Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

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Gooner1
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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#211

Post by Gooner1 » 02 Nov 2021, 13:13

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 05:30
Surely one factor in why it took the world's two greatest global powers so long to defeat a regional European power, despite the two global powers having another great power - with the world's largest army - doing most of the fighting for them.
That regional European power fighting on its own borders was defeated in a few months by the world's greatest global powers allied with another great power with the world's largest army doing much of the fighting.

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#212

Post by Cult Icon » 02 Nov 2021, 14:18

Sheldrake wrote:
01 Nov 2021, 21:00

Your assumption about indolance in Seventh Army and LXXXIV Corps may be right.

However, this supports my point about the low priority accorded to artillery in the Wehrmacht.
In one of the Das Reich Volumes (either IV or V) there is a history of 2.SS Artillery in Normandy. Hausser, now command of the 7th Army, gathered up various artillery units and centralized them into large grouping under the command of the artillery regiment of the division. The history presents this arrangement as successful. There is also discussion of their communications net, string of artillery observers guarding the frontline, and artillery detection units employed, I would have to read it again to refresh my memory. IIRC one of the artillery commanders won a high award for the performance of this artillery.

Overall, I do not think that the Normandy campaign or Operation Fischfang was a good example of German operational concept regarding fire support given their bad strategic situation. The clearest one was the Operation Citadel. There was the North and the South, and the North had a diverse collection of assets (heavy armor, heavy armored howitzers, remote control demolitions, etc) aimed at heavy breakthrough. If the strategic position for Germany was much better I think there would have been further development along these lines; the history of funklenkpanzer shows increasing organizational forms going into 1944 including a misused Tiger FKL. The failure at Kursk should also provide some after-action instruction on how to more effectively use this collection of assets.

Northern effort's GHQ artillery (9th Army):

Arko 101
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 611 [10cm]
3./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 620 [15cm cannon]
II./Artillerie-Regiment 47 [10cm cannon/15cm howitzer]
IV./Artillerie-Regiment 104 [15cm howitzers]

Arko 112
1./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 817 [17cm cannon]
4./leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 69 [10.5cm]
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 709
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 59
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 851 [captured 122mm guns]
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 859 [21cm Mörser]
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 848 [15cm howitzers]
II./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 66 [15cm howitzers]
I., II. and III./Werfer-Regiment 51 [15cm and 21cm]

I do not know of the ammunition numbers but there were long barrages of up to 80 minutes and so prior to offensive lunges. Due to prior fighting, the 9th Army was unable to hoard enough artillery ammunition and refresh their infantry battalions enough for Model's liking (he believed that Op Citadel would fail; and it is implied from his actions that he was more fighting along the lines of inflicting as much damage as possible to his opponent in July 1943). However there was a serious shortfalls in the allocation of long-ranged artillery (eg. 170 mm guns) for counter-battery fire, and Central Front's (Rokossovsky) artillery forces was poweful, the 307th Rifle Division holding the critical objective of Ponyri had some 340 guns in support and strong reserves/supporting units, leading to mission failure despite the large number of German units attempting to encircle and directly clear the village.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 02 Nov 2021, 14:50, edited 2 times in total.


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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#213

Post by Cult Icon » 02 Nov 2021, 14:27

On the "flying artillery" in support of 9th Army (Walther Model), Operation Citadel. The VI had varous phases of using their fighters to gain temporary air superiority, and then deploying a massed air attack prior to offensive pushes on the ground :

Strength of Luftflotte VI supporting the 9th Army (686 aircraft)

186 FW190 Day fighters, 39 BF-109 Night fighters

92 JU-88, 152 HE-111

159 JU-87, 58 BF-110

On Day 1, this force delivered 2,088 sorties.

July 5th- July 9th, 6,848 sorties. Of this figure, 61 % were ground attack missions: 4,278 sorties.

From July 5th-July 15th, averaged 1073.5 sorties a day.

The German air force focused on close air support and air superiority, rather than interdiction missions or objectives of isolating the battlefield with air power.

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#214

Post by Cult Icon » 02 Nov 2021, 15:05

Also employed with 9th Army was the 78th Sturm division, an experimental heavy breakthrough unit. This was partially motorized and characterized by much stronger than normal anti-tank and fire support assets. I suspect that if this unit was highly successful in Citadel that the Germans would try to produce a lot more of them.

So the heavy breakthrough concept in July 5th was composed of a few elements:

1. air superiority, large scale close air support

2. Two Arko and GHQ field artillery, missing substantial long ranged artillery and siege artillery

3. Attacks spearheaded by remote-control demolitions of minefields and strongpoints with special FKL units, supporting by combat engineers. Then followed up with heavy armor, supported by heavily armored howtizers and medium tanks.

4. Use of one sturm-division plus a mixture of infantry and armored divisions.

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#215

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Nov 2021, 19:16

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 05:30
Surely one factor in why it took the world's two greatest global powers so long to defeat a regional European power, despite the two global powers having another great power - with the world's largest army - doing most of the fighting for them.
Maybe, but wasn’t that link to a US shell crisis? The British had plenty of their own to be getting on with!

It also surely demonstrates the resource implications of the US fighting a major war in Europe at the end of a trans-Atlantic supply line and another simultaneously against Japan (remember that war?) at the end of a trans-Pacific supply line. Not forgetting the need to supply Lend-Lease food, munitions and raw materials to those needy Allies. :D

Wasn’t that “regional European power” defeated by a combination of allies, both western and Soviet? A bad-tempered combination, perhaps, but a successful one, despite all of the bickering.

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#216

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Nov 2021, 19:23

Back to logistics and German artillery in Normandy - can anyone get access to this article? Any forum archaeologists out there?
Landscape Archaeology of World War Two German Logistics Depots in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines, Normandy, France
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ ... 7d189f4b31

The description sounds interesting:
Archaeological survey in the Forêt domaniale des Andaines has recorded nearly 900 discrete earthwork bunkers, building foundations, trenches, and other features associated with WW2 German fuel, munitions and logistics depots. Documentary evidence establishes these depots were administered from Bagnoles-de-l’Orne and were a key component of the Seventh Army logistics network before and during the Normandy Campaign of June-August 1944. Post-war survival of features has been remarkably good in this forested setting and it is argued that this likely constitutes one of the best-preserved and most extensive examples of a non-hardened WW2 archaeological landscape yet documented in Western Europe.
Regards

Tom

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#217

Post by Michael Kenny » 02 Nov 2021, 19:38

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 19:23
Back to logistics and German artillery in Normandy - can anyone get access to this article? Any forum archaeologists out there?
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... ndy_France

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#218

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Nov 2021, 20:06

Michael,

Thanks for the link - I will have to practice my “googlability” as I couldn’t find it despite all sorts of swearing!

:thumbsup:

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Tom

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#219

Post by Michael Kenny » 02 Nov 2021, 20:11

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 20:06
Michael,

Thanks for the link - I will have to practice my “googlability” as I couldn’t find it despite all sorts of swearing!
sticking 'pdf' after the title usually works.

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#220

Post by T. A. Gardner » 02 Nov 2021, 21:01

Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 19:38
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 19:23
Back to logistics and German artillery in Normandy - can anyone get access to this article? Any forum archaeologists out there?
https://www.researchgate.net/publicatio ... ndy_France
I printed the article you linked out. It deals mostly with where munitions, POL, that sort of thing were stored and the type of bunkers and such used, their layout, and related things. There really isn't any information on amounts stored or passed through.

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#221

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 02 Nov 2021, 21:28

T. A. Gardner wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 21:01
There really isn't any information on amounts stored or passed through.
It does give the size of the stockpiles in the depots on 5 June 1944 though, which I personally thought was a useful piece of information.

I'm just sorry that you were so disappointed! :D

Regards

Tom

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#222

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Nov 2021, 21:40

Michael Kenny wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 08:36
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
01 Nov 2021, 00:08
Liedtke's argument is air tight: the crushing material losses in Western Ukraine forced production to flow east when it was needed West for any chance of an effective counter to D-Day. Material shortages delayed or prevented deployment of most mechanized units that fought in Normandy or feasibly might have. Liedtke is an excellent researcher capable of connecting the dots across strategic theaters and between economics and battlefield outcomes. A rarity in his field.
The article is full of 'ifs, 'buts and 'maybe' and nothing more than cudda/shudda/wudda kite-flying:
Well, yes, there is that, but also our resident legal-beagle, critical-thinking maven, and brilliant internet psychologist seems to miss that Liedtke actually says the opposite, but what the heck, it must be "air tight". Right?

"Another seven panzer or panzergrenadier, one parachute, and two infantry divisions were so badly damaged that they were withdrawn from the front and sent to the West for extensive refits." (p. 223)

1. SS-Panzer Division when rebuilt in the West played a rather significant part there. Ditto, 16. Panzergrenadier Division, reformed in the West as 116. Panzer Division. Same for 2. Fallschirmjäger Division. 9. Panzerdivision and 11. Panzerdivision as well. 34. Infanterie-Division actually went to Italy for rebuilding rather than to Ob.West, but then there was a crisis brewing there as well.

Oddly enough though, the "excellent researcher" somehow missed that 198. Infanterie-Division did not go West for rebuilding, its scattered fragments went to Rumania in May-June initially and only went West 12 June.

And, of course, many of the others also went West for rehabilitation, as was the long practice of the Heer, before being committed back East. However, it was the time frame and the requirements of the Ostfront that was critical in delaying or preventing the "deployment of most mechanized units that fought in Normandy or feasibly might have", not some obtuseness on the part of the Germans.

6. Panzerdivision departed the Ukraine for Germany on 24 May and was rebuilt in Wehrkreis XI in June before returning to Vilnius in July, where it was in reserve until committed to action with HG-M in September. Difficult to see how it feasibly might have fought in Normandy?

19. Panzerdivision in June was arriving in Denmark for rebuilding, a process that was ongoing in July, when the collapse of AG-M led to orders for parts of the partially rebuilt division entrain for the Truppenübungsplatz Arys in East Prussia as an potential emergency reserve. The division completed assembly there in August and was then commited to action at Warsaw. Difficult to see how it feasibly might have fought in Normandy?

25. Panzerdivision was badly fragmented in the battles in Ukraine and the remnants ended scattered from Lemberg to Esztergom to Grafenwöhr to Senne and even Denmark in May-June. It was finally assembled in Wildflecken as Kampfgrüppe and committed to the Ostfront at the end of August. Difficult to see how it feasibly might have fought in Normandy?

There is also the somewhat inconvenient fact that some Panzer units, especially the Panther Abteilungen, meant for the Ostfront were in Ob.West at Mailly, training and equipping. Some were committed in the West, while others went East, as needed, despite in some cases where there parent unit actually was.

Finally, I sometimes despair, because I can apparently lead a poster to water, but cannot make them think. The 9,038 PKW sent as replacements to the Ostfront in April-May amounted to about 56 per division. The 3,532 sent as replacements to the West amounted to about 59 per division. The 13,211 LKW sent East amounted to about 83 per division, the 5,775 sent west amounted to about 96 per division.

So, yes, you could describe that as a slight bias directed westward...except that, to repeat yet again, the west was the primary ground for rehabilitating divisions, and in April-May a goodly number indeed were there doing just that, many of them Schnelltruppen, which proportionately REQUIRED more motorized vehicles.

Or, let's look at the Gesamtfehlbestand - the over shortfall of these types - by theater. On 1 June, Ob.West was short 3,535 PKW, roughly 59 per division, while the Ostheer was short 21,174, roughly 132 per division. On the same date, ob.West was short 11,447 PKW, roughly 191 per division, while the Ostheer was short 40,637, roughly 254 per division.

That definitely appears to be a bias westward, but yet again to repeat, the west was a primary training ground for rehabilitating divisions, and with so many Schnelltruppen getting sent there for rebuilding it would be expected that more vehicles would be sent there as complete unit replacement sets.

So was Ob.West doomed because troops, weapons, and equipment were diverted east to make up the huge losses of the spring or was the Ostfront doomed because troops, weapons, and equipment were diverted west to counter a possible Allied invasion?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#223

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 02 Nov 2021, 22:39

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 21:40
25. Panzerdivision was badly fragmented in the battles in Ukraine and the remnants ended scattered from Lemberg to Esztergom to Grafenwöhr to Senne and even Denmark in May-June. It was finally assembled in Wildflecken as Kampfgrüppe and committed to the Ostfront at the end of August. Difficult to see how it feasibly might have fought in Normandy?
If it hadn't been shattered in Ukraine. An obvious point of the article. :roll:

...another parody of the inability to conduct counterfactual reasoning, a liability for someone most prone to post in the "What If" section. A liability for poster and readers alike.
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#224

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Nov 2021, 23:00

Cult Icon wrote:
02 Nov 2021, 14:18
In one of the Das Reich Volumes (either IV or V) there is a history of 2.SS Artillery in Normandy. Hausser, now command of the 7th Army, gathered up various artillery units and centralized them into large grouping under the command of the artillery regiment of the division. The history presents this arrangement as successful.
That does not seem to be unusual for German doctrine. The commander of a division artillery regiment as ArFü commanded the divisional artillery, including attachments of Heeresartillerie or from other divisions under command. However, typically an ArKo would be placed with such a grouping to augment the ArFü and to truly make such a grouping effective required the specialists of an Artillerie-Regiments Stab and a Beobachtungs-Abteilung or Feuerleitbatterie.
Overall, I do not think that the Normandy campaign or Operation Fischfang was a good example of German operational concept regarding fire support given their bad strategic situation.
True. In some ways Normandy was the nadir in terms of German artillery practice, but mostly due to limitations imposed by limited ammunition supply and the well-supported Allied counterbattery doctrine. FISCHFANG however, was probably a good exemplar of mid-war German doctrine and was similar to the practice in ZITADELLE, both north and south.
Northern effort's GHQ artillery (9th Army):

Arko 101
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 611 [10cm]
3./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 620 [15cm cannon]
II./Artillerie-Regiment 47 [10cm cannon/15cm howitzer] [BTW, I believe the 4. (10cm sFK) Batterie was replaced by 15cm sFH on 28 February 1940]
IV./Artillerie-Regiment 104 [15cm howitzers] [BTW, technically not Heerestruppen, this was part of 102. Infanterie-Division of XXXXVI. AK.]

Arko 112
1./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 817 [17cm cannon]
4./leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 69 [10.5cm] [BTW, this was actually part of II./Artillerie-Regiment 69. and was a 10cm sFK Batterie]
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 709 BTW, this unit was not organized until December 1944 in Holland. The unit referred to is actually schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 709. with 10cm sFK, It was destroyed in June 1944.
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 59 [BTW, this was actually II./Artillerie-Regiment 59. The original was lost in Stalingrad and this unit was organized 1 May 1943 with leFH and RSO.
leichte Artillerie-Abteilung 851 [captured 122mm guns] BT[BTW, these were probably 12.2cm leFH.
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 859 [21cm Mörser]
schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 848 [15cm howitzers]
II./schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 66 [15cm howitzers] BTW, this should be II./schwere Artillerie-Regiment and was a mixed battalion of 15cm sFH and 10cm sFK.
I., II. and III./Werfer-Regiment 51 [15cm and 21cm]

I do not know of the ammunition numbers but there were long barrages of up to 80 minutes and so prior to offensive lunges.
That is surprising, because the German habit was for short, intense concentrations in support of the schwerpunkte, with lengthier, but intermittent fires as diversions, masking, and deception. Lengthy intense fires were avoided due to the extreme consumption of ammunition stockpiles, which were calculated based on average and intense days of combat.

Anyway, this makes an interesting comparison to American doctrinal practice. While the German example is a deliberate attack on a fortified position, the American example, the assault crossing of the Moselle by the 5th Infantry Division in September 1944, is another form of deliberate attack, albeit in this case the German defenses were a mix of some fixed, field, and hasty fortifications less like the extensively built-up Soviet defenses.

There the XX Corps of Third U.S. Army attached the standard non-divisional light artillery battalion to the division, augmented by an AFA Battalion of the attached CCB, 7th Armored Division. However, the XX Corps also placed in support of the division:

5th Field Artillery Group
695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer, Self-Propelled)
558th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun, Self-Propelled)
274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. Howitzer, Self-Propelled)

204th Field Artillery Group
177th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)
773d Field Artillery Battalion (4.5-inch Gun)
943d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Howitzer)

33d Field Artillery Brigade
203d Field Artillery Group
739th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer)
989th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm. Gun)
999th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch Howitzer)
270th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer)
277th Field Artillery Battalion (240-mm. Howitzer)

So, all told, there were:

18 M3 105mm Howitzers
102 M2A1 and M7 105mm Howitzers
12 4.5" Guns
36 155mm Howitzers
24 155mm Guns
24 8" Howitzers
12 240mm Howitzers

Thus, 228 pieces total to support a reinforced infantry division.

Compared to:

32 10cm sFK
12 10.5cm leFH
12 12.2cm sFH
44 15cm sFH
3 15cm sK
3 17cm sK
9 21cm Mrs

Thus, 115 pieces total to support an army with six divisions attacking.

I think this gives a reasonable comparison of the relative scale of supporting artillery.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Re: Alternative Artillery of the 20th Century

#225

Post by Sheldrake » 02 Nov 2021, 23:24

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
01 Nov 2021, 04:45
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
31 Oct 2021, 21:23

Don't have the numbers at hand...
You're looking at what was carried; the issue is who carried what (horses or trucks?).
Sheldrake wrote:
31 Oct 2021, 21:59
Try this
https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2017/07/0 ... -russia-i/
and the section headed "The impossible equation - Logistics and the supply of Barbarossa" in David Sahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East.
Not a word about the horse vs. truck logistical distribution in either place.

-----------------------------------------------

Conceptual clarity, guys. It saves lots of wasted time.
Have a look at the FMS Study T-8 Problems of Supply in Far-Reaching Operations. By Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and others; 28 vols, 1152 pp, 61 illus; Army War College mimeograph; 1951. A series of studies covering all aspects of the supply problems arising from the unique conditions of Eastern Europe. Supply is treated at all levels, from the Army High Command down to the divisions.

Basically horse transport doesn't get a mention. It is for local distribution only, from depots to the units. German logistics centred on the railways, as they did in 1870 and 1914. The

The distance between the rail head and the front line depends on how many trucks are available. A modern army which is not limited in fuel will need to be prepared for large scale employment of motor transport in the event that railways are temporarily disrupted. German experience with non organic units suggests that a minimum of 30,000 tons capacity is required.

Hitler's decision to fight as close as possible to the beaches in Normandy was very counter productive logistically. There wasn't enough motor transport to support the army given the distance between the battlefield and the railheads. The Seventh army was starved of ammunition.

Yup Hitler had a blind spot when it came to logistics... .

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