Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Wouldn’t that depend on the particular choices the Nazi leadership made? Say it’s autumn 1942 and, as I mentioned before, according to your ATL the Nazi leadership are busy planning a 1943 “Mesopotamia”campaign. Wouldn’t that suggest a shift to maritime aviation, long-range bombers and transport as well as a continuing need to sustain a highly mobile, expeditionary and tactical Air Force which would create different production priorities than one solely focussed on a notional future threat to the Reich?

What's your argument? What is the actual difference between building air forces to support a Mesopotamian campaign and to support the 1943 Ostheer? I don't see any.

If you want to say Germany would build proportionally more Condors/Ju-290's, fine. What percent delta to OTL Condor/Ju-290 proportion are you positing? Does Germany build 90% Condors and forget to build fighters? 10%? I can't see building a few hundred more Condors (than 4x OTL) changing the topline analysis.

The part I highlighted in red is an obvious strawman; obviously not what I'm saying; if it weren't you saying it I'd say it's in bad faith. What part of 4x every category is so hard to understand? Germany wasn't "solely focused" on Reich defense until Spring '44 if ever; it's ridiculous and time-wasting for us both to suggest I'm arguing that.

[KDF33]

Essentially the argument appears to be you are unworthy of arguing with. Sometimes you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make a Wehraboo drink. Oh. And you need to give me sources, but I just need to give you a circular reference to a previous argument made. The Germans have more men so they have more aluminum.

I don't think that's fair to TMP's argument. Having crunched the numbers here, it seems unarguable that the war against the Soviet Union massively constrained Germany's ability to wage an industrial war along the lines of the Anglo-Americans.

As for more manpower permitting the production of more aluminum (or fuel, for that matter), it appears correct to me. Whether as part of the workforce directly extracting / producing, and / or as laborers setting up the infrastructure to do so, I see a direct correlation between the size of the available manpower pool and the industrial output.

***

Boiled down to its fundamentals, TMP's argument is that Germany's inability to successfully conclude its eastern campaign forced it to commit disproportionate human and industrial resources there, and thus prevented it from gearing up to its full potential for the war against the Anglo-Americans. He has attempted to quantify the opportunity cost of that eastern quagmire in a variety of posts, including here.

I don't understand what is so controversial about his views, or why it justifies to label him a 'Wehraboo'.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I see a direct correlation between the size of the available manpower pool and the industrial output.

The amount of effort devoted to denying this is pathological.

[Ружичасти Слон]

I see a direct correlation between the size of the available manpower pool and the industrial output.

The amount of effort devoted to denying this is pathological.

Perhaps when Germany was begin on make increase 4x fighters Britain was decide for to use Empire manpower pool for to make increase 10x bombers .

More manpower = more fighters or bombers . Simple

[Michael Kenny]

I don't think that's fair to TMP's argument. Having crunched the numbers here, it seems unarguable that the war against the Soviet Union massively constrained Germany's ability to wage an industrial war along the lines of the Anglo-Americans.

1941 Germany never had the ability to wage a protracted industrial war against a resilient Soviet Union. This was realised before the invasion and the 'planning' got around that problem by use of captured British, French and Czech vehicles and the mistaken belief it would be a short campaign where a speedy victory would allow a prompt demobilisation. Captured British, French and Czech vehicles were a vital component of this vastly over-expanded Army and the dream died in the snow on the outskirts of Moscow. From that point on it was desperate times for Germany who had to run fast just to stand still and perhaps delay the inevitable defeat for a couple of months. That is the reality and no amount of rearranging the deck-chairs on the Titanic, sorry I mean number-crunching completely made-up production targets will change it.

or why it justifies to label him a 'Wehraboo'.

Check his content. For someone interested in 'What Ifs' he is remarkably uncurious about anything that does not have as an outcome a German victory in WW2. No distractive ruminations about 'What If France invaded Germany in 1939' or 'What would have happened if the Germans failed to capture Narvik in 1940' etc.

[TheMarcksPlan]

For someone interested in 'What Ifs' he is remarkably uncurious about anything that does not have as an outcome a German victory in WW2.

Obviously wrong based solely on threads I've started:

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=245048&start=270&h ... battleship
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=248298&hilit=army
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=248856&hilit=rasputitsa

...to say nothing of the numerous threads in which I've argued for Allied-benefitting contingencies.

It's odd for somebody so obsessed with me to be so blatantly wrong on his TMP facts.

[KDF33]

1941 Germany never had the ability to wage a protracted industrial war against a resilient Soviet Union.

Germany and the USSR in their respective 1939 borders? Yes, I would agree.

Germany's Grossraum and the USSR in its expanded borders, as they respectively stood in early June of 1941? I disagree.

Germany's Grossraum against the rump Soviet Union of early 1942? On the contrary, it would rather be the opposite.

[T]he dream died in the snow on the outskirts of Moscow. From that point on it was desperate times for Germany who had to run fast just to stand still and perhaps delay the inevitable defeat for a couple of months.

What about Trappenjagd, Fridericus, Störfang, Seydlitz, Blau? Those aren't exactly representative of 'standing still'.

Check his content. For someone interested in 'What Ifs' he is remarkably uncurious about anything that does not have as an outcome a German victory in WW2. No distractive ruminations about 'What If France invaded Germany in 1939' or 'What would have happened if the Germans failed to capture Narvik in 1940' etc.

It's unclear to me that TMP is interested in 'what ifs' per se. He has formulated a thesis, that Germany's defeat in WWII was contingent on severe planning mistakes in the build-up and execution of Barbarossa, and has since accumulated data / debated / tweaked his argument to further build his case. I don't see how that marks him as a 'Wehraboo', unless of course by your definition any exploration of the causes of the Nazis' defeat that goes beyond 'they were doomed from the get-go / case closed' is Wehrabooish.

[TheMarcksPlan]

It's unclear to me that TMP is interested in 'what ifs' per se.

Not particularly interested in "what ifs," deeply interested in explaining "why" and using counterfactual reasoning as part of that process. History is one of few scholarly fields in which counterfactual reasoning is not core to the practice; I wish that weren't so.

To say "Why" involves a logical proposition "A happened because B happened/existed" which implies the logical proposition "if not B then not A." We can evaluate explanatory historiography by exploring the counterfactual of "not B."

That allows a BS test. Much WW2 explanatory history is, it turns out, BS.

Many people identify with this or that BS, are mad when you call it out.

[Terry Duncan]

A post from Richard Anderson was removed by this moderator.

Richard,

Please respect other forum members and do not call them names. This has been gone over several times previously, either address the argument and not the person or do not post. There is no excuse for name calling of any form so please cease immediately. Things had improved but they are now slipping back again, do not let that happen or you could find yourself with a further official warning or even a ban. You can be polite and good natured when you wish, so please do try to be in that frame of mind when you post.

Terry.

[Terry Duncan]

Everyone,

Please be civil. Whilst the term 'Wehraboo' is not strictly forbidden it is unhelpful to the conduct of civil conversation and certainly does not need to become a sub-topic within this thread.

Topic locked temporarily for people to compose themselves before posting again.

Terry

Edit: Now unlocked. People, please act responsibly and do not insult each other.

Terry

[TheMarcksPlan]

The best counterargument to my ATL post-SU air war, IMO, would involve some Allied shift to fighter production from bombers. And/or a shift of non-air production resources towards the air war. I've done some analysis in the background but curious to hear versions of the argument from others (of course I dread hearing a superficial "argument" along the lines of "obviously the Allies win this ATL fighter battle" but unsupported by any detailed analysis).

Analytical factors:

• 1. With LW producing 4x OTL peak during ATL 1944, US and German aircraft production are approximately equal in value - Germany probably slightly ahead. (as discussed here, US peak was ~4.5x German by weight; as discussed here, ~20% value/weight penalty to US peak for building bigger planes).
• 2. Allied fighters are heavier and much more expensive than Axis. The cheapest (P-51) cost ~$51k in 1944; P-38/47 were ~$90k (AAF Statistical Digest). Me-109's cost ~$25k in 1944.
• Obviously any shift from bombers to fighters decreases bombers. One HB will get you ~4 Mustangs or ~2.5 P-38/47's (by price per AAF Statistical Digest).
• 3. Allies are still fighting Japan, which OTL took something on the order of 30-40% of American resources. There is certainly room to divert Pacific resources and still win the war but (1) is that politically feasible? and (2) many/most resources aren't directly fungible with the CBO except on a long time horizon - Hellcats and Corsairs, for example, don't have the range for deep escort duty.
• 4. To what degree can Allies shift resources to air warfare, if at all? IMO they can't; they need bigger armies to hold somewhere in Africa and in the Mideast-India quadrant, plus a very large force watching for Sealion (100 divisions?). If anything, Allied aerial resource endowment will be lower than OTL once more soldiers are drafted and more guns/tanks/etc produced.
• 5. Timing of the Allied shift? OTL US didn't recognize a need for escorts until late 1943 due to the stickiness of stupid doctrine. If that holds in ATL, it's mid-1944 before an Allied production shift begins to tell. By that time, ATL Me-262 will be a major factor or near to being so.
• 6. ATL LW qualitative factor. By 1944 at latest, Germany's fuel resources - thus LW training quality/quantity - will be greatly expanded. In addition, LW should be able earlier to make a switch from Me-109G-6 to G-10/14/6AS and to improved Fw-190's. The G-6 was a particularly obsolete design; later G's with MW50 and other DB605 improvements significantly improved its performance OTL (but by then its pilots were so bad it didn't matter).

More to be said on LW qualitative factors per TMP's research schedule and IRL commitments but wanted to throw out some factors for discussion.

If we posit an all-fighter US/UK strategy then I'd probably agree that the Allies would eventually attain air superiority. Their training resources at some point would simply outmatch Germany's and the LW would probably screw things up at some point. But obviously an all-fighter Allied effort means the end of the CBO and, at best, indefinite European stalemate.

TMP bookmark: ATL air war analytical framework

[Tom from Cornwall]

I found this today (CAB79/23/4) in a report completed by the British War Cabinet's Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Oil: "The Axis Oil Position in Europe May 1942". This comprises a summary and detailed annexes which contain "detailed estimates of the various aspects of the Axis Oil Position between 1st November, 1941, and 1st May, 1942".

Obviously based on estimates of stocks, consumption and production but a useful summary of the information that was being put in front of the British Chiefs of Staff at a key moment in WW2. The date of the COS committee meeting at which the report was discussed was 3 September 1942.

This is the kind of detailed estimates which the report includes:

It would be interesting to compare the detailed annexes in this report to the information available post war to see how closely the British estimates reflected the actual Axis position. I'll put that on my "retirement to do" list!

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

The problem is that these estimates were much too optimistic : the real figures were were better for Germany .OTOH the results of increasing/decreasing oil consumption by the WM are very relative:the military oil consumption increased by almost 60 % between 1940 and 1943, but the results on the military situation were very questionable .What would be the results on the allied side of increase/decrease of military oil consumption ? The correlation between consumption and military results on the Soviet side ,do also not prove that more consumption implies a better situation .
German oil production (imports included ) were
1940 :6,888 million ton Consumption : WM : 3,005 million/others 2,851 million
1941 :8,485 million Consumption : WM : 4,67 /others 2,738 million
1942 : 8,965 million Consumption :WM : 4,410 /others 2,073 million
1943 :10,497 million Consumption :WM : 4,712 /others 2,259
The Source = On the Internet :
ww2-weapons.com/military-expenditures-strategic-raw-materials-oil-production/

[Tom from Cornwall]

The problem is that these estimates were much too optimistic : the real figures were were better for Germany .

Ok, thanks. It would be interesting to understand whether the estimates were incorrect overall or due to a misunderstanding of one particular factor (either consumption or production).

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

The problem is that these estimates were much too optimistic : the real figures were were better for Germany .

Ok, thanks. It would be interesting to understand whether the estimates were incorrect overall or due to a misunderstanding of one particular factor (either consumption or production).

Regards

Tom

Tom, be careful of who you are paying attention to. If you would like to compare the estimates to actual, look at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021 page #73. Actual German total supply in 1942 was 4,988,000 metric tons, about one-third the estimate in the CAB papers. BTW, if you want to see the full estimate with appendices, I believe it may be found in the Fischer-Tropsch Archive.