Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[ljadw]

That's a silly argument that only works if you assume there was only one version of Barbarossa possible.

Invading the Soviet Union is on the shortlist of the worst decisions ever made in military history. Ten Sealion failures would not have amounted to that one war-ending debacle.

1 There was only one version of Barbarossa possible .
2 Saying that Barbarossa was a bad decision is totally besides the question : in war you do not decide things because they are good or bad, but because they are possible .
There was no serious alternative for Barbarossa : the stupid proposals from Raeder would not help Germany .
Time was running against Germany . Only a short successful campaign in the East could eliminate Britain before the intervention from the US .

[TheMarcksPlan]

I was curious for your explanation on how the Germans could possibly capture the skilled Soviet labor force given that this would be moved eastward as necessary to avoid the German army

Simple answer. They don't need that labor force.

As I showed upthread, completely unskilled Russian women were at least as productive as the average Soviet industrial worker, once they were put into the German system.

Systems are important. Germans fought like German soldiers under the German system, Germans fought like Russian soldiers under the Russian system (e.g. Rennenkampf in WW1), Japanese and Italians fought like Americans under the American system, Russian women produced like German women under the German production system.

The German production system was more efficient than the Russian (and less efficient than American).

[glenn239]

1 There was only one version of Barbarossa possible .

There were many versions, probably the best for Germany being a 2-season campaign built in. IMO, no conceivable variation of Barbarossa achieves the aim of the invasion in that Germany will be weaker off against the West in all cases than if Germany had not done it. Even if Germany somehow managed to recoup the resources spent in the invasion, the weakening of the USSR assisted the Anglo-Americans, not Germany.

2 Saying that Barbarossa was a bad decision is totally besides the question : in war you do not decide things because they are good or bad, but because they are possible .

Hitler invaded the SU because he thought it was a good decision. Had he thought it a bad decision, he'd not have done it.

There was no serious alternative for Barbarossa : the stupid proposals from Raeder would not help Germany .

There was no alternative strategy Germany could have selected that was worst than Barbarossa. All the alternatives were better.

Time was running against Germany . Only a short successful campaign in the East could eliminate Britain before the intervention from the US .

Only a German alliance with the Soviet Union could deter the United States from entering the war.

[glenn239]

As I showed upthread, completely unskilled Russian women were at least as productive as the average Soviet industrial worker, once they were put into the German system.

From Kennedy, the war production of the Anglo-Americans in 1943 was 48.6 billion. Germany's was 13.8, Japan's was 4.5, Italy's was 1.0 (in 1941). So, the West had the Axis 48.6 to 19.3. The USSR's output in 1943 was 13.9 billion. Even if, somehow, the Germans managed by some miracle to add a third of the Soviet production to their own production, (ie, beyond anything possible), the Axis are still outproduced 48.6 to 24. The only possible solution for the Axis was the Soviet Union joining the Axis, in which case the balance would be 48.6 to 33, (no Barbarossa might increase the Axis production total). (An undamaged Soviet Union and a Germany not sucked into the Eastern Front could probably have exceeded their wartime production results, of course).

[TheMarcksPlan]

From Kennedy, the war production of

What book? It only makes sense to talk of these things in detail, which requires examining data. Primarily, what is exchange rate used for international comparison and what is the data set. All war production or armaments?

I'm happy discuss this with you but only if we are explicit and detailed on parameters.

If, for example, I advance an argument that X Soviets working for Germany at Y% of average Soviet industrial productivity would give Z% of Soviet war production then you have to tell me which values of X, Y, and Z you reject or accept. If you're just going to say it'd be a "miracle" for Germany to get 1/3 of Soviet production then we probably both have better uses for our time and we productively reconvene on a different issue.

Here my X, Y, Z values are 7.5mil workers, at least 100% of Soviet productivity, and ~3/4 of Soviet production. With which elements do you disagree, or which unstated premises?

[ljadw]

1 There was only one version of Barbarossa possible .

There were many versions, probably the best for Germany being a 2-season campaign built in. IMO, no conceivable variation of Barbarossa achieves the aim of the invasion in that Germany will be weaker off against the West in all cases than if Germany had not done it. Even if Germany somehow managed to recoup the resources spent in the invasion, the weakening of the USSR assisted the Anglo-Americans, not Germany.

2 Saying that Barbarossa was a bad decision is totally besides the question : in war you do not decide things because they are good or bad, but because they are possible .

Hitler invaded the SU because he thought it was a good decision. Had he thought it a bad decision, he'd not have done it.

There was no serious alternative for Barbarossa : the stupid proposals from Raeder would not help Germany .

There was no alternative strategy Germany could have selected that was worst than Barbarossa. All the alternatives were better.

Time was running against Germany . Only a short successful campaign in the East could eliminate Britain before the intervention from the US .

Only a German alliance with the Soviet Union could deter the United States from entering the war.

1 The reason for Barbarossa was not to defeat the USSR, but to force Britain to give up before the US would intervene .
A 2-season campaign would not convince Britain to give up .
Hitler attacked the USSR because the alternative was to remain idle and to wait till the US would intervene .
2 There was no alliance possible between Germany and the USSR ,because there was no benefit of such alliance . For both parties .The Soviets would not send 1 million men to defend the Atlantik Wall .
The USSR could do nothing against the US . And the US could do nothing against the USSR .
The policy of the USSR was to remain neutral ( neutrality is profitable during a war ) and, IF possible,to ''invade '' a part of Central/Eastern Europe at the end of the war .
Between October 1939 and May 1940,the German army was concentrated at Germany'western border,but Stalin did not use this opportunity to invade eastern Europe .
After the fall of France,Stalin could have invaded the ME, he did not do it .
Thus, why would he ally himself with Germany when this was losing the war ?
An alliance with the USSR would not help Germany and an alliance with Germany would not benefit the USSR .

[Tom from Cornwall]

completely unskilled Russian women

Why do you think Russian women were "completely unskilled"? Is that what your primary source was saying?

Regards

Tom

[pugsville]

From Kennedy, the war production of

What book? It only makes sense to talk of these things in detail, which requires examining data. Primarily, what is exchange rate used for international comparison and what is the data set. All war production or armaments?

I'm happy discuss this with you but only if we are explicit and detailed on parameters.

If, for example, I advance an argument that X Soviets working for Germany at Y% of average Soviet industrial productivity would give Z% of Soviet war production then you have to tell me which values of X, Y, and Z you reject or accept. If you're just going to say it'd be a "miracle" for Germany to get 1/3 of Soviet production then we probably both have better uses for our time and we productively reconvene on a different issue.

Here my X, Y, Z values are 7.5mil workers, at least 100% of Soviet productivity, and ~3/4 of Soviet production. With which elements do you disagree, or which unstated premises?

unstated premises.

That German woudl have enough resources to feed that production'
That German would have the factory space to accommodate the increased workforce,
That Germany would have the transport capacity to support that increased production requiring movement.

That forced Russian labor would achieve high productivity. Thr Entire German production methods were radically different from Russian productive methods. IT simokly not a matter of smashing a sqaure peg into a round hold.

Integrating that sort of increase in the workforce would take at least 3 years, Where is the Russian labor population going to live how are they going to get where they are needed, who is going to train them and how,

[glenn239]

What book? It only makes sense to talk of these things in detail, which requires examining data. Primarily, what is exchange rate used for international comparison and what is the data set. All war production or armaments?

Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, all war production converted to US dollars. The Americans had the Germans 37 to 14, the British added on top of that made it 48 to 14.

If, for example, I advance an argument that X Soviets working for Germany at Y% of average Soviet industrial productivity would give Z% of Soviet war production then you have to tell me which values of X, Y, and Z you reject or accept. If you're just going to say it'd be a "miracle" for Germany to get 1/3 of Soviet production then we probably both have better uses for our time and we productively reconvene on a different issue.

In 1943 the Anglo-Americans produced 48 billion in war goods. The Germans produced about 14, and the Soviets also produced about 14. If by some miracle the Germans managed by invasion to add 5 billion of the Soviet production to their own by 1943, they're still down 48 to 19 against the Anglo-Americans. The basic facts are that the Soviet Union did not have the capacity to bring Germany's production up to anywhere near the Anglo-American resources. This was one of the fundamental reasons why Barbarossa was the worst military decision in modern history; it had no chance of success because it's basic premise of exploiting Soviet resources to overmatch the Americans was impossible.

Here my X, Y, Z values are 7.5mil workers, at least 100% of Soviet productivity, and ~3/4 of Soviet production. With which elements do you disagree, or which unstated premises?

The Soviet Union in its entirety produced 14 billion in war production in 1943. Even if Hitler reached the Urals, he would not capture more than 50% of that production because much of it was beyond where German armies could reach. Of that 7 billion he captured, let's say by a miracle he recoups most of it - 5 billion. (Not a chance, IMO, but let's just say). Add 5 billion in Soviet captured production to 14 billion in German production in 1943 and you have the Allies overmatching Germany 48 billion to 19 billion. It's simply not a workable strategy. Invading Russia was the way Germany loses WW2.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, all war production converted to US dollars. The Americans had the Germans 37 to 14, the British added on top of that made it 48 to 14.

Obviously I disagree with your conclusions for reasons I've exhaustively set forth in this thread. I'll just briefly restate the main points for anyone reading along who'd like to go back and dive into the details:

• I see German armament having >twice the labor inputs at ~30% higher productivity than OTL. From demob'd domestic and more foreign workers. Total: >2.5 the armaments production.
• Aircraft production would be ~70% of total armaments production vs. ~45% OTL: ~4x OTL aircraft production.

Under those conditions, the Allies can't bomb Germany and can't even imagine invading Europe.

We don't even need to address total war production; it's not necessary to making the above argument.

But on that topic, a few very brief points because I've put enough detailed work into this thread (readers can search for "TMP bookmark" for intensive work).

• US armaments production didn't grow in '43-'44, Germany's grew by ~45% between 1943 average and July '44 per Wagenfuehr's index (accurate in this period, as even Tooze would say). That adds 6.3bn to German war production if that category grew similarly to armaments. Say 5bn annualized delta by July '44 levels, now we're at 19bn OTL.
• While US production could have grown OTL, ATL it cannot because US must raise a larger army.
• 2.5x OTL German production at July '44 annualized level is 47.5bn. Now Germany equals the West's production.
• Germany doesn't need to equal the West's production because US was horribly inefficient (militarily) and had to do many things Germany didn't (e.g. shipping and navy took ~1/3 of US war effort, <10% for Germany).

I won't be convinced by arguments based on topline OTL economic statistics because ATL is dramatically different. There is no point to hammering on OTL statistics in a discussion with me unless one is willing to dive into the fundamentals of production factors and military efficiency.

[glenn239]

1 The reason for Barbarossa was not to defeat the USSR, but to force Britain to give up before the US would intervene .
A 2-season campaign would not convince Britain to give up .

The premise was that the US could not intervene in strength before Germany conquered the USSR and turned back west. The idea that Britain would give up before the US intervened was not considered.

2 There was no alliance possible between Germany and the USSR ,because there was no benefit of such alliance . For both parties .The Soviets would not send 1 million men to defend the Atlantik Wall .

The basis for an alliance between the USSR and Germany was the looming threat of US global hegemony.

The USSR could do nothing against the US . And the US could do nothing against the USSR .

By that logic, North Korea must not exist today because North Korea was at war with the United States in 1950 and apparently the Soviet Union could "do nothing" against the United States in US wars.

The policy of the USSR was to remain neutral ( neutrality is profitable during a war ) and, IF possible,to ''invade '' a part of Central/Eastern Europe at the end of the war .

The policy of the USSR was to keep the capitalist countries in conflict and to overthrow as many countries as possible and replace them with communist governments. The Axis were the weaker alliance, so Soviet support would have to be for them. The weaker countries available to be overthrown and supplanted by Communist regimes were largely in the British, French, and Japanese empires.

Thus, why would he ally himself with Germany when this was losing the war ?

Germany was not losing the war in 1940. If Stalin attacks Germany, (as your wishful thinking implies), then the outcome would be US global hegemony and the Soviet Union totally isolated. If Stalin supported the Axis, then the Axis could stalemate the Allies and the US would not achieve global hegemony.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Reverting to the topic of this thread from yet another fruitless discussion on what Nazi Germany could or could not do after a putative collapse of the Soviet Union, I stumbled across this mention of Turkish railways in the British COS committee meeting minutes for 18 August 1941 and thought it might be of interest:

CAB79-13-40 - Rail links Syria to Turkey - Aug 41.JPG

I'll see if there is any more information as to whether anything was done to close the gap between Arada and Diarbekir and the linking together of the Palestinian and Syrian railway systems.

Regards

Tom

[Peter89]

Reverting to the topic of this thread from yet another fruitless discussion on what Nazi Germany could or could not do after a putative collapse of the Soviet Union, I stumbled across this mention of Turkish railways in the British COS committee meeting minutes for 18 August 1941 and thought it might be of interest:

CAB79-13-40 - Rail links Syria to Turkey - Aug 41.JPG

I'll see if there is any more information as to whether anything was done to close the gap between Arada and Diarbekir and the linking together of the Palestinian and Syrian railway systems.

Regards

Tom

Meanwhile, the Wallies competed their preparations in August and December 1942, respectively. Their railway, which connected the Suez with Turkey's network, was improved to a standard gauge railway (20t/axle), with multiple entry points with metre gauge and also in connection with the Baghdad(-Basra) line. These two lines alone - without other entry points to port terminals of the Turkish railway system - would overwhelm the German logistics at least by 2 to 1 (the narrow gauge lines of the ME was designed to haul at least 150 tons per train, about the third of the standard gauge ones, and the Balkan load was 2/3 of the standard gauge load).

If you are interested in the detailed report of that railway, I'm happy to send it to you.

[TheMarcksPlan]

CAB79-13-40 - Rail links Syria to Turkey - Aug 41.JPG (108.4 KiB)

Thanks Tom. I've previously discussed the Mardin-Diyarbakir rail link here here.

I've also documented that the British later decided that completing this link could only help the Germans, as the Turkish border couldn't be held. I can't remember where in this thread; it was before started using my book-marks.

These lines also underlie my argument that, at least had Turkey been Axis/acquiescent, the Germans could have supported a force in the MidEast larger than any conceivable Allied shipping resources could match.

Note the requirement for supporting Turkish civilian needs. That's because Turkey's trade with Germany/Europe would, obviously, cease if invaded by Germany. The notion that Britain could shipped enough to support Turkey at this time - August '41 the US is neutral - is pure folly. To Britain's credit, they faced the reality that they were not holding anything north of Turkey's border in this scenario. As with most folks in this thread still going through that process, it took them awhile to reach a realistic, rather than wishful, appraisal of the contingent situation.

[ljadw]

1 The reason for Barbarossa was not to defeat the USSR, but to force Britain to give up before the US would intervene .
A 2-season campaign would not convince Britain to give up .

The premise was that the US could not intervene in strength before Germany conquered the USSR and turned back west. The idea that Britain would give up before the US intervened was not considered.

2 There was no alliance possible between Germany and the USSR ,because there was no benefit of such alliance . For both parties .The Soviets would not send 1 million men to defend the Atlantik Wall .

The basis for an alliance between the USSR and Germany was the looming threat of US global hegemony.

The USSR could do nothing against the US . And the US could do nothing against the USSR .

By that logic, North Korea must not exist today because North Korea was at war with the United States in 1950 and apparently the Soviet Union could "do nothing" against the United States in US wars.

The policy of the USSR was to remain neutral ( neutrality is profitable during a war ) and, IF possible,to ''invade '' a part of Central/Eastern Europe at the end of the war .

The policy of the USSR was to keep the capitalist countries in conflict and to overthrow as many countries as possible and replace them with communist governments. The Axis were the weaker alliance, so Soviet support would have to be for them. The weaker countries available to be overthrown and supplanted by Communist regimes were largely in the British, French, and Japanese empires.

Thus, why would he ally himself with Germany when this was losing the war ?

Germany was not losing the war in 1940. If Stalin attacks Germany, (as your wishful thinking implies), then the outcome would be US global hegemony and the Soviet Union totally isolated. If Stalin supported the Axis, then the Axis could stalemate the Allies and the US would not achieve global hegemony.

1 NO : Hitler said several times in his meetings with his generals that the aim was to force Britain to give up .
2 There was no looming threat of US global hegemony .
3 1950 is not 1940 ,besides US did not fight against the SU in 1950 .
4 If the Soviets had wanted to attack the ME,that was dominated by Britain they would have done it before Barbarossa . They did not do it,because they had not the power to do it and because it was not in their interest if Germany could defeat Britain in 1940 .
5 It was in the interest of the USSR that the capitalist civil war would last as long as possible . Who would win was irrelevant .If Germany won,it could not attack the USSR,and a victorious Third Reich would collapse before 1953 .
If the West won, France and Britain would be that exhausted that they would no longer be a danger for the USSR . And the US would leave Europe as after WWI :the US left Europe after 1945 : there were only two US divisions in Europe in 1950 .
The only wise policy for the Soviets was to remain neutral ,as they did in 1939 ,not to ally themselves with a loser : Germany was in a dead end at the end of June 1940 :the army, LW and the KM tried to force Britain to give ,but they failed and every day Britain was becoming stronger .And every day the danger of war with the US was increasing .