Could a German invasion of Turkey succeed?

[KDF33]

Tom, be careful of who you are paying attention to. If you would like to compare the estimates to actual, look at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021 page #73. Actual German total supply in 1942 was 4,988,000 metric tons, about one-third the estimate in the CAB papers. BTW, if you want to see the full estimate with appendices, I believe it may be found in the Fischer-Tropsch Archive.

The figure of 4,988,000 tons is the combined total of avgas, mogas and diesel produced and imported by Germany in 1942.

The British estimate of 11,867,161 tons is for all finished petroleum products, for Axis Europe rather than only Germany.

AFAIK, the British estimate seems to be a good ballpark figure.

[Richard Anderson]

Tom, be careful of who you are paying attention to. If you would like to compare the estimates to actual, look at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021 page #73. Actual German total supply in 1942 was 4,988,000 metric tons, about one-third the estimate in the CAB papers. BTW, if you want to see the full estimate with appendices, I believe it may be found in the Fischer-Tropsch Archive.

The figure of 4,988,000 tons is the combined total of avgas, mogas and diesel produced and imported by Germany in 1942.

The British estimate of 11,867,161 tons is for all finished petroleum products, for Axis Europe rather than only Germany.

Never mind, you're correct, they included all Rumanian production instead of just the German imports from Romania.

AFAIK, the British estimate seems to be a good ballpark figure.

Yes, but the "real figures" were not "better for Germany".

[Tom from Cornwall]

BTW, if you want to see the full estimate with appendices, I believe it may be found in the Fischer-Tropsch Archive.

Rich,

Thanks. I'll look into that.

The British estimate of 11,867,161 tons is for all finished petroleum products, for Axis Europe rather than only Germany.

AFAIK, the British estimate seems to be a good ballpark figure.

Interesting, thanks.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

I also found this snippet from a year earlier (CAB79/14/24 - COS Committee Meeting minutes - 16 September 1941) which I thought might be of interest. Not because I think the figures are likely to be at all accurate (note the caveat about the lack of exact knowledge of the Soviet position) but because it might throw light on British assumptions about the reducing scale of continued Soviet resistance as the area of the USSR occupied by the Axis increased.

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet War Potential - Sep 41.JPG

The accompanying map shows "Lines A - D".

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet War Potential - Map - Sep 41.JPG

These British Cabinet papers can be downloaded from the UK National Archives website.

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

The problem is that these estimates were much too optimistic : the real figures were were better for Germany .

Ok, thanks. It would be interesting to understand whether the estimates were incorrect overall or due to a misunderstanding of one particular factor (either consumption or production).

Regards

Tom

It could be both .
Other point :the production figures I have given are conservative .
Eichholtz (specialist in these things ) gives higher total production figures but he adds that his figures are estimates .
1940 : 7,6 million instead of 6,888
1941 :10 million instead of 8,485
1942 : 9,5 million instead of 8,965
1943 : 11,3 million instead of 10,497
The source is : Deutsche Ölpolitik im Zeitalter der Weltkriege P 349.
But he gives the same figures for imports .
Maybe the underestimating could be caused by the fact that the British experts counted only 3 sources foroil production :
Domestic crude
Syntheric
Imports
But there were other sources as (German terms )
Altöl (= waste oil )
Sprit
Benzol
Erdgas
Steinkolhschwelung
Steinkohlenteerdestillation
Braunkohlenteerdestillation
These sources were in April 1944 good for 20,7 % of the whole domestic production (imports not included ) of 662000 tons .
Source : Eichholtz ''Ende mit Schrecken '' P 102-103 .

[KDF33]

Yes, but the "real figures" were not "better for Germany".

I agree.

[TheMarcksPlan]

it might throw light on British assumptions about the reducing scale of continued Soviet resistance as the area of the USSR occupied

Thanks, Tom. There is a similar American estimate.

Regarding the proportional impact of territorial loss, this estimate is broadly in line with my estimate that an ATL Barbarossa pushing to a line Lake Onega - Volga - Gorkiy - Voronezh - Don - Blau would reduce Soviet 1942 warmaking potential by ~40%.

Differences between my estimate and the British:

1. Britain underestimated the total level of Soviet force generation measured in divisions, even allowing for smaller OTL Soviet divisions. This doesn't impact the proportional analysis, however.

2. British estimate appears only to consider territorial loss, whereas my estimate considers impact of greater ATL casualties (~2.5mil). Thus I predict ~40% proportional loss of warmaking ability on a line somewhat west of the British Line C (the Volga "salient" extending to Samara isn't occupied in my ATL Barbarossa).

My and the British estimates largely concur because the basic logic of territorial loss is fairly obvious and, though ameliorated by evacuations, largely held OTL: Soviet GDP and material production (steel, coal, etc.) plummeted as Germany took its resources (primarily human resources but some natural as well). Had RKKA stopped Ostheer at the border in 1941, its 1942 incarnation could have been ~40% stronger. Same goes for a no-Barbarossa ATL in which Stalin decides to end Nazism in 1942 or 43.

[TheMarcksPlan]

it might throw light on British assumptions about the reducing scale of continued Soviet resistance as the area of the USSR occupied

Thanks, Tom. There is a similar American estimate.

Regarding the proportional impact of territorial loss, this estimate is broadly in line with my estimate that an ATL Barbarossa pushing to a line Lake Onega - Volga - Gorkiy - Voronezh - Don - Blau would reduce Soviet 1942 warmaking potential by ~40%.

Differences between my estimate and the British:

1. Britain underestimated the total level of Soviet force generation measured in divisions, even allowing for smaller OTL Soviet divisions. This doesn't impact the proportional analysis, however.

2. British estimate appears only to consider territorial loss, whereas my estimate considers impact of greater ATL casualties (~2.5mil). Thus I predict ~40% proportional loss of warmaking ability on a line somewhat west of the British Line C (the Volga "salient" extending to Samara isn't occupied in my ATL Barbarossa).

My and the British estimates largely concur because the basic logic of territorial loss is fairly obvious and, though ameliorated by evacuations, largely held OTL: Soviet GDP and material production (steel, coal, etc.) plummeted as Germany took its resources (primarily human resources but some natural as well). Had RKKA stopped Ostheer at the border in 1941, its 1942 incarnation could have been ~40% stronger. Same goes for a no-Barbarossa ATL in which Stalin decides to end Nazism in 1942 or 43.

One contingency here is whether, based on these assessments, Britain/US would continue supporting the SU had Germany driven to something like Line C. Already in the US there was congressional opposition to Soviet Lend Lease, partially based on the likelihood of shipments falling into German hands upon the SU's defeat. A Line C ATL is one in which these voices are more empowered; we know the military establishments in both countries were bearish on Soviet chances anyway.

[Tom from Cornwall]

1. Britain underestimated the total level of Soviet force generation measured in divisions, even allowing for smaller OTL Soviet divisions. This doesn't impact the proportional analysis, however.

I thought a few more extracts from the 13 September 1941 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee report might be of interest:

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet War Potential - p.JPG

My and the British estimates largely concur because the basic logic of territorial loss is fairly obvious and, though ameliorated by evacuations, largely held OTL: Soviet GDP and material production (steel, coal, etc.) plummeted as Germany took its resources (primarily human resources but some natural as well). Had RKKA stopped Ostheer at the border in 1941, its 1942 incarnation could have been ~40% stronger. Same goes for a no-Barbarossa ATL in which Stalin decides to end Nazism in 1942 or 43.

Basic logic, yes. And the British didn't have detailed information about the scope of Soviet evacuation of industrial resources to the East either pre-planned before the war or in response to the German invasion. What they did know (or "guess") is laid out below:

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet Potential - p.3 - JPG.JPG

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet Potential - p.4.JPG

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet Potential - p.5.JPG

CAB79-14-26 - Soviet Potential - p.6.JPG

There is then an appendix which contains an estimation of the remaining Soviet war potential if the USSR was reduced to a rump state back behind Line D. I'll try to post that up tomorrow night.

A few days later (Friday 19th September 1941) the British COS were discussing plans for the demolition of the Caucasian oil installations. Although not explicit the minutes of the relevant COS meeting suggests that the US had agreed to supply oil to compensate for the loss of Caucasian oil - if it came to that - in an effort to ensure that the Soviets would do a good job of demolition. The British were also gathering a Mission of oil and demolition experts (No. 131 Mission) in the Middle East ready to be deployed into the Caucasus if needed. The JPS study that describes their role is in CAB79/14/33.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

One contingency here is whether, based on these assessments, Britain/US would continue supporting the SU had Germany driven to something like Line C. Already in the US there was congressional opposition to Soviet Lend Lease, partially based on the likelihood of shipments falling into German hands upon the SU's defeat. A Line C ATL is one in which these voices are more empowered; we know the military establishments in both countries were bearish on Soviet chances anyway.

I think the British would have wanted to (obviously they were already at war in September 1941 which concentrated the mind!) but it would have become increasingly difficult for the British to do any more than try to support Soviet forces in the South Caucasus I suppose.

Regards

Tom

[TheMarcksPlan]

the British didn't have detailed information about the scope of Soviet evacuation of industrial resources to the East either pre-planned before the war or in response to the German invasion.

Thanks, Tom.

For longer-term projections, material evacuations weren't all that important. SU could replace capital via domestic manufacture or LL, population loss was permanent (until liberation). SU evacuated something like 15% of its prewar capital stock. But at the price of harming logistics to the front and of starving existing industries of transport (leading to output cuts). Yes, I'm aware this is a very heterodox view. Evacuations of personnel were enormously important to SU's survival, indisputably.

We've discussed elsewhere that British estimates failed to take account of potential flexibility within modern(ish) economies. I see that happening in these estimates as well: The papers assume that loss of specific factories means loss of the percentages of output they represent. That the factories could be evacuated is only one element of failing to perceive flexibility. Many of the inputs to these industries - particularly high-value, low-bulk industries like aircraft - were produced elsewhere and would not have been lost with the industries. Therefore re-establishing production, either through evacuation or new plant - was and/or would have been easier than assumed in these documents.

...but of course all flexibility runs into the ultimate bottleneck: labor.

A few days later (Friday 19th September 1941) the British COS were discussing plans for the demolition of the Caucasian oil installations. Although not explicit the minutes of the relevant COS meeting suggests that the US had agreed to supply oil to compensate for the loss of Caucasian oil - if it came to that - in an effort to ensure that the Soviets would do a good job of demolition. The British were also gathering a Mission of oil and demolition experts (No. 131 Mission) in the Middle East ready to be deployed into the Caucasus if needed. The JPS study that describes their role is in CAB79/14/33.

I didn't realize this came up again, after the madcap plan to bomb the installations in 1940. If only the British had known how good the Soviets were at destroying oil infrastructure (Maikop)...

I could see the ATL Allies massively alienating a hobbled SU via demolitions, stinginess with supplies, and the perception of a bitter/defeated Stalin that the Allies had done nearly nothing to help him.

[ljadw]

The importance of the Caucasian oil for the SU in war time,has been exaggerated by AND the West AND by the Germans .
There was a lot of linear thinking ,as : the Caucasus provided X percent ( 80 ? ) of the Soviet oil production before the war, thus the loss of the Caucasus would result in the same loss (80 % ) of the Soviet oil production .What one forgets is the the oil production was less important than the need =the oil consumption and that the USSR consumed/needed less oil during the war than before the war .Coal was more important for the USSR than oil.
About opposition in the US against LL for the USSR :this LL became important only in 1943,after Stalingrad,when Germany had already lost all chances to win in the East .

[Tom from Cornwall]

I could see the ATL Allies massively alienating a hobbled SU via demolitions, stinginess with supplies, and the perception of a bitter/defeated Stalin that the Allies had done nearly nothing to help him.

Agreed, although the British had been massively alienated by the Soviet Union supplying Nazi Germany before June 1941!

The Soviet position in September 1941 was clearly a focus for the British COS Committee. At their meeting on 27 September 1941, the Committee considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff on the defence of the Persian Gulf Area and sent a corresponding telegram to the Cs-in-C concerned (CAB79/14/35).

CAB79-14-35 - Defence of Persian Gulf Area - Sep 41.JPG

At the following meeting, on Monday 29 September 1941, the Committee went on to consider a JPS report on possible British land and air support to Soviet forces on the "TRANS-CAUCASIAN FRONT" (CAB79/14/36). This report details options for the support of and withdrawal of Soviet forces; the maintenance factors that would limit the size of 'British forces which could be maintained in Trans-Caucasia' (spoiler alert - the JPS assessed that the equivalent of 3 divisions could thus be supported using the existing infrastructure); what the impact of supplying such a British force would have on supply to the USSR; and finishes with an Annex which details possible routes and capacities with an assumption of how the capacity would increase if the Trans-Persian railway was developed according to the contemporary plans .

This is the list of routes considered by the planners:

CAB79-14-36 - Trans-Persian Routes - Sep 41.JPG

It's also important to note the caveat that the JPS applied to this analysis:

We would moreover stress that our estimate of forces can be regarded only as a reasonable guide; certain important factors, as for instance the availability of M.T. in the Russian occupied district of Persia, and the extent to which Russian local movement would be using our maintenance routes in that area, can only be assessed after a full reconnaissance of the whole L of C in close conjunction with the Russians.

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

I could see the ATL Allies massively alienating a hobbled SU via demolitions, stinginess with supplies, and the perception of a bitter/defeated Stalin that the Allies had done nearly nothing to help him.

Agreed, although the British had been massively alienated by the Soviet Union supplying Nazi Germany before June 1941!

The Soviet position in September 1941 was clearly a focus for the British COS Committee. At their meeting on 27 September 1941, the Committee considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff on the defence of the Persian Gulf Area and sent a corresponding telegram to the Cs-in-C concerned (CAB79/14/35).

CAB79-14-35 - Defence of Persian Gulf Area - Sep 41.JPG

At the following meeting, on Monday 29 September 1941, the Committee went on to consider a JPS report on possible British land and air support to Soviet forces on the "TRANS-CAUCASIAN FRONT" (CAB79/14/36). This report details options for the support of and withdrawal of Soviet forces; the maintenance factors that would limit the size of 'British forces which could be maintained in Trans-Caucasia' (spoiler alert - the JPS assessed that the equivalent of 3 divisions could thus be supported using the existing infrastructure); what the impact of supplying such a British force would have on supply to the USSR; and finishes with an Annex which details possible routes and capacities with an assumption of how the capacity would increase if the Trans-Persian railway was developed according to the contemporary plans .

This is the list of routes considered by the planners:

CAB79-14-36 - Trans-Persian Routes - Sep 41.JPG

It's also important to note the caveat that the JPS applied to this analysis:

We would moreover stress that our estimate of forces can be regarded only as a reasonable guide; certain important factors, as for instance the availability of M.T. in the Russian occupied district of Persia, and the extent to which Russian local movement would be using our maintenance routes in that area, can only be assessed after a full reconnaissance of the whole L of C in close conjunction with the Russians.

Regards

Tom

Is there a proof that the British were massively alienated by Soviet supplies to Germany before Barbarossa ?
If this was so, this would mean that the British government knew about these supplies and about their (meagre ) importance and leaked this to the British tabloids ,something which is very unlikely .

[Tom from Cornwall]

Is there a proof that the British were massively alienated by Soviet supplies to Germany before Barbarossa ?

Apologies, I was using British as a shorthand for Churchill!

this would mean that the British government knew about these supplies

CAB63-112 - Soviet supply to Germany - Nov 39.JPG

Regards

Tom