Germany could win Barbarossa by suppressing Italy

[Kingfish]

Far more than two panzer divisions could not operate in the desert of Libya .There were almost no roads in Libya .

For Operation Crusader the British employed 7 divisions against 3 German and 7 Italian divisions on the same road-less terrain.

[Kingfish]

5 Telegram 51265 did not prohibit to send a small force to capture Tripoli .
6 Wavell did not send a small force to capture Tripoli,although he had the consent from London .
7 The reason why Wavell did not send a small force to Tripoli was that there was no Italian collapse .
8 Thus it is not so that Churchill forbade to send a small force to Tripoli .

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

[pugsville]

The Italian numerical superiority was only theoretical,because there was never a battle of 36000 British against 150000 Italians . The Italian forces were stationed far away of each other with as result that they could not help each other,while British forces were more mobile and destroyed 10th army piecemeal .
3 divisions were at Sidi Barrani, 2 other divisions at Derna.
Distance Tobruk-Benghazi 460 km : the forces in Benghazi could not help those in Tobruk .

So What? The Italians had the forces. They arranged them as they would.

But there was no battle between 150000 Italians and 36000 British :the Italians were eliminated piecemeal.

So What? That was the balance of force in the campaign. If the Italians allowed themselves to be defeated in detail that does not chnage the number of troops at their disposal,.

How\many troops the Italians have in the campaign, versus how many troops the British had in the campaign. That's the balance of forces in the campaign.

150,0000 v 36,000 is just accurate factual answer. Is there ius nothing "theoretical" about it.

[ljadw]

Far more than two panzer divisions could not operate in the desert of Libya .There were almost no roads in Libya .

For Operation Crusader the British employed 7 divisions against 3 German and 7 Italian divisions on the same road-less terrain.

After his visit to Libya in October 1940,von Thoma said that 4 panzer divisions were needed in Libya, but that only 2 could operate in Libya .
Libya was the worst region of NA for a mobile force to operate.

[Kingfish]

Far more than two panzer divisions could not operate in the desert of Libya .There were almost no roads in Libya .

For Operation Crusader the British employed 7 divisions against 3 German and 7 Italian divisions on the same road-less terrain.

After his visit to Libya in October 1940,von Thoma said that 4 panzer divisions were needed in Libya, but that only 2 could operate in Libya .
Libya was the worst region of NA for a mobile force to operate.

It's not the terrain, it's the logistics. The terrain Von Thoma observed in 1940 didn't change in 1941 or 1942, yet both sides fielded progressively larger forces with an increase in their respective vehicle counts.

[Ружичасти Слон]

5 Telegram 51265 did not prohibit to send a small force to capture Tripoli .
6 Wavell did not send a small force to capture Tripoli,although he had the consent from London .
7 The reason why Wavell did not send a small force to Tripoli was that there was no Italian collapse .
8 Thus it is not so that Churchill forbade to send a small force to Tripoli .

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

Of course, those few telegrams don't cover the complexity of the decision making. I refer you to Wavell's letter of 21 Oct 42 to Lord Cranbourne in response to a speech the latter had made in the House of Lords defending the conduct of the war:

My dear Bobbety,
Very many thanks for your letter of October 9th which I have just received. It was very nice of you to write. I saw a report of your statement in the House and it seemed to me unexceptionable. I have not seen Strabolgi’s article, but I gather that it wanted castigation. I sent you a telegram to-day to say that I was quite happy about what you said.

Naturally, the decision to send the maximum aid to Greece put me in a position of some difficulty, as it required all the trained and equipped troops I had, to make up even a small expeditionary force for Greece. But I never questioned the wisdom of the decision to support Greece and have always expressed myself in full agreement with the policy. I have said so publicly on several occasions when I have talked to officers about events in the Middle East. I made, as you know, a miscalculation as to the strength of force required to hold our gains in Cyrenaica; but that was my mistake, and I am sure that our general strategy was correct in the circumstances. The whole history of our negotiations with Greece at that time and what happened is a very interesting story, and I expect that Anthony Eden has told you about it. I fully supported what we did …

It's contained in PREM3/288/7.

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

Far more than two panzer divisions could not operate in the desert of Libya .There were almost no roads in Libya .

For Operation Crusader the British employed 7 divisions against 3 German and 7 Italian divisions on the same road-less terrain.

After his visit to Libya in October 1940,von Thoma said that 4 panzer divisions were needed in Libya, but that only 2 could operate in Libya .
Libya was the worst region of NA for a mobile force to operate.

It's not the terrain, it's the logistics. The terrain Von Thoma observed in 1940 didn't change in 1941 or 1942, yet both sides fielded progressively larger forces with an increase in their respective vehicle counts.

The logistic problems of the Germans were bigger than those of Britain : Britain had a harbor (Alexandria ) compared to which Tripoli was a small fishing port .And Britain had decent railways.
And at the end of 1942 Germany had still only 2 PzD .
One should also not exaggerate the importance of vehicles in NA : the infantry marched mostly on foot,because vehicles were mostly tied to the few primitive roads .
Terrain and weather were the biggest enemies of motorized vehicles : tracks of tanks lasted only 1200 miles, for the engines of trucks and tanks,it was even worse .
After Alamein, Montgomery was chasing Rommel ( very slowly :it took him 10 weeks to go to Tripoli) with in the front
line ONE division,as it was impossible to supply 3 divisions who advanced 2000 km .

[ljadw]

5 Telegram 51265 did not prohibit to send a small force to capture Tripoli .
6 Wavell did not send a small force to capture Tripoli,although he had the consent from London .
7 The reason why Wavell did not send a small force to Tripoli was that there was no Italian collapse .
8 Thus it is not so that Churchill forbade to send a small force to Tripoli .

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

[Ружичасти Слон]

5 Telegram 51265 did not prohibit to send a small force to capture Tripoli .
6 Wavell did not send a small force to capture Tripoli,although he had the consent from London .
7 The reason why Wavell did not send a small force to Tripoli was that there was no Italian collapse .
8 Thus it is not so that Churchill forbade to send a small force to Tripoli .

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

Was you be serious?

Must i to give you lesson on english language.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to send small force on advance Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer not have permission.

O'Connor was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wilson was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wavell was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Churchill was forbid.

Forbid was be advance on
extra small force
small force
medium force
big force
extra big force.

Churchill was forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Of course, those few telegrams don't cover the complexity of the decision making.

On real history you can to read very clear what was decisions and who was make decisions and why was make decisions.

On ljadw imaginations storys every things are completest different.

On real history on 11.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Tobruk. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Benghazi not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On real history on 21.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Benghazi. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On 10.Febuary 1941.year Wavell was not have permission for to advance on Tripoli. Not small force not big force. He was send telegram on London for to get permission on advance on Tripoli on small force. On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer he not have permission.

The whole discussion is the usual after war myth,invented by journalists .As one can expect .

All datas was be on original documents on archives.

No datas was be from after war myths.

No datas was be invented by journalists.

Myths was be invented by ljadw.

[Tom from Cornwall]

On real history you can to read very clear what was decisions and who was make decisions and why was make decisions.

OK, have you read the 'Report on the Mission of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Eastern Mediterranean Feb - Apr 41' contained in PREM3/294/1? And noted what it says about the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff at that point?

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

5 Telegram 51265 did not prohibit to send a small force to capture Tripoli .
6 Wavell did not send a small force to capture Tripoli,although he had the consent from London .
7 The reason why Wavell did not send a small force to Tripoli was that there was no Italian collapse .
8 Thus it is not so that Churchill forbade to send a small force to Tripoli .

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

Was you be serious?

Must i to give you lesson on english language.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to send small force on advance Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer not have permission.

O'Connor was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wilson was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wavell was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Churchill was forbid.

Forbid was be advance on
extra small force
small force
medium force
big force
extra big force.

Churchill was forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.

Telegram 51265 : No serious effort against Tripoli .
NOT :no extra small force, NOT :no small force.Not : no medium force . NOT : no big force. NOT : no extra big force .
Churchill did NOT forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.
Wavell thought that only a small force could advance to Tripoli, but this depended on the Italians and on the Italians only .

[Ружичасти Слон]

Re-read the telegram quotes from Wavell and Churchill. Your post above confirms you haven't done so.

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

Was you be serious?

Must i to give you lesson on english language.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to send small force on advance Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer not have permission.

O'Connor was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wilson was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wavell was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Churchill was forbid.

Forbid was be advance on
extra small force
small force
medium force
big force
extra big force.

Churchill was forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.

Telegram 51265 : No serious effort against Tripoli .
NOT :no extra small force, NOT :no small force.Not : no medium force . NOT : no big force. NOT : no extra big force .
Churchill did NOT forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.
Wavell thought that only a small force could advance to Tripoli, but this depended on the Italians and on the Italians only .

English lesson number 2

This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli... not mean Churchill was change decision from not advance on Tripoli to now can advance on Tripoli

Only on ljadw not real imaginarys storys can to be such stupid translations.

[Ружичасти Слон]

OK, have you read the 'Report on the Mission of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Eastern Mediterranean Feb - Apr 41' contained in PREM3/294/1? And noted what it says about the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff at that point?

Regards

Tom

I was read minutes on meeting Defence Committee (Operations) 7th Meeting on 1941.year on 10.February 1941.year. That was be meeting for to discuss what Wavell was request on advance on Tripoli. That was be meeting on decision on not give Wavell permission on advance on Tripoli.

I was read aide memoire by Joint Planning Staff number 105 what was have date 8.febuary 1941.year. Topic was be on advance on Tripoli or not advance. Aide memoire was use on Chiefs of Staff meeting on 10.febuary 1941.year. Aide memoire was be basics on advice what was given by military peoples on Defence Committee (Operations) 7th Meeting.

Do you think what i was read can to have same information what was on your document ?