Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[TheMarcksPlan]

the main driver of an increased number of losses - more US bombers over Germany.

Nope. AAF heavy bomber losses to aircraft over Europe:



AAF heavy bomber sorties over Europe:



The data show losses to AC peaking in April at 314, when AAF flew 14,464 HB sorties. In October AAF flew 18,268 HB sorties and lost 35 HB's to aircraft.

There is absolutely no support for the contention that more HB's over Germany alone meant more losses to German fighters.

The changing % of the split between losses to flak and fighters could have 2 main causes - more effective flak or less effective fighters. Do you have any evidence for flak becoming more effective?

You're reading a sufficient condition of showing the nonsense of Richard's analysis as a necessary condition of showing the validity of my own. That's not how logic works.

The % of planes shot down by fighters doesn't matter, only the total is relevant.

How do you tie your shows?

Ha I guess I am too dumb to know that.

...which should provide you, Richard, and others all the more reason to think correctly here. If I can do it, you surely can.

Don't be distracted by bad uses of statistics (we all know who can use them). More German fighters (holding quality constant) would have meant more AAF losses.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Spreadsheet of AAF HB losses total and by rate per sortie:



Note that this is for all AAF HB sorties against Europe, many of which were against France/Italy, especially early in the campaign and around D-Day.

I've made this point elsewhere but bears repeating: AAF lost 909 HB's to aircraft in 1943. On Jan. 1, 1944 it had 2,608 HB's in Europe. If we triple AAF HB losses during 1943, it begins 1944 with 790 HB's or 30% of OTL. Quadrupling losses is impossible unless someone invents negative bombers.

Peak US HB production was 1,508 in March 1944; peak AAF HB losses to fighters was 419 in April '44 (when escorts were already strong). A 5x stronger RLV would shoot down >2,000 HB's in that same peak month, before Flak and accidents take their toll.

Again, daylight bombing is impossible except against a weak opponent.

TMP bookmark: AAF HB losses by type and sortie rate

[Peter89]

I've made this point elsewhere but bears repeating: AAF lost 909 HB's to aircraft in 1943. On Jan. 1, 1944 it had 2,608 HB's in Europe. If we triple AAF HB losses during 1943, it begins 1944 with 790 HB's or 30% of OTL. Quadrupling losses is impossible unless someone invents negative bombers.

Yes, but TMP, you got refutals from like 3 different angles for this theory.

In order to make it a plausible one, you need to demonstrate that:
- what would be the Allies' response? to invent negative bombers is obviously not serious, but what do you actually think the Allies would do if they'd face unbearable heavy bomber losses? Keep sending them into Germany? Historical evidence suggests that they drew the LW into battle on favourable terms (like in Circus in 1941 or in the North African campaign in early 1943)
- where does the resources come from? Aluminium, fuel, etc.? In 1944, it was no longer possible to save extraordinary amounts of aluminum in the process of aircraft manufacturing, and existing sources were fully utilized
- what about keeping 3-4x more aircrafts in the air? The average life time of a Me 109 sank from 115h to 65h as early as 1942, by 1944, most of them didn't make it until they required even a partial overhaul - that was one of the reasons why the OTL numbers could be kept in the air
- what about the infrastructure that produced pilots, mechanics, proper airfields, lubricants, aircraft instruments, ground facilities? could they produce 3-4x more of those?
- where is the proof that more German planes shot down linearly more HBs? Everything we know contradicts this notion, not that it is impossible, but that it is not related, and if related, not linearly.

1943
Wallies lost: 909 heavy bombers, of which 693 due to LW (your numbers)
LW had: 1324-1514 fighters (Williamson)
German monthly fighter aircraft production average: 682-838 (1E fighters - total, Vajda)
All front fighter distribution except the East, 10 February 1943 - 20 December 1943: Single engine: 65-73%, Twin engine 75-94%, Night fighter 92-100% (Zamsky)
Sortie per loss: 55, of which 42 due to LW (your numbers)

1944
Wallies lost: 2135 heavy bombers, of which 985 due to LW (your numbers)
LW had: 1561-1610 fighters (Williamson)
German monthly fighter aircraft production average: 1769-2082 (1E fighters - total, Vajda)
All front fighter distribution except the East, 10 February 1944: Single engine: 79%, Twin engine 95%, Night fighter 91% (Zamsky)
Sortie per loss: 152, of which 70 due to LW (your numbers)

Thus, the Germans increased their fighter production by 2.5-3x from 1943 to 1944, but their numbers on hand increased only marginally, by about 10%. The rest was shot down by the Allies. In the meanwhile, the LW did not shoot down 2.5-3x heavy bombers. In fact, while in 1943, the LW needed 42 heavy bomber sorties to shoot down one, in 1944, they needed 70. Thus, the bombing damage would not decrease linearly either.

The other approach, that "everything would be different in a substantially questionable ATL", is also not really realistic. The German aircraft industry consumed 240 kt aluminium in 1943 and 273 kt aluminium in 1944, while the total production was 432 kt and 455 kt, respectively. As most of the German bauxite came from Hungary and Yugoslavia, you need to go back to the thirties to make changes in these production figures, but definately not on the scale of 3-4x, because the increase in the production on this magnitude would require new technologies, largely unavailable in that time. Thus we can safely conclude that it was not possible to 3-4x German aircraft production, because of the lack of raw materials. There were some room for improvement, of course, because the German production became more and more effective in terms of raw material and working hours, but not on the scale of 3-400%. And this would not be solved by the annexation of the western SU either; the only noteable bauxite deposit west of the Urals was in Tikhvin. The other bauxite sources acquired by the Germans, such as in France and Greece, fell woefully short of expectations. The huge increase in LW fighter force if the Eastern front was absent is also questionable; from 22/06/1941 to 01/01/1944 35% of the 1E fighters were lost in the East (Zamsky). Given that you count with operation-heavy campaigns, and that the endgame would result in the need of patrolling a several thousand kms of border, what exactly is the net gain?

[ljadw]

Even if it was possible to increase 3-4 German aircraft production,it was not possible to increase 3-4 or less the number of new pilots and aircraft crew and aircraft technicians .

[TheMarcksPlan]

TMP, you got refutals from like 3 different angles for this theory.

I'd get more "refutals" if I posted on r/ShitWehraboosSay but they'd be even lower quality.

"everything would be different in a substantially questionable ATL", is also not really realistic.

What follows are issues I've already addressed, mischaracterizations of my statements, and sloppy analysis.

Respectfully, ask me a question about what I'm saying and I will answer it. To correct all these mistakes takes too much time and effort.

1943
Wallies lost: 909 heavy bombers, of which 693 due to LW (your numbers)

NO!

909 lost to AC ("my" numbers, aka AAF Statistical Digest numbers).

Those lost to Flak are basically irrelevant to the discussion.

Germans increased their fighter production by 2.5-3x from 1943 to 1944, but their numbers on hand increased only marginally

Huh, wonder why that was?

You're mistaking an argument about imposing attrition on the W.Allies with an argument about - idk - building up LW Iststarke.

Again, discussions are easier when you ask what I'm saying rather than strategically telling me what I'm saying.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Because it's a long thread, note that I've discussed ATL LW training fuel budget here and definitely elsewhere. TL;DR: training 4x OTL's LW pilots at 1942 levels would require ~5mil tons of avgas. You get half that amount simply by switching OTL hydrogenation plants from mogas to avgas (plus producing more of the required blending agents). The other half (2.5mil tons) is refined from Russian crude (plus blending agents). Producing more blending agents is comfortably built into the overall ATL condition of doubling OTL industrial workforce, as I've discussed extensively in this thread. In addition, lack of Eastern Front shifts resources to training (no Demyansk and Stalingrad airlifts, no diversion of Ar-96 trainers, less stress of LW overall, LW Chief of Staff Jeschonnek stated "first we must defeat Russia, then we can focus on training").

Again, rather than assume TMP is too dumb to realize that training more pilots might be a factor, please ask me a question rather than telling me some obvious thing I've supposedly missed and you've brilliantly raised.

[KDF33]

- where does the resources come from? Aluminium, fuel, etc.? In 1944, it was no longer possible to save extraordinary amounts of aluminum in the process of aircraft manufacturing, and existing sources were fully utilized

The essential prerequisite to TMP's argument has always been the successful conclusion to Hitler's Russian campaign. Looking at the numbers, he is correct that the constant bloodletting in the East completely warped the German war effort.

Using the USSBS and German statistics on Wehrmacht casualties, I've created a table showing the evolution of the German human resources position:



I've circled in red the two sections that are the most striking to me: the increase in foreign workers, and the number of people transferred either to work in 'irreducible' sectors (i.e., agriculture and the metalworking and associated industries) or to the Wehrmacht and the police/SS.

From 6/1/1940 to 5/31/1944, 2,848,000 people were added to the essential economic sectors, whereas 7,555,168 were sent to the military and other security organizations. That's almost 3 persons sent to the military et al. for every 1 sent to the essential economic sectors.

Note, by the way, that the Anglo-Americans had about 7 million troops in theaters against Germany on 6/30/1944 (4,500,000 for all three British arms around the world and 2,397,990 for the U.S. Army in the ETO, MTO and Middle East/Africa), inclusive of the formations equivalent to those of the Ersatzheer.

On top of that, foreign labor recruitment was comparatively low until the spring of 1942. For 1939-40 and 1941-2, you see gains of respectively 847,000 and 1,095,000 (the latter boosted by Sauckel in March-May). 1940-1 is much higher, at 1,872,000, but the lion's share is attributable to the conscription for labor of French and Belgian POW (1,350,000), rather than to the mobilization of the population of countries under occupation.

When you factor in the late start to the forced labor mobilization program (early 1942) combined to the continuous drain of manpower toward the military, primarily to serve the requirements of the Eastern Front, TMP's argument makes a lot of sense.

[Gooner1]

When you factor in the late start to the forced labor mobilization program (early 1942) combined to the continuous drain of manpower toward the military, primarily to serve the requirements of the Eastern Front, TMP's argument makes a lot of sense.

Yes and I am keen to read how the additional manpower can be smelted into aluminium.

[ljadw]

The figures for the Belgians who worked in Germany are not correct,and I have no faith for those of the French .
225000 Belgian soldiers became POW in Germany in May 1940, but most were released less than a year later .
From June 1940 til October 1942 224000 Belgians were going by their own will to Germany to work there .
From November 1942 til August 1944 189000 were forced to go to Germany to work there .
From November 1942 til August 1944,a small, unknown number went voluntarily to work there .
The requisitions started at the end of 1942 .
The foreign labor recruitment in Belgium was higher before the Sauckel requisitions .:224000 against 189000
And these figures do not include all those who in the occupied countries worked for Germany, voluntarily or not .And, it is likely that their number was higher than those who worked in Germany .
There were also Belgians who worked in France for Germany .

[Aber]

More German fighters (holding quality constant) would have meant more AAF losses.

Yes, holding all other things equal.

Counterexample from your spreadsheet - Average monthly loss rate for Heavy Bombers to fighters dropped from 1.83% in 1943 to 0.66% in 1944. Other sources show that German fighter strength was higher in 1944 than in 1943.

Therefore there is not a simple relationship between German fighter numbers and Heavy Bomber losses.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, holding all other things equal.

Counterexample from your spreadsheet - Average monthly loss rate for Heavy Bombers to fighters dropped from 1.83% in 1943 to 0.66% in 1944. Other sources show that German fighter strength was higher in 1944 than in 1943.

Therefore there is not a simple relationship between German fighter numbers and Heavy Bomber losses.

Luftwaffe loss per sortie against Allied day bomber operations 1944:

January 5.9%
February 10.4%
March 10.8%
April 8.8%
May 10.6%
June 13.6%
July 13.1%
August 13.4%
September 15.8%
October 8.1%
November 18.5%
December 13%

Compare those to the Allied daylight heavy bomber losses to fighters.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I'd get more "refutals" if I posted on r/ShitWehraboosSay but they'd be even lower quality.

That sounds like a great site, can you post up a link?

Respectfully, ask me a question about what I'm saying and I will answer it.

Do you know if any of the MTO HB losses in1943 were inflicted by Italian fighters?

Apologies, but I’ve lost track - in your timeline do you propose a date on which the Nazi leadership decide to concentrate on ramping up single-engine fighters? During your putative 2nd year of campaign in USSR? Mid to autumn 1942? Before the daylight HB campaign was underway? While they were busy planning a “Mesopotamia” campaign for spring 1943? While they may have also been diverting aviation assets to support the maritime campaign against the UK?

Regards

Tom

[TheMarcksPlan]

Counterexample from your spreadsheet - Average monthly loss rate for Heavy Bombers to fighters dropped from 1.83% in 1943 to 0.66% in 1944. Other sources show that German fighter strength was higher in 1944 than in 1943.

Luftwaffe loss per sortie against Allied day bomber operations 1944:
...
Compare those to the Allied daylight heavy bomber losses to fighters.

I've said enough about the analytical nonsense of looking only at percentage loss rates. You're not thinking correctly but I doubt my ability to correct you.

It's perhaps my fault for even including a % column in my spreadsheet, should have known that would be distracting.

Therefore there is not a simple relationship between German fighter numbers and Heavy Bomber losses.

Strawman.

Yes, holding all other things equal.

I suspect the main problem here is you're conflating intra-OTL variation with ATL:OTL variation.

I.e. "more fighters" alone can create many different outcomes depending on various OTL situations: How's the weather? Are there escorts? Are these decent 1943 German pilots or crappy latter 1944 pilots? et. That's intra-OTL variation.

OTL:ATL variation slots more German fighters into each of these various situations, holding everything equal in OTL:ATL terms. At each OTL tactical scenario, more German fighters will lead to more Allied losses.

There's a further issue of how many more losses, which is a topic for discussion and debate. I'm interested to have that discussion and view a linear relationship between # of German fighters and # of Allied losses as conservative. Even holding OTL:ATL quality constant, there's likely a supra-linear effect where more German fighters break up more combat boxes and where more German fighters conduct freehunts instead of being tied as escorts to the heavy groups (1E and 2E).

There is an additional analytical factor (and many others) related to quality of German training in 1944, which would certainly improve given the added fuel resources and Eastern Front's absence.

There is an additional discussion regarding attritional "velocity": relative to OTL, what % of ATL's delta to German resources is actually traded in attrition? It's almost certainly less than 100% because the Wallies run out of HB's before 5x OTL attrition.

That raises the additional discussion of Wallied ATL strategy/tactics. There are many possible responses but none of them include bombing Germany as in OTL.

I hope to get to these additional discussions at some point with some interlocutors.

[TheMarcksPlan]

in your timeline do you propose a date on which the Nazi leadership decide to concentrate on ramping up single-engine fighters?

I have specified no ATL shift to 1E fighters, only a general 4x delta to LW production for each LW production category (5x delta to RLV resources because no Ostfront).

That is a conservative projection of ATL fighter output because Ostfront played a large role in delaying Germany's shift to aerial defense.

But again I am arguing for sufficient conditions of defeating the CBO by 1944 and a defensive shift isn't necessary to my ATL. If/when I have the time I'll look at whether greater defensive emphasis from 1942 could have stopped Bomber Command during 1943.

Before the daylight HB campaign was underway?

LW leadership knew a daylight bombing campaign was coming from no later than 1942. AAF was mainly bombing France until late summer 1943 so its capabilities and tactics were well-known before the daylight battle over Germany began in earnest.

While they were busy planning a “Mesopotamia” campaign for spring 1943?

Just apply the global LW delta to that campaign: 4x the OTL Mediterranean LW.

Now again, that 5x OTL RLV resources is sufficient to stop the CBO doesn't imply it's necessary. We can probably shift some of the ATL RLV to the MidEast if necessary.

While they may have also been diverting aviation assets to support the maritime campaign against the UK?

Same as above: 4x the LW resources for this campaign. And once more, probably possible to divert ATL RLV resource to it because 5x RLV strength is probably not necessary.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Do you know if any of the MTO HB losses in1943 were inflicted by Italian fighters?

This I'm not sure of but I'm treating it as a rounding error. Anyone know?

Besides Italy, Hungary and Romania shot down a few as well. But they did so with German planes and with fuel (training and combat) that comes from the German/Axis resource pool so is already built into the analytical framework. That applies somewhat to Italy as well, as RSI forces used some German planes and the fuel pool is entirely German/Axis.