Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

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George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#601

Post by George L Gregory » 18 Oct 2021, 19:43

Moreover, German Austrians themselves seemed during the revolution to have put their loyalty to the monarchy above their cultural affiliations with Germany. The continuing existence of this 'Austrian question', at least in southern Germany and in certain political milieux, largely dictated the terms of the debate about German territory and borders.
Mark Hewitson, Nationalism in Germany, 1848-1866: Revolutionary Nation, page 85.
As long as the term “German nationality” remained a cultural and ethnic concept, it did not imply a political theory about the relationship of nationality and state and it posed no problem of divided loyalties. The Austrian “Greater Germans” at the Paulskirche saw no essential difference between their ideal and Austrian patriotism. Politically, the Germans of the Habsburg Empire were “Austrians”, and Austrian citizenship did not amount to denial of German nationality. In 1848, the German Austrians did not rebel so much against the Austrian emperor as in opposition to absolutism. But after 1866, German-Austrian history was thenceforth strongly influenced, as Otto Bauer observed by, “the conflict between our Austrian and our German character”. And after 1871, the “Greater German” idea in Austria became a servant or “seconder” of a Prussian Germany and a danger to the Habsburg Monarchy. So a group of intellectuals - including five men who were destined for widely divergent careers - Georg Ritter von Schönerer, Viktor Adler, Engelbert Pernerstorfer, Robert Pattai, and the historian Heinrich Friedjung, formulated the famous “Linz program”, in 1882, a manifesto of reforms intended to transform Austria (without Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia) into a democratic nation-state with German majority. They disapproved of Germany domination over foreigners, but in the province of mixed nationality, like the Bohemian Lands and Interior Austria, they became ruthless integral nationalists.

Since the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871, a new German nationalism began to emerge among the German Austrians. Organisations like the German Turnverein found growing swamps of followers in Austria-Hungary. For thousands of German-Austrian students Bismarck’s Protestant, anti-Slavic Germany, and not the Catholic, multi-national empire of the Habsburgs became their spiritual home. The “German School League” (Deutscher Schulverein), founded in 1880, and the Schulverein Südmark, founded in 1889, began to spread Pan-German ideas among the scattered German groups in the Bohemian and South Slav lands.

[…]

Until 1914 official German policy followed the conception of Bismarck, who with his keen sense of Realpolitik understood very well that the union of the German Austrians would lead not only to a renewed armed conflict between the Habsburgs and Hohenzollern, but could kindle a world war as Austria’s Slavs would refuse to accept such an outcome. On the other hand, the German Austrians could better serve the whole German nation from outside the German Empire than inside; in the words of Bismarck, “The German Austrian is justified to aspire for political leadership and should safeguard the interests of Germandom in the Orient, serving as the tie of contact between Germans and Slavs by hindering their collision”.
Charles W. Ingrao, Franz A. J. Szabo, The Germans and the East, pages 171-73.

George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#602

Post by George L Gregory » 18 Oct 2021, 20:36

The creation or use of new terms has assisted with the problem posed by terminology in discussions of German nationalism. Reichsdeutsche [Imperial Germans] is used post-1871 German unification to refer to German citizens of Imperial Germany and its successor states, while Volksdeutsche [ethnic Germans] typically refers to German- speakers outside these borders. Many Habsburg Germans opposed this binary definition of “Germanness”, and promoted a distinctive “Austrianness” at the end of the nineteenth-century, which will be discussed later in this section. For the sake of consistency this thesis refers to Germans of the Habsburg Empire as Habsburg Germans, and Germans of the Austrian crown lands [Cisleithania] as Austrian Germans. From late- October 1918, the Austrian successor was officially known as German-Austria, and citizens of this state were known as German-Austrians. After the signing of the Treaty of St. Germain on 10 September 1919, German-Austrians became simply Austrians, and the state’s name reverted to Austria. The Germans discussed in this thesis are those living in the Czech lands (hereafter referred to as German Bohemians), Vorarlbergers, and Carinthian Germans.

Other historians note that some Habsburg Germans considered themselves nationally German. For example, in 1900 Otto Bauer, Social Democrat and post-war German-Austrian Foreign Minister, wrote that Austria-Hungary was “politically and culturally a German state”. Although German national sentiments increased amongst Habsburg Germans from 1871, Hughes argues that they nevertheless remained “socially and politically divided”. Helmut Walser Smith notes that the unity of the German nation often suffered from both religious and political divisions. The fact that increasing numbers of Habsburg Germans identified as German should therefore not give the false impression of any great unity among this population.

Interpretations of Germanness among Habsburg Germans changed a great deal over time. In the early-nineteenth century, most Habsburg Germans associated nationalism with ideas of “personal, communal, political, and social freedom”. Werner Conze argues that culture and linguistics defined local understandings of Germanness as much as politics. Hughes notes that family, class, occupation, locality, region, state, and church all defined individual Germanness as well. In the nineteenth century, most Habsburg Germans felt themselves culturally a part of a German nation only in that they were concerned for its welfare. This meant that although Habsburg Germans sympathised with other German-speakers, they remained loyal to the Empire and the dynasty, feeling that it best served their interests. Based on historical, linguistic, and cultural similarities, Lonnie Johnson argues that “German-speaking Austrians considered themselves Germans: not Prussians but Germans, just as the inhabitants of Bavaria or Hamburg were Germans and not Prussians”. As a result of this loyalty, Cisleithania remained officially non-national.
The definition of “German” meant different things to different people:
Understandings of “Germanness” varied greatly depending on the region in which one lived. Pieter Judson argues that individual definitions of Germanness were shaped by different local conditions. For example, staunch Catholicism defined Germanness in Tyrol, scepticism towards Catholicism and opposition to Slovenian priests defined Germanness in Styria and Carinthia, while opposition towards Habsburg hegemony defined Germanness in Bohemia. Traditional conservatism in Tyrol meant the nationality question failed to influence Tyrolers as much as it did Carinthians and Styrians. Arnold Suppan argues that although German-Slovene tensions never reached the height of German-Czech tensions, anxiety amongst German minority groups remained largely responsible for centralising national tendencies throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, Judson notes that only rarely did regional Germanness have political connotations. For this reason Judson argues that it is inaccurate to speak simply of “Germans” in East Central Europe in the nineteenth century, explaining that it is more accurate to “speak of those Tyrolers, Upper Austrians, Styrians, Bohemians, or Moravians who also considered themselves to be German”.
After 1866, the German identity of Austrians began to change for some German-speaking Austrians:
Habsburg Germanness changed in the second half of the nineteenth century, as Slavic-speakers increasingly challenged the pre-eminent position of German language and culture in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Use of the German language declined as Slavic linguistic nationalism intensified, even though German remained the official language of the imperial bureaucracy. One of the important resulting changes was the politicisation of place names. As a result of Slavic nationalism, the way in which Habsburg Germans viewed Germanness changed. Although the number of Habsburg Germans identifying as German had increased by 1900, no uniform definition existed of what this meant. According to Pieter Judson, by 1910 nationality had become a “fixed personal identity”, and the function of language lost its importance as a determinant of this identity. Instead, regional loyalties remained important in defining Germanness.

Regional Germanness also came to influence the creation of a distinctive “Austrianness” in the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the late nineteenth century. Prior to 1866, Suppan argues that “the Germans of the Habsburg Empire were ‘Austrians,’ and Austrian citizenship did not amount to denial of German nationality”. However, “Austrianness” and “Germanness” gradually came into increasing conflict, and Greater Germanism declined as a movement in Austria-Hungary after German unification. Nicholas Der Bagdasarian and Michael Hughes both argue that after 1871 Austria-Hungary rapidly lost any of its original German character.50 Like the pan-German People’s Party for pan-Germanists, a political party arose in Austria-Hungary representing those Germans who favoured this “Austrianness”. Karl Lueger, future mayor of Vienna, founded the Christian Social Party in 1889 to represent such Germans. The Christian Social Party differed from von Schönerer’s pan-German Party in a number of important ways. Although pro-German in a linguistic sense, the Christian Socials lacked German nationalism as a core policy. The party instead remained loyal to the Empire and the Catholic Church, focussing more on social issues. The policies adopted by the Christian Socials proved popular amongst Habsburg Germans.

Habsburg Germans consistently defended Austrian distinctiveness against pan- Germanism. Hughes argues that many Habsburg Germans considered themselves distinctively part of a Staatsvolk [state nation].For example, in 1919 some Vorarlbergers defended Austrian distinctiveness as the Ostmark [Eastern March], viewing a powerful Austria as an important bridge between Germany and the Balkans. The concept of Austria as the Ostmark helped foster Austrian distinctiveness within the German nation from the late nineteenth century. The creation of Austrian distinctiveness also later helped secure Austria’s independence in the interwar period, despite widespread support for Anschluss with Germany.

Regional Germanness proved particularly important in the cases examined by this thesis. Interestingly, German-speakers in the Czech lands identified as German Bohemians rather than as Austrian Bohemians, and sought union with German-Austria in 1919 rather than Germany. Austrian distinctiveness encouraged German-speakers along the German-Austrian frontier to advocate for self-determination in order to allow political union with German-Austria. In the period 1918-1920, German-Austrians sought to use plebiscites to give legitimacy to their own regional interpretations of “Germanness.
Matthew Vink, Self-Determination along the Austrian Frontier, 1918-1920: Case Studies of German Bohemia, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia.


ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#603

Post by ljadw » 18 Oct 2021, 22:05

George L Gregory wrote:
18 Oct 2021, 18:45
1) Please clarify what you mean by Austria did not exist between 1867 and 1918. The historian whom you cited and referenced stated that it did and was known as Old Austria.

2) “Cisleithania” was not an official term.

3) German was the most widely spoken language in Austria-Hungary. 23% spoke German and 20% spoke Hungarian.

“The largest group within Cisleithania were Austrian Germans (including Yiddish-speaking Jews), who made up around a third of the population. German-speakers and Czechs made up a majority of the population. Almost 60% of Cisleithania's population was ethnically Slavic.”

Your original statement was that there is no proof Austrians were Germans and yet I cited the same author you used and he said that they were so what do you have to say about that?

You ignored the main points I cited and repeated the same things you have already posted.

Since it’s fun to run rings around you then I shall quote more of Taylor from his other books in my future posts, please bear with me. :D
1 Austria became an official term for Cisleithania only in 1915 .
There was no parliament, no government for the territories who now constitute Austria .
Austria was not an official term .The official term was :The KingdomS ! and LandS ! represented in the Imperial Council . There were 15 of them ,7 only with a majority of German speaking people ,all of them autonomous ,but every one was speaking of Cisleithania .
For Hungary/Transleithania the official name was The LandS !of the Holy Hungarian Crown of St Stephen .
3 Your point 3 is wrong
a Auistria-Hungaria did no longer exist de facto as a state in 1914 , but as a personal union of 2 states,each almost independent of each other .And in each of them ,those with German an Hungarian as domestic language (which does not mean that they were Germans/Hungarians ) were only a minority .
On the other hand, German and Hungarian were the Lingua Franca in Cisleithania and Transleithania .But there is no proof at all that those who used German/Hungarian as Lingua Franca considered themselves as Germans /Hungarians .
Other point : in 17000 there was an Austrian Empire with a population of 11,35 million:
Hungary 4 million
Bohemia : 3,2 million
(Modern ) Austria 2,5 million
Transylvania : 0,8 million
Croatia : 0,6 million
Carinthia : 0,25 million
This Austrian Empire had a mainly Slavic population .
In 1800 this Empire had a population of 24 million,also mainly Slavs .
In 1861 the population of what is today Austria was 4,4 million which means that the population of the Austrian Empire was again mainly Slavic .
And, there is no proof that those with German/German dialect as domestic language considered themselves as Germans or Austrians till 1918 and wanted the Anschluss with Germany or wanted an independent Austrian state .These people were not stupid : they knew that an independent Austrian state would not last 5 years .
The party of von Schönerer did not last long , there were no mass demonstrations of people who wanted to volunteer for /against Germany in 1870 or 1914 .
The German/Austrian identity appeared only after WWI when people had the choice to live in a poor,helpless Austria or to be second rang citizens in Germany .
Before 1918 the inhabitants of Styria considered themselves as Styrians,of Carinthia as Carinthians, etc ..
German nationalism was limited to a small group and the partisans of the Anschluss were only a very small part of the German nationalists .An attack on the Emperor was not PC,it was even politically suicidal .
After the war the choice was between 2 bad solutions :
a poor independent Austrian state
or
to be second rank citizens in Germany .
Before WWI the choice was to be second rank citizens in Germany
or to be a part of a great state with a glorious past .
No wonder that before 1914 German nationalism had no success not in old Austria, not in Austria-Hungary, not in Cisleithania , not in the 7 provinces who now form the Austrian republic .
Before 1914 the inhabitants of Tirol, Salzburgerland , etc had all their own parliament and a big autonomy . They knew what was waiting for them in Germany : they knew what happened to Hannover .
In 1938 Austria was annexed by Germany, and ..disappeared replaced by the now 9 old provinces that formed Austria .
The same would happen if there was an Anschluss before 1914 .

ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#604

Post by ljadw » 18 Oct 2021, 22:13

About Otto Bauer : what he said in 1900 at the age of 19 ( he was born in 1881 ) is not relevant .
Besides : did he advocate a union of Germany with ''Austrian '' territories where the majority spoke German ?
And what about Burgenland with a majority of German speaking people,but what was a part of Hungary ?Should it also be annexed by Germany ?

George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#605

Post by George L Gregory » 18 Oct 2021, 22:54

You seem to be confusing Austria and the Austrian Empire. The reason latter was predominantly Slavic was because the German Austrians ruled many non-German lands; this was one of the main reasons Otto von Bismarck did not want Austria to be a part of the German Empire.

Also, your argument about Cisleithania is flawed. Cisleithania =/= Austria/Austrian lands. The former
Included more than just the Austrian territories of the Austria-Hungarian Empire.
The Cisleithanian capital was Vienna, the residence of the Austrian emperor. The territory had a population of 28,571,900 in 1910. It reached from Vorarlberg in the west to the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria and the Duchy of Bukovina (today part of Ukraine and Romania) in the east, as well as from the Kingdom of Bohemia in the north to the Kingdom of Dalmatia (today part of Croatia) in the south. It comprised the current States of Austria (except for Burgenland), as well as most of the territories of the Czech Republic and Slovenia (except for Prekmurje), southern Poland and parts of Italy (Trieste, Gorizia, Tarvisio, Trentino, and South Tyrol), Croatia (Istria, Dalmatia), Montenegro (Kotor Bay), Romania (Southern Bukovina), and Ukraine (Northern Bukovina).
And most importantly:
After the constitutional changes of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Cisleithanian crown lands (Kronländer) continued to constitute the Austrian Empire, but the latter term was rarely used to avoid confusion with the era before 1867, when the Kingdom of Hungary had been a constituent part of that empire. The somewhat cumbersome official name was Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder ("The Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Imperial Council"). The phrase was used by politicians and bureaucrats, but it had no official status until 1915; the press and the general public seldom used it and then with a derogatory connotation. In general, the lands were just called Austria, but the term "Austrian lands" (Österreichische Länder) originally did not apply to the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (i.e., Bohemia proper, the Margraviate of Moravia and Duchy of Silesia) or to the territories annexed in the 18th-century Partitions of Poland (Galicia) or the former Venetian Dalmatia.

From 1867, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Croatia, the Kingdom of Slavonia and the Principality of Transylvania were no longer "Austrian" crown lands. Rather, they constituted an autonomous state, officially called the "Lands of the Holy Hungarian Crown of St Stephen" (Hungarian: Szent István Koronájának Országai or A Magyar Szent Korona Országai, German: Länder der Heiligen Ungarischen Stephanskrone) and commonly known as Transleithania or just Hungary. The Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied in 1878, formed a separate part. Both the "Austrian" and "Hungarian" lands of the Dual Monarchy had large Slavic-settled territories in the north (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Ruthenians) as well as in the south (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs).
Your lies are easy to expose.

Just because you think what X said is “irrelevant” does not mean that it is irrelevant. On the contrary, in this case, what X said shows that a German identity in Austria existed even in the early 20th century and a few decades after Austria and the Austrians were excluded from Germany.

If you bothered to read what I have posted then you would know fine well that the Austrians did consider themselves to be Germans. And, even Bismarck considered the Austrians to be “German Austrians” who were to help separate Germans and Slavs.

How about you read what I post instead of just repeating what you have been posting for a few pages now?
Last edited by George L Gregory on 19 Oct 2021, 11:49, edited 1 time in total.

George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#606

Post by George L Gregory » 18 Oct 2021, 23:23

I looked at one of the sources and I found the following about the German identity of Austrians:
Changing Meanings of “German” in Habsburg Central Europe:

One avenue of approach to investigating the Germans in nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe is to analyze the changing popular meanings of the terms “German” and “Germans” as they were used at all levels of public life during the nineteenth century. In the next two sections of this essay I look at specific approaches to this question, one from 1848 and the other from the late nineteenth century in Habsburg Austria. Both of these historical moments witnessed renewed public debate over the meanings of “the Germans” and “Germanness,” and a few examples will suffice to show both the early diversity of meaning of the terms, and also the ways the use of the terms and their meanings changed over fifty years.

The conflicts over the meanings of a German nation in 1848 engaged a limited stratum of society. The efforts of this stratum built in part on an appropriation of Habsburg state modernization processes that were rooted in moral, intellectual, and social reform visions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As Arnold Suppan points out in his essay, the eighteenth-century reform efforts of Maria Theresa and particularly Joseph II produced policies that treated the German language as the new lingua franca (to replace Latin) of the Habsburgs’ culturally diverse holdings. The reformers’ goals—to increase the coherence of administration, the productivity, loyalty, and moral capacities of their subjects through increased educational and economic opportunities—all produced policies favorable to German language use at every level of society, although not necessarily unfavorable to the use of other local languages as well.

It is not difficult to see how early German nationalists conflated the reformers’ focus on the utility of the German language with the alleged cultural and later the national qualities of those who used this language. German nationalists adopted this sense of cultural leadership in part as a political response to the claims of the Magyar, Polish, and later Czech nationalists who opposed Habsburg centralization and saw their interests best reflected in decentralized structures. The functional importance of the German language to the centralized empire became the foundation for several arguments promoting the political interests of German-speakers as such. But one should be wary of confusing the terms “German-speaker” with “German,” since many Magyar and Czech nationalists in the early nineteenth century, for example, spoke German fluently, and did not define their nationalist loyalties in terms of their linguistic competence. Furthermore, since the term “nation” had traditionally referred to a political corporation and not a linguistically defined community, it is not surprising to hear speakers of one language around 1800 declaring their loyalty to a nation represented by a different language. We have only to think of those urban German-speakers in the Prussian partition of Poland who proclaimed their loyalty to Poland against their region’s absorption by Prussia. Examples such as this also remind us that throughout the nineteenth century, differences in religious, regional, or class identification often determined social loyalties far more powerfully than dif- ferences in language use.


What range of cultural qualities did the term “German” connote in a local social context by 1848? Did it also refer somehow to an interregional community of Germans? The sudden profusion of public political debate unleashed by the revolution sharply conveyed diverse contemporary meanings of concepts like nation, Germans, Germanness, and Germany in the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. Almost overnight, these concepts became an integral part of the popular rhetoric used to demand political, economic, and social reform in ways that had been impossible before the revolution terminated the Vormärz censorship regime. In 1848, most civically engaged people in Austria appear to have agreed that nationhood was inextricably linked to the pressing issues of personal, community, political and social freedom. Most revolutionaries conceded that without the guarantee of such liberal freedoms, national consciousness could not be spread and national greatness certainly could not be attained. Many historians of 1848, however, tended to present liberalism and national rights as alternatives to each other, even if allegedly naïve political actors at the time did not understand the inevitability of this dichotomy. According to this version of events, individuals and parties eventually had to choose between their liberal and their national commitments. The 1848ers, however, did not understand the issues in quite such binary terms. Mid-nineteenth century activists more often than not conceived national development and political freedoms as mutually constitutive of each other. One could not exist without the other; these were not separate or separable issues. Most bourgeois nationalists (Czech, German, Slovene) believed that the development of their nation depended on the moral progress of their people, and such progress—to be accomplished above all through civic education—could not be guaranteed without the benefit of basic civil rights and the experience of political participation.

When the Viennese German nationalist newspaper Schwarz-Roth-Gold complained about peasant apathy to the nation in August 1848, it did so in terms that linked national identity inextricably to progressive political and moral values. “Traditional education made people stupid. The majority of Austrian peasants does not even know that there is a Germany and that it is their fatherland! . . . Traditional forms of education did not want to . . . provide our children with the example of the free men of their national past, out of fear that it would teach them [to think] independently.” It was the very quality of freedom that characterized everything having to do with nation, and this link of liberal ideas to national identity forged a concept of nation far different from the concepts we encounter around 1900. This may help us to understand why the statutes of several German nationalist organizations in 1848, for example, made membership available to “any Austrian citizen without regard to religion, nationality, or estate.” How could membership in a German nationalist organization be open to individuals of “any nationality?” Clearly the activists who formulated these statutes did not wish to limit membership in a German nation to those who were German-speakers or who felt themselves to be German, but rather opened their community to those who shared their cultural values and political commitment.

If political activists understood a German national community as one that was open to all who partook of their idealism, then the second point to understand about 1848 is how very few people actually shared a sense of national consciousness. Not only did very few peasants express a sense of national belonging, as the quotation above demonstrates, but those who did see themselves as part of a nation often defined that nation in highly parochial terms. The prominence of nation in public discussions should not blind us to the deeply local ways in which it was conceived and understood. Rather than speak of the Germans in East Central Europe, when it comes to 1848 we can perhaps speak of those Tyrolers, Upper Austrians, Styrians, Bohemians, or Moravians who also considered themselves to be German. Activists who sought to spread national enlightenment to the peasantry in 1848 usually formulated their appeals in terms of highly localized interests. This constituted a strategic choice, but it also reflected the beliefs and experiences of the nationalists themselves. In very few places (Vienna, Graz) did discussions of nation transcend local understandings to incorporate broader political and social visions. When, for example, the young Karl Stremayr, a law student at the University of Graz, ran for election to the Frankfurt Parliament, a body whose task after all was the construction of a German nation-state, his speech to local peasant voters hardly mentioned Germany. Instead, he focused on the need to end the feudal economic system and the absolutist regime, and on his loyalty to the emperor.

This situational understanding of nation also permeated discussions among activists who held more radical nationalist positions in towns where nationalist con- flict between different groups had broken out. The Slovene historian Peter Vodopivec recounts one such example of local tradition shaping nationalist positions in southern Styria, where German-speakers and Slovene-speakers often lived in close proximity. In 1848, Slovene nationalists in Ljubljana/Laibach (in neighboring Krain province) demanded the creation of a new province that would unite all Slovenes in the monarchy. Several Slovene nationalists in Styria, however, opposed the division of their traditional province along national lines. Instead of creating a Slovene province with its own diet, the Styrian Slovenes promoted greater national reconciliation and equal- ity among nations within Styria. A poem dating from 1848 and cited by Vodopivec captures a very different kind of nationalist agenda and includes the following lines (written alternately in Slovene and German):

How happy are we brothers,
in beautiful Styria,
we need not fear any ill,
our unity makes us strong,
the knowledge of both languages,
this promotes commerce,
to go our separate ways,
would harm us all.

German-speaking deputies to the Styrian diet charged with creating a new pro- vincial constitution reacted bitterly when Slovene nationalists displayed their Slavic red-white-and-blue colors publicly or founded a Slovene nationalist association in Graz, seeing such actions as public challenges to German and liberal ideals. On the other hand, the German-speaking deputies in Graz treated Slovene speakers (as opposed to Slovene nationalists) as trustworthy political allies, agreeing to publish Slovene language translations of the diet’s proceedings in local German newspapers in order to make the legislative session more accessible. “Many of the Slovenes who read the Graz papers are very intelligent people,” noted one German liberal deputy to the diet, and appending the translations would “give them more trust in us.”
These examples suggest that at mid-century, local differences in language use did not define community relations and identities as fully as later nationalists believed they should. In 1848 local relations and familiarity still appear to have counted far more than any abstract interregional sense of nation. At the same time, if local differences in language use did not convey incommensurable differences, and bilingualism often appeared to be the norm, then local examples of intermarriage and social interaction between users of different languages would not have seemed remarkable either. For this reason too, definitions of Germanness remained open and vague, and liberal in their relations to other nations. Again, from the pages of Schwarz-Roth-Gold, one writer in July 1848 underlined this openness, claiming that membership in the nation “is based not simply on the soil of birth or language of culture, but rather on . . . nobility of action and the worthiness of conviction.” Those who sought out education for themselves and their children and demonstrated their commitment to humanistic values could indeed become German. In fact, the 1848ers believed that this same set of moral qualities that defined their nation would enable it successfully to regulate relations among all the other nations within the Austrian Empire. “We want a German Austria . . . a powerful leader for all our brother nationalities, not through [coercive] power . . . but rather through the voluntary respect that we earn when we deal in freedom and humanity.”

Yet even as German nationalists conceived their nation in open and liberal terms, they, and their counterparts in other movements, faced serious political issues that appear to us to have almost guaranteed the development of mutual antagonism among movements. The Herculean task of reconstituting political and social order on a new basis, as manifested in the efforts of the Frankfurt and Vienna (later Kremsier) parliaments, the short-lived Slav congress, the town councils and provincial diets, all but guaranteed that practical issues of language use would create a serious political bone of contention. German nationalists had trouble understanding the protests of those who sought to undo the earlier attempts to make German a lingua franca for the empire. It is perhaps a testimony to the narrow social basis of nationalist activists, men who had much more in common than they cared to admit, that they maintained a common vision of liberal freedoms in the Kremsier draft and refused to allow their efforts to be derailed by nationalist conflict. It was precisely the issue of language use in government and administration that created a space for the political activism that fundamentally divided nationalists by the late nineteenth century.

In the fifty years following the revolutions of 1848, far more people in the Austrian Empire became actively involved in a public sphere whose limits grew well beyond the boundaries of village or region. Nineteenth-century governments too, continued on the path of centralized state building that had been initiated by their reforming predecessors of the eighteenth century. In the aftermath of the revolution the Habsburg regime had even revived its efforts to impose greater coherence on regional and lo- cal administration through expanded use of German in the bureaucracy. This new insistence on German as the language of governance in the 1850s provoked effective opposition in Hungary. Government centralization in Austria, however, went well beyond language use in the civil service to encompass education reform, development of a transportation and communications infrastructure for the entire empire, and targeted investment to promote industrialization.

Constitutional reform in the 1860s loosened censorship, expanded public education and associational life significantly, and increased popular participation in politics. The expansion of communications and transportation infrastructures often recast political questions in interregional as opposed to local terms. Through the efforts of local associations, local media and political parties, more and more Austrians joined public life in some capacity or other. With the Compromise of 1867, the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy gradually adopted nationalizing policies typical of nation-states like France, Germany, or Italy. The empire that formed the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, however, remained officially anational (later multinational). This state experienced a steady rise in mass political participation, culminating with the implementation of universal manhood suffrage for parliamentary elections in 1907.

In Austrian society, attempts to categorize and mobilize people in ethnic or national terms emerged from popular nationalist political initiatives after 1848 and not directly from the offices of government agencies. Nevertheless, the ongoing modernizing efforts of the state played a critical, if unwitting, role in the nationalization of Austrian society in the late nineteenth century. As nationalist political movements competed within the framework of the new constitutional system to increase their electoral constituencies in an age of growing mass-based politics, they sought to make the idea of national identity relevant to every aspect of life. They succeeded at least in nationalizing political life by demanding the application of constitutional guarantees of linguistic equality to an ever-expanding set of institutions. From educational to judicial institutions, from administrative to commercial practices, no possible corner of public life remained immune to the demands of nationalists. The late-nineteenth-century infusion of nationalist content into public life ranged from the provision of welfare benefits or access to education at all levels to local forms of economic competition and even to patterns of consumption.

To realize this nationalization of public life as fully as possible, however, each group had to define a set of shared qualities that would help newly politicized Austrians to understand to which nation they belonged and why. Additionally, the dynamic of nationalist political competition within Austria after 1867 caused the leaders of each group regularly to insist that its needs were incommensurable with those of competing nations and that a gulf of enormous proportions separated the members of one nation from another. Such claims of differences among populations were made vigorously and often, in part because national belonging continued to mean very little to most nineteenth-century Austrians as they went about their daily routines. And while ordinary Austrians may have reacted with interest or indifference to claims about the importance of national loyalties, nationalist activists continued to develop and refine their claims about national differences, how they manifested themselves in daily life, and how they could be measured scientifically.
By 1900 both ideas about nation and the numbers of people who felt allegiance to nations had changed dramatically throughout East Central Europe. The character of ideas about Germanness changed too, in part because of the growing popularization of politics, in part because of the 1867 Compromise, which had recognized the rights of the Hungarian nation, and in part because of the activism of other nationalist groups in the empire, particularly the Czech nationalists. The role of the German language and culture as a broadly unifying factor in Austrian public life declined considerably as Slav nationalists agitated successfully in the legislatures and the courts for the use of their languages in schools, universities, the courts, and the civil service. German might remain the inner, interregional language of the imperial bureaucracy and of the military, but its advantages as a universal lingua franca in the region had diminished.

Many German nationalists clung uneasily to the traditional claim of German language and culture as somehow more culturally advanced and therefore more valuable than the other languages in public use in the monarchy. With the establishment of Polish and Czech universities at L’viv/Lwów/Lemberg and Prague, with Italian nationalist demands for an Italian-language law faculty and Slovene demands for a university in Ljubljana, the position of German as the undisputed vehicle of culture, progress, and modernity was less self-evident. As a result, German nationalist assertions of their nation’s Kulturträger status in East Central Europe became increasingly strident. As German nationalists became more defensive about the position of their language and culture in the monarchy, they began to adopt new arguments to justify their leading position. They did not abandon arguments about the universality of their nation, and except for the anti-Semites among them, they continued to welcome anyone into its ranks. Yet at the same time, they articulated some new arguments that located specific spaces as German and that stressed the incommensurable differences that separated theirs from other cultures. Speakers of other languages, especially in the cities, seemed less and less likely to choose to become German for the sake of social
mobility, now that they had other options available to them in other languages.

Consequently, the German nationalist community became more inward-looking and exclusive in its rhetoric. The greater German nationalist focus on national ownership of territory and on the fundamental differences that allegedly separated nations also derived from a growing appreciation of the importance of numbers, rather than of “quality” or cultural status, in influencing local and imperial politics. Elections had to be won if control by one nationalist group or another was to be exercised effectively. Although a curial system that favored wealthier and better-educated citizens dominated local municipal and regional elections, activists nevertheless sought to mobilize every possible voter in every curia for their purposes.

After 1848, many government policies of modernization depended on initiatives in the social sciences that sought to organize and map populations according to their linguistic and religious character, for the purpose of applying social policy more effectively. Categorization of local populations according to language use in the im- perial census, for example, became valuable tools for the development of local school and, later, welfare policies after the passage of the 1867 constitution in Austria. Since the constitution had promised equal treatment to the speakers of Austria’s different languages, this required setting up schools in native languages wherever possible. Over time, the implementation of this guarantee and its application to other areas of public life (courts, civil service) required increased statistical knowledge about the linguistic make-up of local populations.

In the 1870s, government statisticians developed a census apparatus that would question Austrians, among other things, about their language of everyday use. The imperial government had no wish to promote nationalist agitation or the importance of national identity, however indirectly, through the census. Yet its attempt at linguistic categorization for limited policy purposes produced several unintended side effects, including new opportunities for nationalist politicians. Statistical studies like the decennial census did not automatically produce nations through a kind of Foucauldian effect, but they certainly did produce new opportunities for nation-building, which creative nationalist politicians readily exploited. In early debates over the particular form of the census, nationalists had complained vigorously that it asked respondents for their language of daily use instead of for their mother tongue or their nationality. The nationalists’ failure to impose national categories on the census, however, did not daunt activists in the least. They simply used other tools at their disposal—press, political agitation, mass meetings—to link language usage in the census to broader, newly invented mass nationalist identities. The nationalists appropriated census categories like “language of daily use” in order to mobilize people on the basis of common qualities. Already in the 1880s, following the first Austrian census, activists claimed that all those who had listed a particular language on the census form belonged in fact to that nation. This claim, and the counter-claims it provoked, produced powerful effects in Austrian public life. By 1910 many more people believed the language question referred to their nationality—a fixed personal identity—rather than to the function of language in their locality. Nationalist activists even turned to the courts to challenge the census results for particular localities where they believed the national enemy had somehow manipulated the outcome. If nationalists complained that the census did not explicitly ask for the national allegiance of its respondents, historians might complain that it made no allowance for the many people who used more than one language in families, businesses, or daily social lives, to report that critical fact. We have no way of knowing whether any of these respondents in fact spoke the language of another nation as well. We historians have also validated nationalist claims about the census, however inadver- tently, by reading it ourselves as if it somehow revealed national self-identification among the Austrian population. Histories of the Habsburg Monarchy or East Central Europe invariably include maps depicting the languages that a majority of people reported in a particular region. Almost always these maps identify their subjects as “the Czechs,” “the Germans,” or “the Slovenes,” for example, rather than as “Czech- speakers,” “German-speakers,” or “Slovene-speakers.” This slippage on the printed page—from the individual who reported a single language of daily use in the census to the presumption of national identity—transforms all people into members of nations, whether they felt that way or not. From there it is a small step to territorialize those nations by assigning to them the geographic regions where they appear to have constituted a majority.

Instead of accepting nationalist claims that associated language use on the census with a declaration of national identity, historians might more fruitfully ask what factors induced some respondents to report one language in a given year in- stead of another language. How might we explain the choices of those individuals, families, and communities who self-consciously practiced a form of bilingualism, marrying their German language skills to Czech, Slovene, Polish, or Hungarian (or marrying their Czech skills to an acquired knowledge of German)? In some regions we know that the same people reported different languages of daily usage in different decennial censuses. What situations caused them to report one language one year and a different language ten years later? Considering these questions in a nineteenth-century context might help us to avoid presuming that such people had already developed a single and consistent sense of national identity. It would also encourage us to follow Rogers Brubaker’s productive suggestion that we think of individual national professions of identity—professions of nationness—as an occasion or as an event rather than as an ongoing process or and unchanging, internalized truth. Finally, keeping these questions in mind would help us literally to see things differently when we examine the abstract depictions of social scientists that map language use onto territory.

If we consider the information that these abstracted maps, graphs, and charts fail to convey to us (bilingualism, situational reporting of linguistic usage), we can see one reason why it is so difficult to speak of Germans, German communities, or a German nation in nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Other kinds of choices made by individuals, families, and communities also undercut the clear assertion of national identity proclaimed for them by contemporary nationalist activists. Why, for example, did some parents in multilingual regions choose to rear and school their children in more than one language?

Nationalist activists tried to square their version of reality with the social behaviors they encountered by denouncing such people as “amphibians,” “national hermaphrodites,” and as psychologically deformed opportunists who would sell themselves and their children to the highest national bidder. Or they depicted such people as the unfortunate pawns of oppressive employers and landlords who forced them to adopt a different language from their authentic one in order to save their job or their apartment. By speaking and writing in these terms, nationalists sought to normalize the concept that everyone indeed had one authentic national identity. To us, however, the example of people who did not easily fit into a nationalist schema points to the fundamental difficulty of presuming that language use in the nineteenth century implied a particular national community identity.

Although more people clearly saw themselves as Germans, as part of a larger German nation by 1900, the significance of that choice and the meanings with which they imbued this choice also remained diverse and often contradictory. The generally swift rise of popular literacy and newspapers throughout the empire meant that people far away from each other received their news from sources that presented it in a uniform context. Far more people who adopted a national identity now shared a comparable sense of the meaning of their Germanness and who belonged to their community, than earlier in the century. Nevertheless, regional loyalties remained powerful when it came to those definitions, and activists often scrambled to paper over several conflicts about the character of the German community that had emerged by 1900. Two particularly vexing questions that prevented the formation of an ideologically unified German nationalist movement involved the role of Jews and the Catholic Church within that movement. Several organizations and parties defined their German identity in terms of racial, religious, or economic anti-Semitism. Several, including the largest among them, remained open to Jewish membership and to a non-racial definition of the German community. Many German nationalists in a region like the Tyrol (like Christian Socials in Lower and Upper Austria) continued to define their community identity in terms of loyalty to the Catholic Church, whereas German nationalist organizations and parties elsewhere saw the Church as their nation’s enemy. When these latter organiza- tions attempted to unify their efforts, as with the first Congress of German Nationalist Defense Organizations in 1908, for example, they could not achieve the hoped-for unity, precisely due to the powerful disagreements about these issues, particularly the role of Jews. While it is true that far more Austrians saw themselves as belonging to a German nation in 1900 than had been the case in 1848, they did not agree at all on the character or meaning of this nation.

This essay has attempted to demonstrate that terms like “German” or “nation” carried far more diffuse and locally based meanings for diverse nineteenth-century populations than they did to Germans at various points in the twentieth century. The study of context, of historical contingency, and of individual circumstance is key to determining what individuals and communities adopted what national identities over time. So is the idea of nationness as event rather than identity. When and in what kinds of situations in the nineteenth century did people tend to see themselves as national? In what kinds of situations were they indifferent or ambivalent about the idea of belonging to a nation? Individuals, families, or even communities may have adopted national identities at certain moments, but that did not prevent some of them from adopting different identities at other moments, or from expressing complete indifference to those identities at yet other moments. Even those who did identify themselves consistently as “Germans” throughout this period would not necessarily have understood themselves as members of a larger interregional German community, one that formed an interconnected, unified cultural and social whole. Their sense of their Germanness may have derived from their particular religious practice, their local social position, or their degree of education. In the context of specific regional and local identities there may indeed have been plenty of self-described Germans to be found, but little sense of a larger connection among such groups of individuals. Imposing the common term “Germans” on these diverse populations risks compromising the accuracy of our representations of people in the past by flattening out their considerable differences to fit them into a broad modern category.

It is also clear, however, that the requirements of modernizing states and the efforts of developing social sciences worked together, however unintentionally, to promote the categorization of populations in terms of language use, religious practice, and eventually according to the abstract concept of nation. While state policies did not alone create nations in the nineteenth century, they often created the available political and social spaces where local or regional activists could articulate particular interests. Even states like Austria, whose policy opposed the recognition of national interests, nevertheless helped to produce the spread of nationalism through promises of linguistic and religious equality. The most egregious example of Austrian state policy that unintentionally encouraged the process of nationalization of populations was undoubtedly the Moravian Compromise of 1905. Undertaken in order to diminish the harmful effects of political nationalism on public life, the compromise created separate Czech and German electoral lists and school systems. The new law required, however, that all Moravians register themselves and their families as either members of the Czech or German nation, thus forcing many who had not previously considered themselves to be part of either nation to join one of them.


From the perspective of the twentieth century, the history of the nineteenth century in Central and Eastern Europe seems to offer a panoramic view of worsening relations among neighboring communities that used different languages or practiced different religions. What we are seeing, however, is neither the awakening of nations nor the end of some kind of idyllic existence characterized by an acceptance of diversity or so-called hybrid identities at the local level. The largely rural communities of East Central Europe in particular knew nothing of hybridity or multiculturalism because they knew nothing of modern nations. What they experienced in their everyday lives was completely normal to them and not exceptional. What was exceptional to them, however, was the gradual intrusion in their world of outsiders, of civil servants, of communications and commercial networks, of new media, of political parties. Even in 1848, when popular politics first exploded the cultural fabric of daily life in the region, the potential for all-consuming nationalist conflicts to tear society apart remained only a potential. Activists in 1848 were not the activists of 1900. The former still defined their world in tangible ways that privileged local interests and interpreta- tions of the world. For this reason, their nationalisms did not necessarily exclude other nationalisms, and given the legal and social conditions of the day, most envisioned a society characterized by personal emancipation. By 1900, however, local condi- tions had changed radically, thanks to the spread of media, the rise of literacy, and a remarkable political mobilization. So too had the contents of nationalist ideologies. Local interests were now understood by more people to be intimately connected to nationalist interests. A broad and abstract concept of nation (whichever version) had become part of loyalty to the traditions of place, making local conflict on nationalist lines more of a possibility in daily life.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/cgi/viewco ... ac-history

George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#607

Post by George L Gregory » 19 Oct 2021, 07:36

The way we interpret the 1935 leaflet will depend to a large extent on how we translate the German term Volk. In this essay, it is translated as “nation” – a decision that may surprise some readers. Historians have long tended to place the meaning of Volk in the context of the discourse of the völkisch and Nazi movements, assigning it a meaning closer to “race” than to “nation.” A glance at the history of the terms concerned indicates, however, that, throughout the “long nineteenth century,” Volk was a political term meaning Staatsvolk, a group of people constituting a political or state community. By contrast, Nation in German designated a group linked by a shared past, a common language and culture, or a common ancestry. Even in 1906, when the völkisch movement was at its peak, a standard German encyclopedia emphasized that the German terms Nation and Volk had different meanings than the English and French concepts of nation/nation and people/peuple. Nation, in both English and French, designated the political concept and people/peuple the pre-political concept. In German, the idea of Nation had to be understood pre-politically as a Völkerschaft with a common history, language, and culture, whereas Volk was the political community made up by the citizens of a state. Accordingly, the 1906 encyclopedia article stated that, whereas it was possible to speak of a German Volk as well as of a German Nation, one could speak only of an Austrian Volk and not of an Austrian Nation – because the Austrians were Germans by nation but belonged politically to a multinational Volk.
Devin Owen Pendas, Mark Roseman, Richard F. Wetzell, Beyond the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany.

Remember that even as late as 1956, among the Austrians who were questioned, nearly half of them still considered themselves to be a part of the German Volk.

ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#608

Post by ljadw » 19 Oct 2021, 07:37

George L Gregory wrote:
18 Oct 2021, 22:54
You seem to be confusing Austria and the Austrian Empire. The reason latter was predominantly Slavic was because the German Austrians ruled many non-German lands; this was one of the main reasons Otto von Bismarck did not want Austria to be a part of the German Empire.

Also, your argument about Cisleithania is flawed. Cisleithania =/= Austria/Austrian lands. The former
Included more than just the Austrian territories of the Austria-Hungarian Empire.
The Cisleithanian capital was Vienna, the residence of the Austrian emperor. The territory had a population of 28,571,900 in 1910. It reached from Vorarlberg in the west to the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria and the Duchy of Bukovina (today part of Ukraine and Romania) in the east, as well as from the Kingdom of Bohemia in the north to the Kingdom of Dalmatia (today part of Croatia) in the south. It comprised the current States of Austria (except for Burgenland), as well as most of the territories of the Czech Republic and Slovenia (except for Prekmurje), southern Poland and parts of Italy (Trieste, Gorizia, Tarvisio, Trentino, and South Tyrol), Croatia (Istria, Dalmatia), Montenegro (Kotor Bay), Romania (Southern Bukovina), and Ukraine (Northern Bukovina).
And most importantly:
After the constitutional changes of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Cisleithanian crown lands (Kronländer) continued to constitute the Austrian Empire, but the latter term was rarely used to avoid confusion with the era before 1867, when the Kingdom of Hungary had been a constituent part of that empire. The somewhat cumbersome official name was Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder ("The Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Imperial Council"). The phrase was used by politicians and bureaucrats, but it had no official status until 1915; the press and the general public seldom used it and then with a derogatory connotation. In general, the lands were just called Austria, but the term "Austrian lands" (Österreichische Länder) originally did not apply to the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (i.e., Bohemia proper, the Margraviate of Moravia and Duchy of Silesia) or to the territories annexed in the 18th-century Partitions of Poland (Galicia) or the former Venetian Dalmatia.

From 1867, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Croatia, the Kingdom of Slavonia and the Principality of Transylvania were no longer "Austrian" crown lands. Rather, they constituted an autonomous state, officially called the "Lands of the Holy Hungarian Crown of St Stephen" (Hungarian: Szent István Koronájának Országai or A Magyar Szent Korona Országai, German: Länder der Heiligen Ungarischen Stephanskrone) and commonly known as Transleithania or just Hungary. The Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied in 1878, formed a separate part. Both the "Austrian" and "Hungarian" lands of the Dual Monarchy had large Slavic-settled territories in the north (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Ruthenians) as well as in the south (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs).
Your lies are easy to expose.

Just because you think what X said is “irrelevant” does not mean that it is irrelevant. On the contrary, in this case, what X said shows that a German identity in Austria existed even in the early 20th century and a few decades after Austria and the Austrians were excluded from Germany.

If you bothered to read what I have posted then you would know fine well that the Austrians did consider themselves to be Germans. And, even Bismarck considered the Austrians to be “German Austrians” who were to help separate Germans and Slavs.

How about you really what I post instead of just repeating what you have been posting for a few pages now?
It is not on Bismarck ( a Prussian ) to to label the ''Austrians '' as '' German Austrians '',it is on the ''Austrians '' to define themselves .
For the rest, still not one proof for the claim that ''German '' speakers ( a meaningless term ) were ''Germans '' ( a meaningless term ) or ''German nationalists '' ( a meaningless term ).
A proof would be that there was in the Reichsrat a strong German nationalist party that was advocating the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the Anschluss of those who spoke German to Germany . And the reason why this proof does not exist is that there was no such party in the Reichsrat .
About Otto Bauer : the opinion of a snot nose of 19 years can not be used in a historical debate .
FYI : Bauer was a former Jew who became first a Marxist socialist and later nationalist socialist and advocated the Anschluss when his ideological friends were ruling Germany but stopped to advocate the Anschluss when Hitler ruled Germany .Thus his German nationalism was subordinated to his ideological preferences .
Last point : there is no proof that ''Austria ''and the ''Austrians '' were excluded from the new German Empire, there are a lot of indications that they refused to be annexed by those who had killed thousands of them during the war of 1866 .

ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#609

Post by ljadw » 19 Oct 2021, 07:41

George L Gregory wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 07:36
The way we interpret the 1935 leaflet will depend to a large extent on how we translate the German term Volk. In this essay, it is translated as “nation” – a decision that may surprise some readers. Historians have long tended to place the meaning of Volk in the context of the discourse of the völkisch and Nazi movements, assigning it a meaning closer to “race” than to “nation.” A glance at the history of the terms concerned indicates, however, that, throughout the “long nineteenth century,” Volk was a political term meaning Staatsvolk, a group of people constituting a political or state community. By contrast, Nation in German designated a group linked by a shared past, a common language and culture, or a common ancestry. Even in 1906, when the völkisch movement was at its peak, a standard German encyclopedia emphasized that the German terms Nation and Volk had different meanings than the English and French concepts of nation/nation and people/peuple. Nation, in both English and French, designated the political concept and people/peuple the pre-political concept. In German, the idea of Nation had to be understood pre-politically as a Völkerschaft with a common history, language, and culture, whereas Volk was the political community made up by the citizens of a state. Accordingly, the 1906 encyclopedia article stated that, whereas it was possible to speak of a German Volk as well as of a German Nation, one could speak only of an Austrian Volk and not of an Austrian Nation – because the Austrians were Germans by nation but belonged politically to a multinational Volk.
Devin Owen Pendas, Mark Roseman, Richard F. Wetzell, Beyond the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany.

Remember that even as late as 1956, among the Austrians who were questioned, nearly half of them still considered themselves to be a part of the German Volk.
The reason why in 1956 almost half of the questioned Austrians claimed to be a part of the German Volk was that it was better in 1956 to live in West Germany than in Austria . The Soviets had left only a year before .
1956 was not 1906 .

George L Gregory
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#610

Post by George L Gregory » 19 Oct 2021, 09:18

ljadw wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 07:37
It is not on Bismarck ( a Prussian ) to to label the ''Austrians '' as '' German Austrians '',it is on the ''Austrians '' to define themselves .
The quote proves that Bismarck also regarded the Austrians as Germans.

The Austrians did that and every time a quote has been shown to you then you just dismiss it by typically calling it “irrelevant”.
For the rest, still not one proof for the claim that ''German '' speakers ( a meaningless term ) were ''Germans '' ( a meaningless term ) or ''German nationalists '' ( a meaningless term ).
Try actually reading what I post. The definition of the ambiguous term “Germans” in the 1800s and early 1900s is explained. The term “Germans” meant different things to different people.
A proof would be that there was in the Reichsrat a strong German nationalist party that was advocating the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the Anschluss of those who spoke German to Germany . And the reason why this proof does not exist is that there was no such party in the Reichsrat .
You don’t get to determine what is considered proof. Your one single proof rhetoric is invalid.

https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/One_single_proof

Try again.
About Otto Bauer : the opinion of a snot nose of 19 years can not be used in a historical debate .
FYI : Bauer was a former Jew who became first a Marxist socialist and later nationalist socialist and advocated the Anschluss when his ideological friends were ruling Germany but stopped to advocate the Anschluss when Hitler ruled Germany .Thus his German nationalism was subordinated to his ideological preferences .
Again, no one cares what you think about Bauer. The point which you seem to keep ignoring/dismissing is that Austrians from all walks of life considered Austria a German state and self-identified as Germans.
Last point : there is no proof that ''Austria ''and the ''Austrians '' were excluded from the new German Empire, there are a lot of indications that they refused to be annexed by those who had killed thousands of them during the war of 1866 .
Again, you need to stop lying.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_question

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Germanism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Germany

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austro-Prussian_War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austria–Prussia_rivalry

As Alan Bullock pointed out in his book Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives on page 2:
Hitler, of course, was a German, but he was born a subject of the Habsburg Empire, where Germans had played the leading for centuries. However, with Bismarck's creation in the 1860s of a German Empire based on Prussia, from which the Austrian Germans were excluded, the latter found themselves forced to defend their historic claim to rule against the growing demands for equality of the Czechs and the other "subject peoples".
Last edited by George L Gregory on 19 Oct 2021, 09:20, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#611

Post by George L Gregory » 19 Oct 2021, 09:18

ljadw wrote:
19 Oct 2021, 07:41
The reason why in 1956 almost half of the questioned Austrians claimed to be a part of the German Volk was that it was better in 1956 to live in West Germany than in Austria . The Soviets had left only a year before .
1956 was not 1906 .
Do you have a source for that claim?

ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#612

Post by ljadw » 19 Oct 2021, 21:23

The Austrian economy is depending on tourism, and there was almost no tourism in Austria in 1956 .Austria,poor before the war, had still not recovered in 1956 .
Not only had the Soviets left only in 1955,but Austria had still to pay a lot of money to the Soviets .
Alan Bullock is wrong : not for the first time ,: Hitler considered himself as a German, but he was not a German but a citizen of Cisleithania .
The ''Austrians '' ,or ''Austrian Germans '' were not excluded from the ''German Empire '',because that implies that they wanted to belong to the German Empire ,and that is not so : the Al Deutsche party of Schönerer obtained in the 1901 elections of the Reichsrat FOUR seats, only four .That was the strength of the Anschluss supporters in 1901 .
There was no reason for the inhabitants of Vienna ( 10 % Jews, more than 20 % Slavs ) for an Anschluss which would have as result that Vienna would become a meaningless city and its inhabitants second rang citizens in Germany .
Only 35 % ,a third,of the inhabitants of Vienna in 1880 were born in the city . The others were immmigrants, mostly Slavs .

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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#613

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Oct 2021, 05:40

Hi ljadw,

GLG asked for a source. Please give him one, as your membership of AHF obliges you to do.

Cheers,

Sid

ljadw
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#614

Post by ljadw » 20 Oct 2021, 09:08

Sources :
1 Tourism in Austria :
2007 : international tourism : 30,8 million people who spent 18,9 billion US Dollars
2 Fremdenverkehr -Wien Geschichte Wiki :
1955 : 1,6 million overnight stays
2016 : 15 million overnight stays
1950 : 940000 overnight stays .
''Today '' tourism is good ( directly/indirectly ) for 13 % of the Austrian GDP . The number of tourists in Austria was meaningless in 1955 .
3 In 1955 VW had built 1 million of Beetles : if Germans could buy cars,while only a few Austrians could buy cars, this proves that already in 1999 the Germans were better off than the Austrians .
4 A big part of the Austrian industry was plundered by the Soviets,an other part was nationalized,and we know that private industry functions better than nationalized industry .
5 German industry was founded on coal,while the importance of coal in Austria was and is still much less than it was in Germany .Austria had to import coal, Germany had not to import coal .
6 15 % of the German vacationers ( 1 million people ) traveled abroad in 1954 . Most Austrians could not afford to do this .
No wonder that a lot of Austrians looked with nostalgia to 1938 .

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Max
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Re: Why didn't Hitler advocate Austrian nationalist ideas?

#615

Post by Max » 20 Oct 2021, 15:04

ljadw
You have shown that life in Germany might have been better than in Austria, but you have not given any source for your assertion that
almost half of the questioned Austrians claimed to be a part of the German Volk was that it was better in 1956 to live in West Germany than in Austria
.
almost half of the questioned Austrians claimed . . . .
How many Austrians were questioned?
What questions were put to them?
What was the study called?
Who conducted the study?
When was the study conducted?
Where is the link to the study?

Even when you cite a source for your statistics on tourism [2 Fremdenverkehr -Wien Geschichte Wiki ] it is not very precise.
When I google that term I cannot see anything about Vienna.
Why not just post a direct link?
Greetings from the Wide Brown.

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