Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

[Richard Anderson]

Nothing wrong with that, as the Allies still fielded lots of French 75mm, 18pdrs, 155mm howitzers, etc. in the same year.

Absolutely true, but in the German case about 1/4 of the leFH in 1940 were the nA 16 and they had a core of reasonably well-trained troops to use them. For the United States in 1940, none of the pieces were modern, except for eight (8) 105mm Howitzers M1, which had been built in the early 1930s and were part of a demonstration battery at the Artillery School, Fort Sill. Worse, there were just 37-odd battalions of divisional artillery active out of the 72 required for the 12 divisions nominally active in the Regular Army...and even the "active" battalions were on a reduced strength. However, at least most of those were nominally motorized, for the National Guard, the situation was worse, most of its batteries remained horse-drawn and aside from monthly dry-firing exercises at the armory, they were lucky if they could fire a few live rounds per year on ranges. The Organized Reserves were worse still, since they only provided officers to partially man a few Regular Army Inactive units for six weeks during the summer.

Most of the French 75mm were modernized in the 1930s. All of the deployed British 18-pdr were on modernized carriages as the 18/25 pounder.

[stg 44]

Would you mind letting me get to respond to your first post before you start going off on a post I addressed to another poster?

Since I have you on ignore, you're lucky you get any response at all.

Lucky me
Though it is funny how you keep saying this, but still keep responding. Seems like you can't quit me.

Did you bother to read the paper? The material wasn't taken from Ob. West, all available replacements/production was shifted to rebuild the units smashed in the East which meant Ob. West was not only deprived of several units, but a bunch of new production that should have been sent to them to build up their units to TOE.

Oh, so there was some other meaning to "the situation in Ukraine diverted major resources and reserves away from Normandy, especially motor vehicles after the 1st Panzer Army lost most of their equipment in Hube's Pocket" that I misunderstood? Now you're saying the argument is that some stuff from somewhere went to the East instead of the West...is that correct?

Well then, let's look at specifics. Let's narrow it down to PKW and LKW, which are the most important resource in this case. So the Ostheer actually lost 9,693 PKW in April and 1366 in May, ending with a shortfall on 1 June of 21,274, after receiving 9,038 as replacements in those two months and was spread over about 155 divisions. BTW, that is with monthly production January-May averaging just 2451.

OB.West meanwhile, the villain in this story, lost 691 PKW in April and May, ending with a shortfall of 3535 on 1 June, after receiving 3532...for roughly 60 divisions.

Have I mentioned that there was no actually combat going on in Ob.West in April and May 1944? So what we have is the notion that the threat of an Allied landing should have resulted in fewer replacements going to the Ostheer and more to Ob.West. I don't quite follow that logic.

Oh look cherrypicked stats without a source. How about you read the screen shots I posted from the article? That would answer your questions. 103,571 motor vehicles (not counting combat vehicles like SPWs and AFVs) were lost in March and April 1944, mostly on the Eastern Front, mostly in Ukraine. 33,000 replacements were sent East in April-May 1944.

Why Ob. West needed equipment was to get units up to strength to repel the invasion that could have been coming as early as May per intelligence reports of the time.

Maybe you should read the paper before you comment then.

After reading the snippet posted by MK I am even more glad I did not spend the $45 on it.

I offered you a free copy and you ignored it. I've posted the relevant screenshots after Michael posted a bunch of parts that were not relevant to the issue under discussion.

Okay, the divisions of II. SS-Panzerkorps. Yep, wasted effort because they did jack all by the time they got to Ukraine and simply turned around and went back to Normandy...but they weren't both in Normandy to start with. 9. SS was with 19. AOK in Southern France, while 10. SS was between the Seine and Dives...and was also the least ready for combat. Would it have made a difference on D-Day or soon after? Doubful.

349. Inf-Div...so it was wrong to send it to the Ostheer from Calais in April? Why? The primary function of Ob.West was to defend the coast and train replacements for the Ostheer. 349. Inf-Div was organized in France from fragments of the 217. Inf-Div, which was destroyed in the East.I doubt there was ever a question that it would not go East when rebuilt.

507. sPz-Abtl? Yes, it completed organizing in the Netherlands, but was on its way to Poland on 15 March. It too was likely never considered for Ob.West, especially given the perilous state of the Ostfront. Chekassy-Korsun was in the past and the Kamenets–Podolsky battle was just beginning. Why would the Germans retain such a battalion in Ob.West to guard against a potential threat when there was a real calamity occurring?

Ditto 311. and 312. StuG Brigaden...they were newly formed, in Germany, and were never assigned to Ob.West.

So these three divisions, plus five others, could have been in France and might have contained the Allied bridgehead is the argument?

It is immaterial I suppose that 5. SS was ground into hamburger at Kovel in April and it was rebuilding at Heidelager from May into July?

57. Inf-Div? It was in such bad shape that when it was ordered to began rebuilding 28 February, it was expected it would not be ready until 1 June, but then its building was abruptly ended 13 April so it could be placed in reserve at Mogilev, where it was destroyed. It was never available for Ob.West.

And so on. These are imagined possibilities for imaginary reserves that rival Hitler's.

Again none of that was relevant to what we were talking about, I posted the relevant screenshots. In this thread the part that prompted your original reply was the diversion of equipment from preparing the divisions in the west for the invasion to replacing some of the equipment lost in Ukraine in March-April 1944; the screen shots I posted after you wrote all this actually addresses that rather than the irrelevant parts that Michael posted and you've jumped on to shift the topic to something you'd rather argue about rather than what was actually being talked about.

[nuyt]

Nothing wrong with that, as the Allies still fielded lots of French 75mm, 18pdrs, 155mm howitzers, etc. in the same year.

Absolutely true, but in the German case about 1/4 of the leFH in 1940 were the nA 16 and they had a core of reasonably well-trained troops to use them. For the United States in 1940, none of the pieces were modern, except for eight (8) 105mm Howitzers M1, which had been built in the early 1930s and were part of a demonstration battery at the Artillery School, Fort Sill. Worse, there were just 37-odd battalions of divisional artillery active out of the 72 required for the 12 divisions nominally active in the Regular Army...and even the "active" battalions were on a reduced strength. However, at least most of those were nominally motorized, for the National Guard, the situation was worse, most of its batteries remained horse-drawn and aside from monthly dry-firing exercises at the armory, they were lucky if they could fire a few live rounds per year on ranges. The Organized Reserves were worse still, since they only provided officers to partially man a few Regular Army Inactive units for six weeks during the summer.

Most of the French 75mm were modernized in the 1930s. All of the deployed British 18-pdr were on modernized carriages as the 18/25 pounder.

Agreed! The French Army's own 75mm guns were mostly on rubber tires I believe, but still on their WW1 carriage that did not provide for higher elevations?

[Carl Schwamberger]

... So, anyway, as a contrast we can look at the U.S. Army in 1932, which had a stock of 4,236 75mm guns, 973 155mm field guns, 2,971 155mm howitzers, 475 8inch howitzers, and 320 240mm howitzers, but it was ineffective, antiquated, mostly in storage, and with few active Army units to man them. And yet, as of 8 May 1945, there were 2,832 non-divisional pieces in the ETOUSA, supporting the 61 Infantry, Armored, and Airborne divisions there, so each division, in addition to its 48-54 organic FA pieces, had another 46 on average in support...roughly 96 pieces per division versus the 67.4 polyglot of the Heer ...

36 105mm howitzers +2 spare

12 155mm howitzers +1 spare

18 75mm guns or 105mm howitzers in the three regimental cannon companies +1 spare

66 howitzers/guns +4 spare

I suspect the spares were usually used and awaiting replacement in divisions in sustained combat for 90+ days. Ours in peace time were problematic. Usually awaiting repair, so they could be swapped out for another worn piece.

The argument the cannon in the regimental companies were not 'field artillery' applied to green divisions. I've found veterans in both the US and German armies preferred to hide the regimental guns behind masking terrain and connect them to the division artillery communications. Creating three extra FA batteries as it were. 'Assault' tactics with these cannon sounded great, but inexperienced artillery officers swiftly learned exposure to enemy counter fires gets you maimed or killed.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Agreed! The French Army's own 75mm guns were mostly on rubber tires I believe, but still on their WW1 carriage that did not provide for higher elevations?

Yes, tho I'm unsure how many were converted to rubber tires. Secondary sources indicate Approx 40% of the French artillery was motorized in 1939 or 1940. There was a Mle 1897/33 built in relatively small numbers. That had a split trail allowing a higher elevation. There was also a Mle 1987/38 (?) with a altered shield with was intended as a AT gun.

[nuyt]

... Agreed! The French Army's own 75mm guns were mostly on rubber tires I believe, but still on their WW1 carriage that did not provide for higher elevations?

Yes, tho I'm unsure how many were converted to rubber tires. Secondary sources indicate Approx 40% of the French artillery was motorized in 1939 or 1940. There was a Mle 1897/33 built in relatively small numbers. That had a split trail allowing a higher elevation. There was also a Mle 1987/38 (?) with a altered shield with was intended as a AT gun.

Thanks!

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Those numbers included some elderly weapons. In 1940 the Wehrmacht had some 1000 leFH16s in use (mixed in the data with leFH 18s), a number that had miraculously grown during the 1930s when the secret stocks were made available. I have my books in storage, but this quote covers it well: "In 1933 there were 28 in use with 24 artillery batteries. As the army re-armed after the Nazi's came to power that increased to 496 in 1934, 568 in 1936, 728 in 1936 and 980 in 1937." From: http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/we ... FH_16.html

Similar situation for sFH13, that was still in use and had been restocked during the 1930s (as well as several dozen 10,5cm K17, still used in 1940).

The 15cm heavy gun park was mainly K16, another WW1 vintage weapon.

Wish Kliene-Albrandt were still alive. In the 1960s he did some research on the black Reichsweher including interviewing some of the officers still alive. In his lecture he talked about the hidden reserves, but never mentioned weapons, other than the small arms of the police reserves.

In the 1920s the US Army briefly considered taking on 480 of the FH16. (Re: FA Journal) I've often wondered if those things were all in the US. Ive spotted at least a dozen parked on the lawns of county court houses and veterans clubs. Reading the above remark caused me to consider if a US scrap dealer sold them back to Germany in 1933

[nuyt]

I heard from a friend in DC that a lot were brought back from Europe indeed, dunno of 480, but could be.
I always wondered if they somehow made it back to Germany too.
At least the stocks in Holland must have, apart from a dozen 28cm Krupp guns that were still there in 1940, owned by the same trader who had also taken care of the Rheinmetall stocks.
Did a lot of as yet unpublished research on the Dutch dealings by Rheinmetall/Krupp. Shocking stuff and I may never uncover all.

[Sheldrake]

The source was FMS B832 interview with Staudinger the ARKO I SS Corps
"unfortunately nothing had been done, all through the years of German occupation ,to survey and stake out artillery positions. Apparently this had been neglected as a consequence of the tactical theory, allegedly by Rommel himself, that the guns should be stationed immediately at the waters edge in the hopes that by doing so enemy troops could be prevented from gaining a footing." FMS 832 P13-14

Yup the artillery dispositions seem to have been neglected as a consequence of the Rommel's Longest day theory.

Pre Rommel it appears there would be no artillery near the beaches. The earlier concept was to make the fight a mobile battle a bit inland.

Either way the bulk of the artillery, rocket or cannon, were positioned a few km inland. Their set op looks like a conventional artillery deployment to me. LXXXIV Corps had how many field artillery and rocket batteries? 70? 80? Im not seeing evidence they were all overlooking the beaches. & since they did engage the Allied assault with indirect fires across the coastal battlefield they did have artillery positions staked out. This smells more like Marcks corps artillery officer lacked the ability to rapidly integrate the reinforcing SS Division into the corps fire plan.

Another thought is Staudinger was a fan of the mobile counter attack & is dising Rommels doctrine in this interview.

I think the divisional artillery of the 716 division was roughly where it ended up on D Day. Merville battery had been occupied since 1942 and I suspect the same is true of the Maisy grandcamp battery I have seen pictures of AR 1716's guns in other places, but dating from 1942 ish.

By spring 1944, LXXXIV Corps artillery was mostly in emplacements rather than 'staked out posiitons'. Some of the Coastal artillery was redeployed to an alternate position. Famously the Pointe Du Hoc battery, but also the Ouistrehem battery as well. The most recent reinforcements to the Corps were from ID352 and Abteilung 989 which deployed too late to be emplaced - and escaped notice in the D Day fire plan.

Your assumption about indolance in Seventh Army and LXXXIV Corps may be right. Staudinger is right to question why after four years of occupation and two of the Atlantic Wall, there were no contingency plans to receive reinforcing artillery. It would not have taken too much effort. Rommel in his famous inspection tours doesn't seem to have asked any penetrating questions of the GOC 7th Army sometime Chief of Artillery General Dollman. or LXXXIV Corps General of Artillerie Marcks or Artillerymen who commanded ID 716 (Richter) and 21 Panzer Div (Feuchtinger)

However, this supports my point about the low priority accorded to artillery in the Wehrmacht.

[Richard Anderson]

Lucky me
Though it is funny how you keep saying this, but still keep responding. Seems like you can't quit me.

No, no, obviously its me that is so lucky, plus I can never resist pointing out bafflegab.

Oh look cherrypicked stats without a source.

Seriously? RG242, T78, R145, F5886-et.seq., which contains the two Anlagen to "Ubersichten über einsatzbereite Panzer u, Stu,Gesch. Ost in %", Der Generalinspekturder Panzertruppen Abt. Org. Nr. 3266/44 g.Kdos." dated 15/11/44 and revised 10/12/44, as well as Ungepanzert losses and shortfalls for the period 1 December 1943 through 1 September 1944 as reported in Anlagen to OKH.Gen.Stab d. H./Gen Qu I/06535/44 g.Kdos., originally dated 5 August, 5 September, and 5 October 1944. I see he gives his figures for March and April as derived from T78, Roll 168, which might be the missing report of c. 5 July covering March-May. I have never run across it, but it is certainly possible given the thousands of rolls and hundreds of thousands of frames of microfilm there are. Next time I can get to NARA, assuming they ever open up, I'll try to remember to check Roll 168.

How about you read the screen shots I posted from the article? That would answer your questions. 103,571 motor vehicles (not counting combat vehicles like SPWs and AFVs) were lost in March and April 1944, mostly on the Eastern Front, mostly in Ukraine. 33,000 replacements were sent East in April-May 1944.

The loss of all Ungapanzert vehicles for the Gesamt Heer in April was given as 44,191, not including 1,289 trailers. He has 41,839, but since he does not break down by type according to the report I do not see where his error is. The figure of 61,732 is possible for March, but the detail is missing. For example, 33,345 replacements for the Ostfront April/May should be 33,346, minor perhaps, but why is the error there? June's 11,921 should be 12,254. For Ob.West, he has April/May as 12,472, but it should be 12,404 and his figure for June of 7,657 should be 7,544.

However, over and above the problem with the odd errors, are the conclusions drawn by him.

Why Ob. West needed equipment was to get units up to strength to repel the invasion that could have been coming as early as May per intelligence reports of the time.

Sure, and why the Ostheer needed equipment was to get units up to strength to replace over a hundred thousand losses that had actually occurred in the previous few months.

I offered you a free copy and you ignored it. I've posted the relevant screenshots after Michael posted a bunch of parts that were not relevant to the issue under discussion.

Oh, so the snippets you choose to post are relevant, but the rest of the article is not?

Again none of that was relevant to what we were talking about, I posted the relevant screenshots. In this thread the part that prompted your original reply was the diversion of equipment from preparing the divisions in the west for the invasion to replacing some of the equipment lost in Ukraine in March-April 1944; the screen shots I posted after you wrote all this actually addresses that rather than the irrelevant parts that Michael posted and you've jumped on to shift the topic to something you'd rather argue about rather than what was actually being talked about.

Yeah, the only problem with that is the screen shots you decided was relevant actually say nothing about diverting "equipment from preparing the divisions in the west for the invasion to replacing some of the equipment lost in Ukraine in March-April 1944", which I already pointed out the data doesn't support either.

[Richard Anderson]

36 105mm howitzers +2 spare

12 155mm howitzers +1 spare

18 75mm guns or 105mm howitzers in the three regimental cannon companies +1 spare

66 howitzers/guns +4 spare

I suspect the spares were usually used and awaiting replacement in divisions in sustained combat for 90+ days. Ours in peace time were problematic. Usually awaiting repair, so they could be swapped out for another worn piece.

Er, um, Carl? There were no "spares" in the T/O&E of any of the FA units in the US Army in World War II. Spares were held by the theater Ordnance reserve in depots, based upon a replacement formula that calculated, for example, the replacement factor for the 105mm M2A1 Howitzer was 3% of total theater T/E per month, with the reserve calculated to be two and a half months worth, so 7.5% of total T/E.

Of course, one salient feature of U.S. Army Ordnance designs was they tended to be over-engineered, while firing stresses were minimized as much as possible, so they tended to be very reliable. Then, since the German counter-battery threat was generally low, the main battle threat was being overrun, while Ordnance service in the field was excellent, so few units ever fell below strength in combat.

The argument the cannon in the regimental companies were not 'field artillery' applied to green divisions. I've found veterans in both the US and German armies preferred to hide the regimental guns behind masking terrain and connect them to the division artillery communications. Creating three extra FA batteries as it were. 'Assault' tactics with these cannon sounded great, but inexperienced artillery officers swiftly learned exposure to enemy counter fires gets you maimed or killed.

Indeed, the Cannon Company of the Infantry Regiment often fired as a fourth battery for the supporting light artillery battalion, but that was limited by the relatively short range of the 105mm M3 Howitzer. In the end, the original concept of the Cannon Company as a direct fire, SP unit was upheld at the end of the war, even if the organization essentially never took place. However, I was counting as the Army counted, they were not Field Artillery, they were Infantry. The same holds true for the Germans, the leIG and sIG were under control of the infantry, not the artillery, and the German lack of redundant communications meant they were rarely used as field artillery.

[TheMarcksPlan]

It seems someone should mention that the US, with all its industrial and logistical might, somehow suffered an ammunition crisis in the midst of its headline campaign.

In the entire eleven months of operations on the Continent no supply problem plagued U.S. forces more persistently or constricted their operations more seriously than the shortage of field artillery ammunition. Restrictions on expenditures were imposed shortly after the Normandy landings because of unloading difficulties at the beaches. Such restrictions continued with little relaxation until the end of hostilities because resupply from the United States was uncertain.1 ... in the major items accounting for the great bulk of all expenditures the aggregate stocks on hand in the theater were almost without exception below the authorized levels throughout the eleven months of operations.

It's great to have maximally flexible artillery kitted out with the best tubes and communications systems, so long as you remember to build enough shells.

Surely one factor in why it took the world's two greatest global powers so long to defeat a regional European power, despite the two global powers having another great power - with the world's largest army - doing most of the fighting for them.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Oh look cherrypicked stats without a source. How about you read the screen shots I posted from the article? That would answer your questions. 103,571 motor vehicles (not counting combat vehicles like SPWs and AFVs) were lost in March and April 1944, mostly on the Eastern Front, mostly in Ukraine. 33,000 replacements were sent East in April-May 1944.

Of course you're right but, equally obviously, you're wasting your time. The psychobabble about maneuver - what, between hedgegrows? - should have made this perfectly clear earlier, if it wasn't already.

[Michael Kenny]

I offered you a free copy and you ignored it. I've posted the relevant screenshots after Michael posted a bunch of parts that were not relevant to the issue under discussion.

I posted the first actual pages from the article and a few posts later I provided a link to the actual report

.

It is online for free but you have to dig. I can send a copy to anyone who wants one.

This link will be active for one week

https://we.tl/t-68nNAYtEOR

which can be downloaded by anyone. I gave a copy (that I uploaded) of the full article-you are the one who posted only 'parts' of it.
I also believe a claim that the Germans were beaten in Normandy because there was a massive drain of their vehicle stocks because of losses on the Eastern Front is an incorrect reading of the situation.

Liedtke's argument is air tight: the crushing material losses in Western Ukraine forced production to flow east when it was needed West for any chance of an effective counter to D-Day. Material shortages delayed or prevented deployment of most mechanized units that fought in Normandy or feasibly might have. Liedtke is an excellent researcher capable of connecting the dots across strategic theaters and between economics and battlefield outcomes. A rarity in his field.

The article is full of 'ifs, 'buts and 'maybe' and nothing more than cudda/shudda/wudda kite-flying:
:

One can only speculate as to the
possible consequences had the II. SS-Panzerkorps already been stationed in
France on 6 June. However, with its two divisions possessing most of their
required number of motor vehicles and hence a high degree of mobility,
and since all the other fully operational panzer divisions in France were
committed almost immediately, it seems likely that the II. SS-Panzerkorps
would also have been employed against the Allied landings at a very early
stage. While the early deployment of an additional two panzer divisions
with 245 tanks and assault guns may not have sufficed to wipe out any
of the Allied beachheads, it would nonetheless have represented a major
reinforcement.74 At the very least, the German containment of the landings
would have congealed far sooner, and, in turn, German defense lines would
have become even more formidable. Although the eventual outcome of the
campaign would probably have remained the same, for the Allies, breeching
these defences would have entailed significantly higher costs of time and
blood. With the British and Canadian armies already experiencing dire shortages
of trained infantry replacements during the campaign, and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill worried that fighting in Normandy was degenerating
into positional warfare reminiscent of the Great War, the situation for
the Allies could have been far worse..........................


Although seemingly inconsequential because of its small size, the potential
impact such a reserve may have had upon events during the summer of
1944 could still have been significant. This may especially have been the
case in terms of the Normandy landings. Admittedly, their approach to the
bridgehead would have been slowed by Allied air attacks and the destruction
that these had inflicted upon the French rail net, while German supply problems
in Normandy would correspondingly have also been that much greater.
Nonetheless, if deployed en masse and in a timely manner before the formations
already engaged had become too badly depleted, the arrival of eight
fresh divisions with roughly 98,000 men would doubtlessly have improved
the Germans ability to contain the landings. Potentially, the infantry divisions
would have relieved the committed panzer units, allowing the latter
to move into reserve. Divisional frontages could also have been narrowed,
thereby thickening the German defensive front and permitting the creation
of more tactical reserves. Behind the line, the relieved panzer divisions, now
joined by the 5. SS-Panzer Division with another 125 tanks and assault guns,
would have buttressed the front as operational reserves while simultaneously
resting and refitting. Despite superior Anglo-American firepower and material
resources, the ready availability of a larger number of reserve panzer divisions
may well have stymied efforts to achieve a clean breakthrough and
allowed the Germans to maintain the integrity of their defences. Given the
difficulties the Allies experienced in overcoming the German containment
front as it in fact existed, the improvement of the German defenses to such
a degree would, at the very least, have turned the campaign into a much
longer and even more bloody slogging match

It just the usual hindsight way to correct the actual German mistakes and provide possible ways to lessen/negate all the Allied wins/advantages.

[Michael Kenny]

It seems someone should mention that the US, with all its industrial and logistical might, somehow suffered an ammunition crisis in the midst of its headline campaign.

Did you forgot the tank shortage? However all this is relative. If one side has an ammunition supply/tank reserve rate 10 times that of the enemy and shortages reduce that to 'only' 5x then it is still is a massive advantage.