfare are ridiculous and are invented opinions with little basis on facts and sources.

The German Pz divisions used combined arms, and modified their tactics in different situations. Sometimes they used tanks only. Sometimes this was due to contingencies (no forces available for support). The 5th Pz Army offensive ( Arracourt ) is unique for the German army in WW2 and you'd be hard pressed to find any similar set of engagements.

And you know what? You are wasting my time, don't expect me to continue.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by historygeek2021 » 23 Jul 2021 23:21

Terry Duncan wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:20
historygeek2021 wrote:
23 Jul 2021 18:40
Incidents like this are what make me dubious of ATLs where Germany wins. When did the Germans ever enjoy tactical success against the Americans after Kasserine Pass? The U.S. Army was simply on a different level.
You can happily turn this around and ask when did the US ever manage to defeat the German army on anything like equal odds? The US may well have had a superiority in numbers and supply, but local tactical battles often went in the favour of the Germans otherwise the Normandy campaign wouldnt have lasted so long and Patton wouldnt have stalled at Metz.
The only "success" the Germans had against the U.S. Army after Kasserine Pass was in defensive delaying actions. The U.S. slowly but surely worked its way through Normandy. The U.S. slowly but surely captured Metz. The U.S. slowly but surely pushed back the Germans in the Ardennes.

The U.S. Army would always have superiority in equipment, ammunition and soldiers who know how to use it because the United States was a vastly superior industrial power compared to Germany: viewtopic.php?f=66&t=258449 There would never be "equal odds" because a second rate industrial country going up against a first rate industrial country is inherently not a fight with equal odds. Even when German forces were superior, (Arracourt, Bastogne), they lost.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 24 Jul 2021 00:12

Cult Icon wrote:
23 Jul 2021 22:37
You read?

sources?

Your posts on armored warfare are ridiculous and are invented opinions with little basis on facts and sources.

The German Pz divisions used combined arms, and modified their tactics in different situations. Sometimes they used tanks only. Sometimes this was due to contingencies (no forces available for support). The 5th Pz Army offensive ( Arracourt ) is unique for the German army in WW2 and you'd be hard pressed to find any similar set of engagements.

And you know what? You are wasting my time, don't expect me to continue.
Sorry, I usually don't respond to ad hominem, irrelevant appeals to authority, or trivial objections.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Michael Kenny » 24 Jul 2021 00:32

Terry Duncan wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:20


The US may well have had a superiority in numbers and supply, but local tactical battles often went in the favour of the Germans otherwise the Normandy campaign wouldn't have lasted so long and Patton wouldn't have stalled at Metz.
Could anyone provide a reference where it is explained how it was decided that The Normandy Campaign took longer than expected? Even better can one of the purveyors of this fiction give an estimate as to how long they think it should have taken given that the Allies had a supply timetable that had Paris captured in 90 days and they did that with time to spare. On the face of it 'Normandy' took less time than was allowed for.
The 'didn't they do well'/they lasted longer than expected/'it wasn't a fair fight' excuses are completely absurd statements that have no basis in fact, none whatsoever.

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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by Terry Duncan » 24 Jul 2021 01:16

Michael Kenny wrote:
24 Jul 2021 00:32
Terry Duncan wrote:
23 Jul 2021 20:20


The US may well have had a superiority in numbers and supply, but local tactical battles often went in the favour of the Germans otherwise the Normandy campaign wouldn't have lasted so long and Patton wouldn't have stalled at Metz.
Could anyone provide a reference where it is explained how it was decided that The Normandy Campaign took longer than expected? Even better can one of the purveyors of this fiction give an estimate as to how long they think it should have taken given that the Allies had a supply timetable that had Paris captured in 90 days and they did that with time to spare. On the face of it 'Normandy' took less time than was allowed for.
The 'didn't they do well'/they lasted longer than expected/'it wasn't a fair fight' excuses are completely absurd statements that have no basis in fact, none whatsoever.
Not what I said. I said it wouldnt have lasted so long if the Germans were not capable of holding their own. If every engagement had ended in an Allied victory then it would have all been over far quicker. Given they landed knowing they would have to fight through the bocage then I think it went pretty well to plan, but that plan didnt involve the Germans losing every tactical engagement did it.

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: German armored vehicles/weapons if the war continued?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 24 Jul 2021 01:31

Terry Duncan wrote:
24 Jul 2021 01:16
Not what I said. I said it wouldnt have lasted so long if the Germans were not capable of holding their own. If every engagement had ended in an Allied victory then it would have all been over far quicker. Given they landed knowing they would have to fight through the bocage then I think it went pretty well to plan, but that plan didnt involve the Germans losing every tactical engagement did it.
Hey, I give credit to the Germans were it's due. Their tactical defensive operations were spot on. In small unit actions where they were defending they almost always gave better than they got. But you don't win wars with companies that are good on defending a fixed position, particularly in a mechanized war like WW 2.

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