Consequences if Omaha Beach fails

[Sheldrake]

While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.

Much as adimre yourn views, I can't let this pass.

The D Day plan was based on the assumption of fine weather for air support. The four engined bombers were a huge addition to allied firepower. Had the weather been better the 8th AF would have bombed the beahc localities not 1000 yards inland. Ike gets the credit for the decision to go ahead under marginal condiutions. Bradley gets the blame for what goes wrong..


Words like calamity imply fasilure and disaster. But Omaha Beach was a great success. 34,000 men landed at a cost of around 7-10%. This isnt a calamity, but an acceptable cost after a hard fight. The Canadian victory of Vimy Ridge cost 10,000 casualties from around 60,000 attacking troops. Look at British French and Italian battles of WW1 and Red Army victories on the Eastern Front.

Monty, the land commander for Op Overlord famously said of battle that there will be a break in, a dog fight and a break out. This wasn't original, but a paraphrase of British Field Service Regulations.

The break in to a fortified position and dog fight will cost casualties. The battle might reach a culminating point where the attacker cannot make further progress, har run out of reserves or will power, in which case it is a defensive victory. Or the defenders are eventually overwhelmed or withdraw in which case there will be a break out. That pattern unfolded on Omaha Beach on D Day.

Battles can't be judged Judging a battle after a few hours. After the first day, Op Cobra looked as if it might be a repeat of Op Goodwood. Op Diadem in May looked pretty much a disaster too. IRRC that when asked what would happen if the initial landings failed either Gerow of Heubner said they would carry on with the reserve regiments then the 2nd Infantry Diviison.

The most likely way Omaha Beach might have failed is if someoen senior lost their nerve.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'll ponder this a bit more. Four major operations should have given more clues. Part of the problem may have been Bradlys limited experience at this.

While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.

First three to four hours is at the core the assault. That problems emerged is what we are talking about. Or at least I am.

We have discussed the morale effect at least twice before this year, & more previously. I think we are beyond allusions there.

Looking at the number that fell on W-5 I'd think the stun effect would have occurred with about a quarter of the bombs. Jahnke & co were under fire from tanks & possibly naval gunfire less than half hour after the last bomb fell.

Probably...and the same likely would have happened at OMAHA if somehow the ten-odd critical WN there could have been hit the same way. However, the likelihood of that is somewhere between nil and zero.

I'd give it better odds. Theres a couple things in their technique they could have adjusted.

[Carl Schwamberger]

While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.

Much as adimre yourn views, I can't let this pass.

The D Day plan was based on the assumption of fine weather for air support. The four engined bombers were a huge addition to allied firepower. Had the weather been better the 8th AF would have bombed the beahc localities not 1000 yards inland.

Plan A assumed no overcast. But there was a plan B, watch the clock & radar, so its not like they were surprised by the overcast. My view is B could have been executed better. As we would have said during out CAX operations back in the 1980s, adding in the trigger delay desynchronized the attack at its final critical point.

[Richard Anderson]

Much as adimre yourn views, I can't let this pass.

Yourn too.

No arguments with any of that except I would describe the first three to four hours on OMAHA as a "calamity", That the end result was a success does not change that.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Do the Germans have any chance of completely destroying the Utah beachhead in this scenario after the Omaha landing fails?

Its not the best terrain for attacking into. The Vire Estuary covers the south flank. Multi bands of marshes & deep silty/muddy streams cover the west. North toward Cherbourg is better ground leading into the lodgment. But, then the attacker has to circle the entire area to mass his attack. It was a lot easier in terms of roads and distance to mass infront of the Brits & that still didn't work. Pinning in the US VII Corps & preventing the June capture of Cherbourg sounds better.

In several posts theres a assumption the 352 Inf Div & other units used in eradicating the O Beach assault would be used elsewhere subsequently. My take is they'd be largely hors de combat after Allied fire support from the air and sea got through with them. Worst case is the defense trades off 2-3 divisions to destroy one or two US divisions & their assault support. That is to say the German assault formations would be reduced to Category III or IV when the smoke clears.

[Richard Anderson]

Plan A assumed no overcast. But there was a plan B, watch the clock & radar, so its not like they were surprised by the overcast. My view is B could have been executed better. As we would have said during out CAX operations back in the 1980s, adding in the trigger delay desynchronized the attack at its final critical point.

Again I'm not so sure. The 9th Bomb Division strike on UTAH targeted a total of seven defended locales, including WN-5. A total of 277 (or 269 depending on which report you read) B-26 dropped 4,414 250-lb bombs on them. Of those, based on finding just 28 bomb strikes, the Ninth AF ORS calculated 16% were "direct hits", which meant they fell inside the perimeter of the defended locale. Another 43% fell within 500 yards of the perimeter, of which 66% fell inland and the rest between the high tide and water line. They also calculated the chances of a direct hit on a pillbox was about 2% of those dropped in the perimeter, so around 14 bombs may have been direct hits, none of which could physically damage the pillbox. That was visually and with an overland approach.

And yet, only two of the seven targets were actually affected by the bombing (the battery at St Martin de Varreville was also affected anecdotally). Add in the complications of the approach from the sea required for the Eighth AF heavies and their lower accuracy even when bombing visually, and I doubt the results could change very much, if at all.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Again I'm not so sure. The 9th Bomb Division strike on UTAH targeted a total of seven defended locales, including WN-5. A total of 277 (or 269 depending on which report you read) B-26 dropped 4,414 250-lb bombs on them. Of those, based on finding just 28 bomb strikes, the Ninth AF ORS calculated 16% were "direct hits", which meant they fell inside the perimeter of the defended locale. Another 43% fell within 500 yards of the perimeter, of which 66% fell inland and the rest between the high tide and water line. They also calculated the chances of a direct hit on a pillbox was about 2% of those dropped in the perimeter, so around 14 bombs may have been direct hits, none of which could physically damage the pillbox. That was visually and with an overland approach. ...

For your shock effect the 500 yard radius is what you want to consider. It might be a bit smaller but fussing over 50 meters might not be the best use of time here. Temporary concussion from overpressure, temporary hearing loss, and fear. The artillery Effects Tables & guides we used considered 0-2% physical losses sufficient to 'Suppress' a target, & above 2% sufficient to 'Neutralize' the same. I don't have precise information on material damage in W-5, but every account or description leads to it being Neutralized for the following 20-30 minutes. Maybe there is something somewhere that supports they were putting out effective fires on the beach crossing, but I've not seen it yet.

Interpolating what I do have to W-61, W71, or wherever, leads to thinking reducing the overall efficiency of the O Beach defense by 20% or even 10% is better than 0 %. We in our practice never expected to 'destroy' a defense position, or a exposed maneuvering unit. What we hoped for was getting to the 2% or a 5% loss & disorienting the enemy unit long enough to execute our action without effective disruption on us.

To describe it in another way. If Glockel or Severloh are unable to comprehend what they doing with their weapons, are deafened, or cant even get up off the floor for fifteen or twenty minutes its a better outcome than what occurred. If a half dozen of the MG on O Beach & one or two AT guns are out of action its a bonus.

[Richard Anderson]

For your shock effect the 500 yard radius is what you want to consider. It might be a bit smaller but fussing over 50 meters might not be the best use of time here.

What size bomb are you talking about? These are 100-lb, 250-lb, and 500-lb bombs. Again, for the B-17 the choice was 52 100-lb or 12 500-lb bombs.

Temporary concussion from overpressure, temporary hearing loss, and fear. The artillery Effects Tables & guides we used considered 0-2% physical losses sufficient to 'Suppress' a target, & above 2% sufficient to 'Neutralize' the same. I don't have precise information on material damage in W-5, but every account or description leads to it being Neutralized for the following 20-30 minutes. Maybe there is something somewhere that supports they were putting out effective fires on the beach crossing, but I've not seen it yet.

I'll see if I have any of the particulars. IIRC, one of the 4.7cm AT (f) were knocked out, but that was it. The main effect IIRC is the garrison was stunned and did not want to come out of the shelters.

Interpolating what I do have to W-61, W71, or wherever, leads to thinking reducing the overall efficiency of the O Beach defense by 20% or even 10% is better than 0 %. We in our practice never expected to 'destroy' a defense position, or a exposed maneuvering unit. What we hoped for was getting to the 2% or a 5% loss & disorienting the enemy unit long enough to execute our action without effective disruption on us.

Sure, any effect would have been better than the zero effect they got, but aside from changing the attack plan entirely, you also need clear skies and a ground forces command willing to accept the risk to their landing force.

To describe it in another way. If Glockel or Severloh are unable to comprehend what they doing with their weapons, are deafened, or cant even get up off the floor for fifteen or twenty minutes its a better outcome than what occurred. If a half dozen of the MG on O Beach & one or two AT guns are out of action its a bonus.

Sure, but getting there is the problem.

[Richard Anderson]

Its not the best terrain for attacking into. The Vire Estuary covers the south flank. Multi bands of marshes & deep silty/muddy streams cover the west. North toward Cherbourg is better ground leading into the lodgment. But, then the attacker has to circle the entire area to mass his attack. It was a lot easier in terms of roads and distance to mass infront of the Brits & that still didn't work. Pinning in the US VII Corps & preventing the June capture of Cherbourg sounds better.

In several posts theres a assumption the 352 Inf Div & other units used in eradicating the O Beach assault would be used elsewhere subsequently. My take is they'd be largely hors de combat after Allied fire support from the air and sea got through with them. Worst case is the defense trades off 2-3 divisions to destroy one or two US divisions & their assault support. That is to say the German assault formations would be reduced to Category III or IV when the smoke clears.

Yep, you hit that nail square on the head Carl. Despite my qvetching about the over-emphasis of the planners on defeating a German armored counterattack and how that affected the assault phase, they were damned smart in their use of the terrain to protect the initial beachheads.

[Sheldrake]

While my antipathy for Bradley is well known, I don't think he can be to blame for this, nor his staff. For whatever reason, convenience, simplicity, whatever you want to call it, the invasion planning was cookie-cutter, one size fits all, rather than tailored to circumstances. The obsession with getting troops and vehicles ashore and inland ASAP overrode every other consideration. It may have been time constraints. It may have been lack of imagination. It may have been just piss-poor leadership and staff work. However, it resulted in calamity only at OMAHA and even there for just the first three to four hours.

Much as adimre yourn views, I can't let this pass.

The D Day plan was based on the assumption of fine weather for air support. The four engined bombers were a huge addition to allied firepower. Had the weather been better the 8th AF would have bombed the beahc localities not 1000 yards inland.

Plan A assumed no overcast. But there was a plan B, watch the clock & radar, so its not like they were surprised by the overcast. My view is B could have been executed better. As we would have said during out CAX operations back in the 1980s, adding in the trigger delay desynchronized the attack at its final critical point.

I agree.

Fear of friendly fire meant that the safety margins applied to air and naval bombardment negated much of the neutralising effect as the defenders had ample time to recover. Gockel claims there weas a good =ten minutes between being bombed and troops emerging from landing craft

Certainly the Royal Navy were very aanxious about being hit by US Bombers. Their distinguished OR expert Nobel Laureate professor Blackett tried to get the aerial bombardment cancelled in the days before D Day, claiming that it would be a friendly fire disaster, Parham in his D Day diary calls him a blighted, who had not read the fire plan until days before the operation and then caused a panic. It was an asymetric risk. A higher risk of friendly fire might reduce the overall casualties among soldiers, but without any up side for the navy....

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Utah would have been "cut off", but that means everything "Omaha" would have been directed to Utah. That was essentially the way it was planned.

This one is really useful.. Thanks.

Sandeep

[Carl Schwamberger]

For your shock effect the 500 yard radius is what you want to consider. It might be a bit smaller but fussing over 50 meters might not be the best use of time here.

What size bomb are you talking about? These are 100-lb, 250-lb, and 500-lb bombs. Again, for the B-17 the choice was 52 100-lb or 12 500-lb bombs.

A 155mm cannon projectile M107 with PD fuze weighs 42.2kg & has (from memory) 6.9kg explosive. Again from memory, vs a entrenched defense position with overhead cover of sandbags over steel stakes or timber 90 rounds would be required for initial Neutralization of a 350 meter dia target. Thats 3,807kg, a bit short of four tons projectiles. Extrapolating upwards for a extended Neutralization of that target of 20+ minutes x4 projectile would be fifteen tons. John McManus maps of the US 1st Div assault show the W-61 & W-62 to be apporx 300 & 500 yards Dia respectively. We never planned Neutralization attacks on hard targets like concrete bunkers. Suppression was the preferred technique. Scaling up x2 to 30 tons cannon ammunition would put you in the zone for inflicting the desired level of shock and bleeding ears on men better protected inside concrete. In one of these multiple files on my computer there is a dispersal study for the high altitude attacks of the 8th AF. But, I'm getting mental fatigue & have a few other things on other subjects to get at. For the moment a back of the envelope calculation will assume 25% of bombs hit inside the 500 meter circle. Balkowski has a chart showing nine Wn. targeted with 88 or 82 tons, One with 107 tons, and three with 129 tons. With 25% inside this effect zone gives you 22, 27, 33 tons on target. If its 50% then 44, 53, & 65 tons on each Wn.

I don't know how accurate McManus sketch maps are. For w-61 they show three Tobrucks, two MG & one Renault turret, Also there is a bunker, presumably concrete wi a AT gun, & oddly a AT gun depicted in the open. Presumably that was in some sort of pit/ revetment structure. W-62 is shown with two mortar & one MG Tobruk; Five bunkers three MG, One 'cannon;, and two AT guns; and two cannon & two MG depicted without surrounding bunkers. This suggest not everything was under concrete, but we'd want some collaboration of that.

Temporary concussion from overpressure, temporary hearing loss, and fear. The artillery Effects Tables & guides we used considered 0-2% physical losses sufficient to 'Suppress' a target, & above 2% sufficient to 'Neutralize' the same. I don't have precise information on material damage in W-5, but every account or description leads to it being Neutralized for the following 20-30 minutes. Maybe there is something somewhere that supports they were putting out effective fires on the beach crossing, but I've not seen it yet.

I'll see if I have any of the particulars. IIRC, one of the 4.7cm AT (f) were knocked out, but that was it. The main effect IIRC is the garrison was stunned and did not want to come out of the shelters.

Some claim there was a 88 in W-5, & variously claim it was damaged, or jammed after firing one shot. There also mention of a MG knocked out.

Interpolating what I do have to W-61, W71, or wherever, leads to thinking reducing the overall efficiency of the O Beach defense by 20% or even 10% is better than 0 %. We in our practice never expected to 'destroy' a defense position, or a exposed maneuvering unit. What we hoped for was getting to the 2% or a 5% loss & disorienting the enemy unit long enough to execute our action without effective disruption on us.

Sure, any effect would have been better than the zero effect they got, but aside from changing the attack plan entirely, you also need clear skies and a ground forces command willing to accept the risk to their landing force.

To describe it in another way. If Glockel or Severloh are unable to comprehend what they doing with their weapons, are deafened, or cant even get up off the floor for fifteen or twenty minutes its a better outcome than what occurred. If a half dozen of the MG on O Beach & one or two AT guns are out of action its a bonus.

Sure, but getting there is the problem.

Im guessing you are referring to the safety margin between the bomb targets and the lead assault boats. We had a identical consideration in live fire combined arms exercises. There were variables, but a 3000 meter set back was thought the minimum. Since the ground force was sometimes stationary, & other times moving we assumed someone was approaching or touching the safety line. To keep the distance we did not use the 'delay release' technique described for the 8th AF. Halting everyone was done, but tended to discombobulate the maneuver on the ground. It did keep everyone somewhat safer, but wants though to be the best thing to do with a actual enemy in range. What we did do was extend the safety zone, or the time between bombs on target & the ground maneuver crossing the whatever marker line you are using. Balakoski places the air attacks occurring from H -25 to H-5. Bumping the air attack from H-5 to H -x or -y to increase the safety set back was our technique. There were some other techniques we used, but its late

[Carl Schwamberger]

I agree.

Fear of friendly fire meant that the safety margins applied to air and naval bombardment negated much of the neutralising effect as the defenders had ample time to recover. Gockel claims there weas a good =ten minutes between being bombed and troops emerging from landing craft

Heres where the accounts get crossways. Glockel & others remember being bombed, but yet other Germans don't. Some differentiate between the naval gunfire that landed on them & aircraft bombs landing somewhere else. Others don't. Dolittle watched bombers pass by at altitude, then dropped below the overcast and wrote that he instantly saw all the bombs hit a mile plus behind the beach. Some survivors of the assault say they saw from the boats "bombs" plastering the beach. Others don't. My wild guess is they were mistaking the random hits from the boat launched rockets as aircraft bombs. Maybe Rich has in his pocket a post battle survey of bomb craters on the several beaches.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Their distinguished OR expert Nobel Laureate professor Blackett tried to get the aerial bombardment cancelled in the days before D Day, claiming that it would be a friendly fire disaster, Parham in his D Day diary calls him a blighted, who had not read the fire plan until days before the operation and then caused a panic. It was an asymetric risk. A higher risk of friendly fire might reduce the overall casualties among soldiers, but without any up side for the navy....

I'm wondering if this was the chap who advised the air forces would not be able to hit and drop bridges across France.

[Richard Anderson]

John McManus maps of the US 1st Div assault show the W-61 & W-62 to be apporx 300 & 500 yards Dia respectively.

WN 62 was a rough trapezoid around 160 yards by about 140 yards with a total area inside the wire of around 18,000 square yards. Critically however, it was around 200 yards from the high water, thus around 900 yards from the low water mark. That was critical, because for blind bombing the H2X "saw" the difference between the reflection of the water and the reflection of the land...if the operator was truly skilled in interpretation.

We never planned Neutralization attacks on hard targets like concrete bunkers. Suppression was the preferred technique. Scaling up x2 to 30 tons cannon ammunition would put you in the zone for inflicting the desired level of shock and bleeding ears on men better protected inside concrete. In one of these multiple files on my computer there is a dispersal study for the high altitude attacks of the 8th AF. But, I'm getting mental fatigue & have a few other things on other subjects to get at. For the moment a back of the envelope calculation will assume 25% of bombs hit inside the 500 meter circle. Balkowski has a chart showing nine Wn. targeted with 88 or 82 tons, One with 107 tons, and three with 129 tons. With 25% inside this effect zone gives you 22, 27, 33 tons on target. If its 50% then 44, 53, & 65 tons on each Wn.

The problem is the closest fall of bombs that could be identified were 300 to 400 yards inland and then extended up to three miles inland. That was because of the bombing requirement made. First, all non-visual bombing had to be completed 10 minutes prior to H-Hour, thus for OMAHA NLT 0620. Next, bombing runs were timed to begin at 0600. Each "defended area target", eleven on OMAHA, excluding Port-en-Bessin, was target by six squadrons of six aircraft flying abreast, of which the center lead aircraft was the H2X-equipped Pathfinder (there were actually 2 for most of the six-squadron groups with on flying as backup). The Pathfinder guided the drop, with each succeeding wave calculating their drop based upon the anticipated rate of advance over roughly three minute intervals...assuming perfect formation and interval keeping. However, there was another kicker. Since the time of arrival could not be perfectly anticipated, a further delay from the drop point was instituted depending on when the squadrons of the group arrived. Those dropping at H-30 or earlier had zero delay, those dropping from H-30 to H-25 had a 5 second delay, those dropping from H-25 to H-20 had a 10 second delay, those dropping from H-20 to H-15 had a 15 second delay, and those dropping from H-15 to H-10 had a 30 second delay. At roughly 275 MPH rate of advance, a 30 second delay, meant that the bombers dropped at least 4,000 yards from the aim point, so roughly 3100 yards inland...if they were accurate.

Some claim there was a 88 in W-5, & variously claim it was damaged, or jammed after firing one shot. There also mention of a MG knocked out.

There was not. WN-4 had one casemated 5cm gun and two 5cm and the 4,7cm French gun in open pits. There were also at least five MG positions, one in a French tank turret, and an 8cm mortar. There were about 25 in the position, including Leutnant Jahnke.

Im guessing you are referring to the safety margin between the bomb targets and the lead assault boats. We had a identical consideration in live fire combined arms exercises. There were variables, but a 3000 meter set back was thought the minimum. Since the ground force was sometimes stationary, & other times moving we assumed someone was approaching or touching the safety line. To keep the distance we did not use the 'delay release' technique described for the 8th AF. Halting everyone was done, but tended to discombobulate the maneuver on the ground. It did keep everyone somewhat safer, but wants though to be the best thing to do with a actual enemy in range. What we did do was extend the safety zone, or the time between bombs on target & the ground maneuver crossing the whatever marker line you are using. Balakoski places the air attacks occurring from H -25 to H-5. Bumping the air attack from H-5 to H -x or -y to increase the safety set back was our technique. There were some other techniques we used, but its late

If bombing visually, the timing was H-30 to H-5. If bombing with H2X and GEE, the timing was H-30 to H-10. Only those bombing non-visually at the very beginning had any chance of getting bombs on target or within 500 yards of target.