Chief of Staff Choices 1939?

[ljadw]

In September 1948 the polls predicted a GOP landslide of 13 % in popular votes,which meant a GOP victory in electoral votes .
In 2016 they gave Clinton an advance of 2 /4 % of popular votes, which did not mean a victory in the electoral college , but still they predicted Clinton to be president , thus a Clinton majority in the electoral college .
The polls were also wrong in 1936 .
Winning the popular vote does not mean winning the electoral votes .
Not only are polls biased , but they are predicting what the person wants who paid them .
There were also polls who gave a Trump win, but these were paid by the GOP .
Polls are publicity . Nothing more .
If the Libertarian candidate of 2016 would pay for a poll predicting that he would win, he would have such a poll .

[Delta Tank]

Just saw and read this. Interesting.

Good job of trashing Hart as a "Defeatist" and Coward". "Realist" might be more accurate.

Asiatic Fleet had 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 13 old destroyers and no air cover. IJN had 2 battleships, 1 light carrier, 7 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 29 modern destroyers, and air control. They had to go south to avoid destruction. Joined with the British, Dutch, and Australians in ABDA, they fought valiantly, but ineffectively, in the Allied loss of the Netherlands East Indies.

If Hart had stayed in the Philippines, he could not have functioned effectively as a Fleet Commander. He would have been a useless mouth to feed from the limited food supplies available because MacArthur didn't move his supplies to Bataan before the Japanese Army arrived. He sent an advanced party off in a PBY on Dec 24 and planned to follow on Dec 25 on 2 more PBYs. Japanese aircraft destroyed the 2 planes, so Hart caught a ride on the submarine USS Shark at 2 AM, Dec 26. He arrived in Java on Jan 1, 1942.

This info is from Blair "Silent Victory", Morison "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun In The Pacific", and Cressman "Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II".

I posted the following on another thread. viewtopic.php?f=33&t=133930&p=1178170&h ... s#p1178170

This from Command Decisions, which can be found here: http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_06.htm

"To support the movement to Bataan a new plan of supply was quickly drawn. Under War Plan ORANGE the movement of supplies to Bataan was to begin immediately on the outbreak of war and continue until the depots and warehouses there had been stocked with sufficient supplies to sustain a garrison of 43,000 men for six months. When MacArthur substituted for ORANGE his order to fight it out on the beaches, this supply plan was canceled. The supplies earmarked for Bataan under ORANGE therefore went to advance depots and railheads behind the beaches. When MacArthur ordered a return to ORANGE, many of the supplies needed on Bataan were scattered, and no measures had yet been taken to move them to Bataan. MacArthur's decision left only seven days, until 1 January, when Manila was evacuated, in which to bring in the supplies, and instead of the 43,000 men provided for in ORANGE, the force withdrawing to Bataan would be closer to 80,000. This change in plans was destined to have a greater effect on the ability of the defenders to hold Bataan than any other phase of the operation.

The supply plan went into effect on the morning of 24 December, when General Marshall called the G-4 and the quartermaster into his office and told them of the decision to withdraw all troops on Luzon to Bataan and to evacuate Manila. Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the quartermaster, was instructed to move his base of operations to Bataan immediately and to check on the reserves at Corregidor to be sure that there was enough to supply 10,000 men for six months. Small barges and boats required to move the supplies from Manila to Corregidor and Bataan were quickly gathered, and within twenty-four hours Corregidor was completely stocked with the supplies for a six-month campaign. At the same time, all supplies were immediately started on their way to Bataan by every available means-water, truck, and rail. Ammunition had already been stored in the peninsula, together with certain defense reserves including 300,000 gallons of gasoline, lubricating oil, and greases, and about 3,000 tons of canned meats and fish. [29] "

So as I read this the food got there but the number of men in the perimeter had doubled, but the amount of food had not. And remember Bataan and Corregidor held out for just about 5 months, (versus the planned 6 months) but the US did not fight their way back for another two and half years! so I doubt if enough supplies could of been placed on Battan to last that amount of time.

This comes from the book entitled "Fall of the Philippines"
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... 5.htm#p254

"Full-scale movement of supplies to Bataan did not begin until the decision was made on 23 December to withdraw to Bataan. By that time the number of troops to be supplied during the siege of Bataan had increased from the planned 43,000 to almost 80,000, in addition to about 26,000 civilians who had fled to Bataan to escape the invading army. Moving to Bataan enough food and supplies to keep so large a force in action for a period of 180 days would have been extremely difficult under the most favorable circumstances. To accomplish it in about one week, during the confusion of war and retreat, proved to be an impossible task. (page 254)"

Discussions on the attempts to run the blockade can be found here:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_22.htm
Starting on page 390

"Only a very small portion of the supplies gathered so painfully and hoarded so carefully in the south ever reached Manila Bay. The total could not have been more than a few thousand tons. The Legaspi, with a capacity of 1,000 tons, was the first of the interisland steamers to make the journey safely. On 22 January she brought a cargo of rice and other food from Panay to Corregidor, and in February completed another trip. On 1 March, while she was on her third trip, she was sunk by a Japanese gunboat off the north coast of Mindoro and her crew captured.

Late in February the Princessa made the run from Cebu to Corregidor with a cargo of 700 tons of food. At Mindanao the 2,500 tons of rations and 2,000 rounds of 81-mm. ammunition from the Coast Farmer were transferred to the Elcano and Lepus. The first got through to Manila Bay, but the Lepus was captured off Palawan on 28 February. The cargoes of the Dona Nati and Anhui were loaded for transshipment at Cebu, but the ships failed to break through the tightening Japanese blockade. Ten of the interisland steamers were sunk by the enemy or scuttled by their crews to avoid capture, resulting in the loss of 7,000 tons of food, petroleum, and other miscellaneous supplies.25

In terms of supplies delivered to the battlefield, the blockade-running program from Australia and the Netherland Indies was a dismal failure. Of the 10,000 tons of rations which reached Mindanao and Cebu only about 1,000 tons-a four-day supply for the 100,000 soldiers and civilians on Bataan-reached Manila Bay. Even more distressing was the condition of the food when it finally reached the men. The containers in which the food was packed had broken open and the holds of the ships contained a miscellaneous pile of canned goods. All of it had to be sorted and repacked before it could be issued to the troops. Practically all the paper labels on the cans were destroyed so that they could not be identified without opening them. Flour and sugar sacks had broken open and the contents were spread loosely among the cans. Shovels had to be used to get these precious commodities back into new sacks. Onions and potatoes, piled on the decks during the voyage through tropical waters, were rotted and had to be destroyed almost before the eyes of the starving men. These "heart-breaking" conditions resulted in delays in unloading and, what was much worse, considerable loss of food to the weakened and hungry garrison.26"

Mike

[rcocean]

So as I read this the food got there but the number of men in the perimeter had doubled, but the amount of food had not. And remember Bataan and Corregidor held out for just about 5 months, (versus the planned 6 months) but the US did not fight their way back for another two and half years! so I doubt if enough supplies could of been placed on Battan to last that amount of time.

Great post. Very informative. I think the lack of food in the fall of Bataan has been greatly exaggerated. Even if everyone had a full belly, there still would've been malaria and other diseases which greatly reduced the fighting strenght of the Bataan Combat troops. Futher the Japanese had massive artillery superority, air superiority, and were able to replace their losses while the General King couldn't.

During their final offensive in April 1942, the Japanese had observation balloons directing their artillery fire, and had two months to pinpoint the American-Filipino defenses. Their counter-battery fire rendered the US artilery response weak and useless. Under the weight of the artillery barrage, the center of the Filipino-american line collapsed and the US-Filipine army had to retreat. IRC, some 24000 Filipino's and Americans were in hospitals or some type, and King had to surrender or the Japanese army would've overrun them and butchered the wounded.

I have no doubt that being hungry lowered morale and sapped the fighting strength but if you look at the Japanese offensive in January , you'll see that we were forced to retreat, despite not being hungry.

[Delta Tank]

"Others despised him as an over-ambitious, self-righteous, empire-builder with some justification." No, I'd say MacArthur's flaws were egotism and romanticism. Eisenhower, who was a good judge stated MacArthur too often would try to get away from harsh reality and believe he could will things into being. Or he'd put a good face on something, like the Filipino Army. On Bataan MacArthur kept believing that if they just tried hard enough, the allies & the Navy could get some supplies through, and somehow they could win. Someone like Eisenhower would've simply accepted the inevitable and cold bloodedly looked for exit strategy from Dec 8th on. If MacArthur had not been ordered from Corregidor he would've died rather than surrender. The whole idea of Ike or Bradley doing that is laughable. No Romantic nonsense for them.

I don't see anything "Self-righteous" about him.

To All,
Was MacArthur privy to Magic intercepts? Did MacArthur know that we had broken any of the Japanese codes in 1941?

Mike

[Carl Schwamberger]

Was MacArthur privy to Magic intercepts? Did MacArthur know that we had broken any of the Japanese codes in 1941?

Exactly what he knew is the question.

No, he was not privy to the MAGIC intercepts.

No, he was not directly privy to the USN decrypts of the JN15 code or any others at the time.

Yes he did did get summaries or briefs, on what these decrypt revealed relevant to his command. & he did get messages describing the general strategic situation & the ongoing breakdown of the negotiations with Japan.

'Secret Allies in the Pacific' by R Worth, describes the covert intel sharing by the Dutch, US, and British in the Pacific region in the 6-10 months run up to the War. This includes some indication of what Mac was briefed on from those sources. Not a lot in terms of Japans intent that I see. But, some on the ongoing preparations.

He also was a direct addressee of the 27 November War Warning message. In my experience the language of that message was a clear & direct warning the Japanese would attack very soon.

On the 6th & 7th December he had information on Japanese convoys and surface fleet headed south from the Indo China area.

Also on the 6th & briefly on the 7th he met with British Admiral Phillips who had flown to Manilia & departed morning of the 7th for Singapore. What Phillips told him I don't have, but Phillips had been briefed on the Japanese transports and warships assembling, before departing for Manila.

A couple observations here:

The Japanese did not start their 'operational preparations for war until they realized the Embargos represented the US new attitude & war was more likely to be necessary. That was July-August. The Japanese decision for war came in October, & assumed the possibilities of the US reversing its key positions by the target date of late November 1941.

Col Willobhy Mac intel chief has acquired a low reputation, as a mediocrity and sycophant. He filtered the intel Mac received and could put his spin on every item. I don't have any take on how that colored the information Mac received.

Up to November there was a assumption of idea war would not come until the spring of 1942, at the earliest. This is also the target 'date' for some of the key preparations or milestones in the US and the Philippines. This might have resulted in the historically frequent idea the enemy is in synch with our planning timeline. In November the MAGIC decrypts and the failing negotiations resulted in the War Warning Message.

[daveshoup2MD]

Was MacArthur privy to Magic intercepts? Did MacArthur know that we had broken any of the Japanese codes in 1941?

Exactly what he knew is the question.

No, he was not privy to the MAGIC intercepts.

No, he was not directly privy to the USN decrypts of the JN15 code or any others at the time.

Yes he did did get summaries or briefs, on what these decrypt revealed relevant to his command. & he did get messages describing the general strategic situation & the ongoing breakdown of the negotiations with Japan.

'Secret Allies in the Pacific' by R Worth, describes the covert intel sharing by the Dutch, US, and British in the Pacific region in the 6-10 months run up to the War. This includes some indication of what Mac was briefed on from those sources. Not a lot in terms of Japans intent that I see. But, some on the ongoing preparations.

He also was a direct addressee of the 27 November War Warning message. In my experience the language of that message was a clear & direct warning the Japanese would attack very soon.

On the 6th & 7th December he had information on Japanese convoys and surface fleet headed south from the Indo China area.

Also on the 6th & briefly on the 7th he met with British Admiral Phillips who had flown to Manilia & departed morning of the 7th for Singapore. What Phillips told him I don't have, but Phillips had been briefed on the Japanese transports and warships assembling, before departing for Manila.

A couple observations here:

The Japanese did not start their 'operational preparations for war until they realized the Embargos represented the US new attitude & war was more likely to be necessary. That was July-August. The Japanese decision for war came in October, & assumed the possibilities of the US reversing its key positions by the target date of late November 1941.

Col Willobhy Mac intel chief has acquired a low reputation, as a mediocrity and sycophant. He filtered the intel Mac received and could put his spin on every item. I don't have any take on how that colored the information Mac received.

Up to November there was a assumption of idea war would not come until the spring of 1942, at the earliest. This is also the target 'date' for some of the key preparations or milestones in the US and the Philippines. This might have resulted in the historically frequent idea the enemy is in synch with our planning timeline. In November the MAGIC decrypts and the failing negotiations resulted in the War Warning Message.

It's worth noting that MacArthur kept Willoughby in his G2 post from 1941-51, from the PI to Australia and back again, and then on to Japan through to the first full year in Korea, and saw him promoted to BG and MG.

Presumably, Mac deserves "credit" for that...

[Empiricist]

Costello didn't understand that P-40s didn't have the range to escort B-17s to Formosa, nor did they have the oxygen to operate above 20,000 feet.

In all civilized air forces and civil aviation of the world oxygen must be used from 10,000ft up. The USAAF of WWII era have never been an exception. Every pilot and the other crew members had to use oxygen masks from 10,000ft. In vast majority of the USAAF aircraft oxygen installation was self-activated automatically from 10,000ft.

[rcocean]

Costello didn't understand that P-40s didn't have the range to escort B-17s to Formosa, nor did they have the oxygen to operate above 20,000 feet.

In all civilized air forces and civil aviation of the world oxygen must be used from 10,000ft up. The USAAF of WWII era have never been an exception. Every pilot and the other crew members had to use oxygen masks from 10,000ft. In vast majority of the USAAF aircraft oxygen installation was self-activated automatically from 10,000ft.

There was a shortage of oxygen and the neccessary pressured tanks for the P-40s in the Philippines in December 1941. They also had problems getting the 50 cals to work over 20,000 feet due to various problems. But thanks for telling me that oxygen was used in US AAF planes. See "Doomed at the Start", and "They fought with what they had".

[Empiricist]

Hello,

Thanks a lot for your reply. Yes, I can imagine various USAAF problems then because I translated many times various USN aviation and USAAF documents of 1942-1943. For all forumers interested in the oxygen of the US WWII era military aviation I would recommend the Air Forces Manual No. 35 Notes on The Use of Oxygen Equipment for Air Crews.

And yes, both the USN/USMC aviation and USAAF had (in 1941-1942) serious problems with frozen guns during high altitude flights. The USA activated then the R&D program at new grease for machine guns and cannons working at high altitudes and the problem was solved in early1943.