Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 03:40

Good to get confirmation on why some posters need to be ignored.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 12 Nov 2021 13:50

Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 03:40
Good to get confirmation on why some posters need to be ignored.
Richard, you're the one who keeps seeking out my threads to reply to despite repeated protestations that I'm on your ignore list and when you can't argue your point effectively you pull lines like this. Maybe best for you to keep me on ignore.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Nov 2021 16:57

stg 44 wrote:
12 Nov 2021 13:50
Richard, you're the one who keeps seeking out my threads to reply to despite repeated protestations that I'm on your ignore list and when you can't argue your point effectively you pull lines like this. Maybe best for you to keep me on ignore.
Um, "stg 44" or whatever your name is, my original reply to "your thread" was to "avalancheon", not you. I do not "seek" you or "your threads" out, but the discussions around these never-ending what ifs usually slip into misrepresentations of reality, which is when I find I cannot resist commenting. It is like when anti-vaxxers on social media start talking about "luciferase" content in vaccines, by letting the misinformation remain unchallenged it invites the acceptance of fiction over fact and then a domino-effect where alternative facts swiftly displace reality.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Nov 2021 04:22

Richard Anderson wrote:
11 Nov 2021 18:53
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
11 Nov 2021 18:05
I've gamed the absence of the 352 Div from the Calvados. No surprise it can make a difference. Tho oddly it was still difficult to reach the planned advance of 6th June. That had to do with movement rather than the weak opposition of the remaining defense. Also noticed th game pieces tended t pile up on the beach due to the movement rules. This reminds me of remarks by a couple of field grade officers present that the landing plan for O Beach was to ambitious and 'fast' contributing to the congestion.
Yes, the Allied assault plan, which was more or less the same on every beach, was abysmal. It assumed so many things that simply had no basis to support them.

The problems really began when the Germans began their beach obstacle construction program in late February and early March. Even though a landing conference in December identified that as the single most problematic thing the Germans could do, little or no thought was given to contingency planning or to modifications to the assault landing schedule.
I recall a description of the US Navy firing torpedoes into reproductions of the beach defenses on a Florida shore at high tide. The results killed the idea.

Instead of stretching out the landing and preceding the main landing with a comprehensive plan to clear the obstacles, the decision was made to create ad hoc clearance units timed to land eight minutes after the initial DD tanks and just two minutes after the initial covering infantry landed. The gapping teams then had between five and twenty-seven minutes to clear their gaps. Add in various serials landing at the wrong place due to the rip currents, loss of control vessels, smoke obscuring landmarks, and simple miss-identification of landmarks and the result, even when German resistance was minimal as on some of the British beaches, was chaos.
The chaos compounded initial errors, such as overloading the assault infantry with so much unnecessary gear as to make them barely capable of a brisk waddle across the beach,
That error has been consistent since at least Roman times. I would not be surprised at depictions of Sumerian spearmen foundering under too much kit along the banks of the Tigris River.
.. as well as the decision to make direct assaults on the strongpoints guarding natural exits from the beaches rather than the areas between the strongpoints, and the results should have been predictable.
Who'd have thunk so many forms of fire support in preparation and during the assault would fail?
Of course, all this urgency had a reason, which was the fears of a German armored counterattack in the initial 48-hours. ...

The root problem then may simply have been the over-stylized nature of the Allied planning. Each beach was treated more or less exactly the same as the other with regards to anticipating German reactions, instead of being treated as a separate tactical problem. For example, would it have been better on OMAHA to use the assets scheduled to land the 635th TD Bn (T) on the 2d/3d tides to land additional armor or infantry?
I've often wondered how different any of this might have been had Clark brought a better experienced staff from 5th & 7th Armies. They might have been just as concerned about armored counter attacks & made some other bad assumptions, but a larger and greater depth of experience in three amphib assaults (four?) sounds better than the thinner experience of Bradley & his staff.
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 02:05
Futurist wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Nov 2021 01:39
Add in the excellent bombing by the 9th AF Mediums and the result was very different.
Can you elaborate, please?
Unlike OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD, where the aerial "beach drenching" was done by the Eighth Air Force, UTAH was struck by the medium bombers of Ninth Air Force, bombing visually below the cloud deck. While not perfect, the did nicely bracket WN 5, which is where the UTAH assault force was about to land. To quote from my book on the subject.
A few minutes before the first assault troops landed 277 B-26 Medium Bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped a total of 4,414 250-lb. instantaneous-fused bombs with devastating accuracy on top of WN 5.
Wish i had the time to do estimates on how the 8th would have helped had they hit their targets. Some years ago I passed on collecting some effects data that would have helped with that.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 14 Nov 2021 00:53

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Nov 2021 04:22
Wish i had the time to do estimates on how the 8th would have helped had they hit their targets. Some years ago I passed on collecting some effects data that would have helped with that.
This website has data that might be helpful:
http://www.theobservationpost.com/blog/?p=2121
WHAT IF THE WEATHER HAD BEEN BETTER?

The fire plan was predicated on fine weather and good visibility. With good weather the Eighth Air Force bombers might have dropped more ordnance on Omaha Beach. On the British beaches many of the defences were further inland than at Omaha Beach.On the British beaches air attacks were considered to have knocked out 13% of defences. Had that been repeated on Omaha Beach that might have resulted in the destruction on nine machine guns and a mortar, which according to the model might have saved 193 casualties
There is a chart that shows how much different levels of knocked out defenses would impact casualties as well.

Data is badly skewed though, because it only includes a fraction of total Omaha losses, 3000 in the estimates of the report. Total was around 4700 per Joseph Balkoski's "Omaha Beach" that uses the records of all the units involved to come to the conclusion.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/716905.Omaha_Beach

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Nov 2021 20:13

A lot to digest in that. The author did not remark on one of the early plans to drop a airborne div behind OMAHA Beach. Not a flaw in his work, but interesting background to his remarks. The points about the artillery seem dead on to me, tho the thin coverage by the available ammunition over the given time & square of the 7,800 meter long beach is not clear.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Nov 2021 21:28

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Nov 2021 04:22
Who'd have thunk so many forms of fire support in preparation and during the assault would fail?
Did it fail or was it just not designed to do what it turned out was required?
I've often wondered how different any of this might have been had Clark brought a better experienced staff from 5th & 7th Armies. They might have been just as concerned about armored counter attacks & made some other bad assumptions, but a larger and greater depth of experience in three amphib assaults (four?) sounds better than the thinner experience of Bradley & his staff.
Bradley did bring them. He basically had carte blanche to bring who he wanted, so he brought 30 picked officers from Fifth and Seventh Army and II Corps to form the Headquarters of First Army in England in October 1943. Those 30 officers comprised the bulk of the Headquarters Tactical Echelon (39 officers including the CG) and nearly half of all Headquarters officers ranking O-5 and higher (81 officers, including the CG). The Advance Echelon of FUSA in England made up the shortfall. Those officers had participated in the initial planning for the cross-Channel attack and the planning for TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE.
Wish i had the time to do estimates on how the 8th would have helped had they hit their targets. Some years ago I passed on collecting some effects data that would have helped with that.
The problem was that just like many other elements of the assault plan, the air plan was not well thought out in terms of possible effectiveness. Aside from the problematic nature of the bombing restrictions imposed to protect the assault troops approaching the beaches, no real attempt was made to calculate the effect of various types of bombs versus the German fortifications. Basically, the success of the 250-lb HE bombs on WN-5 on UTAH was mostly psychological and fortuitous in that little destruction other than to some surface positions occurred, but the troops landed soon enough after the strike that the defenders were still dazed. That could not have happened at OMAHA because of the restrictions, but also because of the chocie of bombs and the need to hit multiple targets.

At OMAHA the plan was that 75 6-aircraft squadrons would strike five targets across a front of nine miles with a large proportion of 100-lb HE and 120-lb Frag, and a few 500-lb HE bombs.

Pointe et Raz de la Percee was assigned 24 B-24 each with 12 500-lb and 12 B-24 each with 52 120-lb Frag
Vierville was assigned 24 B-24 each with 12 500-lb HE, 48 each with 52 100-lb HE, and 36 each with 52 120-lb Frag
St Laurent was assigned 72 B-24 each with 52 100-lb HE and 72 each with 52 120-lb Frag
Colleville was assigned 24 B-24 each with 12 500-lb HE, 48 each with 52 100-lb HE, and 36 each with 52 120-lb Frag
Port-en-Bessin was assigned 42 B-24 each with 12 500-lb HE and 12 each with 52 100-lb HE

So a large number of bombs, theoretically 1,368 500-lb, 8,320 100-lb HE, and 8,112 120-lb Frag, which means a lot of bangs, but to little effect. The 120-lb Frag was only useful versus exposed troops of which type target was probably next to nonexistent on OMAHA. The 100-lb HE might have had some effectiveness at damaging or destroying wire entanglements, while the over-pressure could possibly detonate some mines...if they landed within a few feet of the wire or mines. Otherwise, they were essentially useless against troops under cover. The 500-lb HE could penetrate at most one to one and a half feet of concrete...if it achieved a direct hit, the fuze actuated perfectly, and the bomb did not ricochet or deform. Except if the fuze actuated perfectly it would do no significant damage to concrete structures, because they were fuzed instantaneous given they did not wish to crater and possibly block the quick movement of vehicles off the beach (the notion some of the assault forces had that the intent was to crater is inexplicable other than as wishful thinking). Thus, even the chance of the 500-lb bombs to have a significant effect on field fortifications was minimal and also required a near direct hit.

In the end, the number of bombs dropped was;

Pointe et Raz de la Percee was targeted by 184 500-lb HE and 416 120-lb Frag
Vierville was targeted by 266 500-lb HE, 2,198 100-lb HE, and 852 120-lb Frag
St Laurent was targeted by 3,128 100-lb HE and 2,800 120-lb Frag
Colleville was targeted by 128 500-lb HE, 1,281 100-lb HE, and 971 120-lb Frag
Port-en-Bessin was targeted by 270 500-lb HE and 99 100-lb HE

Total 848 500-lb HE, 7,554 100-lb HE, and 5,039 120-lb HE, but likely none of them closer than 400 yards from the beach. Of course too, the bombs dropped on Port-en-Bessin had little or no effect on the assault on OMAHA, although they theoretically may have helped the British Commandos who assaulted the town from the east.
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Nov 2021 23:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Nov 2021 20:13
A lot to digest in that. The author did not remark on one of the early plans to drop a airborne div behind OMAHA Beach. Not a flaw in his work, but interesting background to his remarks. The points about the artillery seem dead on to me, tho the thin coverage by the available ammunition over the given time & square of the 7,800 meter long beach is not clear.
Mmmm, and some oddities?

For example, the author of that blog posted an image of a hand drawn map and said it was "drawn by ObserstLeutnant Ziegelmann in 1947 shows the artillery deployment in 352 divisional area" and references it to "Annex 16a to FMS 490". Except there is no Annex 16a to FMS 490. There is an Anlage 16 to FMS B-464, but that is for "Die Kaempfe der 352.I.D. suedl. St.Lo vom 19.7.-24.7.44". The map shown in the blog is considerable different from those found in the FMS, which were overlays rather than actual maps. None of the other maps in the Ziegelmann FMS resemble these.

Then the blog author, referencing the map, says that 10./Art-Regt 1716. was south of Vierville just north of the Bayeaux road...except that it moved to a position 4 kilometers NE of Bayeaux prior to 6 June.
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Nov 2021 01:32

Richard Anderson wrote:
14 Nov 2021 21:28
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Nov 2021 04:22
Who'd have thunk so many forms of fire support in preparation and during the assault would fail?
Did it fail or was it just not designed to do what it turned out was required?
That would be a good description of failure.
I've often wondered how different any of this might have been had Clark brought a better experienced staff from 5th & 7th Armies. They might have been just as concerned about armored counter attacks & made some other bad assumptions, but a larger and greater depth of experience in three amphib assaults (four?) sounds better than the thinner experience of Bradley & his staff.
Bradley did bring them. He basically had carte blanche to bring who he wanted, so he brought 30 picked officers from Fifth and Seventh Army and II Corps to form the Headquarters of First Army in England in October 1943. Those 30 officers comprised the bulk of the Headquarters Tactical Echelon (39 officers including the CG) and nearly half of all Headquarters officers ranking O-5 and higher (81 officers, including the CG). The Advance Echelon of FUSA in England made up the shortfall. Those officers had participated in the initial planning for the cross-Channel attack and the planning for TORCH, HUSKY, and AVALANCHE.
Yet the result looks like people with less experience planned this. Maybe the wrong men were picked out of the pack? I've lived that one.
Wish I had the time to do estimates on how the 8th would have helped had they hit their targets. Some years ago I passed on collecting some effects data that would have helped with that.
The problem was that just like many other elements of the assault plan, the air plan was not well thought out in terms of possible effectiveness. ...[/quote]

& I'd still want to examine the effects data for those weapons.

Dolittle's version of the planning for the 8th AF track is he & his staff told 1st Army & Bradly it was not going to work very well. But, his paragraph on this does not have much detail on why.

Beyond the physical effects on objects there is the morale, or cognitive effect on the defenders. It is correct the several tons on bombs that landed on Lt Jahnkes W-5 'only' put a 5cm AT gun & a MG out of action and dinged the 8.8cm cannon. What the Lt had to contend with was getting his men to function after the bombs ceased falling. Weapons not effectively used may as well have been damaged or destroyed.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by stg 44 » 15 Nov 2021 02:50

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Nov 2021 01:32
Dolittle's version of the planning for the 8th AF track is he & his staff told 1st Army & Bradly it was not going to work very well. But, his paragraph on this does not have much detail on why.

Beyond the physical effects on objects there is the morale, or cognitive effect on the defenders. It is correct the several tons on bombs that landed on Lt Jahnkes W-5 'only' put a 5cm AT gun & a MG out of action and dinged the 8.8cm cannon. What the Lt had to contend with was getting his men to function after the bombs ceased falling. Weapons not effectively used may as well have been damaged or destroyed.
Wasn't it to do with the blind bombing they had to do due to the low cloud cover and planned late release of the bombs to give a margin of safety for landing infantry and to avoid tearing up the beach so much?

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Nov 2021 03:08

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Nov 2021 01:32
That would be a good description of failure.
:lol: Seriously, the problem was that despite experience in four major amphibious assaults against the Germans there was a disconnect. Partly, I suspect, because the previous landings were not against strong fixed defenses...anyway, the lessons learned (horrible term) were apparently:

From TORCH - use experienced coxswains in your landing craft if you want them operational after landing...
From HUSKY - we solved the problems of TORCH, but these German armored counterattacks could be a problem;
From AVALANCHE - yep, these German armored counterattacks are a problem;
From SHINGLE - uh, even when we land on an undefended coast, these German armored counterattacks are a problem;
OVERLORD - fixed the German armored counterattack problem!
Yet the result looks like people with less experience planned this. Maybe the wrong men were picked out of the pack? I've lived that one.
Well, no one had a lot of depth of experience in terms of amphibious assault planning...even Corlett with all the noise he made. The problem, I think, may have been the lessons learned kept revolving around how to defeat the German armored counterattack, so the whole "what does it take to get ashore" thing took a back burner. Plus, none of them had any real experience in their positions, most of these guys were captains a year or two before.
& I'd still want to examine the effects data for those weapons.
Terminal Ballistics, Volumes I, II, and III. What was learned in Normandy and the Pacific ended up in there.
Dolittle's version of the planning for the 8th AF track is he & his staff told 1st Army & Bradly it was not going to work very well. But, his paragraph on this does not have much detail on why.
I suspect because Doolittle knew very well what the limitations were, especially when the ground guys established the rules of engagement.
Beyond the physical effects on objects there is the morale, or cognitive effect on the defenders. It is correct the several tons on bombs that landed on Lt Jahnkes W-5 'only' put a 5cm AT gun & a MG out of action and dinged the 8.8cm cannon. What the Lt had to contend with was getting his men to function after the bombs ceased falling. Weapons not effectively used may as well have been damaged or destroyed.
Yep, the concentration of a good number of 250-lb HE within the perimeter of WN-5 had a notable morale effect, which I think I already alluded to. The problem is, even that was partly accidental and the 1,000-lb SAP meant to crack the egg missed entirely.

About the only way it could have been as effective on OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD is if all the HB had been loaded with 250-lb and 500-lb HE, there had been no timing restrictions, and the Eighth AF wallas had been convinced to bomb under the cloud cover, despite the potential flak risk.
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Nov 2021 06:49

stg 44 wrote:
15 Nov 2021 02:50
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Nov 2021 01:32
Dolittle's version of the planning for the 8th AF track is he & his staff told 1st Army & Bradly it was not going to work very well. But, his paragraph on this does not have much detail on why.
Wasn't it to do with the blind bombing they had to do due to the low cloud cover and planned late release of the bombs to give a margin of safety for landing infantry and to avoid tearing up the beach so much?
As Rich pointed out the primary plan assumed clear weather. Dolittle's objections may have included the possibility of overcast, they did have the radar operating and had the time delay contingent on overcast, so someone had thought it might be a problem. But, since Plan A assumed no overcast there must have been other items on Dolittles mind. & yes, perhaps the bomb size may have been a concern. Dolittle was not a ordnance specialist, engines & fuel were his background, but he had experts on ordnance & had the ability to listen. Thinking over the attack in terms of my training & reading elsewhere; I'd have been considering accuracy in clear weather as a problem. The track record attacking targets elsewhere in France the previous two years, and more recent raids in Germany were not reasons to be optimistic. While its correct the attack was made in daylight the assembly and navigation along a convoluted and quick approach could have put the bombs off target from navigation errors. One might consider the attack a technical success since the bombs were 'only 1-2 km off & only a few seconds late. The 9th AF Groups were able to adapt and drop under the overcast because they had experience at that. The original plan had then attacking from 10,000 or higher. The mission briefs that morning warned of the overcast being at 5,000 or below. The attack leaders & rest of the pilots were nervous but they found the underside of the overcast and found the targets. The bomber pilots of 8th AF had near zero experience at that sort of thing. There was also the matter of the routes being more or less over the invasion fleet. A mass of bombers shedding altitude as they approached & overflew the fleet at first light may not have looked like a good idea to the 8th AF staff.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Nov 2021 07:18

Richard Anderson wrote:
15 Nov 2021 03:08
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Nov 2021 01:32
That would be a good description of failure.
:lol: Seriously, the problem was that despite experience in four major amphibious assaults against the Germans there was a disconnect. Partly, I suspect, because the previous landings were not against strong fixed defenses...anyway, the lessons learned (horrible term) were apparently:

From TORCH - use experienced coxswains in your landing craft if you want them operational after landing...
From HUSKY - we solved the problems of TORCH, but these German armored counterattacks could be a problem;
From AVALANCHE - yep, these German armored counterattacks are a problem;
From SHINGLE - uh, even when we land on an undefended coast, these German armored counterattacks are a problem;
OVERLORD - fixed the German armored counterattack problem!
Yet the result looks like people with less experience planned this. Maybe the wrong men were picked out of the pack? I've lived that one.
Well, no one had a lot of depth of experience in terms of amphibious assault planning...even Corlett with all the noise he made. The problem, I think, may have been the lessons learned kept revolving around how to defeat the German armored counterattack, so the whole "what does it take to get ashore" thing took a back burner. Plus, none of them had any real experience in their positions, most of these guys were captains a year or two before.
I'll ponder this a bit more. Four major operations should have given more clues. Part of the problem may have been Bradlys limited experience at this.

Beyond the physical effects on objects there is the morale, or cognitive effect on the defenders. It is correct the several tons on bombs that landed on Lt Jahnkes W-5 'only' put a 5cm AT gun & a MG out of action and dinged the 8.8cm cannon. What the Lt had to contend with was getting his men to function after the bombs ceased falling. Weapons not effectively used may as well have been damaged or destroyed.
Yep, the concentration of a good number of 250-lb HE within the perimeter of WN-5 had a notable morale effect, which I think I already alluded to.
We have discussed the morale effect at least twice before this year, & more previously. I think we are beyond allusions there.

Looking at the number that fell on W-5 I'd think the stun effect would have occurred with about a quarter of the bombs. Jahnke & co were under fire from tanks & possibly naval gunfire less than half hour after the last bomb fell.
About the only way it could have been as effective on OMAHA, GOLD, JUNO, and SWORD is if all the HB had been loaded with 250-lb and 500-lb HE, there had been no timing restrictions, and the Eighth AF wallas had been convinced to bomb under the cloud cover, despite the potential flak risk.
Given their lack of experience I doubt anyone in 8th AF would have been convinced to thread the needle & fly under a 1,500 or even 3,000 foot ceiling 8O It was outside their reality & they'd rightly have feared losing more aircraft from miscalculation than German FLAK. Given the fragility of the B24 they might have lost some to fragments of their bombs.

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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Nov 2021 07:56

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Nov 2021 07:18
I'll ponder this a bit more. Four major operations should have given more clues. Part of the problem may have been Bradlys limited experience at this.
While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.

We have discussed the morale effect at least twice before this year, & more previously. I think we are beyond allusions there.

Looking at the number that fell on W-5 I'd think the stun effect would have occurred with about a quarter of the bombs. Jahnke & co were under fire from tanks & possibly naval gunfire less than half hour after the last bomb fell.
Probably...and the same likely would have happened at OMAHA if somehow the ten-odd critical WN there could have been hit the same way. However, the likelihood of that is somewhere between nil and zero.
Given their lack of experience I doubt anyone in 8th AF would have been convinced to thread the needle & fly under a 1,500 or even 3,000 foot ceiling 8O It was outside their reality & they'd rightly have feared losing more aircraft from miscalculation than German FLAK. Given the fragility of the B24 they might have lost some to fragments of their bombs.
Well, they sort of did it at Ploesti, which was not a good advertisement for trying it at OMAHA.
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Re: Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

Post by Aber » 15 Nov 2021 11:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
15 Nov 2021 07:56
While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.
The bolded bit is true, but surely it is core to large-scale amphibious operations; the attacker has to make the most of the few hours before the defenders can react.

The more interesting question is within the context of a fixed time for the landing, limitations of air support, and available weapons etc what you would do differently?

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